7.2.3. Chap. III
Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence
The system which makes virtue consist in benevolence, though
I think not so ancient as all of those which I have already given
an account of, is, however, of very great antiquity. It seems to
have been the doctrine of the greater part of those philosophers
who, about and after the age of Augustus, called themselves
Eclectics, who pretended to follow chiefly the opinions of Plato
and Pythagoras, and who upon that account are commonly known by
the name of the later Platonists.
In the divine nature, according to these authors, benevolence
or love was the sole principle of action, and directed the
exertion of all the other attributes. The wisdom of the Deity was
employed in finding out the means for bringing about those ends
which his goodness suggested, as his infinite power was exerted
to execute them. Benevolence, however, was still the supreme and
governing attribute, to which the others were subservient, and
from which the whole excellency, or the whole morality, if I may
be allowed such an expression, of the divine operations, was
ultimately derived. The whole perfection and virtue of the human
mind consisted in some resemblance or participation of the divine
perfections, and, consequently, in being filled with the same
principle of benevolence and love which influenced all the
actions of the Deity. The actions of men which flowed from this
motive were alone truly praise-worthy, or could claim any merit
in the sight of the Deity. It was by actions of charity and love
only that we could imitate, as became us, the conduct of God,
that we could express our humble and devout admiration of his
infinite perfections, that by fostering in our own minds the same
divine principle, we could bring our own affections to a greater
resemblance with his holy attributes, and thereby become more
proper objects of his love and esteem; till at last we arrived at
that immediate converse and communication with the Deity to which
it was the great object of this philosophy to raise us.
This system, as it was much esteemed by many ancient fathers
of the Christian church, so after the Reformation it was adopted
by several divines of the most eminent piety and learning and of
the most amiable manners; particularly, by Dr Ralph Cudworth, by
Dr Henry More, and by Mr John Smith of Cambridge. But of all the
patrons of this system, ancient or modern, the late Dr Hutcheson
was undoubtedly, beyond all comparison, the most acute, the most
distinct, the most philosophical, and what is of the greatest
consequence of all, the soberest and most judicious.
That virtue consists in benevolence is a notion supported by
many appearances in human nature. It has been observed already,
that proper benevolence is the most graceful and agreeable of all
the affections, that it is recommended to us by a double
sympathy, that as its tendency is necessarily beneficent, it is
the proper object of gratitude and reward, and that upon all
these accounts it appears to our natural sentiments to possess a
merit superior to any other. It has been observed too, that even
the weaknesses of benevolence are not very disagreeable to us,
whereas those of every other passion are always extremely
disgusting. Who does not abhor excessive malice, excessive
selfishness, or excessive resentment? But the most excessive
indulgence even of partial friendship is not so offensive. It is
the benevolent passions only which can exert themselves without
any regard or attention to propriety, and yet retain something
about them which is engaging. There is something pleasing even in
mere instinctive good-will which goes on to do good offices
without once reflecting whether by this conduct it is the proper
object either of blame or approbation. It is not so with the
other passions. The moment they are deserted, the moment they are
unaccompanied by the sense of propriety, they cease to be
agreeable.
As benevolence bestows upon those actions which proceed from
it, a beauty superior to all others, so the want of it, and much
more the contrary inclination, communicates a peculiar deformity
to whatever evidences such a disposition. Pernicious actions are
often punishable for no other reason than because they shew a
want of sufficient attention to the happiness of our neighbour.
Besides all this, Dr Hutcheson[11] observed that whenever in
any action, supposed to proceed from benevolent affections, some
other motive had been discovered, our sense of the merit of this
action was just so far diminished as this motive was believed to
have influenced it. If an action, supposed to proceed from
gratitude, should be discovered to have arisen from an
expectation of some new favour, or if what was apprehended to
proceed from public spirit, should be found out to have taken its
origin from the hope of a pecuniary reward, such a discovery
would entirely destroy all notion of merit or praise-worthiness
in either of these actions. Since, therefore, the mixture of any
selfish motive, like that of a baser alloy, diminished or took
away altogether the merit which would otherwise have belonged to
any action, it was evident, he imagined, that virtue must consist
in pure and disinterested benevolence alone.
When those actions, on the contrary, which are commonly
supposed to proceed from a selfish motive, are discovered to have
arisen from a benevolent one, it greatly enhances our sense of
their merit. If we believed of any person that he endeavoured to
advance his fortune from no other view but that of doing friendly
offices, and of making proper returns to his benefactors, we
should only love and esteem him the more. And this observation
seemed still more to confirm the conclusion, that it was
benevolence only which could stamp upon any action the character
of virtue.
Last of all, what, he imagined, was an evident proof of the
justness of this account of virtue, in all the disputes of
casuists concerning the rectitude of conduct, the public good, he
observed, was the standard to which they constantly referred;
thereby universally acknowledging that whatever tended to promote
the happiness of mankind was right and laudable and virtuous, and
the contrary, wrong, blamable, and vicious. In the late debates
about passive obeDience and the right of resistance, the sole
point in controversy among men of sense was, whether universal
submission would probably be attended with greater evils than
temporary insurrections when privileges were invaded. Whether
what, upon the whole, tended most to the happiness of mankind,
was not also morally good, was never once, he said, made a
question.
Since benevolence, therefore, was the only motive which could
bestow upon any action the character of virtue, the greater the
benevolence which was evidenced by any action, the greater the
praise which must belong to it.
Those actions which aimed at the happiness of a great
community, as they demonstrated a more enlarged benevolence than
those which aimed only at that of a smaller system, so were they,
likewise, proportionally the more virtuous. The most virtuous of
all affections, therefore, was that which embraced as its object
the happiness of all intelligent beings. The least virtuous, on
the contrary, of those to which the character of virtue could in
any respect belong, was that which aimed no further than at the
happiness of an individual, such as a son, a brother, a friend.
In directing all our actions to promote the greatest possible
good, in submitting all inferior affections to the desire of the
general happiness of mankind, in regarding one's self but as one
of the many, whose prosperity was to be pursued no further than
it was consistent with, or conducive to that of the whole,
consisted the perfection of virtue.
Self-love was a principle which could never be virtuous in
any degree or in any direction. It was vicious whenever it
obstructed the general good. When it had no other effect than to
make the individual take care of his own happiness, it was merely
innocent, and though it deserved no praise, neither ought it to
incur any blame. Those benevolent actions which were performed,
notwithstanding some strong motive from self-interest, were the
more virtuous upon that account. They demonstrated the strength
and vigour of the benevolent principle.
Dr Hutcheson[12] was so far from allowing self-love to be in
any case a motive of virtuous actions, that even a regard to the
pleasure of self-approbation, to the comfortable applause of our
own consciences, according to him, diminished the merit of a
benevolent action. This was a selfish motive, he thought, which,
so far as it contributed to any action, demonstrated the weakness
of that pure and disinterested benevolence which could alone
stamp upon the conduct of man the character of virtue. In the
common judgments of mankind, however, this regard to the
approbation of our own minds is so far from being considered as
what can in any respect diminish the virtue of any action, that
it is rather looked upon as the sole motive which deserves the
appellation of virtuous.
Such is the account given of the nature of virtue in this
amiable system, a system which has a peculiar tendency to nourish
and support in the human heart the noblest and the most agreeable
of all affections, and not only to check the injustice of
self-love, but in some measure to discourage that principle
altogether, by representing it as what could never reflect any
honour upon those who were influenced by it.
As some of the other systems which I have already given an
account of, do not sufficiently explain from whence arises the
peculiar excellency of the supreme virtue of beneficence, so this
system seems to have the contrary defect, of not sufficiently
explaining from whence arises our approbation of the inferior
virtues of prudence, vigilance, circumspection, temperance,
constancy, firmness. The view and aim of our affections, the
beneficent and hurtful effects which they tend to produce, are
the only qualities at all attended to in this system. Their
propriety and impropriety, their suitableness and unsuitableness,
to the cause which excites them, are disregarded altogether.
Regard to our own private happiness and interest, too, appear
upon many occasions very laudable principles of action. The
habits of oeconomy, industry, discretion, attention, and
application of thought, are generally supposed to be cultivated
from self-interested motives, and at the same time are
apprehended to be very praise-worthy qualities, which deserve the
esteem and approbation of every body. The mixture of a selfish
motive, it is true, seems often to sully the beauty of those
actions which ought to arise from a benevolent affection. The
cause of this, however, is not that self-love can never be the
motive of a virtuous action, but that the benevolent principle
appears in this particular case to want its due degree of
strength, and to be altogether unsuitable to its object. The
character, therefore, seems evidently imperfect, and upon the
whole to deserve blame rather than praise. The mixture of a
benevolent motive in an action to which self-love alone ought to
be sufficient to prompt us, is not so apt indeed to diminish our
sense of its propriety, or of the virtue of the person who
performs it. We are not ready to suspect any person of being
defective in selfishness. This is by no means the weak side of
human nature, or the failing of which we are apt to be
suspicious. If we could really believe, however, of any man,
that, was it not from a regard to his family and friends, he
would not take that proper care of his health, his life, or his
fortune, to which self-preservation alone ought to be sufficient
to prompt him, it would undoubtedly be a failing, though one of
those amiable failings, which render a person rather the object
of pity than of contempt or hatred. It would still, however,
somewhat diminish the dignity and respectableness of his
character. Carelessness and want of oeconomy are universally
disapproved of, not, however, as proceeding from a want of
benevolence, but from a want of the proper attention to the
objects of self-interest.
Though the standard by which casuists frequently determine
what is right or wrong in human conduct, be its tendency to the
welfare or disorder of society, it does not follow that a regard
to the welfare of society should be the sole virtuous motive of
action, but only that, in any competition, it ought to cast the
balance against all other motives.
Benevolence may, perhaps, be the sole principle of action in
the Deity, and there are several, not improbable, arguments which
tend to persuade us that it is so. It is not easy to conceive
what other motive an independent and all-perfect Being, who
stands in need of nothing external, and whose happiness is
complete in himself, can act from. But whatever may be the case
with the Deity, so imperfect a creature as man, the support of
whose existence requires so many things external to him, must
often act from many other motives. The condition of human nature
were peculiarly hard, if those affections, which, by the very
nature of our being, ought frequently to influence our conduct,
could upon no occasion appear virtuous, or deserve esteem and
commendation from any body.
Those three systems, that which places virtue in propriety,
that which places it in prudence, and that which makes it consist
in benevolence, are the principal accounts which have been given
of the nature of virtue. To one or other of them, all the other
descriptions of virtue, how different soever they may appear, are
easily reducible.
That system which places virtue in obedience to the will of
the Deity, may be counted either among those which make it
consist in prudence, or among those which make it consist in
propriety. When it is asked, why we ought to obey the will of the
Deity, this question, which would be impious and absurd in the
highest degree, if asked from any doubt that we ought to obey
him, can admit but of two different answers. It must either be
said that we ought to obey the will of the Deity because he is a
Being of infinite power, who will reward us eternally if we do
so, and punish us eternally if we do otherwise: or it must be
said, that independent of any regard to our own happiness, or to
rewards and punishments of any kind, there is a congruity and
fitness that a creature should obey its creator, that a limited
and imperfect being should submit to one of infinite and
incomprehensible perfections. Besides one or other of these two,
it is impossible to conceive that any other answer can be given
to this question. If the first answer be the proper one, virtue
consists in prudence, or in the proper pursuit of our own final
interest and happiness; since it is upon this account that we are
obliged to obey the will of the Deity. If the second answer be
the proper one, virtue must consist in propriety, since the
ground of our obligation to obedience is the suitableness or
congruity of the sentiments of humility and submission to the
superiority of the object which excites them.
That system which places virtue in utility, coincides too
with that which makes it consist in propriety. According to this
system, all those qualities of the mind which are agreeable or
advantageous, either to the person himself or to others, are
approved of as virtuous, and the contrary disapproved of as
vicious. But the agreeableness or utility of any affection
depends upon the degree which it is allowed to subsist in. Every
affection is useful when it is confined to a certain degree of
moderation; and every affection is disadvantageous when it
exceeds the proper bounds. According to this system therefore,
virtue consists not in any one affection, but in the proper
degree of all the affections. The only difference between it and
that which I have been endeavouring to establish, is, that it
makes utility, and not sympathy, or the correspondent affection
of the spectator, the natural and original measure of this proper
degree.
[11.]
See Inquiry concerning Virtue, sect. 1 and
2.
[12.]
Inquiry concerning virtue, sect. 2. art. 4. also
Illustrations on the moral sense, sect. 5. last paragraph.