4. CHAPTER IV
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY
Having rejected the hypotheses that have most generally been advanced
as to the rational basis of a political authority, let us enquire whether
we may not arrive at the same object by a simple investigation of the obvious
reason of the case, without refinement of system or fiction of process.
Government then being first supposed necessary for the welfare of mankind,
the most important principle that can be imagined relative to its structure
seems to be this; that, as government is a transaction in the name and for
the benefit of the whole, every member of the community ought to have some
share in the selection of its measures. The arguments in support of this
proposition are various.
First, it has already appeared that there is no satisfactory criterion
marking out any man, or set of men, to preside over the rest.
Secondly, all men are partakers of the common faculty, reason; and may
be supposed to have some communication with the common instructor, truth.
It would be wrong in an affair of such momentous concern that any chance
for additional wisdom should be rejected; nor can we tell, in many cases,
till after the experiment, how eminent any individual may be found in the
business of guiding and deliberating for his fellows.
Thirdly, government is a contrivance instituted for the security of individuals;
and it seems both reasonable that each man should have a share in providing
for his own security; and probable that partiality and cabal will by this
means be most effectually excluded.
Lastly, to give each man a voice in the public concerns comes nearest
to that fundamental purpose of which we should never lose sight, the uncontrolled
exercise of private judgement. Each man will thus be inspired with a consciousness
of his own importance, and the slavish feelings that shrink up the soul in
the presence of an imagined superior will be unknown.
Admitting then the propriety of each man having a share in directing the
affairs of the whole in the first instance, it seems necessary that he should
concur in electing a house of representatives, if he be the member of a large
state; or, even in a small one, that he should assist in the appointment
of officers and administrators;[1] which implies, first, a delegation of
authority to these officers, and, secondly, a tacit consent, or rather an
admission of the necessity, that the questions to be debated should abide
the decision of a majority.
But to this system of delegation the same objections may be urged that
were cited from Rousseau under the head of a social contract. It may be alleged
that "if it be the business of every man to exercise his own judgement,
he can in no instance surrender this function into the hands of another."
To this objection it may be answered, first, that the parallel is by no
means complete between an individual's exercise of his judgement in a case
that is truly his own, and his exercise of his judgement in an article where
the province of a government is already admitted. If there be something contrary
to the simplest ideas of justice in such a delegation, this is an evil inseparable
from political government. The true and only adequate apology of government
is necessity; the office of common deliberation is solely to supply the most
eligible means of meeting that necessity.
Secondly, the delegation we are here considering is not, as the word in
its most obvious sense may seem to imply, the act of one man committing to
another a function which, strictly speaking, it became him to exercise for
himself. Delegation, in every instance in which it can be reconciled with
justice, proposes for its object the general good. The individuals to whom
the delegation is made are either more likely, from talents or leisure, to
perform the function in the most eligible manner, or there is at least some
public interest requiring that it should be performed by one or a few persons,
rather than by every individual for himself. This is the case whether in
that first and simplest of all political delegations, the prerogative of
a majority, or in the election of a house of representatives, or in the appointment
of public officers. Now all contest as to the person who shall exercise a
certain function and the propriety of resigning it is frivolous the moment
it is decided how and by whom it can most advantageously be exercised. It
is of no consequence that I am the parent of a child when it has once been
ascertained that the child will live with greater benefit under the superintendence
of a stranger.
Lastly, it is a mistake to imagine that the propriety of restraining me,
when my conduct is injurious, rises out of any delegation of mine. The justice
of employing force upon certain emergencies was at least equally cogent be
fore the existence of society.[2] Force ought never to be resorted to but
in cases of absolute necessity; and, when such cases occur, it is the duty
of every man to defend himself from violation. There is therefore no delegation
necessary on the part of the offender; but the community, in the censure
it exercises over him, puts itself in the place of the injured party.
From what is here stated, we may be enabled to form the clearest and most
unexceptionable idea of the nature of government. Every man, as was formerly
observed,[3] has a sphere of discretion; that sphere is limited by the co-ordinate
sphere of his neighbour. The maintenance of this limitation, the office of
taking care that no man exceeds his sphere, is the first business of government.
Its powers, in this respect, are a combination of the powers of individuals
to control the excesses of each other. Hence is derived to the individuals
of the community a second and indirect province, of providing, by themselves
or their representatives, that this control is not exercised in a despotical
manner, or carried to an undue excess.
It may perhaps be imagined by some persons that the doctrine here delivered,
of the justice of proceeding in common concerns by a common deliberation,
is nearly coincident with that which affirms a lawful government to derive
its authority from a social contract. Let us consider what is the true difference
between them: and this seems principally to lie in the following particular.
The principle of a social contract is an engagement to which a man is
bound by honour, fidelity or consistency to adhere. According to the principle
here laid down, he is bound to nothing. He joins in the common deliberation
because he foresees that some authority will be exercised, and because this
is the best chance that offers itself for approximating the exercise of that
authority, to the dictates of his own understanding. But, when the deliberation
is over, he finds himself as much disengaged as ever. If he conform to the
mandate of authority, it is either because he individually approves it, or
from a principle of prudence, because he foresees that a greater mass of
evil will result from his disobedience than of good. He obeys the freest
and best constituted authority, upon the same principle that would lead him,
in most instances, to yield obedience to a despotism; only with this difference,
that, if the act of authority be erroneous, he finds it less probable that
it will be corrected in the first instance than in the second, since it proceeds
from the erroneous judgement of a whole people. — But all this will appear
with additional evidence when we come to treat of the subject of obedience.
Too much stress has undoubtedly been laid upon the idea, as of a grand
and magnificent spectacle, of a nation deciding for itself upon some great
public principle, and of the highest magistracy yielding its claims when
the general voice has pronounced. The value of the whole must at last depend
upon the quality of their decision. Truth cannot be made more true by the
number of its votaries. Nor is the spectacle much less interesting of a solitary
individual, bearing his undaunted testimony in favour of justice, though
opposed by misguided millions. Within certain limits however the beauty of
the exhibition may be acknowledged. That a nation should exercise undiminished
its function of common deliberation is a step gained, and a step that inevitably
leads to an improvement of the character of individuals. That men should
agree in the assertion of truth is no unpleasing evidence of their virtue.
Lastly, that an individual, how ever great may be his imaginary elevation,
should be obliged to yield his personal pretensions to the sense of the community
at least bears the appearance of a practical confirmation of the great principle
that all private considerations must yield to the general good.
[ [1]]
We shall be led, in a subsequent branch of this enquiry, to investigate
how far either of these measures is inseparable from the maintenance of social
order. Book V, Chap. XXIV.