4. CHAPTER IV
Of Tyrannicide
A question connected with the mode of effecting political melioration,
and which has been eagerly discussed among political reasoners, is that of
tyrannicide. The moralists of antiquity contended for the lawfulness of this
practice; by the moderns it has been generally condemned.
The arguments in its favour are built upon a very obvious principle. "Justice
ought universally to be administered. Crimes of an inferior description are
restrained, or pretended to be restrained, by the ordinary operations of
jurisprudence. But criminals by whom the welfare of the whole is attacked,
and who overturn the liberties of mankind, are out of the reach of this restraint.
If justice be partially administered in subordinate cases, and the rich man
be able to oppress the poor with impunity, it must be admitted that a few
examples of this sort are insufficient to authorize the last appeal of human
beings. But no man will deny that the case of the usurper and the despot
is of the most atrocious nature. In this instance, all the provisions of
civil policy being superseded, and justice poisoned at the source, every
man is left to execute for himself the decrees of immutable equity."
It may however be doubted whether the destruction of a tyrant be, in any
respect, a case of exception from the rules proper to be observed upon ordinary
occasions. The tyrant has indeed no particular sanctity annexed to his person,
and may be killed with as little scruple as any other man, when the object
is that of repelling personal assault. In all other cases, the extirpation
of the offender by a self-appointed authority does not appear to be the appropriate
mode of counteracting injustice.
For, first, either the nation whose tyrant you would destroy is ripe for
the assertion and maintenance of its liberty, or it is not. If it be, the
tyrant ought to be deposed with every appearance of publicity. Nothing can
be more improper than for an affair, interesting to the general weal, to
be conducted as if it were an act of darkness and shame. It is an ill lesson
we read to mankind, when a proceeding, built upon the broad basis of general
justice, is permitted to shrink from public scrutiny. The pistol and the
dagger may as easily be made the auxiliaries of vice, as of virtue. To proscribe
all violence, and neglect no means of information and impartiality, is the
most effectual security we can have, for an issue conformable to reason and
truth.
If, on the other hand, the nation be not ripe for a state of freedom,
the man who assumes to himself the right of interposing violence may indeed
show the fervour of his conception, and gain a certain notoriety; but he
will not fail to be the author of new calamities to his country. The consequences
of tyrannicide are well known. If the attempt prove abortive, it renders
the tyrant ten times more bloody, ferocious and cruel than before. If it
succeed, and the tyranny be restored, it produces the same effect upon his
successors. In the climate of despotism some solitary virtues may spring
up. But, in the midst of plots and conspiracies, there is neither truth,
nor confidence, nor love, nor humanity.
Secondly, the true merits of the question will be still further understood
if we reflect on the nature of assassination. The mistake which has been
incurred upon this subject is to be imputed principally to the superficial
view that has been taken of it. If its advocates had followed the conspirator
through all his windings, and observed his perpetual alarm, lest truth should
become known, they would probably have been less indiscriminate in their
applause. No action can be imagined more directly at war with a principle
of ingenuousness and candour. Like all that is most odious in the catalogue
of vices, it delights in obscurity. It shrinks from the piercing light of
day. It avoids all question, and hesitates and trembles before the questioner.
It struggles for a tranquil gaiety, and is only complete where there is the
most perfect hypocrisy. It changes the use of speech, and composes every
feature the better to deceive.
Between the acting of a dreadful thing
And the first motion, all the interim
[1]
is mystery and reserve. Is it possible to believe that a person who has
upon him all the indications of guilt is engaged in an action which virtue
enjoins? The same duplicity follows him to the last. Imagine to yourself
the conspirators kneeling at the feet of Caesar, as they did the moment before
they destroyed him! not all the virtue of Brutus can save them from your
indignation.
There cannot be a better instance than that of which we are treating,
to prove the importance of general sincerity. We see in this example that
an action which has been undertaken from the best motives may, by a defect
in this particular, tend to overturn the very foundations of justice and
happiness. Wherever there is assassination, there is an end to all confidence
among men. Protests and asseverations go for nothing. No man presumes to
know his neighbour's intention. The boundaries that have hitherto served
to divide the honest man from the profligate are gone. The true interests
of mankind require, not the removal, but the confirmation of these boundaries.
All morality proceeds upon mutual confidence and esteem, will grow and expand
as the grounds of that confidence shall be more evident, and must inevitably
decay, in proportion as they are undermined.
[ [1]]
Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, Act ii.