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The theory of moral sentiments.

  
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Part I Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections
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Section I Of the Sense of Propriety
 1.1.1. 
Chap. I Of Sympathy
 1.1.2. 
Chap. II Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy
 1.1.3. 
Chap. III Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with out own.
 1.1.4. 
Chap. IV The same subject continued
 1.1.5. 
Chap. V Of the amiable and respectable virtues
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Section II Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety
  
Introduction
 1.2.1. 
Chap.I Of the Passions which take their origin from the body
 1.2.2. 
Chap. II Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination
 1.2.3. 
Chap. III Of the unsocial Passions
 1.2.4. 
Chap. IV Of the social Passions
 1.2.5. 
Chap. V Of the selfish Passions
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Section III Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Aprobation in the one state than in the other
 1.3.1. 
Chap. I That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned
 1.3.2. 
Chap. II Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks
 1.3.3. 
Chap. III Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition
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Part II Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment Consisting of Three Parts
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Section I Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
  
Introduction
 2.1.1. 
Chap. 1 That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment appears to deserve punishment
 2.1.2. 
Chap. II Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment
 2.1.3. 
Chap. III That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it
 2.1.4. 
Chap. IV Recapitulation of the foregoing Chapters
 2.1.5. 
Chap. V The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit
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Section II Of Justice and Beneficence
 2.2.1. 
Chap. I Comparison of those two Virtues
 2.2.2. 
Chap. II Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit
 2.2.3. 
Chap. III Of the utility of this constitution of Nature
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Section III Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions
  
Introduction
 2.3.1. 
Chap. I Of the Causes of this Influence of Fortune
 2.3.2. 
Chap. II Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune
 2.3.3. 
Chap. III Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments
 3. 
Part III Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty Consisting of One Section
 4. 
Part IV Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of Approbation Consisting of One Section
 5. 
Part V Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation Consisting of One Section
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Part VI Of the Character of Virtue Consisting of Three Sections
  
Introduction
 6.1. 
Section I Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence
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Section II Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People
  
Introduction
 6.2.1. 
Chap. I Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our care and attention
 6.2.2. 
Chap. II Of the order in which Societies are by nature recommended to our Beneficence
 6.2.3. 
Chap. III Of universal Benevolence
 6.3. 
Section III Of Self-command
  
Conclusion of the Sixth Part
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PART VII Of Systems of Moral Philosophy Consisting of Four Sections
 7.1. 
Section I Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments
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Section II Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue
  
Introduction
 7.2.1. 
Chap. I Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety
 7.2.2. 
Chap. II Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence
 7.2.3. 
Chap. III Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence
 7.2.4. 
Chap. IV Of Licentious Systems
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Section III Of the Different Systems which have been Formed Concerning the Principle of Approbation
  
Introduction
 7.3.1. 
Chap. I Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love
 7.3.2. 
Chap. II Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation
 7.3.3. 
Chap. III Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation
 7.4. 
Section IV Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality

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The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

by

Adam Smith

Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.
London
: Printed for A. Millar, in the
Strand
; And A. Kincaid and J. Bell in
Edinburgh
. MDCCLIX
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