1. CHAPTER I
OF RESISTANCE
Having now made some progress in the enquiry originally instituted, it
may be proper to look back, and consider the point at which we are arrived.
We have examined, in the first place, the powers of man as they relate to
the subject of which we treat; secondly, we have delineated the principles
of society, as founded in justice and general interest, independently of,
and antecedent to, every species of political government; and, lastly, have
endeavoured to ascertain the fundamental conditions which must belong to
the most rational system of government. We might now proceed to investigate
the different objects of government, and deduce the inferences respecting
them which are pointed out to us by the preceding reasonings. But there are
various miscellaneous considerations which, though they have not fallen under
the former heads, are of considerable importance to our disquisition, and
may usefully occupy the remainder of the present volume. They are of different
classes, and in a certain degree detached from each other; but may perhaps
without impropriety be ranged under two branches: the mode in which the speculative
opinions of individuals are to be rendered effectual for the melioration
of society; and the mode in which opinion is found to operate in modifying
the conduct of individuals.
The strong hold of government has appeared hitherto to have consisted
in seduction. However imperfect might be the political constitution under
which they lived, mankind have ordinarily been persuaded to regard it with
a sort of reverential and implicit respect. The privileges of Englishmen,
and the liberties of Germany, the splendour of the most Christian, and the
solemn gravity of the Catholic king, have each afforded a subject of exultation
to the individuals who shared, or thought they shared, in the advantages
these terms were conceived to describe. Each man was accustomed to deem it
a mark of the peculiar kindness of providence that he was born in the country,
whatever it was, to which he happened to be long. The time may come which
shall subvert these prejudices. The time may come when men shall exercise
the piercing search of truth upon the mysteries of government, and view without
prepossession the defects and abuses of the constitution of their country.
Out of this new order of things a new series of duties will arise. When a
spirit of impartiality shall prevail, and loyalty shall decay, it will become
us to enquire into the conduct which such a state of thinking shall make
necessary. We shall then be called upon to maintain a true medium between
blindness to injustice and calamity on the one hand, and an acrimonious spirit
of violence and resentment on the other. It will be the duty of such as shall
see these subjects in the pure light of truth to exert themselves for the
effectual demolition of monopolies and usurpation; but effectual demolition
is not the offspring of crude projects and precipitate measures. He who dedicates
himself to these may be suspected to be under the domination of passion,
rather than benevolence. The true friend of equality will do nothing unthinkingly,
will cherish no wild schemes of uproar and confusion, and will endeavour
to discover the mode in which his faculties may be laid out to the greatest
and most permanent advantage.
The whole of this question is intimately connected with the enquiry which
has necessarily occupied a share In the disquisitions of all writers on the
subject of government, concerning the propriety and measures of resistance.
"Are the worst government and best equally entitled to the toleration
and forbearance of their subjects? Is there no case of political oppression
that will authorize the persons who suffer it to take up arms against their
oppressors? Or, if there be, what is the quantity of oppression at the measure
of which insurrections begin to be justifiable? Abuses will always exist,
for man will always be imperfect; what is the nature of the abuse which it
would be pusillanimous to oppose by words only, and which true courage would
instruct us was to be endured no longer?"
No question can be conceived more important than this. In the examination
of it philosophy almost forgets its nature; it ceases to be speculation,
and becomes an actor. Upon the decision, according as it shall be decided
in the minds of a bold and resolute party, the existence of thousands may
be suspended. The speculative enquirer, if he live in a state where abuse
is notorious and grievances frequent, knows not, while he weighs the case
in the balance of reason, how far that which he attempts to describe is already
realized in the apprehension of numbers of his countrymen. Let us enter upon
the question with the seriousness which so critical an inquiry demands.
Resistance may have its source in the emergencies either of the public
or the individual. "A nation," it has commonly been said, "has
a right to shake off any authority that is usurped over it." This is
a proposition that has generally passed without question, and certainly no
proposition can appear more plausible. But, if we examine it minutely, we
shall find that it is attended with equivocal circumstances. What do we mean
by a nation? Is the whole people concerned in this resistance, or only a
part? If the whole be prepared to resist, the whole is persuaded of the injustice
of the usurpation. What sort of usurpation is that which can be exercised
by one or a few persons over a whole nation universally disapproving of it?
Government is founded in opinion. [1] Bad government deceives us first, before
it fastens itself upon us like an incubus, oppressing all our efforts. A
nation in general must have learned to respect a king and a house of lords,
before a king and a house of lords can exercise any authority over them.
If a man or a set of men, unsanctioned by any previous prejudice in their
favour, pretend to exercise sovereignty in a country, they will become objects
of derision rather than of serious resistance. Destroy the existing prejudice
in favour of any of our present institutions, and they will fall into similar
disuse and contempt.
It has sometimes been supposed "that an army, foreign or domestic,
may be sufficient to hold a people in subjection, completely against their
inclination." A domestic army at least will in some degree partake of
the opinions and sentiments of the people at large. The more precautions
are employed to prevent the infection, the doctrine will probably spread
with so much the more certainty and rapidity. Show me that you are afraid
of my entertaining certain opinions or hearing certain principles, and you
will infallibly, sooner or later, awaken my curiosity. A domestic army will
always be found a very doubtful instrument of tyranny in a period of crisis.
- A foreign army after a time will become domesticated. If the question be
of importing a foreign army for the specific purpose of supporting tottering
abuse, great alarm will inevitably be excited. These men, it may be, are
adapted for continuing the reign of tyranny; but who will pay them? A weak,
superstitious or ignorant people may be held in the chains of foreign power;
but the school of moral and political independence sends forth pupils of
a very different character. In the encounter with their penetration and discernment,
tyranny will feel itself powerless and transitory. In a word, either the
people are unenlightened and unprepared for a state of freedom, and then
the struggle and the consequences of the struggle will be truly perilous;
or the progress of political knowledge among them is decisive, and then everyone
will see how futile and short-lived will be the attempt to hold them in subjection,
by means of garrisons and a foreign force. The party attached to liberty
is, upon that supposition, the numerous one; they are the persons of true
energy, and who have an object worthy of their zeal. Their oppressors, few
in number, and degraded to the rank of lifeless machines, wander with no
certain destination or prospect over the vast surface, and are objects of
pity rather than serious alarm. Every hour diminishes their number and their
resources; while, on the other hand, every moment's delay gives new strength
to the cause, and fortitude to the champions, of liberty. Men would not be
inclined pertinaciously to object to a short delay, if they recollected the
advantages and the certainty of success with which it is pregnant. - Meanwhile
these reasonings turn upon the probability that the purposes of liberty will
be full as effectually answered without the introduction of force: there
can be little doubt of the justifiableness of a whole nation having recourse
to arms, if a case can be made out in which it shall be impossible for them
to prevent the introduction of slavery in any other way.
The same reasonings, with little variation, will apply to the case of
an unquestionable majority of a nation, as to that of the whole. The majority
of a nation is irresistible; it as little needs to have recourse to violence;
there is as little reason to expect that any usurper will be so mad as to
contend with it. If ever it appear to be other wise, it is because, in one
of two ways, we deceive ourselves with the term majority. First, nothing
is more obvious than the danger incident to a man of a sanguine temper of
overestimating the strength of his party. He associates perhaps only with
persons of his own way of thinking, and a very small number appears to him
as if it were the whole world. Ask persons of different tempers and habits
of life how many republicans there are at this hour in England or Scotland,
and you will immediately be struck with the very opposite answers you will
receive. There are many errors of a sanguine temper that appear, at first
sight, innocent or even useful: but surely every man of integrity and conscience
will hesitate, before he suffers the possibility that an error of this sort
should encourage him to plunge a nation in violence, and open a sea of blood.
He must have a heart of strange composition who, for the precarious inferences
he draws in moral or political calculation, would volunteer a mandate of
death, or be the first to unsheath the sword of summary execution.
A second deception that lurks under the word majority lies, not in the
question of number, but of quality and degree of illumination. A majority,
we say perhaps, is dissatisfied with the present state of things, and wishes
for such a specific alteration. Alas, it is to be feared that the greater
part of this majority are often mere parrots who have been taught a lesson
of the subject of which they understand little or nothing. What is it they
dislike? A specific tax perhaps, or some temporary grievance. Do they dislike
the vice and meanness that grow out of tyranny, and pant for the liberal
and ingenuous virtue that would be fostered in their own minds in a different
condition? No. They are very angry, and fancy themselves very judicious.
What is it they desire? They know not. It would probably be easy to show
that what they profess to desire is little better than what they hate. What
they hate is not the general depravation of the human character; and what
they desire is not its improvement. It is an insult upon human understanding,
when we speak of persons in this state of infantine ignorance, to say that
the majority of the nation is on the side of political renovation. Few greater
misfortunes can befall any country than for such persons to be instigated
to subvert existing institutions, and violently to take the work of political
reformation into their own hands.
There is an obvious remedy to each of the deceptions here enumerated:
Time: Is it doubtful whether the reformers be a real majority of the inhabitants
of any country? Is it doubtful whether the majority truly understand the
object of their professed wishes, and therefore whether they be ripe for
its reception, and competent to its assertion? Wait but a little while, and
the doubt will probably be solved in the manner that the warmest friend of
human happiness and improvement would desire. If the system of independence
and equality be the truth, it may be expected hourly to gain converts. The
more it is discussed, the more will it be understood, and its value cherished
and felt. If the state of the majority be doubtful, a very few years, perhaps
a shorter time, will tend to place it beyond the reach of controversy. The
great cause of humanity, which is now pleading in the face of the universe,
has but two enemies; those friends of antiquity, and those friends of innovation,
who, impatient of suspense, are inclined violently to interrupt the calm,
the incessant, the rapid and auspicious progress which thought and reflection
appear to be making in the world. Happy would it be for mankind if those
persons who interest themselves most zealously in these great questions would
confine their exertions to the diffusing, in every possible mode, a spirit
of enquiry, and the embracing every opportunity of increasing the stock,
and generalizing the communication, of political knowledge!
A third situation, which may be conceived to exist in a country where
political reform has been made a topic of considerable attention, is that
where neither the whole, nor the majority, of the nation is desirous of the
reform in question, but where the innovators are an unquestionable minority.
In this case nothing can be more indefensible than a project for introducing
by violence that state of society which our judgements may happen to approve.
In the first place, no persons are ripe for the participation of a benefit
the advantage of which they do not understand. No people are competent to
enjoy a state of freedom who are not already imbued with a love of freedom.
The most dreadful tragedies will infallibly result from an attempt to goad
mankind prematurely into a position, however abstractedly excellent, for
which they are in no degree prepared. Secondly, to endeavour to impose our
sentiments by force is the most detestable species of persecution. Others
are as much entitled to deem themselves in the right as we are. The most
sacred of all privileges is that by which each man has a certain sphere,
relative to the government of his own actions, and the exercise of his discretion,
not liable to be trenched upon by the intemperate zeal or dictatorial temper
of his neighbour.[2] To dragoon men into the adoption of what we think right
is an intolerable tyranny. It leads to unlimited disorder and injustice.
Every man thinks himself in the right; and, if such a proceeding were universally
introduced, the destiny of mankind would be no longer a question of argument,
but of strength, presumption or intrigue.
There is a further ambiguity in the term nation, as employed in the proposition
above stated, "that a nation has a right forcibly to shake off any authority
that is usurped over it." A nation is an arbitrary term. Which is most
properly termed a nation, the Russian empire, or the canton of Berne? Or
is everything a nation upon which accident shall bestow that appellation?
It seems most accurate to say that any number of persons who are able to
establish and maintain a system of mutual regulation for themselves conformable
to their own opinions, without imposing a system of regulation upon a considerable
number of others inconsistent with the opinion of these others, have a right,
or, more properly speaking, a duty obliging them to adopt that measure. That
any man, or body of men, should impose their sense upon persons of a different
opinion is, absolutely speaking, wrong,and in all cases deeply to be regretted:
but this evil it is perhaps in some degree necessary to incur, for the sake
of a preponderating good. All government includes in it this evil, as one
of its fundamental characteristics.
There is one circumstance of much importance to be attended to in this
disquisition. Superficial thinkers lay great stress upon the external situation
of men, and little upon their internal sentiments. Persevering enquiry will
probably lead to a mode of thinking the reverse of this. To be free is a
circumstance of little value, if we could suppose men in a state of external
freedom, without the magnanimity, energy and firmness that constitute almost
all that is valuable in a state of freedom. On the other hand, if a man have
these qualities, there is little left for him to desire. He cannot be degraded;
he cannot readily become either useless or unhappy. He smiles at the impotence
of despotism; he fills up his existence with serene enjoyment and industrious
benevolence. Civil liberty is chiefly desirable as a means to procure and
perpetuate this temper of mind. They therefore begin at the wrong end, who
make haste to overturn and confound the usurped powers of the world. Make
men wise, and by that very operation you make them free. Civil liberty follows
as a consequence of this; no usurped power can stand against the artillery
of opinion. Everything then is in order, and succeeds at its appointed time.
How unfortunate is it that men are so eager to strike and have so little
constancy to reason!
It is probable that this question of resistance would never have admitted
of so long a controversy, if the advocates of the system of liberty promulgated
in the last century had not, unobserved to themselves, introduced a confusion
into the question. Resistance may be employed, either to repel the injuries
committed against the nation generally, or such as, in their immediate application,
relate to the individual. To the first of these the preceding reasonings
principally apply. The injuries to a nation depend for their nature, for
the most part, upon their permanency, and therefore admit of the utmost sobriety
and deliberation as to the mode in which they are to be remedied. Individuals
may be injured or destroyed by a specific act of tyranny, but nations cannot;
the principal mischief to the nation lies in the presage contained in the
single act, of the injustice that is to continue to be exercised. Resistance,
by the very meaning of the term, as it is used in political enquiry, signifies
a species of conduct that is to be adopted in relation to an established
authority: but an old grievance seems obviously to lead, as its counterpart,
to a gradual and temperate remedy.
The consideration which, by being confounded with this, has served to
mislead certain enquirers is that of what is commonly known by the name of
self-defence, or, more properly, the duty obliging each individual to repel,
as far as lies in his power, any violent attack made either upon himself
or another. This, by the terms of the question, is a circumstance that does
not admit of delay; the benefit of the remedy entirely.depends upon the time
of the application. The principle in this case is of easy development. Force
is an expedient the use of which is much to be deplored. It is contrary to
the nature of intellect, which cannot be improved but by conviction and persuasion.
It corrupts the man that employs it, and the man upon whom it is employed.
But it seems that there are certain cases so urgent as to oblige us to have
recourse to this injurious expedient: in other words, there are cases where
the mischief to accrue from not violently counteracting the perverseness
of the individual is greater than the mischief which the violence necessarily
draws along with it. Hence it appears that the ground justifying resistance,
in every case where it can be justified, is that of the good likely to result
from such interference being greater than the good to result from omitting
it.
There are probably cases where, as in a murder for example about to be
committed on a useful and valuable member of society, the chance of preventing
it by any other means than instantaneous resistance is so small as by no
means to vindicate us in incurring the danger of so mischievous a catastrophe.
But will this justify us, in the case of an individual oppressed by the authority
of a community? Let us suppose that there is a country in which some of its
best citizens are selected as objects of vengeance by an alarmed and jealous
tyranny. It cannot reasonably be doubted that every man, a condemned felon
or murderer, is to be commended for quietly withdrawing himself from the
execution of the law; much more such persons as have now been described.
But ought those well affected citizens that are still at large to rise in
behalf of their brethren under persecution? Every man that is disposed to
enter into such a project, and who is anxious about the moral rectitude of
his conduct, must rest its justification upon one of the two grounds above
stated: either the immediate purpose of his rising is the melioration of
public institutions, or it is to be estimated with reference to the meritoriousness
of the individuals in question. The first of these has been sufficiently
discussed; we will suppose therefore that he confines himself to the last.
Here, as has been already observed, the whole, as a moral question, will
turn upon the comparative benefit or mischief to result from the resistance
to be employed. The disparity is great indeed between the resistance ordinarily
suggested by the term self-defence, and the resistance which must expect
to encounter in its progress the civil power of the country. In the first,
the question is of a moment; if you succeed in the instant of your exertion,
you may expect the applause, rather than the prosecution, of executive authority.
But, in the latter, the end will scarcely be accomplished but by the overthrow
of the government itself. Let the lives of the individuals in supposition
be as valuable as you please, the value will necessarily be swallowed up
in the greater questions that occur in the sequel. Those questions therefore
are the proper topics of attention; and we shall be to blame if we suffer
ourselves to be led unawares into a conduct the direct tendency of which
is the production of one sort of event, while all we intended was the production
of another. The value of individuals ought not to be forgotten; there are
men whose safety should be cherished by us with anxious attention; but it
is difficult to imagine a case in which, for their sake, the lives of thousands,
and the fate of millions, should be committed to risk.
[[1]]
Book I, Chap. VI, p. 148; Book II, Chap. III, pp. 181-2.
[[2]]
Book II, Chap. V, VI.