1. CHAPTER I
SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL WRITERS
Having in the preceding book attempted a general delineation of the principles
of rational society, it is proper that we, in the next place, proceed to
the topic of government.
It has hitherto been the persuasion of communities of men in all ages
and countries that there are occasions, in which it becomes necessary, to
supersede private judgement for the sake of public good, and to control the
acts of the individual, by an act to be performed in the name of the whole.
Previously to our deciding upon this question, it will be of advantage
to enquire into the nature of government, and the manner in which this control
may be exercised with the smallest degree of violence and usurpation in regard
to the individual. This point, being determined, will assist us finally to
ascertain both the quantity of evil which government in its best form involves,
and the urgency of the case which has been supposed to demand its interference.
There can be little ground to question the necessity, and consequently
the justice, of force to be, in some cases, interposed between individual
and individual. Violence is so prompt a mode of deciding differences of opinion
and contentions of passion that there will infallibly be some persons who
will resort to this mode. How is their violence to be repressed, or prevented
from being accompanied occasionally with the most tragical effects? Violence
must necessarily be preceded by an opinion of the mind dictating that violence;
and, as he who first has resort to force instead of argument, is unquestionably
erroneous, the best and most desirable mode of correcting him is by convincing
him of his error. But the urgency of the case when, for example, a dagger
is pointed to my own breast or that of another, may be such as not to afford
time for expostulation. Hence the propriety and duty of defence.
Is not defence equally necessary, on the part of a community, against
a foreign enemy, or the contumacy of its own members? This is perhaps the
most forcible view in which the argument in favour of the institution of
government has yet been placed. But, waiving this question for the present,
the enquiry now proposed is, if action on the part of the community should
in any in stance be found requisite, in what manner is it proper or just
that the force, acting in behalf of the community, should be organized?
There are three hypotheses that have been principally maintained upon
this subject. First, the system of force, according to which it is affirmed
"that, inasmuch as it is necessary that the great mass of mankind should
be held under the subjection of compulsory restraint, there can be no other
criterion of that restraint than the power of the individuals who lay claim
to its exercise, the foundation of which power exists, in the unequal degrees
in which corporal strength, and intellectual sagacity, are distributed among
mankind."
There is a second class of reasoners, who deduce the origin of all government
from divine right, and affirm "that, as men derived their existence
from an infinite creator at first, so are they still subject to his providential
care, and of consequence owe allegiance to their civil governors, as to a
power which he has thought fit to set over them."
The third system is that which has been most usually maintained by the
friends of equality and justice; the system according to which the individuals
of any society are supposed to have entered into a contract with their governors
or with each other, and which founds the authority of government in the consent
of the governed.
The first two of these hypotheses may easily be dismissed. That of force
appears to proceed upon the total negation of abstract and immutable justice,
affirming every government to be right that is possessed of power sufficient
to enforce its decrees. It puts a violent termination upon all political
science; and is calculated for nothing further than to persuade men to sit
down quietly under their present disadvantages, whatever they may be, and
not exert themselves to discover a remedy for the evils they suffer. The
second hypothesis is of an equivocal nature. It either coincides with the
first, and affirms all existing power to be alike of divine derivation; or
it must remain totally useless, till a criterion can be found to distinguish
those governments which are approved by God from those which cannot lay claim
to that sanction. The criterion of patriarchal descent will be of no avail
till the true claimant and rightful heir can be discovered. If we make utility
and justice the test of God's approbation, this hypothesis will be liable
to little objection; but then on the other hand little will be gained by
it, since those who have not introduced divine right into the argument will
yet readily grant that a government which can be shown to be agreeable to
utility and justice is a rightful government.
The third hypothesis demands a more careful examination. If any error
have insinuated itself into the support of truth, it becomes of particular
consequence to detect it. Nothing can be of more importance than to separate
prejudice and mistake on the one hand from reason and demonstration on the
other. Wherever they have been confounded, the cause of truth must necessarily
be the sufferer. The cause, so far from being injured by a dissolution of
the unnatural alliance, may be expected to derive from that dissolution a
superior degree of prosperity and lustre.