2.1.1. Chap. 1
That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude,
appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever
appears to be the proper object of resentment appears to deserve
punishment
To us, therefore, that action must appear to deserve reward,
which appears to be the proper and approved object of that
sentiment, which most immediately and directly prompts us to
reward, or to do good to another. And in the same manner, that
action must appear to deserve punishment, which appears to be the
proper and approved object of that sentiment which most
immediately and directly prompts us to punish, or to inflict evil
upon another.
The sentiment which most immediately and directly prompts us
to reward, is gratitude; that which most immediately and directly
prompts us to punish, is resentment.
To us, therefore, that action must appear to deserve reward,
which appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude;
as, on the other hand, that action must appear to deserve
punishment, which appears to be the proper and approved object of
resentment.
To reward, is to recompense, to remunerate, to return good
for good received. To punish, too, is to recompense, to
remunerate, though in a different manner; it is to return evil
for evil that has been done.
There are some other passions, besides gratitude and
resentment, which interest us in the happiness or misery of
others; but there are none which so directly excite us to be the
instruments of either. The love and esteem which grow upon
acquaintance and habitual approbation, necessarily lead us to be
pleased with the good fortune of the man who is the object of
such agreeable emotions, and consequently, to be willing to lend
a hand to promote it. Our love, however, is fully satisfied,
though his good fortune should be brought about without our
assistance. All that this passion desires is to see him happy,
without regarding who was the author of his prosperity. But
gratitude is not to be satisfied in this manner. If the person to
whom we owe many obligations, is made happy without our
assistance, though it pleases our love, it does not content our
gratitude. Till we have recompensed him, till we ourselves have
been instrumental in promoting his happiness, we feel ourselves
still loaded with that debt which his past services have laid
upon us.
The hatred and dislike, in the same manner, which grow upon
habitual disapprobation, would often lead us to take a malicious
pleasure in the misfortune of the man whose conduct and character
excite so painful a passion. But though dislike and hatred harden
us against all sympathy, and sometimes dispose us even to rejoice
at the distress of another, yet, if there is no resentment in the
case, if neither we nor our friends have received any great
personal provocation, these passions would not naturally lead us
to wish to be instrumental in bringing it about. Though we could
fear no punishment in consequence of our having had some hand in
it, we would rather that it should happen by other means. To one
under the dominion of violent hatred it would be agreeable,
perhaps, to hear, that the person whom he abhorred and detested
was killed by some accident. But if he had the least spark of
justice, which, though this passion is not very favourable to
virtue, he might still have, it would hurt him excessively to
have been himself, even without design, the occasion of this
misfortune. Much more would the very thought of voluntarily
contributing to it shock him beyond all measure. He would reject
with horror even the imagination of so execrable a design; and if
he could imagine himself capable of such an enormity, he would
begin to regard himself in the same odious light in which he had
considered the person who was the object of his dislike. But it
is quite otherwise with resentment: if the person who had done us
some great injury, who had murdered our father or our brother,
for example, should soon afterwards die of a fever, or even be
brought to the scaffold upon account of some other crime, though
it might sooth our hatred, it would not fully gratify our
resentment. Resentment would prompt us to desire, not only that
he should be punished, but that he should be punished by our
means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had
done to us. Resentment cannot be fully gratified, unless the
offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve
for that particular wrong which we have suffered from him. He
must be made to repent and be sorry for this very action, that
others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified
from being guilty of the like offence. The natural gratification
of this passion tends, of its own accord, to produce all the
political ends of punishment; the correction of the criminal, and
the example to the public.
Gratitude and resentment, therefore, are the sentiments which
most immediately and directly prompt to reward and to punish. To
us, therefore, he must appear to deserve reward, who appears to
be the proper and approved object of gratitude; and he to deserve
punishment, who appears to be that of resentment.
