3. CHAPTER III
OF THE EQUALITY OF MANKIND
The principles of justice, as explained in the preceding chapter, proceed
upon the assumption of the equality of mankind. This equality is either physical
or moral. Physical equality may be considered either as it relates to the
strength of the body or the faculties of the mind.
This part of the subject has been exposed to cavil and objection. It has
been said "that the reverse of this equality is the result of our experience.
Among the individuals of our species, we actually find that there are not
two alike. One man is strong, and another weak. One man is wise, and another
foolish. All that exists in the world of the inequality of conditions is
to be traced to this as their source. The strong man possesses power to subdue,
and the weak stands in need of an ally to protect. The consequence is inevitable:
the equality of conditions is a chimerical assumption, neither possible to
be reduced into practice, nor desirable if it could be so reduced."
Upon this statement two observations are to be made. First, this inequality
was in its origin infinitely less than it is at present. In the uncultivated
state of man, diseases, effeminacy and luxury were little known; and, of
consequence, the strength of everyone much more nearly approached to the
strength of his neighbour. In the uncultivated state of man, the understandings
of all were limited, their wants, their ideas and their views nearly upon
a level. It was to be expected that, in their first departure from this state,
great irregularities would introduce themselves; and it is the object of
subsequent wisdom and improvement to mitigate these irregularities.
Secondly, Notwithstanding the encroachments that have been made upon
the equality of mankind, a great and substantial equality remains. There
is no such disparity among the human race as to enable one man to hold several
other men in subjection, except so far as they are willing to be subject.
All government is founded in opinion. Men at present live under any particular
form because they conceive it their interest to do so. One part indeed of
a community or empire may be held in subjection by force; but this cannot
be the personal force of their despot; it must be the force of another part
of the community, who are of opinion that it is their interest to support
his authority. Destroy this opinion, and the fabric which is built upon it
falls to the ground. It follows therefore that all men are essentially independent.
— So much for the physical equality.
The moral equality is still less open to reasonable exception. By moral
equality I understand, the propriety of applying one unalterable rule of
justice to every case that may arise. This cannot be questioned, but upon
arguments that would subvert the very nature of virtue. "Equality,"
it has been affirmed, "will always be an unintelligible fiction, so
long as the capacities of men shall be unequal, and their pretended claims
have neither guarantee nor sanction by which they can be enforced."[1]
But surely justice is sufficiently intelligible in its own nature, abstractedly
from the consideration whether it be or be not reduced into practice. Justice
has relation to beings endowed with perception, and capable of pleasure and
pain. Now it immediately results from the nature of such beings, independently
of any arbitrary constitution, that pleasure is agreeable and pain odious,
pleasure to be desired and pain to be disapproved. It is therefore just and
reasonable that such beings should contribute, so far as it lies in their
power, to the pleasure and benefit of each other. Among pleasures, some are
more exquisite, more unalloyed and less precarious than others. It is just
that these should be preferred.
From these simple principles we may deduce the moral equality of mankind.
We are partakers of a common nature, and the same causes that contribute
to the benefit of one will contribute to the benefit of another. Our senses
and faculties are of the same denomination. Our pleasures and pains will
therefore be alike. We are all of us endowed with reason, able to compare,
to judge and to infer. The improvement therefore which is to be desired for
one is to be desired for another. We shall be provident for ourselves, and
useful to each other in proportion as we rise above the sphere of prejudice.
The same independence, the same freedom from any such restraint, as should
prevent us from giving the reins to our own understanding, or from uttering,
upon all occasions, whatever we think to be true, will conduce to the improvement
of all. There are certain opportunities and a certain situation most advantageous
to every human being, and it is just that these should be communicated to
all, as nearly as the general economy will permit.
There is indeed one species of moral inequality, parallel to the physical
inequality that has been already described. The treatment to which men are
entitled is to be measured by their merits and their virtues. That country
would not be the seat of wisdom and reason where the benefactor of his species
was regarded with no greater degree of complacence than their enemy. But
in reality this distinction, so far from being adverse to equality in any
tenable sense, is friendly to it, and is accordingly known by the appellation
of equity, a term derived from the same origin. Though in some sense all
exception, it tends to the same purpose to which the principle itself is
indebted for its value. It is calculated lo infuse into every bosom an emulation
of excellence. The thing really lo be desired is the removing as much as
possible arbitrary distinctions, and leaving to talents and virtue the field
of exertion unimpaired. We should endeavour to afford to all the same opportunities
and the same encouragement, and to render justice the common interest and
choice.
It should be observed that the object of this chapter is barely to present
a general outline of the principle of equality. The practical inferences
that flow from it must remain to be detailed under subsequent heads of enquiry.
[ [1]]
"On a dit-que nous avions tous les mêmes droits. J'ignore
ce que c'est rue les mêmes droits, où il y a inégalité
de talens ou de force, et nulle garantie, nulle sanction." Raynal, Revolution
d'Amérique, p. 34.