Appendix
OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE
A proposition which, however evident in itself, seems never to have been
considered with the attention it deserves is that which affirms the connection
between understanding and virtue. Can an honest ploughman be as virtuous
as Cato? Is a man of weak intellects and narrow education as capable of moral
excellence as the sublimest genius or the mind most stored with information
and science?
To determine these questions it is necessary we should recollect the nature
of virtue. Considered as a personal quality, it consists in the disposition
of the mind, and may be defined a desire to promote the happiness of intelligent
beings in general, the quantity of virtue being as the quantity of desire.
Now desire is wholly inseparable from preference, or a perception of the
excellence, real or supposed, of any object. I say real or supposed, for
aIl object totally destitute of real and intrinsic excellence may become
an object of desire on account of the imaginary excellence that is ascribed
to it. Nor is this the only mistake to which human intellect is liable. We
may desire an object of absolute excellence, not for its real and genuine
recommendations, but for some fictitious attractions we may impute to it.
This is always in some degree the case when a beneficial action is performed
from an ill motive.
How far is this mistake compatible with real virtue? If I desire the happiness
of intelligent beings, without a strong and vivid perception of what it is
in which their happiness consists, can this desire be admitted for virtuous?
Nothing seems more inconsistent with our ideas of virtue. A virtuous preference
is the preference of an object for the sake of certain qualities which really
be long to it. To attribute virtue to any other species of preference would
be nearly the same as to suppose that an accidental effect of my conduct,
which was out of my view at the time of adopting it, might entitle me to
the appellation of virtuous.
Hence it appears, first, that virtue consists in a desire of the happiness
of the species: and, secondly, that that desire only can be eminently virtuous
which flows from a distinct perception of the value, and consequently of
the nature, of the thing desired. But how extensive must be the capacity
that comprehends the full value and the real ingredients of true happiness?
It must begin with a collective idea of the human species. It must discriminate,
among the different causes that produce a pleasurable state of mind, that
which produces the most exquisite and durable pleasure. Eminent virtue requires
that I should have a grand view of the tendency of knowledge to produce happiness,
and of just political institution to favour the progress of knowledge. It
demands that I should perceive in what manner social intercourse may be made
conducive to virtue and felicity, and imagine the unspeakable advantages
that may arise from a coincidence and succession of generous efforts. These
things are necessary, not merely for the purpose of enabling me to employ
my virtuous disposition in the best manner, but also of giving to that disposition
a just animation and vigour. God, according to the ideas usually conceived
of that being, is more benevolent than man because he has a constant and
clear perception of the nature of that end which his providence pursues.
A further proof that a powerful understanding is in separable from eminent
virtue will suggest itself, if we recollect that earnest desire, in matters
that fall within the compass of human exertion, never fails in some degree
to generate capacity.
This proposition has been beautifully illustrated by the poets, when they
have represented the passion of love as immediately leading, in the breast
of the lover, to the attainment of many arduous accomplishments. It unlocks
his tongue, and enables him to plead the cause of his passion with insinuating
eloquence. It renders his conversation pleasing, and his manners graceful.
Does he desire to express his feelings in the language of verse? It dictates
to him the most natural and pathetic strains, and supplies him with a just
and interesting language, which the man of more reflection and science has
often sought for in vain.
No picture can be more truly founded in a knowledge of human nature than
this. The history of all eminent talents is of a similar kind. Did Themistocles
desire to eclipse the trophies of the battle of Marathon? The uneasiness
of this desire would not let him sleep, and all his thoughts were occupied
with the invention of means to accomplish the purpose he had chosen. It is
a well known maxim in the forming of juvenile minds that the instruction
which is communicated by mere constraint makes a slow and feeble impression;
but that, when once you have inspired the mind with a love for its object,
the scene and the progress are entirely altered. The uneasiness of mind which
earnest desire produces doubles our intellectual activity; and as surely
carries us forward with increased velocity towards our goal as the expectation
of a reward of ten thousand pounds would prompt a man to walk from London
to York with firmer resolution and in a shorter time.
Let the object be for a person uninstructed in the rudiments of drawing
to make a copy of some celebrated statue. At first, we will suppose, his
attempt shall be mean and unsuccessful. If his desire be feeble, he will
be deterred by the miscarriage of this essay. If his desire be ardent and
invincible, he will return to the attack. He will derive instruction from
his failure. He will examine where and why he miscarried. He will study his
model with a more curious eye. He will correct his mistakes, derive encouragement
from a partial success, and new incentives from miscarriage itself.
The case is similar in virtue as in science. If I have conceived an earnest
desire of being the benefactor of my species, I shall, no doubt, find out
a channel in which for my desire to operate, and shall be quick-sighted in
discovering the defects, or comparative littleness, of the plan I may have
chosen. But the choice of an excellent plan for the accomplishment of an
important purpose, and the exertion of a mind perpetually watchful to remove
its defects, imply considerable understanding. The further I am engaged in
the pursuit of this plan, the more will my capacity increase. If my mind
flag and be discouraged in the pursuit, it will not be merely want of understanding,
but want of desire. My desire and my virtue will be less than those of the
man who goes on with unremitted constancy in the same career.
Thus far we have only been considering how impossible it is that eminent
virtue should exist in a weak understanding; and it is surprising that such
a proposition should ever have been contested. It is a curious question to
examine how far the converse of this proposition is true, and in what degree
eminent talents are compatible with the absence of virtue.
From the arguments already adduced, it appears that virtuous desire is
wholly inseparable from a strong and vivid perception of the nature and value
of the object of virtue. Hence it seems most natural to conclude that, though
understanding, or strong percipient power, is the indispensable prerequisite
of virtue, yet it is necessary that this power should be exercised upon this
object, in order to its producing the desired effect. Thus it is in art.
Without genius no man ever was a poet; but it is necessary that general capacity
should have been directed to this particular channel, for poetical excellence
to be the result.
There is however some difference between the two cases. Poetry is the
business of a few, virtue and vice are the affair of all men. To every intellect
that exists, one or other of these qualities must properly belong. It must
be granted that, where every other circumstance is equal, that man will be
most virtuous whose understanding has been most actively employed in the
study of virtue. But morality has been, in a certain degree, an object of
attention to all men. No person ever failed, more or less, to apply the standard
of just and unjust to his own actions and those of others; and this has,
of course, been generally done with most ingenuity by men of the greatest
capacity.
It must further be remembered that a vicious conduct is always the result
of narrow views. A man of powerful capacity, and extensive observation, is
least likely to com mit the mistake, either of seeing himself as the only
object of importance in the universe, or of conceiving that his own advantage
may best be promoted by trampling on that of others. Liberal accomplishments
are surely, in some degree, connected with liberal principles. He who takes
into his view a whole nation as the subjects of his operation, or the instruments
of his greatness, may be expected to entertain some kindness for the whole.
He whose mind is habitually elevated to magnificent conceptions is not likely
to sink, without strong reluctance, into those sordid pursuits which engross
so large a portion of mankind.
But, though these general maxims must be admitted for true, and would
incline us to hope for a constant union between eminent talents and great
virtues, there are other considerations which present a strong drawback upon
so agreeable an expectation. It is sufficiently evident that morality, in
some degree, enters into the reflections of all mankind. But it is equally
evident that it may enter for more or for less; and that there will be men
of the highest talents who have their attention diverted to other objects,
and by whom it will be meditated upon with less earnestness, than it may
sometimes be by other men, who are, in a general view, their inferiors. The
human mind is in some cases so tenacious of its errors, and so ingenious
in the invention of a sophistry by which they may be vindicated, as to frustrate
expectations of virtue, in other respects, the best founded.
From the whole of the subject it seems to appear that men of talents,
even when they are erroneous, are not destitute of virtue, and that there
is a fullness of guilt of which they are incapable. There is no ingredient
that so essentially contributes to a virtuous character as a sense of justice.
Philanthropy, as contradistinguished to justice, is rather an unreflecting
feeling than a rational principle. It leads to an absurd indulgence, which
is frequently more injurious than beneficial, even to the individual it proposes
to favour. It leads to a blind partiality, inflicting calamity, without remorse,
upon many perhaps, in order to promote the imagined interest of a few. But
justice measures by one unalterable standard the claims of all, weighs their
opposite pretensions, and seeks to diffuse happiness, because happiness is
the fit and proper condition of a conscious being. Wherever therefore a strong
sense of justice exists, it is common and reasonable to say that in that
mind exists considerable virtue, though the individual, from an unfortunate
concurrence of circumstances, may, with all his great qualities, be the instrument
of a very small portion of benefit. Can great intellectual power exist without
a strong sense of justice?
It has no doubt resulted from a train of speculation similar to this,
that poetical readers have commonly remarked Milton's devil to be a being
of considerable virtue. It must be admitted that his energies centred too
much in personal regards. But why did he rebel against his maker? It was,
as he himself informs us, because he saw no sufficient reason for that extreme
inequality of rank and power which the creator assumed. It was because prescription
and precedent form no adequate ground for implicit faith. After his fall,
why did he still cherish the spirit of opposition? From a persuasion that
he was hardly and injuriously treated. He was not discouraged by the apparent
inequality of the contest: because a sense of reason and justice was stronger
in his mind than a sense of brute force; because he had much of the feelings
of an Epictetus or a Cato, and little of those of a slave. He bore his torments
with fortitude, because he disdained to be subdued by despotic power. He
sought revenge, because he could not think with tameness of the unexpostulating
authority that assumed to dispose of him. How beneficial and illustrious
might the temper from which these qualities flowed have been found, with
a small diversity of situation!
Let us descend from these imaginary existences to real history. We shall
find that even Caesar and Alexander had their virtues. There is great reason
to believe that, however mistaken was their system of conduct, they imagined
it reconcilable, and even conducive, to the general interest. If they had
desired the general good more earnestly, they would have understood better
how to promote it.
Upon the whole it appears that great talents are great energies, and that
great energies cannot flow but from a powerful sense of fitness and justice.
A man of uncommon genius is a man of high passions and lofty design; and
our passions will be found, in the last analysis, to have their surest foundation
in a sentiment of justice. If a man be of an aspiring and ambitious temper,
it is because at present he finds himself out of his place, and wishes to
be in it. Even the lover imagines that his qualities, or his passion, give
him a title superior to that of other men. If I accumulate wealth, it is
because I think that the most rational plan of life cannot be secured without
it; and, if I dedicate my energies to sensual pleasures, it is that I regard
other pursuits as irrational and visionary. All our passions would die in
the moment they were conceived were it not for this reinforcement. A man
of quick resentment, of strong feelings, and who pertinaciously resists everything
that he regards as an unjust assumption, may be considered as having in him
the seeds of eminence. Nor is it easily to be conceived that such a man should
not proceed from a sense of justice, to some degree of benevolence; as Milton's
hero felt real compassion and sympathy for his partners in misfortune.
If these reasonings are to be admitted, what judgement shall we form of
the decision of Johnson, who, speaking of a certain obscure translator of
the odes of Pindar, says that he was "one of the few poets to whom death
needed not to be terrible?"[1] Let it be remembered that the error
is by no means peculiar to Johnson, though there are few instances in which
it is carried to a more violent extreme than in the general tenour of the
work from which this quotation is taken. It was natural to expect that there
would be a combination among the multitude to pull down intellectual eminence.
Ambition is common to all men; and those who are unable to rise to distinction
are at least willing to reduce others to their own standard. No man can completely
understand the character of him with whom he has no sympathy of views; and
we may be allowed to revile what we do not understand. But it is deeply to
be regretted that men of talents should so often have entered into this combination.
Who does not recollect with pain the vulgar abuse that Swift has thrown upon
Dryden, and the mutual jealousies and animosities of Rousseau and Voltaire,
men who ought to have co-operated for the salvation of the world?
[ [1]]
Lives of the Poets: Life of West.