Livy's History of Rome: Book 28
The Final Conquest of Spain
28.1
Though Hasdrubal's
invasion had shifted the burden of war to Italy and brought corresponding
relief to Spain, war was suddenly renewed in that country which was quite as
formidable as the previous one. At the time of Hasdrubal's departure Spain
was divided between Rome and Carthage as follows: Hasdrubal Gisgo had
retreated to the ocean littoral near Gades, the Mediterranean coast-line and
almost the whole of Eastern Spain was held by Scipio on behalf of Rome. A
new general took Hasdrubal's place, named Hanno, who brought over a
fresh army, and marched into Celtiberia, which lies between the
Mediterranean and the ocean, and here he soon raised a very considerable
army. Scipio sent M. Silanus against him with a force of not more than
10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Silanus marched with all the speed he
could, but his progress was impeded by the bad state of the roads and by the
narrow mountain passes, obstacles which are met with in most parts of
Spain. In spite of these difficulties he outstripped not only any natives who
might have carried tidings, but even any floating rumours of his advance, and
with the assistance of some Celtiberian deserters who acted as guides he
succeeded in finding the enemy. When he was about ten miles distant, he was
informed by his guides that there were two camps near the road on which he
was marching; the one on the left was occupied by the Celtiberians, a newly
raised army about 9000 strong, the one on the right by the Carthaginians.
The latter was carefully guarded by outposts, pickets and all the usual
precautions against surprise; the Celtiberian camp was without any
discipline, and all precautions were neglected as might be expected of
barbarians and raw levies who felt all the less fear because they were in their
own country. Silanus decided to attack that one first, and kept his men as
much to the left as possible, so as not to be seen by the Carthaginian
outposts. After sending on his scouts he advanced rapidly against the enemy.
28.2
He was
now about three miles away and none of the enemy had yet noticed his
advance, the rocks and thickets which covered the whole of this hilly district
concealed his movements. Before making his final advance, he ordered his
men to halt in a valley where they were effectually hidden and take food. The
scouting parties resumed and confirmed the statements of the deserters, on
which the Romans, after placing the baggage in the centre and arming
themselves for the combat, advanced in order of battle. The enemy caught
sight of these when they were a mile distant and hurriedly prepared to meet
them. As soon as Mago heard the shouting and confusion he galloped across
from his camp to take command. There were in the Celtiberian army 4000
men with shields and 200 cavalry, making up a regular legion. These were
his main strength and he stationed them in the front; the rest who were
lightly armed he posted in reserve. In this formation he led them out of the
camp, but they had hardly crossed the rampart when the Romans hurled their
javelins at them. The Spaniards stooped to avoid them, and then sprang up
to discharge their own, which the Romans who were in their usual close
order received on their overlapping shields; then they closed up foot to foot
and fought with their swords. The Celtiberians, accustomed to rapid
evolutions, found their agility useless on the broken ground, but the Romans,
who were used to stationary fighting, found no inconvenience from it beyond
the fact that their ranks were sometimes broken when moving through
narrow places or patches of brushwood. Then they had to fight singly or in
pairs, as if they were fighting duels.
These very obstacles, however, by impeding the enemy's flight,
gave them up, as though bound hand and foot, to the sword. Almost all the
heavy infantry of the Celtiberians had fallen when the Carthaginian light
infantry, who had now come from the other camp, shared their fate. Not
more than 2000 infantry escaped; the cavalry, which had hardly taken any
part in the battle, together with Mago also got away. The other general,
Hanno, was taken prisoner, together with those who were the last to appear
in the field when the battle was already lost. Mago, with almost the whole of
his cavalry and his veteran infantry, joined Hasdrubal at Gades ten days after
the battle. The Celtiberian levies dispersed amongst the neighbouring forests
and so reached their homes. So far the war had not been a serious one, but
there was all the material for a much greater conflagration had it been
possible to induce the other tribes to join the Celtiberians in arms; that
possibility was by this most timely victory destroyed. Scipio therefore
eulogised Silanus in generous terms, and felt hopeful of bringing the war to a
termination if he on his part acted with sufficient promptitude. He advanced,
accordingly, into the remote corner of Spain where all the remaining strength
of Carthage was concentrated under Hasdrubal. He happened at the time to
be encamped in the district of Baetica for the purpose of securing the fidelity
of his allies, but on Scipio's advance he suddenly moved away and in a march
which closely resembled a flight retreated to Gades on the coast. Feeling,
however, quite certain that as long as he kept his army together he would be
the object of attack, he arranged, before he crossed over to Gades, for the
whole of his force to be distributed amongst the various cities, so that they
could defend the walls whilst the walls protected them.
28.3
When
Scipio became aware of this breaking up of the hostile forces, he saw that to
carry his arms from city to city would involve a loss of time far greater than
the results gained, and consequently marched back again. Not wishing,
however, to leave that district in the enemy's hands, he sent his brother
Lucius with 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry to attack the richest city in that
part of the country; the natives call it Orongi. It is situated in the country of
the Maessesses, one of the tribes of Southern Spain; the soil is fertile, and
there are also silver mines. Hasdrubal had used it as his base from which to
make his incursions on the inland tribes. Lucius Scipio encamped in the
neighbourhood of the city, but before investing it, he sent men up to the
gates to hold a parley with the townsmen and endeavour to persuade them to
put the friendship rather than the strength of the Romans to the proof. As
nothing in the shape of a peaceable answer was resumed, he surrounded the
place with a double line of circumvallation and formed his army into three
divisions, so that one division at a time could be in action while the other
two were resting, and thus a continuous attack might be kept up. When the
first division advanced to the storm there was a desperate fight; they had the
utmost difficulty in approaching the walls and bringing up the scaling-ladders
owing to the rain of missiles showered down upon them. Even when they
had planted the ladders against the walls and began to mount them, they
were thrust down by forks made for the purpose, iron hooks were let down
upon others so that they were in danger of being dragged off the ladders and
suspended in mid-air. Scipio saw that what made the struggle indecisive was
simply the insufficient number of his men and that the defenders had the
advantage because they were fighting from their walls. He withdrew the
division which was engaged, and brought up the two others. In face of this
fresh attack the defenders, worn out with meeting the former assault,
retreated hastily from the walls, and the Carthaginian garrison, fearing that
the city had been betrayed, left their various posts and formed into one body.
This alarmed the townsmen, who dreaded lest the enemy when once inside
the city should massacre every one, whether Carthaginian or Spaniard. They
flung open one of the gates and burst out of the town, holding their shields in
front of them in case missiles should be hurled on them from a distance, and
showing their empty right hands to make it plain that they had thrown away
their swords. Their action was misinterpreted either owing to the distance at
which they were seen, or because treachery was suspected, and a fierce
attack was made upon the flying crowd, who were cut down as though they
were a hostile army. The Romans marched in through the open gate whilst
other gates were demolished with axes and mallets, and as each cavalry man
entered he galloped in accordance with instructions to the forum. The
cavalry were supported by a detachment of triarii; the legionaries occupied
the rest of the city. There was no plundering and, except in the case of armed
resistance, no bloodshed. All the Carthaginians and about a thousand of the
townsmen who had closed the gates were placed under guard, the town was
handed over to the rest of the population and their property restored to
them. About 2000 of the enemy fell in the assault upon the city; not more
than 90 of the Romans.
28.4
The
capture of this city was a source of great gratification to those who had
effected it, as it was also to the commander-in-chief and the rest of the army.
The entry of the troops was a noteworthy sight owing to the immense
number of prisoners who preceded them. Scipio bestowed the highest
commendation on his brother, and declared that the capture of Orongis was
as great an achievement as his own capture of New Carthage. The winter
was now coming on, and as the season would not admit of his making an
attempt on Gades or pursuing Hasdrubal's army, dispersed as it was
throughout the province, Scipio brought his entire force back into Hither
Spain. After dismissing the legions to their winter quarters, he sent his
brother to Rome with Hanno and the other prisoners of high rank, and then
retired to Tarraco. The Roman fleet under the command of the proconsul M.
Valerius Laevinus sailed during the year to Africa, and committed
widespread devastation round Utica and Carthage; plunder was carried off
under the very walls of Utica and on the frontiers of Carthage. On their
return to Sicily they fell in with a Carthaginian fleet of seventy vessels. Out
of these seventeen were captured, four were sunk, the rest scattered in flight.
The Roman army, victorious alike on land and sea, returned to Lilybaeum
with an enormous amount of plunder of every kind. Now that the enemy's
ships had been driven off and the sea rendered safe, large supplies of corn
were conveyed to Rome.
28.5
It was in
the beginning of this summer that the proconsul P. Sulpicius and King
Attalus who, as already stated, had wintered at Aegina, sailed for Lemnos
with their combined fleets, the Roman vessels numbering twenty-five and the
king's ships, thirty-five. In order to be in readiness to meet his enemies by
land or sea, Philip went down to Demetrias on the coast and issued orders
for his army to assemble at Larissa by a given day. When they heard of the
king's arrival at Demetrias, deputations from all his allies visited him there.
The Aetolians, emboldened by their alliance with Rome and the arrival of
Attalus, were ravaging their neighbours' lands. Great alarm was created
amongst the Acarnanians, the Boeotians and the inhabitants of Euboea, and
the Achaeans had further cause for apprehension, for, in addition to their war
with the Aetolians, they were threatened by Machanidas the tyrant of
Lacedaemon, who had encamped not far from the Argive frontiers. The
deputations informed the king of the state of things, and one and all begged
him to render them assistance against the dangers which were threatening by
land and sea. The condition of his own kingdom was far from tranquil;
reports were brought to him announcing that Scerdilaedus and Pleuratus
were again active and that Thracian tribes, especially the Maedi, were
prepared to invade Macedonia as soon as the king was involved in a distant
war. The Boeotians and the States in the interior of Greece reported that the
Aetolians had closed the pass of Thermopylae at its narrowest part with a
fosse and rampart to prevent him from carrying succour to the cities of his
allies. Even a lethargic leader would have been roused to activity by all these
disturbances round him. He dismissed the deputations with a definite
promise that he would furnish assistance to them all as time and
circumstances allowed. For the moment the most pressing care was the city
of Peparethos, as King Attalus, who had sailed thither from Lemnos, was
reported to be plundering and destroying all the country round. Philip sent a
detachment to protect the place. He also sent Polyphantas with a small force
into Boeotia, and Menippus, one of his generals, with 1000 peltasts to
Chalcis. This force was supplemented by 500 Agrianians, in order that the
whole of the island might be protected. Philip himself proceeded to Scotusa
and ordered the Macedonian troops at Larissa to march there. Information
was brought to him here that the national council of the Aetolians had been
summoned to meet at Heraclea and that Attalus would be present to consult
with them as to the conduct of the war. Philip accordingly proceeded thither
by forced marches, but did not reach the place till the council was broken up.
He destroyed the crops, however, which were almost ripe, especially round
the gulf of the Aenianes, and then led his army back to Scotusa. Leaving the
bulk of his forces there he returned to Demetrias with his household troops.
With the view of meeting any movement on the part of the enemy, he sent
men into Phocis, Euboea and Peparethos to select elevated positions on
which beacon fires might be lighted, and himself fixed an observation post on
Tisaeos, a peak of immense height. In this way he hoped to receive instant
notice from the distant fires of any movement on the part of the enemy. The
Roman general and Attalus sailed from Peparethos to Nicaea, and from there
to the city of Oreus in Euboea. This is the first city in Euboea which you
pass on your left hand as you leave the Gulf of Demetrias for Chalcis and the
Euripus. It was arranged between Attalus and Sulpicius that the Romans
should attack by sea and the king's troops by land.
28.6
It was
not till the fourth day after their arrival that they commenced the attack, the
interval having been spent in secret conferences with Plator, whom Philip
had made commandant of the garrison. The city has two citadels, one
overlooking the sea, the other in the heart of the city. From the latter a
subterranean passage leads down to the sea, and at one time terminated in a
tower five stories high, which formed an imposing defence. Here a violent
contest took place, for the tower was plentifully stored with missiles of every
kind, and the engines and artillery had been brought up from the ships for
use against the walls. Whilst every one's attention was engrossed by the
struggle going on here, Plator admitted the Romans through the gate of the
seaward citadel, and this was captured at once. Then the defenders, finding
themselves forced back into the city, tried to gain the other citadel. Men who
were posted here for the purpose closed the gates against them, and thus
shut out from both citadels they were killed or made prisoners. The
Macedonian garrison stood in a close phalanx under the wall of the citadel,
neither attempting to flee nor taking an active part in the fighting. Plator
persuaded Sulpicius to let them go and they were placed on board and
landed at Demetrium in Phthiotis. Plator himself joined Attalus. Encouraged
by his easy success at Oreus, Sulpicius sailed at once with his victorious fleet
to Chalcis, but here the result by no means answered his expectations. The
sea which is wide and open at each end of the Euripus contracts here into a
narrow channel, which at first sight presents the appearance of a double
harbour with two mouths opposite each other. But it would be difficult to
find a more dangerous roadstead for a fleet. Sudden tempestuous winds
sweep down from the lofty mountains on both sides, and the Euripus does
not, as is commonly asserted, ebb and flow seven times a day at regular
intervals, but its waters, driven haphazard like the wind first in one direction
and then in another, rush along like a torrent down the side of a precipitous
mountain, so that ships are never in quiet waters day or night. After
Sulpicius had anchored his fleet in these treacherous waters, he found that
the town was protected on the one side by the sea, and on the other, the land
side, by very strong fortifications, whilst the strength of its garrison and the
loyalty of the officers, so different from the duplicity and treason at Oreus,
made it impregnable. After surveying the difficulties of his position, the
Roman commander acted wisely in desisting from his rash enterprise, and
without any further loss of time sailed away to Cynos in Locris, a place
situated about a mile from the sea, which served as the emporium of the
Opuntians.
28.7
The
beacon fires at Oreus had given Philip warning, but through the treachery of
Plator they were lighted too late, and in any case Philip's inferiority in naval
strength would have made it extremely difficult for him to reach the island.
In consequence of this delay he made no effort for its relief, but he hastened
to the relief of Chalcis as soon as he got the signal. Although this city is also
situated on the island, it is separated from the mainland by such a narrow
strait as to allow of its being connected by a bridge, and it is therefore more
easy to approach it by land than by sea. Philip marched from Demetrias to
Scotusa; he left that place at midnight, and after routing the Aetolians who
were holding the pass of Thermopylae drove them in confusion to Heraclea.
He finally reached Elatia in Phocis, having covered more than sixty miles in
one day. Almost on the very same day the city of the Opuntians was taken
and sacked by Attalus. Sulpicius had left the spoils to him, because Oreus
had been sacked by the Romans a few days previously, when the king's
troops were elsewhere. Whilst the Roman fleet was lying off Oreus, Attalus
was busily occupied in extorting contributions from the principal citizens of
Opus, utterly unaware of Philip's approach. So rapid was the Macedonian
advance that had not some Cretans who had gone foraging further than usual
caught sight of the hostile column in the distance, Attalus would have been
completely surprised. As it was he fled, without stopping to arm, in wild
disorder to his ships, and the men were actually pushing their vessels off
when Philip appeared, and even from the water's edge created great alarm
amongst the crews. Then he returned to Opus, storming at gods and men
because the chance of a great success had been almost snatched out of his
hands. He was just as furious with the Opuntians, for, though they might
have held out till his arrival, no sooner did they see the enemy than they
voluntarily surrendered.
After settling matters at Opus, he went on to Thronium. Attalus
had sailed to Oreus, but on learning that Prusias, the king of Bithynia, had
violated the frontiers of his dominions he dropped all his projects in Greece,
including the Aetolian war, and sailed to Asia. Sulpicius took his fleet back
to Aegina, whence he had started in the beginning of spring. Philip captured
Thronium with no more difficulty than Attalus had experienced at Opus. The
population of this city consisted of refugees from Thebes in Phthiotis. When
the place was captured by Philip, they escaped and put themselves under the
protection of the Aetolians, who assigned for their abode a city which had
been ruined and abandoned in the previous war with Philip. After his capture
of Thronium he advanced to the capture of Tithronon and Drymiae, small
unimportant towns in Doris. Ultimately he reached Elatia, where it was
arranged that the embassies from Ptolemy and the Rhodians should meet
him. Here they were discussing the question of bringing the Aetolian war to
a close -the ambassadors had been present at the recent council of the
Romans and Aetolians at Heraclea -when news was brought that
Machanidas had decided to attack the Eleans in the midst of their
preparations for the Olympic Games. Philip thought it his duty to prevent
this, and accordingly dismissed the ambassadors after assuring them that he
was responsible for the war and would place no obstacles in the way of
peace, provided its terms were fair and honourable. He then set off with his
army in light marching order, and passed through Boeotia to Megara, and
from there he descended to Corinth. Here he collected supplies, and then
advanced towards Phlius and Pheneos. When he had reached Heraea he
heard that Machanidas, alarmed at his rapid approach, had made a hurried
return to Lacedaemon. On receiving this intelligence he repaired to Aegium,
in order to be present at the meeting of the Achaean League; he also
expected to find there the Carthaginian fleet, which he had sent for in the
hope of doing something by sea. The Carthaginians had left that place a few
days previously for Oxeae and then, when they heard that Attalus and the
Romans had left Oreus, they sought shelter in the harbours of Acarnania,
fearing lest if they were attacked within the strait of Rhium, the neck of the
Gulf of Corinth, they should be overpowered.
28.8
Philip
was extremely disappointed and vexed at finding that in spite of his rapid
movements he was always too late to do anything, and that Fortune mocked
his energy and activity by snatching away every opportunity from before his
eyes. However, he concealed his disappointment in the presence of the
council, and spoke in a very confident tone. Appealing to gods and men he
declared that at no time or place had he ever failed to go with all possible
speed wherever the clash of hostile arms was heard. It would be difficult, he
continued, to estimate whether the enemy's anxiety to flee or his own
eagerness to fight played the greater part in the war. In this way Attalus got
away from Opus, and Sulpicius from Chalcis, and now Machanidas had
slipped out of his hands. But flight did not always mean victory, and it was
impossible to regard as serious a war in which when once you have come
into touch with the enemy, you have conquered. The most important thing
was the enemy's own admission that they were no match for him, and in a
short time he would win a decisive victory, the enemy would find the result
of the battle no better than they had anticipated. His allies were delighted
with his speech. He then made over Heraea and Triphylia to the Achaeans,
and on their bringing forward satisfactory evidence that Aliphera in
Megalopolis had formed part of their territory, he restored that place also to
them. Subsequently with some vessels furnished by the Achaeans -three
quadriremes and as many biremes -he sailed to Anticyra. He had previously
sent into the Gulf of Corinth seven quinqueremes and more than twenty light
vessels, intending to strengthen the Carthaginian fleet, and with these he
proceeded to Eruthrae in Aetolia near Eupalium, where he disembarked. The
Aetolians were aware of his landing, for all the men who were in the fields or
in the neighbouring forts of Potidania or Apollonia fled to the woods and the
mountains; their flocks and herds which they were unable in their haste to
drive away Philip secured and placed on board. The whole of the plunder
was despatched in charge of Nicias the praetor of the Achaeans to Aegium;
Philip, sending his army overland through Boeotia, went himself to Corinth,
and from there to Cenchreae. Here he re-embarked, and sailing past the
coast of Attica, round the headland of Sunium and almost through the hostile
fleets, arrived at Chalcis. In his address to the citizens he spoke in the highest
terms of their loyalty and courage in refusing to be moved by either threats
or promises, and he urged them, in case they were attacked, to show the
same determination to be true to their ally if they thought their own position
preferable to that of Opus or Oreus. From Chalcis he sailed to Oreus, where
he entrusted the administration and defence of the city to those magnates
who had fled on the capture of the place rather than betray it to the Romans.
Then he returned to Demetrias, the place from which he had started to
render assistance to his allies. He now proceeded to lay down the keels of
100 war-ships at Cassandrea, and a large number of shipwrights were
assembled for their construction. As matters were now quiet in Greece,
owing to the departure of Attalus and the effective assistance which Philip
had given to his allies in their difficulties, he returned to Macedonia to
commence operations against the Maedi.
28.9
Just at
the close of this summer Quintus Fabius, the son of Maximus, who was on
the staff of the consul M. Livius, came to Rome to inform the senate that the
consul considered L. Porcius and his legions sufficient for the defence of
Gaul, in which case he, Livius, and his consular army might be safely
withdrawn. The senate recalled not only Livius, but his colleague as well, but
the instructions given to each differed. M. Livius was ordered to bring his
troops back, but Nero's legions were to remain in their province, confronting
Hannibal. The consuls had been in correspondence with each other and had
agreed that as they had been of the same mind in their conduct of public
affairs, so, though coming from opposite directions, they should approach
the City at the same time. Whichever should be the first to reach Praeneste
was to wait there for his colleague, and, as it happened, they both arrived
there on the same day. After despatching a summons for the senate to meet
at the temple of Bellona in three days' time they went on together towards
the City. The whole population turned out to meet them with shouts of
welcome, and each tried to grasp the consuls' hands; congratulations and
thanks were showered upon them for having, by their efforts, rendered the
commonwealth safe. When the senate was assembled they followed the
precedent set by all victorious generals and laid before the House a report of
their military operations. Then they made request that in recognition of their
energetic and successful conduct of public affairs special honours should be
rendered to the gods and they, the consuls, should be allowed to enter the
City in triumph The senators passed a decree that their request should be
granted out of gratitude to the gods in the first place, and then, next to the
gods, out of gratitude to the consuls. A solemn thanksgiving was decreed on
their behalf, and each of them was allowed to enjoy a triumph.
As they had been in perfect agreement as to the management of
their campaign, they decided that they would not have separate triumphs,
and the following arrangement was made: As the victory had been won in
the province assigned to Livius, and as it had fallen to him to take the
auspices on the day of battle, and further, as his army had been brought back
to Rome, whilst Nero's army was unable to leave its province, it was decided
that Livius should ride in the chariot at the head of his soldiers, and C.
Claudius Nero alone on horseback. The triumph thus shared between them
enhanced the glory of both, but especially of the one who allowed his
comrade to surpass him in honour as much as he himself surpassed him in
merit. "That horseman," men said to one another, "traversed Italy from end
to end in six days, and at the very time when Hannibal believed him to be
confronting him in Apulia he was fighting a pitched battle with Hasdrubal in
Gaul. So one consul had checked the advance of two generals, two great
captains from the opposite corners of Italy, by opposing his strategy to the
one and meeting the other in person. The mere name of Nero had sufficed to
keep Hannibal quiet in his camp, and as to Hasdrubal, what brought about
his defeat and destruction but Nero's arrival in the field? The one consul may
ride in a chariot with as many horses as he pleases, the real triumph belongs
to the other who is borne on horseback through the City; even if he went on
foot Nero's renown would never die, whether through the glory he acquired
in war, or the contempt he showed for it in his triumph." These and similar
remarks from the spectators followed Nero till he reached the Capitol. The
money they brought into the treasury amounted to 300,000 sesterces and
80,000 of bronze coinage. M. Livius' largesse to his soldiers amounted to
fifty-six ases per man, and C. Nero promised to give the same amount to his
men as soon as he rejoined his army. It is remarked that in their jests and
songs the soldiers on that day celebrated the name of C. Claudius Nero more
frequently than that of their own consul; and that the members of the
equestrian order were full of praises for L. Veturius and Q. Caecilius, and
urged the plebs to make them consuls for the coming year. The consuls
added considerably to the weight of this recommendation when on the
morrow they informed the Assembly with what courage and fidelity the two
officers had served them.
28.10
The
time was approaching for the elections and it was decided that they should
be conducted by a Dictator. C. Claudius Nero named his colleague M. Livius
as Dictator, and he nominated Q. Caecilius as his Master of the Horse. L.
Veturius and Q. Caecilius were both elected consuls. Then came the election
of praetors; those appointed were C. Servilius, M. Caecilius Metellus,
Tiberius Claudius Asellus and Q. Mamilius Turrinus, who was a plebeian
aedile at the time. When the elections were over, the Dictator laid down his
office and after disbanding his army went on a mission to Etruria. He had
been commissioned by the senate to hold an enquiry as to which cantons in
Etruria had entertained the design of deserting to Hasdrubal as soon as he
appeared, and also which of them had assisted him with supplies, or men, or
in any other way. Such were the events of the year at home and abroad. The
Roman Games were celebrated in full on three successive days by the curule
aediles, Cnaeus Servilius Caepio and Servilius Cornelius Lentulus; similarly
the Plebeian Games were celebrated by the plebeian aediles, M. Pomponius
Matho and Q. Mamilius Turrinus. It was now the thirteenth year of the Punic
War. Both the consuls, L. Veturius Philo and Q. Caecilius Metellus, had the
same province -Bruttium -assigned to them, that they might jointly carry on
operations against Hannibal. The praetors balloted for their provinces. M.
Caecilius Metellus obtained the City jurisdiction; Q. Mamilius, that over
aliens. Sicily fell to C. Servilius, and Sardinia to Ti. Claudius.
The armies were distributed as follows: One of the consuls took
over Nero's army; the other, that which Q. Claudius had commanded; each
consisted of two legions. M. Livius, who was acting as proconsul for the
year, took over from C. Terentius the two legions of volunteer slaves in
Etruria. It was also decreed that Q. Mamilius, to whom the jurisdiction over
aliens had been allotted, should transfer his judicial business to his colleague,
and hold Gaul with the army which L. Porcius had commanded as
propraetor; he was also instructed to ravage the fields of those Gauls who
had gone over to the Carthaginians on the arrival of Hasdrubal. C. Servilius
was to protect Sicily, as C. Mamilius had done, with the two legions of the
survivors of Cannae. The old army in Sardinia, under A. Hostilius, was
recalled, and the consuls enrolled a new legion which Tiberius Claudius was
to take with him to the island. A year's extension of command was granted
to Q. Claudius, that he might remain in charge at Tarentum, and to C.
Hostilius Tubero, that he might continue to act at Capua. M. Valerius, who
had been charged with the defence of the Sicilian seaboard, was ordered to
hand over thirty ships to the praetor' C. Servilius, and return to Rome with
the rest of his fleet.
28.11
In the
anxiety caused by the strain of such a serious war when men referred every
occurrence, fortunate or the reverse, to the direct action of the gods,
numerous portents were announced. At Tarracina the temple of Jupiter, at
Satricum that of Mater Matuta were struck by lightning. At the latter place
quite as much alarm was created by the appearance of two snakes which
glided straight through the doors into the temple of Jupiter. From Antium it
was reported that the ears of corn seemed to those who were reaping them
to be covered with blood. At Caere a pig had been farrowed with two heads,
and a lamb yeaned which was both male and female. Two suns were said to
have been seen at Alba, and at Fregellae it had become light during the night.
In the precinct of Rome an ox was said to have spoken; the altar of Neptune
in the Circus Flaminius was asserted to have been bathed in perspiration, and
the temples of Ceres, Salus and Quirinus were all struck by lightning. The
consuls received orders to expiate the portents by sacrificing full-grown
victims and to appoint a day of solemn intercession. These measures were
carried out in accordance with the senatorial resolution. What was a much
more terrifying experience than all the portents reported from the country or
seen in the City, was the extinction of the fire in the temple of Vesta. The
vestal who was in charge of the fire that night was severely flogged by order
of P. Licinius, the Pontifex Maximus. Though this was no portent sent by the
gods, but merely the result of human carelessness, it was decided to sacrifice
full-grown victims and hold a service of solemn supplication in the temple of
Vestal.
Before the consuls left for the seat of war, they were advised by the
senate "to see to it that the plebeians were reinstated on their holdings.
Through the goodness of the gods the burden of war had now been shifted
from the City of Rome and from Latium, and men could dwell in the country
parts without fear, it was by no means fitting that they should be more
concerned for the cultivation of Sicily than for that of Italy." The people
found it, however, anything but an easy matter. The small holders had been
carried off by the war, there was hardly any servile labour available, the
cattle had been driven off as plunder, and the homesteads had been either
stripped or burnt. Still, at the authoritative behest of the consuls a
considerable number did return to their farms. What led to the senate taking
up this question was the presence of deputations from Placentia and
Cremona, who came to complain of the invasion and wasting of their
country by their neighbours, the Gauls. A large proportion of their settlers,
they said, had disappeared, their cities were almost without inhabitants, and
the countryside was a deserted wilderness. The praetor Mamilius was
charged with the defence of these colonies; the consuls, acting on a
resolution of the senate, published an edict requiring all those who were
citizens of Cremona and Placentia to return to their homes before a certain
day. At last, towards the beginning of spring, they left for the seat of war.
The consul Q. Caecilius took over the army from C. Nero, and L. Veturius,
the one which Q. Claudius had commanded, and this he brought up to its full
strength with the fresh levies which he had raised. They led their armies into
the district of Consentia, and ravaged it in all directions. As they were
returning laden with plunder they were attacked in a narrow pass by a force
of Bruttians and Numidian javelin-men, and not only the plunder but the
troops themselves were in danger. There was, however, more alarm and
confusion than real fighting. The plunder was sent forward and the legions
succeeded in getting into a position free from danger. They advanced into
Lucania, and the whole of the district returned to its allegiance to Rome
without offering any resistance.
28.12
No
action was fought with Hannibal this year, for after the blow which had
fallen upon him and upon his country, he made no forward movement, nor
did the Romans care to disturb him, such was their impression of the powers
which that single general possessed, even while his cause was everywhere
round him crumbling into ruin. I am inclined to think that he deserves our
admiration more in adversity than in the time of his greatest successes. For
thirteen years he had been carrying on war with varying fortune in an
enemy's country far from home. His army was not made up of his own
fellow-countrymen, it was a mixed assemblage of various nationalities who
had nothing in common, neither laws nor customs, nor language, who
differed in appearance, dress and arms, who were strangers to one another in
their religious observances, who hardly recognised the same gods. And yet
he had united them so closely together that no disturbance ever broke out,
either amongst the soldiers themselves or against their commander, though
very often money and supplies were lacking and it was through want of these
that numerous incidents of a disgraceful character had occurred between the
generals and their soldiers in the First Punic War. He had rested all his hopes
of victory on Hasdrubal and his army, and after that army had been wiped
out he withdrew into Bruttium and abandoned the rest of Italy to the
Romans. Is it not a matter of surprise that no mutiny broke out in his camp?
For in addition to all his other difficulties, there was no prospect of feeding
his army except from the resources of Bruttium, and even if the whole of
that country had been in cultivation it would have afforded but meager
support for so large an army. But as it was, a large part of the population
had been diverted from the tillage of the soil by the war and by their
traditional and innate love of brigandage. He received no assistance from
home, for the government was mainly concerned about keeping their hold on
Spain, just as though everything in Italy was going on successfully.
The situation in Spain was in some respects similar, in others
completely dissimilar to the state of affairs in Italy. It was similar in so far as
the Carthaginians after their defeat and the loss of their general had been
driven into the most distant parts of Spain to the shores of the ocean. It was
dissimilar because the natural features of the country and the character of the
inhabitants made Spain more fitted than Italy, more fitted, in fact, than any
country in the world for the constant renewal of hostilities. Though it was
the first province, at all events on the continent, into which the Romans
made their way, it was, owing to this cause, the very last to be completely
subjugated, and this only in our own days under the conduct and auspices of
Augustus Caesar. Hasdrubal Gisgo, who, next to the Barcine family, was the
greatest and most brilliant general that held command in this war, was
encouraged by Mago to renew hostilities. He left Gades, and traversing
Further Spain, raised a force of 50,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry. As to the
strength of his cavalry the authorities are generally agreed, but some writers
assert that the infantry force which he led to Silpia amounted to 70,000 men.
Near this city the two Carthaginian commanders encamped on a wide and
open plain, determined to accept battle if offered.
28.13
When
intelligence was brought to Scipio of the muster of this large army, he did
not consider that he could meet it with his Roman legions unless he
employed his native auxiliaries to give at all events the appearance of greater
strength. At the same time he felt that he ought not to depend too much
upon them, for if they changed sides it might lead to the same disaster as that
which had overtaken his father and his uncle. Culchas, whose authority
extended over twenty-eight towns, had promised to raise a force of infantry
and cavalry during the winter, and Silanus was sent to bring them up. Then
breaking up his quarters at Tarraco, Scipio marched down to Castulo,
picking up small contingents furnished by the friendly tribes which lay on his
line of march. There Silanus joined him with 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry.
His entire army, Romans and allied contingents, infantry and cavalry,
amounted now to 55,000 men. With this force he advanced to meet the
enemy and took up his position near Baecula. Whilst his men were
entrenching their camp they were attacked by Mago and Masinissa with the
whole of their cavalry and would have been thrown into great disorder had
not Scipio made a charge with a body of horse which he had placed in
concealment behind a hill. These speedily routed those of the assailants who
had ridden close up to the lines and were actually attacking the entrenching
parties; with the others, however, who kept their ranks and were advancing
in steady order the conflict was more sustained, and for a considerable time
remained undecided. But when the cohorts of light infantry came in from the
outposts, and the men at work on the intrenchments had seized their arms
and, fresh for action, were in ever increasing numbers relieving their wearied
comrades until a considerable body of armed men were hastening from the
camp to do battle, the Carthaginians and Numidians retreated. At first they
retired in order though hurriedly and kept their ranks, but when the Romans
pressed their attacks home and resistance was no longer possible, they broke
and fled as best they could. Though this action did much to raise the spirits
of the Romans and depress those of the enemy, there were for several days
incessant skirmishes between the cavalry and light infantry on both sides.
28.14
After
the strength of each side had been sufficiently tested in these encounters
Hasdrubal led out his army to battle, on which the Romans did the same.
Each army remained standing in front of its camp, neither caring to begin the
fight. Towards sunset the two armies, first the Carthaginian and then the
Roman, marched back to camp. This went on for some days; the
Carthaginians were always the first to get into line and the first to receive the
order to retire when they were tired out with standing. No forward
movement took place on either side, no missile was discharged, no
battle-shout raised. The Romans were posted in the centre on the one side,
the Carthaginians in the centre of the other; the flanks on both armies were
composed of Spanish troops. In front of the Carthaginian line were the
elephants which looked in the distance like towers. It was generally
supposed in both camps that they would fight in the order in which they had
been standing, and that the main battle would be between the Romans and
Carthaginians in the centre, the principals in the war and fairly matched in
courage and in arms. When Scipio found that this was assumed as a matter
of course, he carefully altered his dispositions for the day on which he
intended to fight. The previous evening he sent a tessera through the camp
ordering the men to take their breakfast and see that their horses were fed
before daybreak, the cavalry were at the same time to be fully armed with
their horses ready, bitted and saddled. Day had scarcely broken when he sent
the whole of his cavalry with the light infantry against the Carthaginian
outposts, and at once followed them up with the heavy infantry of the
legions under his personal command. Contrary to universal expectation he
had made his wings the strongest part of his army by posting the Roman
troops there, the auxiliaries occupied the centre.
The shouts of the cavalry roused Hasdrubal and he rushed out of
his tent. When he saw the melee in front of the rampart and the disordered
state of his men, and in the distance the glittering standards of the legions
and the whole plain covered with the enemy, he at once sent the whole of his
mounted force against the hostile cavalry. He then led his infantry out of the
camp, and formed his battle line without any change in the existing order.
The cavalry fight had now been going on for some time without either side
gaining the advantage. Nor could any decision be arrived at, for as each side
was in turn driven back they retreated into safety amongst their infantry. But
when the main bodies were within half a mile of each other, Scipio recalled
his cavalry and ordered them to pass to the rear of the infantry, whose ranks
opened out to give them passage, he then formed them into two divisions,
and posted one as a support behind each of the wings. Then when the
moment for executing his maneuver arrived he ordered the Spaniards in the
centre to make a slow advance, and sent word to Silanus and Marcius that
they were to extend to the left as they had seen him extend to the right, and
engage the enemy with their light cavalry and infantry before the centers had
time to close. Each wing was thus lengthened by three infantry cohorts and
three troops of horse, besides velites, and in this formation they advanced
against the enemy at a run, the others following en echelon. The line curved
inwards towards the centre because of the slower advance of the Spaniards.
The wings were already engaged whilst the Carthaginians and African
veterans, the main strength of their army, had not yet had the chance of
discharging a single missile. They did not dare to leave their place in the line
and help their comrades for fear of leaving the centre open to the advance of
the enemy. The wings were being pressed by a double attack, the cavalry and
light infantry had wheeled round and were making a flank charge, whilst the
cohorts were pressing their front in order to sever them from their centre.
28.15
The
struggle had now become a very one-sided one in all parts of the field. Not
only were untrained Balearics and raw Spanish levies face to face with the
Roman and Latin legionaries but as the day went on, the physical strength of
Hasdrubal's army began to give way. Surprised by the sudden attack in the
early morning they had been compelled to go into battle before they could
strengthen themselves with food. It was with this view that Scipio had
deliberately delayed the fight till late in the day, for it was not until the
seventh hour that the attack began on the wings, and it was some time after
that before the battle reached the centre, so that, what with the heat of the
day, the fatigue of standing under arms, and the hunger and thirst from
which they were suffering, they were worn out before they closed with the
enemy. Thus exhausted they leaned on their shields as they stood. To
complete their discomfiture the elephants, scared by the sudden onsets of the
cavalry and the rapid movements of the light infantry, rushed from the wings
into the centre of the line. Wearied and depressed, the enemy began to
retreat, keeping their ranks however, just as if they had been ordered to
retire. But when the victors saw that matters were going in their favour they
made still more furious attacks in all parts of the field, which the enemy were
almost powerless to withstand, though Hasdrubal tried to rally them and
keep them from giving way by calling out that the hill in their rear would
afford them a safe retreat if they would retire in good order. Their fears,
however, got the better of their sense of shame, and when those nearest to
the enemy gave way, their example was suddenly followed by all and there
was a universal flight. Their first halt was on the lower slope of the hill, and
as the Romans hesitated about mounting the hill, they began to re-form their
ranks, but when they saw them steadily advancing they again fled and were
driven back in disorder to their camp. The Romans were not far from the
rampart and would have carried the camp in their onset had not the brilliant
sunshine which often glows between heavy showers been succeeded by such
a storm that the victors could hardly get back to their camp, and some were
even deterred by superstitious fears from attempting anything further for the
day. Although the night and the storm invited the Carthaginians, exhausted
as they were by their toil and many of them by their wounds, to take the rest
they so sorely needed, yet their fears and the danger they were in allowed
them no respite. Fully expecting an attack on their camp as soon as it was
light they strengthened their rampart with large stones collected from all the
valleys round, hoping to find in their intrenchments the defence which their
arms had failed to afford them. The desertion of their allies, however,
decided them to seek safety in flight rather than risk another battle. The first
to abandon them was Attenes, chief of the Turdetani; he went over with a
considerable body of his countrymen, and this was followed by the surrender
of two fortified towns with their garrisons to the Romans. For fear of the
evil spreading and the spirit of disaffection becoming general, Hasdrubal
shifted his camp the following night.
28.16
When
the outposts brought intelligence of the enemy's departure Scipio sent on his
cavalry and followed with his entire army. Such was the rapidity of the
pursuit that had they followed in Hasdrubal's direct track they must have
caught him up. But, acting on the advice of their guides, they took a shorter
route to the river Baetis, so that they might be able to attack him if he
attempted its passage. Finding the river closed to him, Hasdrubal turned his
course towards the ocean, and his hurried march, which in its haste and
confusion looked like a flight gave him a considerable start on the Roman
legions. Their cavalry and light infantry harassed and retarded him by
attacking him in flank and rear, and whilst he was continually forced to halt
to repel first the cavalry and then infantry skirmishers, the legions came up.
Now it was no longer a battle but sheer butchery, until the general himself
set the example of flight and escaped to the nearest hills with some 6000
men, many of them without arms. The rest were killed or made prisoners.
The Carthaginians hastily improvised an intrenched camp on the highest
point of the hills, and as the Romans found it useless to attempt the
precipitous ascent, they had no difficulty in making themselves safe. But a
bare and sterile height was hardly a place in which to stand even a few days'
siege, and there were numerous desertions. At last Hasdrubal sent for ships -he was not far from the sea -and fled in the night, leaving his army to its
fate. As soon as Scipio heard of his flight he left Silanus to keep up the
investment of the Carthaginian camp with 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry,
whilst he himself with the rest of his force returned to Tarraco. During his
seventy days' march to this place, he took steps to ascertain the attitude of
the various chiefs and tribes towards Rome, so that they might be
recompensed as they deserved. After his departure Masinissa came to a
secret understanding with Silanus, and crossed over with a small following
to Africa, to induce his people to support him in his new policy. The reasons
which determined him on this sudden change were not evident at the time,
but the loyalty which he subsequently displayed throughout his long life to its
close proved beyond question that his motives at the beginning were
carefully weighed. After Mago had sailed to Gades in the ships which
Hasdrubal had sent back for him, the rest of the army abandoned by their
generals broke up, some deserting to the Romans, others dispersing amongst
the neighbouring tribes. No body of troops remained worth consideration
either for numbers or fighting strength. Such, in the main, was the way in
which under the conduct and auspices of Publius Scipio the Carthaginians
were expelled from Spain, fourteen years from the commencement of the
war, and five years after Scipio assumed supreme command. Not long after
Mago's departure Silanus joined Scipio at Tarraco, and reported that the war
was at an end.
28.17
Lucius
Scipio was sent to Rome in charge of numerous prisoners of high rank to
announce the subjugation of Spain. Everybody else welcomed this brilliant
success with feelings of delight and exultation, but the one man who had
achieved it and whose thirst for solid and lasting renown was insatiable
looked upon his conquest of Spain as only a small instalment of what his
lofty ambition led him to hope for. Already he was looking to Africa and the
great city of Carthage as destined to crown his glory and immortalise his
name. This was the goal before him and he thought it best to prepare the
way to it by gaining over the kings and tribes in Africa. He began by
approaching Syphax, king of the Masaesulians, a tribe of Moorish
nationality. They lived opposite that part of the Spanish coast where New
Carthage lies. At that time there existed a treaty of alliance between their
king and Carthage, but Scipio did not imagine that Syphax would regard the
sanctity of treaties more scrupulously than they are generally regarded by
barbarians whose fidelity depends upon the caprices of fortune. Accordingly
he sent C. Laelius to him with presents to win him over. The barbarian was
delighted with the presents, and, as he saw that the cause of Rome was
everywhere successful, whilst the Carthaginians had failed in Italy and
entirely disappeared from Spain, he consented to become friendly to Rome,
but insisted that the mutual ratification of the treaty should take place in the
presence of the Roman general. All that Laelius could obtain from the king
was a safe-conduct, and with that he returned to Scipio. In furtherance of his
designs on Africa it was of supreme importance for him to secure Syphax; he
was the most powerful of the native princes, and had even attempted
hostilities against Carthage; moreover, his frontiers were only separated from
Spain by a narrow strait.
Scipio thought it worth while running considerable risk in order to
accomplish his end, and as it could not be effected in any other way, he made
arrangements for visiting Syphax. Leaving the defence of Spain in the hands
of L. Marcius at Tarraco and M. Silanus at New Carthage, to which latter
place he had proceeded by forced marches from Tarraco, he sailed across to
Africa accompanied by C. Laelius. He only took two quinqueremes, and as
the sea was calm most of the passage was made by rowing, though a light
breeze occasionally assisted them. It so happened that Hasdrubal after his
expulsion from Spain entered the harbour at the same time. He had brought
his seven triremes to anchor and was preparing to land when the two
quinqueremes were sighted. No one entertained the smallest doubt that they
belonged to the enemy and could easily be overpowered by superior numbers
before they gained the harbour. The efforts of the soldiers and sailors,
however, to get their arms ready and the ships into trim amidst much noise
and confusion were rendered futile by a freshening breeze from the sea,
which filled the sails of the quinqueremes and carried them into port before
the Carthaginians could get up their anchors. As they were now in the king's
harbour, no one ventured to make any further attempt to molest them. So
Hasdrubal, who was the first to land. and Scipio and Laelius, who
disembarked soon afterwards, all made their way to the king.
28.18
Syphax regarded it as an exceptional
honour -as indeed it was -for the captains of the two most powerful nations
of their time to come to him seeking his friendship and alliance. He invited
them both to be his guests, and as Fortune had willed that they should be
under the same roof and at the same hearth he tried to induce them to confer
together with the view of removing all causes of quarrel. Scipio declined on
the ground that he had no personal quarrel with the Carthaginian and he was
powerless to discuss affairs of State without the orders of the senate. The
king was anxious that it should not seem as if one of his guests was excluded
from his table, and he did his utmost to persuade Scipio to be present. He
raised no objection, and they both dined with the king, and at his particular
request occupied the same couch. Such was Scipio's charm of manner and
innate tact in dealing with everybody that he completely won over not only
Syphax, who as a barbarian was unaccustomed to Roman manners, but even
his deadly enemy. Hasdrubal openly avowed that "he admired Scipio more
now that he had made his personal acquaintance than after his military
successes, and he had no doubt that Syphax and his kingdom were already at
the disposal of Rome, such skill did the Roman possess in winning men. The
question for the Carthaginians was not how Spain had been lost, but how
Africa was to be retained. It was not from a love of travel or a passion for
sailing along pleasant shores that a great Roman commander had quitted his
newly subjugated province and his armies and crossed over with two vessels
to Africa, the land of his enemies, and trusted himself to the untried honour
of a king. His real motive was the hope of becoming master of Africa; this
project he had long been pondering over; he openly complained that 'Scipio
was not conducting war in Africa as Hannibal was in Italy."' After the treaty
with Syphax was concluded Scipio set sail from Africa and, after a four days'
passage in which he was buffeted by changeable and mostly stormy winds,
reached the harbour of New Carthage.
28.19
Spain
was now quiet as far as war with Carthage was concerned, but it was quite
evident that some communities conscious of wrong-doing were kept quiet
more by their fears than by any feeling of loyalty to Rome. Amongst these
Iliturgi and Castulo were foremost in importance and foremost in guilt. As
long as Roman arms were successful Castulo remained true to her alliance;
after the Scipios and their armies were destroyed they revolted to Carthage.
Iliturgi had gone further, for the inhabitants had betrayed and put to death
those who had sought refuge with them after those disasters, thus
aggravating their treason by crime. To take action against these cities
immediately on his arrival in Spain, whilst the issue was still undecided,
might have been justifiable but hardly wise. Now, however, that matters
were settled, it was felt that the hour of punishment had arrived. Scipio sent
orders to L. Marcius to take a third part of his force to Castulo and at once
invest the place, and with the remainder he himself marched to Iliturgi where
he arrived after a five days' march. The gates were closed and every
preparation had been made to repel an assault; the townsmen were quite
conscious of the punishment they deserved, and any formal declaration of
war was, therefore, unnecessary. Scipio made this the subject of his address
to his soldiers. "The Spaniards," he said, "by closing their gates have shown
how well they deserve the punishment which they fear. We must treat them
with much greater severity than we treated the Carthaginians; with the latter
we contend for glory and dominion, with hardly any feeling of anger, but
from the former we have to exact the penalty for cruelty, treachery and
murder. The time has come for you to avenge the atrocious massacre of your
fellow-soldiers and the treachery meditated against yourselves had you been
carried there in your flight. You will make it clear for all time by this awful
example that no one must ever consider a Roman citizen or a Roman soldier
a fit subject for ill-treatment, whatever his condition may be."
Roused by their general's words the men began to prepare for the
assault, storming parties were picked out of all the maniples and supplied
with ladders, and the army was formed into two divisions, one being placed
under the command of Laelius, so that the town might be attacked from
opposite sides and a twofold terror created. The defenders were stimulated
to a determined and prolonged resistance not by their general or their chiefs
but by the fear which came from a consciousness of guilt. With their past
crime in mind they warned each other that the enemy was seeking not
victory so much as vengeance. The question was not how to escape from
death but where to meet it, whether, sword in hand, on the battlefield where
the fortune of war often raises up the vanquished and flings the victor to the
ground, or amidst the ashes of their city before the eyes of their captive
wives and children after being torn with the lash and subjected to shameful
and horrible tortures. With this prospect before them every man who could
carry arms took his part in the fighting, and even the women and children
working beyond their strength supplied missiles to the combatants, and
carried stones up to the walls for those who were strengthening the
defences. Not only was their liberty at stake -that motive only inspires the
brave -but they had before their eyes the very extremity of torture and a
shameful death. As they looked at each other and saw that each was trying
to outdo all the rest in toil and danger, their courage was fired, and they
offered such a furious resistance that the army which had conquered Spain
was again and again repulsed from the walls of one solitary city, and fell
back in confusion after a contest which brought it no honour. Scipio was
afraid that the futile efforts of his troops might raise the enemies' courage
and depress his own men, and he decided to take his part in the fighting and
his share of the danger. Reproaching his soldiers for their cowardice he
ordered the ladders to be brought up and threatened to mount himself if the
rest hung back. He had already reached the foot of the wall and was in
imminent danger when shouts arose on all sides from the soldiers who were
anxious for their commander's safety, and the ladders were at once planted
against the wall. Laelius now delivered his attack from the other side of the
town. This broke the back of the resistance; the walls were cleared of their
defenders and seized by the Romans, and in the tumult the citadel also was
captured on that side where it was considered impregnable.
28.20
Its
capture was effected by some African deserters who were serving with the
Romans. Whilst the attention of the townsmen was directed to defending the
positions which appeared to be in danger and the assailants were mounting
their ladders wherever they could approach the walls, these men noticed that
the highest part of the city, which was protected by precipitous cliffs, was
left unfortified and undefended. These Africans, men of light make and
through constant training extremely agile, were furnished with iron hooks,
and where the projections of the cliff gave them a footing they climbed it,
when they came to a place where it was too steep or too smooth they fixed
the hooks in at moderate intervals and used them as steps, those in front
pulling up those behind, and those below pushing up those above them. In
this way, they managed to reach the top, and no sooner had they done so
than they ran down with loud shouts into the city which the Romans had
already captured. And now the hatred and resentment which had prompted
the attack on the city showed itself. No one thought of making prisoners or
securing plunder though everything was at the mercy of the spoilers; the
scene was one of indiscriminate butchery, non-combatants together with
those in arms, women equally with men were all alike massacred; the ruthless
savagery extended even to the slaughter of infants. Then they flung lighted
brands on the houses and what the fire could not consume was completely
demolished. So bent were they upon obliterating every vestige of the city,
and blotting out all record of their foes. From there Scipio marched to
Castulo. This place was being defended by natives from the surrounding
towns and also by the remains of the Carthaginian army who had gathered
there after their flight. But Scipio's approach had been preceded by the news
of the fall of Iliturgi, and this spread dismay and despair everywhere. The
interests of the Carthaginians and of the Spaniards were quite distinct, each
party consulted for its own safety without regard to the other, and what was
at first mutual suspicion soon led to an open rupture between them.
Cerdubelus openly advised the Spaniards to surrender, Himilco, the
Carthaginian commander, counselled resistance. Cerdubelus came to a secret
understanding with the Roman general, and betrayed the city and the
Carthaginians into his hands. More clemency was shown in this victory; the
town was not so deeply involved in guilt and the voluntary surrender went
far to soften any feelings of resentment.
28.21
After
this Marcius was sent to reduce to submission any tribes that had not yet
been subjugated. Scipio returned to New Carthage to discharge his vows and
to exhibit the gladiatorial spectacle which he had prepared in honour of the
memory of his father and his uncle. The gladiators on this occasion were not
drawn from the class from which the trainers usually take them -slaves and
men who sell their blood -but were all volunteers and gave their services
gratuitously. Some had been sent by their chiefs to give an exhibition of the
instinctive courage of their race, others professed their willingness to fight
out of compliment to their general, others again were drawn by a spirit of
rivalry to challenge one another to single combat. There were several who
had outstanding quarrels with one another and who agreed to seize this
opportunity of deciding them by the sword on the agreed condition that the
vanquished was to be at the disposal of the victor. It was not only obscure
individuals who were doing this. Two distinguished members of the native
nobility, Corbis and Orsua, first cousins to each other, who were disputing
the primacy of a city called Ibes gave out that they intended to settle their
dispute with the sword. Corbis was the elder of the two, but Orsua's father
had been the last to hold that dignity, having succeeded his brother. Scipio
wanted them to discuss the question calmly and peaceably, but as they had
refused to do so at the request of their own relations, they told him that they
would not accept the arbitrament of any one, whether god or man except
Mars, and to him alone would they appeal. The elder relied upon his
strength, the younger on his youth; they both preferred to fight to the death
rather than that one should be subject to the commands of the other. They
presented a striking spectacle to the army and an equally striking proof of
the mischief which the passion for power works amongst men. The elder
cousin by his familiarity with arms and his dexterity easily prevailed over the
rough untrained strength of the younger. The gladiatorial contests were
followed by funeral games with all the pomp which the resources of the
province and the camp could furnish.
28.22
Meantime Scipio's lieutenants were by no
means inactive. Marcius crossed the Baetis, called by the natives the Certis,
and received the surrender of two cities without striking a blow. Astapa was
a city which had always been on the side of Carthage. But it was not this that
created a strong feeling of resentment so much as its extraordinary hatred
against the Romans, far more than was justified by the necessities of war.
Neither the situation nor the fortifications of the city were such as to inspire
its inhabitants with confidence, but their love of brigandage induced them to
make raids on the territories of their neighbours who were allies of Rome. In
these excursions they made a practice of capturing any Roman soldiers or
camp sutlers or traders whom they came across. As it was dangerous to
travel in small parties, large companies used to travel together and one of
these whilst crossing the frontier was surprised by the brigands who were
lying in ambush, and all were killed. When the Roman army advanced to
attack the place, the inhabitants, fully aware of the chastisement which their
crime merited, felt quite certain that the enemy were too much incensed to
allow of any hope of safety in surrender. Despairing of protection either in
their walls or their arms, they resolved upon a deed equally cruel and
horrible to themselves and to those who belonged to them. Collecting the
more valuable of their possessions they piled them up into a heap in a
selected place in their forum. On this pile they ordered their wives and
children to take their seats and then heaped round them a quantity of wood,
on the top of which they threw dead brushwood. Fifty armed men were told
off to guard their possessions and the persons of those who were dearer than
their possessions, and the following instructions were given them: "Remain
on guard as long as the battle is doubtful, but if you see that is going against
us, and the city is on the point of being captured, you know that those whom
you see going into action will never return alive, and we implore you by all
the gods celestial and infernal in the name of liberty, liberty which will end in
either an honourable death or a dishonourable servitude, that you leave
nothing on which a savage enemy can vent his rage. Fire and sword are in
your hands. Better that faithful and loving hands should make away with
what is doomed to die than that the enemy should add mockery and scorn to
murder. "These admonitions were followed by a dire curse on any one who
was turned from his purpose by hope of life or by softheartedness.
Then they flung open the gates and burst out in a tumultuous
charge. There was no advanced post strong enough to check them, for the
last thing to be feared was that the besieged would venture outside their
walls. One or two troops of horse and some light infantry were sent against
them from the camp, and a fierce irregular fight ensued in which the troopers
who had been first to come into collision with the enemy were routed, and
this created a panic amongst the light infantry. The attack would have been
pushed even to the foot of the rampart if the pick of the legions had not
made the most of the few minutes allowed them for getting into line. As it
was, there was at first some wavering amongst the front ranks, for the
enemy, blinded by rage, rushed with mad recklessness upon wounds and
death. Then the veterans who came up in support, unshaken by the frantic
onset, cut down the front ranks and stayed the advance of those behind.
When in their turn they tried to force the enemy back they found that not a
man would give ground, they were all resolved to die where they stood. On
this the Romans extended their lines, which their superiority in numbers
enabled them to do easily, until they outflanked the enemy, who fighting in a
compact body were killed to a man.
28.23
The
wholesale slaughter was at any rate the work of an exasperated soldiery who
met their armed foes in the shock of open battle. But a much more horrible
butchery took place in the city, where a weak and defenceless crowd of
women and children were massacred by their own people, and their still
writhing bodies flung on to the lighted pile which was again almost
extinguished by the streams of blood. And last of all the men themselves,
exhausted by the pitiful slaughter of those dear to them, flung themselves
arms and all into the midst of the flames. All had perished by the time the
Romans came on the scene. At first they stood horror-struck at such a
fearful sight, then, seeing the melted gold and silver flowing amongst the
other articles which made up the heap, the greediness common to human
nature impelled them to try and snatch what they could out of the fire. Some
were caught by the flames, others were scorched by the heated air, for those
in front could not retreat owing to the crowd pressing on behind. Thus
Astapa was destroyed without yielding any plunder to the soldiers. After
accepting the surrender of the remaining cities in that district Marcius led his
victorious army back to Scipio at New Carthage. Just at this time some
deserters came from Gades and promised to deliver up the city with its
Carthaginian garrison and the commandant and also the ships in the harbour.
After his flight Mago had taken up his quarters in that city, and with the help
of the ships which he had assembled he had got together a considerable
force, partly from the opposite coast of Africa and partly through the agency
of Hanno from the Spanish tribes round. After guarantees of good faith had
been given on both sides, Scipio sent Marcius with the cohorts of light
infantry and Laelius with seven triremes and one quinquereme to conduct
joint operations against the place by sea and land.
28.24
Scipio
was overtaken by a serious illness, which rumour, however, made still more
serious, as each man from the innate love of exaggeration added some fresh
detail to what he had already heard. The whole of Spain, especially the
remoter parts, was much agitated at the news, and it was easy to judge what
an amount of trouble would have been caused by his actual death from
seeing what storms arose from the groundless rumour of it. Friendly states
did not preserve their fidelity, the army did not remain loyal. Mandonius and
Indibilis had made up their minds, that after the expulsion of the
Carthaginians the sovereignty of Spain would pass to them. When they
found that their hopes were frustrated they called out their countrymen, the
Lacetani, and raised a force amongst the Celtiberians with which they
ravaged the country of the Suessitanians and the Sedetanians, who were
allies of Rome. A disturbance of a different kind, an act of madness on the
part of the Romans themselves, occurred in the camp at Sucro. It was held
by a force of 8000 men who were stationed there to protect the tribes on this
side the Ebro. The vague rumours about their commander's life were not
however the primary cause of their movement. A long period of inactivity
had, as usual, demoralised them, and they chafed against the restraints of
peace after being accustomed to live on the plunder captured from the
enemy. At first their discontent was confined to murmurs amongst
themselves. "If there is war going on in the province," they said, "what are
we doing here amongst a peaceable population? If the war is at an end why
are we not taken back to Rome? "Then they demanded their arrears of pay
with an insolence quite inconsistent with military discipline or the respect
which soldiers should show towards their officers. The men at the outposts
insulted the tribunes as they went their rounds of inspection, and some went
off during the night to plunder the peaceable inhabitants in the
neighbourhood, till at last they used to quit their standards in broad daylight
without leave. They did everything just as their caprice and fancy dictated,
no attention was paid to rules or discipline or to the orders of their officers.
One thing alone helped to keep up the outward aspect of a Roman camp and
that was the hope which the men entertained that the tribunes would become
infected with their madness and take part in their mutiny. In this hope they
allowed them to administer justice from their tribunals, they went to them for
the watchword and the orders of the day, and relieved guard at the proper
intervals. Thus after depriving them of any real authority they kept up the
appearance of obedience, whilst they were actually their own commanders.
When they found that the tribunes censured and reprobated their
proceedings and endeavoured to repress them, and openly declared that they
would have nothing to do with their insensate folly, they broke out into open
mutiny. They drove the tribunes from their official seats, and then out of the
camp, and amidst universal acclamation placed the supreme command in the
hands of the chief ringleaders of the mutiny, two common soldiers whose
names were C. Albius of Cales and C. Atrius, an Umbrian. These men were
by no means content to wear the insignia of the military tribunes, they had
the audacity to affect those of the chief magistrates, the fasces and the axes.
It never occurred to them that those symbols which they had carried before
them to strike fear into others were impending over their own backs and
necks. The false belief that Scipio was dead blinded them; they felt certain
that the spread of this report would kindle the flames of war throughout the
whole of Spain. In the general turmoil they imagined that they would be able
to levy contributions on the allies of Rome and plunder the cities round
them, and when crime and outrage were being committed everywhere, what
they had done would not be noticed in the universal confusion.
28.25
They
were every hour expecting fresh details of Scipio's death, and even news of
his funeral. None came however and the idle rumours by degrees died away.
Then they began to look for those who started the report, but each in turn
kept out of the way, preferring to be thought credulous rather than
suspected of inventing such a story. Abandoned by their followers, the
ringleaders looked with dread upon the insignia they had assumed, and fully
expected that in return for this idle show of power they would draw down
upon themselves the weight of the true and legitimate authority. While the
mutiny was thus at a standstill, definite information was brought that Scipio
was alive and this was soon followed by the further intelligence that his
health was restored. This intelligence was brought by a party of seven
military tribunes, whom Scipio had sent to Sucro. At first their presence was
strongly resented, but the quiet talks they had with those they happened to
know had a calming effect; they visited the soldiers in their tents, and chatted
with the groups which gathered round the tribunals or in front of the
headquarters tent. They made no reference to the treason the soldiers had
been guilty of, but only questioned them as to the causes of the sudden
outbreak. They were told in reply that the men did not get their pay
punctually, nor their due share of credit for the part they had played in the
campaign. It was by their courage, they asserted, that the Roman name was
preserved and the province saved for the republic after the destruction of the
two armies and their commanders, at the time when the Iliturgans committed
their foul crime. And though they had received the just recompense for their
treason, no one had been found to reward the Roman soldiers for their
meritorious services.
In reply to these and similar complaints the tribunes told the men
that their requests were reasonable and they would lay them before the
general. They were glad that these were nothing worse or harder to set right,
and the men might rest assured that P. Scipio, after the favour the gods had
shown him, and, indeed, the whole State, would show their gratitude. Scipio
was experienced in war, but unfamiliar with the storms of internal
disturbances. Two things made him anxious, the possibility of the army
exceeding all measure in its insubordination, or of his inflicting punishments
which would be excessive. For the present he decided to go on as he had
begun, and handle the matter gently. Collectors were sent among the
tributary states so that the soldiers might hope to receive their pay soon. An
order was shortly after issued for them to assemble at New Carthage for that
purpose; they might go in a body or successively in single detachments as
they preferred. The unrest was already dying down when the sudden
cessation of hostilities on the part of the revolted Spaniards completely
stopped it. When Mandonius and Indibilis heard that Scipio was still alive,
they gave up their enterprise and retired within their frontiers, and the
mutineers could no longer find any one either amongst their own countrymen
or amongst the natives who would associate himself with their mad scheme.
After carefully considering every possible plan they saw that the only way of
escaping the consequences of their evil counsels, and that not a very hopeful
way, was to submit themselves either to the just displeasure of their general
or to his clemency, which they were not without hopes of experiencing. They
argued that he had ever pardoned the enemies of his country after armed
conflict, whereas during their mutiny not a wound had been received or a
drop of blood shed, it had been free from all cruelty and did not deserve a
cruel punishment. So ready are men with reasons when they wish to palliate
their own misconduct. There was considerable hesitation as to whether they
should go to receive their pay separately cohort by cohort. or all together.
The latter course seemed the safer and they decided upon it.
28.26
Whilst
they were discussing these points a council of war was being held over them
in New Carthage. The members were divided; some thought it sufficient to
proceed only against the ringleaders, who did not number more than
five-and-thirty; others regarded it as an act of high treason rather than a
mutiny and held that such a bad example could only be dealt with by the
punishment of the many who were implicated. The more merciful view, that
punishment should only fall on those with whom the mischief originated,
finally prevailed; for the troops generally a severe reprimand was considered
sufficient. On the breaking up of the council the army stationed in Carthage
was informed that an expedition was to be made against Mandonius and
Indibilis, and that rations were to be prepared for several days in advance.
The object was to make it appear that this was the business for which the
council had been held. The seven tribunes who had been sent to Sucro to
quell the mutiny now returned in advance of the troops, and each handed in
the names of five ringleaders. Suitable men had been told off to meet the
culprits with smiles and pleasant words, and invite them to their houses, and
when they had drunk themselves into a state of stupor place them in fetters.
When the men were now not far from New Carthage they were informed by
people who met them that the whole of the army at Carthage were starting
on the morrow with M. Silanus against the Lacetanians. This news did not
completely dispel the secret fears which haunted their minds, still they were
greatly rejoiced to hear it, as they imagined that now that their commander
would be alone, they would have him in their power, instead of their being in
his.
The sun was setting when they entered the city, and they found the
other army making all preparations for their march. It had been arranged
beforehand how they were to be received, they were told that their
commander was glad that they had arrived when they did, just before the
other army left. They then dispersed for food and rest, and the ringleaders
were conducted by the men selected for the purpose to their houses, where
they were entertained, and where the tribunes arrested and manacled them
without any disturbance. At the fourth watch the baggage train of the army
began to move for its pretended march; at daybreak the standards went
forward, but the whole army was halted as soon as it reached the gate, and
guards were posted round all the gates to prevent any one from leaving the
city. The newly arrived troops were then summoned to an assembly, and
they ran into the forum and crowded threateningly round their general's
tribunal, expecting to intimidate him by their shouts. At the moment when he
ascended his tribunal the troops who had marched back from the gate and
were fully armed surrounded the unarmed crowd. Now their rebellious spirit
was completely cowed, and, as they afterwards admitted, the thing that they
were most afraid of was the colour and vigour of their chief whom they
expected to see looking weak and ill, and the expression in his face such as
they had never witnessed before, not even in the heat of battle. For some
time he sat in silence, until he received information that the ringleaders had
been brought down to the forum and everything was in readiness.
28.27
After
the usher had obtained silence he made the following speech: "I never
supposed that I should want words in which to address my army, not that I
ever trained myself to speak rather than to act, but that having lived a camp
life from boyhood I have learnt to understand the soldier's character. As to
what I am to say to you now, words and ideas alike fail me; I do not even
know by what title I am to address you. Am I to call you Roman citizens -you who have revolted against your country? Can I call you soldiers when
you have renounced the authority and auspices of your general, and broken
the solemn obligations of your military oath? Your appearance, your
features, your dress, your demeanour I recognise as those of my
fellow-countrymen, but I see that your actions, your language, your designs,
your spirit and temper are those of your country's foes. What difference is
there between your hopes and aims and those of the Ilergetes and the
Lacetanians? And yet they chose men of kingly rank, Mandonius and
Indibilis, to lead them in their madness, whilst you delegated the auspices
and the supreme command to Atrius, an Umbrian, and Albius, a man from
Cales. Do tell me, soldiers, that you did not all join in that or approve of its
being done. I will gladly believe that only a few were guilty of such insensate
folly, if you assure me that this is so. For the crime is of such a nature that
had it involved the whole army it could only have been expiated by a
frightful sacrifice.
"It is painful for me to speak thus, opening up, as it were, wounds,
but unless they are handled and probed they cannot be healed. After the
expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain I did not believe that there were
anywhere people who wished me dead, such had been my conduct towards
friends and enemies alike. And yet, alas so greatly was I mistaken that even
in my own army the report of my death was not only credited but eagerly
looked for. I would not for a moment wish to lay this to the charge of you
all, for if I thought that the whole of my army wished for my death, I would
die here before your eyes. My life would have no attraction for me if it were
hateful to my fellow-countrymen and my soldiers. But every multitude is like
the sea which left to itself is naturally motionless, till winds and gales excite
it. So it is with calm and storms amongst you, the cause and origin of your
madness is to be found in your ringleaders, who infected you with their
frenzy. For you do not seem even now to be aware to what lengths of folly
you have gone or what criminal recklessness you have been guilty of towards
me, towards your country, your parents and your children, towards the gods
who were witnesses of your military oath, towards the auspices under which
your served, towards the traditions of the army and the discipline of our
ancestors, towards the majesty inherent in supreme authority. About myself I
prefer to be silent; you may have lent a thoughtless rather than a willing ear
to the report of my death; I may be a man whose rule might be naturally
expected to prove irksome to his army. But your country -what has it
deserved of you that you should make common cause with Mandonius and
Indibilis for its betrayal? What have the Roman people done that you should
deprive the tribunes whom they elected of their authority, and bestow it on
private individuals? And not content with having such men for tribunes you,
a Roman army, have transferred the fasces of your commander to men who
never possessed a single slave to be at their command! The headquarters tent
was occupied by an Albius and an Atrius; at their doors the trumpet
sounded; to them you went for orders; they were seated on P. Scipio's
tribunal; the lictor was in attendance and cleared the way before them; in
front of them the axes and fasces were borne! When there is a shower of
stones, or buildings are struck by lightning, or animals produce monstrous
offspring, you consider these things as portents. We have here a portent
which no victims, no intercessions can expiate but the blood of those who
have dared such an awful crime.
28.28
"Though no crime is dictated by rational
motives, I should still like to know what was in your mind, what was your
intention, so far as such wickedness admitted of any. Years ago a legion
which was sent to garrison Regium murdered the principal men of the place
and kept possession of that wealthy city for ten years. For this crime the
entire legion of 4000 men were beheaded at Rome in the Forum. But they
did not choose for their leader an Umbrian who was little more than a
camp-follower, an Atrius whose very name is an evil omen. They followed
D. Vibellius, a military tribune. Nor did they join hands with Pyrrhus, or with
the Samnites and Lucanians, the enemies of Rome, but you communicated
your plans to Mandonius and Indibilis and prepared to join them in arms.
They were content to do as the Campanians did when they wrested Capua
from the Tuscans, its old inhabitants, or as the Mamertines did when they
seized Messana in Sicily; they intended to make Regium their future home
without any idea of attacking Rome or the allies of Rome. Did you intend to
make Sucro your permanent abode? If, after subjugating Spain, I had gone
away and left you here you would have rightly complained to gods and men
that you had not returned to your wives and children. But you may have
banished from your minds all thought of them, as you have in the case of
your country and in my own case. I want to trace the course which your
criminal project would have taken, though stopping short of the extreme of
madness. As long as I was alive and retained intact the army with which in
one day I captured New Carthage and defeated and routed four Carthaginian
armies, would you really have wrested the province of Spain from the hands
of Rome, you, a force of some 8000 men, every one of you of less account
at all events than the Albius and Atrius whom you made your masters?
"I put aside and ignore my own honour and reputation, and assume
that I was in no way injured by your too easily crediting the story of my
death. But what then? Supposing I had died, would the commonwealth have
died with me, would the sovereignty of Rome have shared my fate? No,
Jupiter Optimus Maximus would never have allowed a City built for eternity,
built under the auspices and sanction of the gods, to be as short-lived as this
fragile mortal body of mine. C. Flaminius, Aemilius Paulus, Sempronius
Gracchus, Postumius Albinus, M. Marcellus, T. Quinctius Crispinus, Cnaeus
Fulvius, and my own relations, the two Scipios, all of them distinguished
generals, have been carried off in this single war, and yet Rome lives on and
will live on though a thousand more should perish through sickness or the
sword. Would then the republic have been interred in my solitary grave?
Why even you yourselves, after the defeat and death of my father and my
uncle, chose Septimus Marcius to lead you against the Carthaginians, flushed
as they were with their recent victory. I am speaking as though Spain would
have been left without a general; but would not the sovereignty of the empire
have been amply vindicated by M. Silanus, who came into the province
invested with the same power and authority as I myself with my brother
Lucius and C. Laelius as his lieutenants? Can any comparison be made
between their army and you, between their rank and experience and those of
the men you have chosen, between the cause for which they are fighting and
the one which you have taken up? And if you were superior to them all
would you bear arms in company with the Carthaginians against your
country, against your fellow-citizens? What injury have they done to you?"
28.29
"Coriolanus was once driven to make
war on his country by an iniquitous sentence which condemned him to
dishonoured and forlorn exile, but his affection as a son recalled him from
the crime which he was meditating as a citizen. What have you suffered to
call out this bitter hostility? Did you proclaim war against your country, did
you desert the people of Rome in favour of the Ilergetes, did you trample
underfoot all law, human and divine, simply because your pay was a few
days in arrear owing to your general's illness? There is no doubt about it,
soldiers, you were seized with madness; the bodily illness from which I
suffered was not one whit more severe than the mental malady which
overtook you. I shrink with horror from dwelling upon the credit men gave
to rumours, the hopes they entertained, the ambitious schemes they formed.
Let all be forgotten, if possible, or if not that, let silence at least draw a veil
over all. I admit that my words have appeared stern and unfeeling to you, but
how much more unfeeling, think you, has your conduct been than anything I
have said? You imagine that it is right and proper for me to tolerate your
actions, and yet you have not patience to hear them mentioned. Bad as they
are however, I will not reproach you with them any longer; I only wish you
may forget them as easily as I shall. As for the army as a body, if you
sincerely repent of your wrongdoing you give me satisfaction enough and
more than enough. Albius of Cales and Atrius of Umbria with the other
ringleaders in this detestable mutiny will expiate their crime with their blood.
The sight of their punishment ought to give you satisfaction rather than pain,
if indeed you have recovered your sanity, for their designs would have
proved more mischievous and destructive to you than to any one else." He
had hardly finished speaking when, at a preconcerted signal, the eyes and
ears of his audience were assailed by everything which could terrify and
appal. The army which was on guard all round the assembly clashed their
swords against their shields, and the voice of the usher was heard calling
over the names of those who had been sentenced in the council or war.
These were stripped to the waist and conducted into the middle of the
assembly; all the apparatus of punishment was at once brought out; they
were tied to the stake, scourged and finally beheaded. The spectators were
so benumbed by terror that no voice was raised against the severity of the
punishment, not even a groan was heard. Then the bodies were all dragged
away, and after the place was cleansed, the soldiers were summoned each by
name to take the oath of obedience to P. Scipio before the military tribunes.
Then they each received the pay due to them. Such was the end and issue of
the mutiny which started amongst the soldiers at Sucro.
28.30
Hanno, Mago's lieutenant, had been
despatched during this time, with a small body of Africans to hire troops
among the Spanish tribes, and succeeded in raising 4000 men. Soon
afterwards, his camp was captured by L. Marcius, most of his men were
killed in the assault, some during their flight by the pursuing cavalry; Hanno
himself escaped with a handful of his men. Whilst this was going on at the
Baetis Laelius sailed westward and brought up at Carteia, a city situated on
that part of the coast where the Straits begin to widen into the ocean. Some
men had come into the Roman camp with a voluntary offer to surrender the
city of Gades, but the plot was discovered before it was ripe. All the
conspirators were arrested and Mago handed them over to the custody of
Adherbal for conveyance to Carthage. Adherbal placed them on board a
quinquereme which was sent on in advance as it was a slower vessel than the
eight triremes with which he followed shortly after The quinquereme was
just entering the Straits when Laelius sailed out of the harbour of Carteia in
another quinquereme followed by seven triremes. He bore straight down
upon Adherbal, feeling quite sure that the quinquereme could not be brought
round, as it was caught by the current sweeping through the channel.
Surprised by this unsuspected attack, the Carthaginian general
hesitated for a few moments whether to follow his quinquereme or turn his
prows against the enemy. This hesitation put it out of his power to decline
the contest, for they were now within range of one another's missiles, and
the enemy were pressing on him on all sides. The strength of the tide
prevented them from steering their ships as they wished. There was no
semblance of a naval battle, no freedom of action, no room for tactics or
maneuvers. The tidal currents completely dominated the action and carried
the ships against their own side and against the enemy indiscriminately, in
spite of all the efforts of the rowers. You might see a ship which was
endeavouring to escape carried stem foremost against the victors, whilst the
one pursuing it, if it got into an opposing current, was swept back as though
it were the one in flight. And when they were actually engaged and one ship
was making for another in order to ram it, it would swerve from its course
and receive a side-blow from the other's beak, whilst the one which was
coming broadside on would suddenly be swung round and present its prow.
So the varying struggle of the triremes went on, directed and controlled by
Chance. The Roman quinquereme answered the helm better, either because
its weight made it steadier, or because it had more banks of oars to cut
through the waves. It sank two triremes, and sweeping rapidly past a third
sheared off all the oars on one side, and it would have disabled the rest if
Adherbal had not got clear away with the remaining five, and crowding all
sail reached Africa.
28.31
After
his victory Laelius returned to Carteia where he learnt what had been going
on at Gades, how the plot had been discovered and the conspirators sent to
Carthage. As the purpose for which he had come was thus frustrated he sent
word to L. Marcius, saying that if they did not wish to waste their time by
sitting before Gades, they ought both to rejoin their commander-in-chief.
Marcius quite agreed, and they both returned in a few days to New
Carthage. On their departure Mago breathed more freely after having been
threatened by the double danger from land and sea, and on receiving
intelligence of the renewal of hostilities by the Ilergetes, he once more
entertained hopes of reconquering Spain. Messengers were despatched to
Carthage, to lay before the senate a highly coloured account of the mutiny in
the Roman camp and the defection of the allies of Rome, and at the same
time strongly urge that assistance should be sent to him in order that he
might win back the heritage left him by his ancestors, the sovereignty of
Spain. Mandonius and Indibilis had retired for some time within their borders
and were quietly waiting till they knew what was decided with regard to the
mutiny. They felt no doubt that if Scipio pardoned the offence of his own
fellow-countrymen, he would exercise clemency towards them also. But
when the severity of the punishment became generally known they were
convinced that equal measure would be meted out to them, and so they
decided to resume hostilities. They summoned their tribesmen once more to
arms, and called out the auxiliaries who had joined them before, and with a
force of 20,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry they crossed their frontiers and
marched to their old camping ground in Sedetania.
28.32
By his
punctual payment of arrears to all alike, the guilty as well as the innocent,
and by his affable tone and bearing towards every one, Scipio soon regained
the affection of his soldiers. Before he broke up his quarters at New
Carthage, he called his troops together and after denouncing at some length
the treachery of the two chiefs in recommencing war went on to say that the
temper in which he was going to avenge that crime was very different from
the spirit in which he had recently healed the fault of his misled
fellow-citizens. Then he felt as if he were tearing his own vitals, when with
groans and tears he expiated either the thoughtlessness or the guilt of 8000
men at the cost of thirty lives. Now it was in a cheerful and confident spirit
that he was marching to the destruction of the Ilergetes. They were not
natives of the same soil with him, nor was there any treaty bond between
them; the only bond was that of honour and friendship, and that they had
themselves broken by their crime. When he looked at his own army he saw
that they were all either Roman citizens or Latin allies, but what affected him
most was the fact that there was hardly a single soldier amongst them who
had not been brought from Italy, either by his uncle Cnaeus Scipio, who was
the first Roman general to come into that province, or by his father or else
by himself. They were all of them accustomed to the name and auspices of
the Scipios, and he wanted to take them back with him to their country to
enjoy a well-earned triumph. Should he become a candidate for the
consulship he hoped that they would support him, as the honour conferred
on him would belong to them all. As to the expedition in front of them the
man who regarded it as a war must have forgotten all that he had hitherto
done. Mago, who had fled with a few ships to an island surrounded by an
ocean; beyond the limits of the world of men, was, he assured them, more of
a concern to him than the Ilergetes were, for a Carthaginian general and a
Carthaginian garrison, however small, were still there, but here there were
only brigands and brigand chiefs. They may be strong enough to plunder
their neighbours' fields and burn their houses and carry off their flocks and
herds but they have no courage for a pitched battle and an open field; when
they have to fight they will trust more to their swiftness for flight than to
their weapons. It was not, therefore, because he saw that there was any
danger from them, or any prospect of serious war that he was marching to
crush the Ilergetes before his departure from the province, but because such
a criminal revolt must not go unpunished, and also because it must not be
said that a single enemy has been left behind in a province which by such
courage and good fortune has been reduced to submission. "Follow me
then," he said, in conclusion, "with the kind help of heaven, not to make war
-for you have to do with an enemy who is no match for you -but to inflict
punishment upon men steeped in crime."
28.33
The
men were then dismissed with orders to make their preparations for the next
day's departure. Ten days after leaving New Carthage he reached the Ebro,
and within four days of his passage of the river he came within view of the
enemy. In front of his camp there was a level stretch of ground shut in on
either side by mountains. Scipio ordered some cattle taken mostly from the
enemy's fields to be driven towards the hostile camp in order to rouse the
savagery of the barbarians. Laelius was instructed to remain with his cavalry
in concealment behind a projecting mountain spur, and when the light
infantry who went to guard the cattle had drawn the enemy into a skirmish
he was to charge from his hiding-place. The battle soon began, the Spaniards
on catching sight of the cattle rushed out to secure them, and the skirmishers
attacked them while occupied with their plunder. At first the two sides
harassed one another with missiles, then they discharged light darts, which
are more likely to provoke than to decide a battle, and at last they drew their
swords. It would have been a steady hand-to-hand fight if the cavalry had
not come up. They not only made a frontal attack, riding down all in their
way, but some galloped round the foot of the mountain so as to cut off the
retreat of the enemy. There was more slaughter than usually occurs in
skirmishes of this kind, and the barbarians were infuriated rather than
disheartened at their want of success.
In order, therefore, to show that they were not defeated, they
marched out to battle the next morning at daybreak. There was not room for
them all in the narrow valley, described above; two divisions of their infantry
and the whole of their cavalry occupied the plain and the rest of their infantry
were posted on the slope of a hill. Scipio saw that the confined space would
give him an advantage. Fighting on a narrow front was more adapted to
Roman than to Spanish tactics, and as the enemy had brought his line into a
position where he could not employ all his strength, Scipio adopted a novel
stratagem. As there was no room for him to outflank the enemy with his own
cavalry, and as the enemy's cavalry which was massed with the infantry
would be useless where it was, he gave Laelius orders to make a detour
along the hills, escaping observation as far as possible, and keep the cavalry
action distinct from the infantry battle. Scipio led the whole of his infantry
against the enemy with a front of four cohorts, as it was impossible to extend
further. He did not lose a moment in beginning the fight, for he hoped that in
the heat of battle his cavalry might execute their maneuver unnoticed. Nor
were the enemy aware of their movements till they heard the sounds of battle
in their rear. So two separate contests were going on through the whole
length of the valley, one between the infantry and the other between the
cavalry, and the narrow width of the valley prevented the two armies from
assisting each other or acting in concert. The Spanish infantry, who had gone
into action trusting to the support of their cavalry, were cut to pieces and the
cavalry, unable to stand the attack of the Roman infantry after their own had
all fallen, and taken in rear by Laelius and his cavalry, closed up and for a
time stood their ground and kept up their resistance, but at last all were
killed to a man. Not a single combatant out of the cavalry and infantry which
fought in the valley remained alive. The third division which had been
standing on the mountain side, looking on in safety instead of participating in
the fight, had room and time enough to make good their retreat. Amongst
them were the two chieftains, who escaped in the confusion before the entire
army was surrounded.
28.34
The
Spanish camp was captured the same day and in addition to the rest of the
booty 3000 prisoners were secured. As many as 2000 Romans and allies fell
in the battle; the wounded amounted to more than 3000. The victory would
not have been so costly had the battle been fought in a wider plain where
flight would have been easier. Indibilis laid aside all idea of continuing the
war, and thought that the safest course, considering his hopeless position,
would be to throw himself on Scipio's well-known clemency and honour. He
sent his brother Mandonius to him. Throwing himself on his knees before the
victor he put everything down to the fatal frenzy of the time, which like
some pestilential contagion had infected not only the Ilergetes and
Lacetanians but even a Roman army with madness. He declared that he and
his brother and the rest of their countrymen were in such a condition that
they would, if he thought it right, give back their lives to the same P. Scipio
from whom they had received them, or, if they were spared a second time,
they would devote the whole of their lives to the one man to whom they
owed them. Previously they had trusted to the strength of their cause and
had not made trial of his clemency, now that their cause was hopeless they
put all their trust in their conqueror's mercy. It was the traditional practice of
the Romans, in the case of a conquered nation with whom no friendly
relations had previously existed either through treaty or community of rights
and laws, not to accept their submission or allow any terms of peace until all
their possessions sacred and profane had been surrendered, hostages given,
their arms taken away and garrisons placed in their cities. In the present
instance however, Scipio, after sternly reprimanding Mandonius and the
absent Indibilis at considerable length, said that their lives were justly
forfeited by their crime, but that through his own kindness and that of the
Roman people, they would be spared. He would not, however, demand
hostages, since these were only a security for those who feared a fresh
outbreak of hostilities, nor would he take away their arms, he would leave
their minds at rest. But if they revolted it was not unoffending hostages but
they themselves who would feel the weight of his arm; he would inflict
punishment not upon a defenceless but upon an armed foe. He would leave it
to them whether they preferred the favour or the wrath of Rome; they had
experience of both. So Mandonius was dismissed, the only condition
imposed upon him being a pecuniary indemnity sufficient to furnish the pay
which was owing to the troops. After sending Marcius on in advance into
Southern Spain, Scipio stayed where he was for a few days until the
Ilergetes paid over the indemnity and then, setting out with a light-armed
force, overtook Marcius who was already nearing the ocean.
28.35
The
negotiations which had been begun with Masinissa were delayed for various
reasons. He wanted in any case to meet Scipio personally and to grasp his
hand in confirmation of the league between them, and this was the reason
why Scipio undertook at that time such a long and out-of-the-way journey.
Masinissa was at Gades, and on being informed by Marcius that Scipio was
coming, he represented to Mago that his horses were getting out of
condition through being confined in so small an island, and were causing a
general scarcity from which all alike suffered, whilst his cavalry were
becoming enervated through inaction. He persuaded the Carthaginian
commander to allow him to cross to the mainland for the purpose of
plundering the adjacent country. When he had landed he sent three Numidian
chieftains to Scipio to fix the time and place of the interview. Two were to
be detained by Scipio as hostages, the third was to be sent back to conduct
Masinissa to the place that had been decided upon. They came to the
conference, each with a small escort. From what he had heard of his
achievements the Numidian had already conceived a great admiration for the
Roman commander and had pictured him in imagination as a man of grand
and imposing presence. But when he saw him he felt a deeper veneration for
him. The majesty, natural to Scipio, was heightened by his flowing hair and
the simplicity of his general appearance, which was devoid of all adornment
and decoration, and in the highest degree manly and soldierly. He was at the
most vigorous time of life, and his recovery from his recent illness had given
him a freshness and clearness of complexion which renewed the bloom of
youth.
Almost speechless with astonishment at this his first meeting with
him, the Numidian began by thanking him for having sent his nephew home.
From that moment, he declared, he had looked for such an opportunity as
this of expressing his gratitude, and now that one was offered him by the
kindness of heaven he would not let it slip. He was desirous of rendering
such service to Scipio and to Rome that no one of foreign birth might ever
be found to have afforded more zealous assistance. This had long been his
wish, but Spain was a strange and unknown land to him, and he had been
unable to carry out his purpose there; it would, however, be easy to do it in
the land of his birth, where he had been brought up in the expectation of
succeeding to his father's throne. If the Romans sent Scipio as their general
into Africa, he felt pretty certain that the time of Carthage would be very
short. Scipio watched him and listened to him with great pleasure. He knew
that Masinissa was the master-spirit in all the enemy's cavalry, and the
youth's whole bearing showed high courage. After they had pledged their
faith to each other, Scipio returned to Tarraco. Masinissa was allowed by the
Romans to carry off plunder from the adjacent fields, in order that he might
not be thought to have sailed across to the mainland without sufficient cause.
After this he returned to Gades.
28.36
Mago's hopes had been raised by the
mutiny in the Roman camp and the revolt of Indibilis. Now he despaired of
effecting anything in Spain and made preparations for his departure. Whilst
he was so employed a despatch came from the Carthaginian senate ordering
him to take the fleet which he had at Gades over to Italy, and after raising as
large a force as possible of Gauls and Ligurians in that country to form a
junction with Hannibal and not allow the war which had been begun with so
much energy and even more success to drag on lifelessly. Money was
brought to him from Carthage for the purpose, and he also requisitioned as
much as he could from the people in Gades. Not only their public treasury
but even their temples were plundered, and they were all compelled to
contribute their private stores of gold and silver. Sailing along the Spanish
coast, he landed a force not far from New Carthage, and plundered the
nearest fields, after which he brought up his fleet at the city. During the day
he kept his men on board, and did not disembark them till night. He then
took them to that part of the city wall where the Romans had effected the
capture of the place; thinking that the city was held by a weak garrison and
that there would be a movement amongst some of the townsmen who hoped
for a change of masters. The country people, however, who were fleeing
from their fields had brought news of the depredations and approach of the
enemy. His fleet had also been seen during the day, and it was obvious that
they would not have taken their station before the city without some special
reason. An armed force was accordingly drawn up outside the gate which
faced the sea. The enemy approached the walls in disorder, soldiers and
seamen were mixed together, and there was much more noise and tumult
than fighting strength. Suddenly the gate was thrown open and the Romans
burst out with a cheer; the enemy were thrown into confusion, turned their
backs at the very first discharge of missiles and were pursued with heavy loss
down to the shore. If the ships had not been brought up close to the beach
and so afforded a means of escape, not a single fugitive would have
survived. On the ships, too, there was hurry and confusion; the crews drew
up the ladders, lest the enemy should clamber on board with their comrades,
and cut the cables and hawsers so as not to lose time in weighing anchor.
Many who tried to swim to the ships could not see in the darkness what
direction to take or what dangers to avoid, and perished miserably. The next
day, after the fleet had regained the ocean, it was discovered that 800 men
had been killed between the wall and the shore and as many as 2000 arms of
different kinds picked up.
28.37
On his
return to Gades, Mago found the gates closed against him, so he anchored
off Cimbii, a place not far from Gades, and sent envoys to lodge a complaint
against the gates being closed to him, an ally and a friend. They excused
themselves by saying that it was done by a gathering of the townsmen who
were incensed at some acts of pillage committed by the soldiers during the
embarkation. He invited their sufetes -the title of their supreme magistrate -together with the city treasurer to a conference, and when they were come
he ordered them to be scourged and crucified. From there he sailed to
Pityusa, an island about a hundred miles distant from the mainland, which
had at the time a Phoenician population. Here the fleet naturally met with a
friendly reception, and not only were supplies furnished on a generous scale
but he received reinforcements for his fleet in the shape of arms and men.
Thus encouraged, the Carthaginian sailed on to the Balearic Isles, a voyage
of about fifty miles. There are two islands so called; the larger one was better
supplied with arms and contained a more numerous population; it also
possessed a harbour where Mago thought he could conveniently shelter his
fleet for the winter, as the autumn was now closing. But his fleet met with
quite as hostile a reception as if the island had been inhabited by Romans.
The sling which the Balearics make most use of today was at that time their
sole weapon, and no nation comes near them in the skill with which they
handle it. When the Carthaginians tried to approach the land such a shower
of stones fell upon them like a violent hailstorm that they did not venture
inside the harbour. Putting out once more to sea they approached the smaller
island, which possessed a fertile soil, but fewer resources in men and arms.
Here they landed and encamped in a strong position commanding the
harbour, from which they became masters of the island without meeting any
resistance. They raised a force of 2000 auxiliaries which they sent to
Carthage and then beached their ships for the winter. After Mago's departure
Gades surrendered to the Romans.
28.38
Such
is the record of Scipio's command in Spain. After handing over the charge of
the province to the proconsuls L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, he set
sail with ten ships for Rome. On his arrival a meeting of the senate was held
at the temple of Bellona, at which he gave a report of all he had done in
Spain, how many pitched battles he had fought, how many towns he had
captured, and what tribes he had brought under the dominion of Rome. He
asserted that when he arrived in Spain he found four Carthaginian armies
opposed to him; when he. left, there was not a single Carthaginian in the
country. He was not without hope that a triumph might be accorded to him
for his services; he did not, however, press his demand for one, as it was
quite understood that no one had up to that time enjoyed a triumph who was
not invested with a magistracy. After the senate had been dismissed, he made
his entry into the City and had borne before him 14,342 pounds of silver and
a great quantity of silver coins, all of which he, deposited in the treasury. L.
Veturius Philo now proceeded to hold the consular elections, and all the
centuries voted amidst much enthusiasm for Scipio. Publius Licinius Crassus,
the Pontifex Maximus, was elected as his colleague. It is recorded that a
larger number of voters took part in that election than at any other time
during the war. They had come from all parts, not only to give their votes,
but also to get sight of Scipio; they flocked in crowds round his house, and
at the Capitol when he sacrificed the hecatomb which he had vowed to
Jupiter in Spain. They assured themselves that as C. Lutatius had brought the
First Punic War to a close, so Scipio would terminate this one, and as he had
driven the Carthaginians out of Spain, so he would drive them out of Italy.
They were marking out Africa as his province just as though the war in Italy
was at an end. Then followed the election of praetors. Two of those elected
-Spurius Lucretius and Cnaeus Octavius -were plebeian aediles at the time;
the others -Cnaeus Servilius Caepio and L. Aemilius Papus -were not
holding any office. It was in the fourteenth year of the Second Punic War
(B.C. 205) that P. Cornelius Scipio and P. Licinius Crassus entered on their
consulship. In the assignment of the consular provinces Scipio with his
colleague's consent took Sicily without recourse to the ballot, because
Crassus, as Pontifex Maximus, was prevented by his sacred duties from
leaving Italy; he therefore took Bruttium. The praetors then balloted for their
provinces. The City jurisdiction fell to Cnaeus Servilius; Spurius Lucretius
received Ariminum, as the province of Gaul was then called; Sicily fell to L.
Aemilius and Sardinia to Cnaeus Octavius.
28.39
The
senate held a session in the Capitol. A resolution was passed on the motion
of P. Scipio that he should celebrate the Games which he had vowed during
the mutiny and defray the cost out of the money which he had brought into
the treasury. Then he introduced a deputation from Saguntum, the senior
member of which addressed the House in the following terms: "Although
there is no form of suffering, senators, which we have not endured in order
to keep our faith with you to the last, still the kindness which you and your
generals have shown to us has made us forget our misery. For us you have
undertaken war and for fourteen years have carried it on with such
determination that often you have brought yourselves and often reduced the
Carthaginians to the last extremities. Though you had in the heart of Italy
such a terrible war and such an enemy as Hannibal, you nevertheless sent a
consul with his army to Spain to collect, as it were, the remains of our
wreckage. From the day that the two Scipios, Publius and C. Cornelius,
came into the province they never at any moment failed to do good to us and
injury to our enemies. First of all, they restored our city to us, and sent men
all over Spain to find out those of us who had been sold into slavery and set
them free. When our fortunes, from being utterly miserable, had become
almost enviable, your two generals Publius and C. Cornelius met with their
deaths, a loss which we felt even more bitterly than you. It seemed at the
time as though we had been brought back from distant exile to our old home
only to see for the second time our own ruin and our country's destruction.
It did not require a Carthaginian general or army to effect our annihilation,
the Turduli, our inveterate enemies who had been the cause of our former
collapse, would have been quite able to extinguish us. And just when we had
lost all hope, you suddenly sent P. Scipio, whom we are more fortunate than
all our fellow-citizens in seeing here today. We shall carry back to our
people the news that we have seen, as your consul-elect, the one man in
whom we placed all our hopes of safety. City after city has been taken by
him from your enemies throughout Spain, and in every instance he picked
out the Saguntines from the mass of prisoners and sent them home. And
lastly the Turdetani, such deadly enemies to us that had their strength
remained unimpaired Saguntum must have fallen, even they have been
brought so low by his arms that they are no longer to be feared by us, nor, if
I may dare to say so, by our posterity. The tribe in whose favour Hannibal
destroyed Saguntum have had their own city destroyed before our eyes. We
take tribute from their land, but it is not the profit, but the revenge that we
enjoy most.
"For these blessings, the greatest that we could hope for or ask
heaven to grant, the senate and people of Saguntum have sent this
deputation to convey their grateful thanks. We are at the same time to
convey their congratulations to you on having been so successful these last
years in Spain and Italy that you have subjugated the one country by the
might of your arms, not only as far as the Ebro, but even to its most distant
shores which the ocean bounds, whilst in the other you have left the
Carthaginian nothing outside the rampart of his camp. To the great Guardian
of your stronghold in the Capitol, Jupiter Optimus Maximus, we are bidden
not only to render thanks for these boons, but also, if you allow us, to offer
and carry to him in the Capitol this gift of a golden crown, as a memorial of
your victories. We pray that you will sanction this and further, if it seem
good to you, that you will ratify and confirm for all time the advantages
which your generals have conferred upon us." The senate replied to the
effect that the destruction and restoration of Saguntum would both alike be a
proof to all the world of the faith which each side had kept to the other.
Their generals had acted wisely and properly and in accordance with the
wishes of the senate in restoring Saguntum and rescuing its citizens from
slavery, and all other acts of kindness which they had performed were such
as the senate wished to have done. They accorded permission to the envoys
to place their gift in the Capitol. Free quarters and hospitality were provided
for them at the cost of the State, and orders were given for each to be
presented with a sum of not less than 10,000 ases. The other deputations
were then admitted to an audience of the senate. The Saguntines also asked
to be allowed to make a tour through Italy as far as they could with safety,
and guides were furnished them and letters sent to the different towns
requesting them to give the Spaniards a hospitable reception
28.40
The
next question before the senate concerned the raising of troops and the
distribution of the various commands. There was a rumour that Africa was
to form a new province and be allotted to Scipio without having recourse to
the ballot. Scipio himself, no longer contented with a moderate share of
glory, was telling people that he had been returned as consul not simply to
carry on the war but to bring it to an end, and the only way of doing that was
for him to take an army over to Africa. In the event of the senate's
opposition he asserted openly that he would carry his proposal by the
authority of the people. The project was most distasteful to the leaders of the
senate, and as the rest of the senators, afraid of becoming unpopular, refused
to speak out, Q. Fabius Maximus was asked for his opinion. This he gave in
the following speech: "I am quite aware, senators, that many of you regard
the question before us today as already decided, and consider that any one
who discusses the destination of Africa as though it were still an open
question is wasting words. I do not quite understand, however, how Africa
can have been definitely assigned as the province of our gallant and energetic
consul, when neither the senate nor the people have decided that it shall be
included amongst the provinces for the year. If it has been so assigned then I
think the consul is quite wrong in inviting a sham discussion upon a measure
that has been decided upon; he is not only stultifying the senate as a body,
but each individual senator who is called upon in turn for his opinion.
"In expressing my dissent from those who think that we ought at
once to invade Africa, I am quite conscious that I expose myself to two
imputations. For one thing my action will be set down to my cautious nature.
Young men may call it timidity and indolence if they please, as long as we
have no cause to regret that though the counsels of others have seemed at
first sight more attractive, experience shows that mine are better. The other
charge against me will be that I am actuated by motives of malevolence and
envy against the ever-growing glory of our most gallant consul. If my past
life, my character, my dictatorship and five consulships, the glory I have
acquired as a citizen and as a soldier, a glory so great as to produce surfeit
rather than a desire for more -if these do not shield me from this imputation
at least let my age free me from it. What rivalry can exist between myself and
a man who is not even as old as my son? When I was Dictator, in the full
maturity of my powers and engaged in most important operations my
authority was by an unheard-of innovation divided with the Master of the
Horse. Yet no one ever heard a word of protest from me either in the senate
or in the Assembly, even when he was pursuing me with abuse. It was
through my actions rather than my words that I wished the man whom
others considered my equal to be compelled to admit his inferiority to me.
And am I, who have received all the honours that the State can confer, to
enter into competition with one who is in the full flower of his youth? And
simply that if Africa is refused to him, it may be granted to me, tired as I am
not only of public business but of life itself? No, I must live and die with the
glory that I have won. I have prevented Hannibal from conquering in order
that he might be conquered by those of you who are in the full vigour of
your powers."
28.41
"It is
but fair, Publius Cornelius, that whilst in my own case I have never preferred
my own reputation to the interests of the State, you should pardon me for
not regarding even your glory as more important than the welfare of the
commonwealth. I admit that if there were no war in Italy or only an enemy
from whose defeat no glory was to be gained, then the man who would keep
you in Italy though acting in the public interest might appear to be depriving
you of the chance of winning glory in a foreign war. But as our enemy
Hannibal has been holding Italy for fourteen years with an undefeated army,
you will surely not despise the glory of expelling from Italy during your
consulship the enemy who has been the cause of so many defeats, so many
deaths, and of leaving it on record that it is you who have terminated this
war, as C. Lutatius has the lasting glory of bringing the First Punic War to a
close? Unless, indeed, Hasdrubal was a finer general than Hannibal, or the
last war a more serious one than this one, or the victory which closed it a
greater and more brilliant one than this will be, should it fall to our lot to
conquer whilst you are consul. Would you rather have drawn Hamilcar away
from Drepana and Eryx, than expel Hannibal and his Carthaginians from
Italy? Even though you should cling to the glory you have acquired more
than to what you hope for, you will not pride yourself upon having delivered
Spain from war rather than Italy. Hannibal is not yet such an enemy that the
man who prefers to fight against another foe would not be thought to fear
rather than to despise him. Why do you not gird yourself to this task? Why
do you not march straight from here to where Hannibal is and carry the war
thither instead of taking a roundabout course in the hope that when you have
crossed over into Africa he will follow you? You are anxious to win the
crowning glory of bringing the Punic War to an end; your natural course will
be to defend your own country before you go to attack the enemy's. Let
there be peace in Italy before there is war in Africa; let our own fears be
banished before we make others tremble. If both objects can be achieved
under your generalship and auspices, then when you have conquered
Hannibal here, go on and capture Carthage. If one of the two victories must
be left for your successors, the former is the greater and more glorious one
and will necessarily lead to the latter. As matters now are, the public
exchequer is unable to support two armies in Italy and also in Africa, we
have nothing left from which to equip a fleet and furnish it with supplies, and
over and above all this who can fail to see what great dangers would be
incurred? P. Licinius, let us suppose, is conducting the campaign in Italy and
P. Scipio one in Africa. Well, supposing -may all the gods avert the omen
which I shudder at the mention of! but what has happened may happen again
-supposing, I say, that Hannibal wins a victory and marches on Rome, are
we to wait till then before recalling you from Africa, as we recalled Q.
Fulvius from Capua? What, if even in Africa the fortunes of war prove
equally favourable for both sides? Take warning from the fate of your own
house, your father and uncle destroyed with their armies within a month of
each other in the country where they had raised the name of Rome and the
glory of your family high among the nations through their successful
operations by land and sea. The daylight would fail me if I attempted to
enumerate the kings and captains who by their rash invasion of their enemy's
territory have brought the most crushing defeat on themselves and their
armies. Athens, a city most sensible and wise, listened to the advice of a
young man of high birth and equally high ability, and sent a great fleet to
Sicily before it had disposed of the war at home, and in one naval battle the
flourishing republic was, for ever ruined."
28.42
"I will
not take instances from distant lands and remote times. This very Africa we
are speaking about and the fate of Atilius Regulus form a conspicuous
example of the fickleness of fortune. "When you, Scipio, have a view of
Africa from the sea will not your conquest of Spain seem mere child's play?
What resemblance is there between them? You began by coasting along the
shores of Italy and Gaul over a sea free from any hostile fleet, and you
brought up at Emporiae, a friendly city. After disembarking your troops you
led them through a perfectly safe country to Tarraco, to the friends and allies
of Rome, and from Tarraco your route led through the midst of Roman
garrisons. Round the Ebro lay the armies of your father and your uncle,
whose courage had been raised by defeat and who were burning to avenge
the loss of their commanders. Their leader was, it is true, irregularly chosen
by the vote of the soldiery to meet the emergency, but had he belonged to an
ennobled family and been duly appointed he would have rivalled
distinguished generals in his mastery of the art of war. Then you were able to
attack New Carthage without the slightest interruption; not one out of the
three Carthaginian armies attempted to defend their allies. The rest of your
operations, though I am far from depreciating them, are not to be compared
with a war in Africa. There no harbour is open to our fleet, no district which
will receive us peaceably, no city in alliance with us, no king friendly to us,
no spot which we can use as a base of operations. Wherever you turn your
eyes, you see hostility and menace.
"Do you put your trust in Syphax and his Numidians? Be satisfied
with having trusted them once. Rashness does not always succeed and
duplicity prepares the way for confidence through trifles, so that when the
occasion calls for it, it may succeed in securing some great advantage. Your
father and your uncle were not defeated until the treachery of their
Celtiberian auxiliaries left them victims to the enemy. You yourself were not
exposed to anything like the danger from the Carthaginian commanders,
Mago and Hasdrubal, that you were from Indibilis and Mandonius after you
had accepted their alliance. Can you trust the Numidians after the experience
you have had of the disloyalty of your own troops? Syphax and Masinissa
would both prefer that they rather than the Carthaginians should be the
leading powers in Africa, but failing that, they would rather have the
Carthaginians than any one else. At this moment mutual rivalry and
numberless grounds of complaint are embittering them against one another,
because external dangers are far distant; but once let them see the arms of
Rome and a foreign army, and they will hasten side by side to extinguish, as
it were, a conflagration which threatens them both. Those Carthaginians
defended Spain in a very different way from that in which they would defend
their country's walls, the temples of their gods, their hearths and homes,
when their trembling wives will follow them and their little children cling to
them as they march out to battle. What, moreover, if, feeling quite assured of
the united support of Africa, the fidelity of their royal allies and the strength
of their walls, and seeing that you and your army are no longer here to
protect Italy, the Carthaginians should send over a fresh army from Africa,
or order Mago, who, we understand, has left the Balearic Isles and is sailing
along the Ligurian coast, to form a junction with Hannibal? Surely we should
be in the same state of alarm as we were at the appearance in Italy of
Hasdrubal, after you had allowed him to slip through your hands -you, who
are going to blockade not Carthage only but the whole of Africa with your
army! You will say that you defeated him. Then I regret all the more, both
on your account and on behalf of the republic, that you allowed him after his
defeat to invade Italy.
"Allow us to ascribe all that has gone happily for you and for the
dominion of Rome to your wise counsels, and all misfortunes to the
uncertain chances of war -the more talent and courage you claim for
yourself the more will your native country and all Italy desire to keep such a
doughty defender at home. Even you cannot disguise the fact that where
Hannibal is, there is the centre and mainstay of the war, for you are giving
out that the one reason for your going to Africa is to draw Hannibal there.
Whether there then or here, you still have Hannibal to deal with. And will
you, I should like to know, be in a stronger position in Africa, single-handed,
than here with your own army and your colleague's acting together? What a
difference that makes is shown by the recent instance of the consuls Claudius
and Livius. Where, pray, is Hannibal more likely to be supplied with men and
arms? In the most remote corner of Bruttium where he has so long been
vainly asking for reinforcements from home, or in the country round
Carthage and on the soil of Africa which is entirely occupied by his allies?
What an extraordinary idea that is of yours to fight where your forces are
reduced by one-half and those of the enemy largely augmented, rather than
in a country where with two armies you would engage only one, and that,
too, exhausted by so many battles, and such long and burdensome service.
Just think how different your plan is from your father's. On his election as
consul he proceeded to Spain, then left his province and returned to Italy in
order to meet Hannibal on his descent from the Alps; you are preparing to
leave Italy while Hannibal is actually here, not in the interest of the republic
but because you think it a grand and glorious thing to do. Just in the same
way you, a general of the Roman people, left your province and your army
without any legal authority, without any instructions from the senate, and
entrusted to a couple of ships the fortunes of the State and the majesty of the
empire which were for the time bound up with your own safety. I hold the
view that P. Cornelius Scipio was elected consul not for his own private
ends, but for us and the commonwealth, and that armies are raised to guard
this city and the soil of Italy, and not for consuls to transport to any part of
the world they please in the arrogant style of kings and despots."
28.43
This
speech of Fabius, so appropriate to the circumstances under which it was
delivered, and backed up by the weight of his character and his
long-established reputation for prudence, produced a great effect upon most
of those present, especially upon the seniors. Seeing that the majority
approved of the sage counsels of age in preference to the impetuous temper
of youth, Scipio is reported to have made the following reply: "Senators, at
the beginning of his speech, Q. Fabius admitted that what he had to say
might lay him under a suspicion of jealousy. Personally, I should not dare to
accuse so great a man of that weakness, but either through the inadequacy of
his defence or the impossibility of making a successful one, he has utterly
failed to clear himself of the charge. For in his anxiety to dispel the
suspicion, he spoke about his distinctions and his reputation in such
exaggerated terms as to give the impression that I was in danger of finding a
rival in the lowest of the Romans, not in him who, because he stands above
all others -a position which I frankly confess I am striving to attain, denies
the possibility of any rivalry between us. He has represented himself as an
old man full of honours, and me as a youth not even as old as his son, as if
the passion for glory did not extend beyond the span of human life and find
its chief satisfaction in the memory of future generations. I am quite certain
that it is the lot of all great men to compare themselves not with their
contemporaries alone, but also with the illustrious of all ages. I admit,
Quintus Fabius, that I am desirous not only of equalling your renown but -forgive my saying so -of surpassing it, if I can. Let not your feeling towards
me, or mine towards my juniors, be such that we would prevent any of our
fellow-citizens from reaching our level. That would not only injure the
victims of our envy, it would be a loss to the State, and almost to the human
race.
"The speaker dwelt upon the danger to which I should be exposed
if I landed in Africa, showing apparently solicitude not only for the
commonwealth and its army but even for me. What has led to this sudden
anxiety on my account? When my father and my uncle were killed and their
armies all but annihilated; when Spain was lost; when four Carthaginian
armies and their generals were holding the whole country down by the terror
of their arms; when you were looking for a man to take the supreme
command in that war and no one appeared, no one came forward to offer
himself but me; when the Roman people conferred the supreme command on
me before I had reached my twenty-fifth year -why did no one then say
anything about my age, the strength of the enemy, the difficulties of the
campaign or the recent disaster which had overtaken my father and my
uncle? Has some calamity occurred recently in Africa greater than the one
which happened then in Spain? Are there larger armies and better and more
numerous commanders in Africa now than there were then in Spain? Was I
then at a riper age for undertaking a great war than I am today? Is Spain a
more convenient field for operations against the Carthaginians than Africa?
Now that I have scattered four Carthaginian armies in flight, reduced so
many cities by force or fear, and subjugated every part down to the shores of
the ocean, petty kings and savage tribes alike; now that I have reconquered
the whole of Spain so completely that no vestige of war anywhere remains, it
is an easy task to make light of my services, as easy, in fact, as it will be,
when I have returned victorious from Africa, to make light of those very
difficulties which are now painted in such dark colours in order to keep me
here.
"Fabius says that no part of Africa is accessible, that there are no
harbours open to us. He tells us that M. Atilius Regulus was made prisoner
in Africa, as though he had met with misfortune as soon as he landed. He
forgets that that very commander, unfortunate as he was afterwards, did find
some harbours in Africa open to him, and for the first twelve months won
some brilliant victories, and as far as the Carthaginian generals were
concerned, remained undefeated to the last. You will not, therefore, deter
me by quoting that instance. Even if that disaster had occurred in this war
instead of in the last one, quite recently and not forty years ago -even then
why should I be prevented from invading Africa because Regulus was made
prisoner any more than I was prevented from going to Spain after the two
Scipios were killed? I should be sorry to believe that Xanthippus, the
Lacedaemonian, was born to be a greater blessing to Carthage than I am to
be to my country, and my confidence is strengthened by seeing what
tremendous issues depend upon one man's courage. We have had to listen
even to stories about the Athenians, how they neglected the war at their
doors in order to go to Sicily. Well, since you are at leisure to tell us tales
about Greece why do you not mention Agathocles, king of Syracuse, who
after Sicily had long been wasted by the flames of the Punic War sailed
across to this same Africa and turned the tide of war back to the country
from which it had started?"
28.44
"Put
what need is there of instances drawn from other lands and other times to
remind us how much depends upon taking the aggressive and removing
danger from ourselves by making it recoil upon others? It makes all the
difference in the world whether you are devastating the territory of another
nation or seeing your own destroyed by fire and sword. It shows more
courage to attack than to repel attacks. Then again, the unknown always
inspires terror, but when you have entered your enemy's country you have a
nearer view of his strength and weakness. Hannibal never hoped that so
many communities would go over to him after Cannae; how much less could
the Carthaginians, faithless allies, harsh and tyrannical masters as they are,
count upon the firmness and stability of their African empire! So far, even
when deserted by our allies, we stood in our own strength, the soldiery of
Rome. The Carthaginians have no citizen army, their soldiers are all
mercenaries, ready to change sides on the smallest provocation. If only
nothing stops me, you will hear that I have landed, that Africa is wrapped in
the flames of war, that Hannibal is tearing himself away from Italy, that
Carthage is besieged -all at one stroke. You may look for more cheerful and
more frequent news from Africa than you received from Spain. Everything
inspires me with hope -the Fortune which waits on Rome, the gods who
witnessed the treaty which the enemy has broken, the two princes Syphax
and Masinissa, whose fidelity I shall so far trust as to protect myself from
any perfidy they may attempt. Many advantages which at this distance are
not apparent will be disclosed as the war goes on. A man proves his capacity
for leadership by seizing every opportunity that presents itself, and making
every contingency subserve his plans. I shall have the adversary whom you,
Q. Fabius assign to me -Hannibal -but I would rather draw him away than
that he should keep me here; I would compel him to fight in his own
country, and Carthage shall be the prize of victory rather than the half-ruined
strongholds of Bruttium.
"And now as to any injury that may befall the republic during my
voyage or whilst I am disembarking my men on the shores of Africa or
during my advance on Carthage. As the consul, P. Licinius, is also Pontifex
Maximus, and cannot be absent from his sacred duties, it is impossible for
him to ballot for so distant a province. Would it not be almost an insult to
say that he cannot accomplish the task, after Hannibal's power has been
shaken and almost shattered, which you, Q. Fabius, were able to accomplish
when Hannibal in the hour of victory was flying about in every part of Italy?
And even if the war should not be brought to a more speedy termination by
the plan which I suggest, the dignity of Rome and her prestige amongst
foreign kings and nations would surely require us to show that we possess
sufficient courage not only to defend Italy but to carry our arms even as far
as Africa. We must not let the idea get abroad that no Roman general durst
do what Hannibal has done, or that whilst in the First Punic War, when the
struggle was for Sicily, Africa was frequently attacked by our fleets and
armies, in this war, when the struggle is for Italy, Africa is left in peace. Let
Italy, which has been so long harassed, have some rest at last; let Africa take
its turn of fire and ruin; let a Roman camp threaten the gates of Carthage
rather than that we should see the enemy's lines from our walls. Let Africa be
the seat of war henceforth; let us roll back there all the terror and the flight,
all the wasting of our lands and the defection of our allies, all the other
miseries of war which have been assailing us for the last fourteen years.
Enough has been said as to the republic and the present war and the
allocation of provinces. It would be a long and uninteresting discussion if I
were to follow the example of Q. Fabius, and as he has depreciated my
services in Spain, so I were to pour ridicule on his glory and extol my own. I
will do neither the one nor the other, senators, and if, young as I am, I
cannot have the advantage over an old man in anything else, I will at least
prove his superior in moderation and restraint of language. My life and my
conduct of affairs have been such that I am quite content to accept in silence
the judgment which you have spontaneously formed."
28.45
Scipio
was listened to with impatience, for it was generally believed that if he did
not succeed in inducing the senate to decree that Africa should be his
province, he would at once bring the question before the Assembly. So Q.
Fabius, who had held four consulships, challenged Scipio to say openly
before the senate whether he left the decision as to the provinces in their
hands, and was prepared to abide by it, or whether he was going to refer it
to the people. Scipio replied that he should act as he thought best in the
interests of the State. On this Fabius observed: "It was not because I did not
know what you would say or how you would act that I made my request, for
you openly avow that you are sounding the House rather than consulting it,
and that if we do not at once assign you the province which you want, you
have a resolution ready to put to the Assembly." (Then, turning to the
tribunes) "I demand of you, tribunes of the plebs, that you support me in my
refusal to vote, for even if the decision is in my favour the consul is not
going to recognise it." Then a discussion arose between the consul and the
tribunes, he asserting that there was no just ground for their intervening and
supporting a senator in his refusal to vote, when called upon to do so. The
tribunes gave their decision in the following terms: "If the consul submits to
the senate the allocation of the provinces their decision shall be binding and
final, and we will not allow any reference to the people. If he does not so
submit it, we shall support any senator in his refusal to vote when called
upon to do so." The consul asked for a day's grace in order to consult his
colleague. The following day he submitted the matter to the decision of the
senate. The decree made respecting the provinces was that one consul
should take Sicily and the thirty warships which C. Servilius had had the
previous year, permission being granted him to sail to Africa, if he thought
such a course would be in the interests of the State; the other consul was to
take Bruttium and the operations against Hannibal, with either the army
which had served under L. Veturius, or the one which Q. Caecilius had
commanded. These two were to ballot and arrange which of them was to act
in Bruttium with the two legions which the consul would not require, and the
one to whom that field should fall was to have his command extended for a
year. With the exception of the consuls and praetors, all who were to take
charge of armies and provinces had their commands extended for a year. It
fell to Q. Caecilius to act with the consul against Hannibal in Bruttium.
Scipio exhibited the Games amidst the applause of a large and
enthusiastic crowd of spectators. M. Pomponius Matho and Q. Catius were
sent on a mission to Delphi to carry thither the offering made from the
plunder of Hasdrubal's camp. It was a golden crown of 200 pounds' weight,
and there were facsimiles of the pieces of spoil made in silver weighing in the
aggregate 1000 pounds. Scipio did not succeed in obtaining permission to
levy troops and indeed he did not press the point, but he was allowed to
enlist volunteers. As he had stated that his fleet would not be a charge on the
State he was given liberty to accept any materials contributed by the allies
for the construction of his ships. The cantons of Etruria were the first to
promise assistance, each according to its means. Caere contributed corn and
provisions of all kinds for the crews; Populonia, iron; Tarquinii, cloth for the
sails; Volaterrae, timber for the hulls and corn; Arretium, 3000 shields and as
many helmets, whilst they were ready to supply as many as 50,000 darts,
javelins and long spears. They also offered to furnish all the axes, spades,
sickles, gabions and hand-mills required for forty warships as well as
120,000 pecks of wheat and provision for the sailing-masters and the rowers
on the voyage. Perusia, Clusium and Russellae sent pine-wood for the
timbers of the ships and a large quantity of corn. The Umbrian communities
as well as the inhabitants of Nursia, Reate and Amiternum and the whole of
the Sabine country promised to furnish men. Numerous contingents from the
Marsi, the Paeligni and the Marrucini volunteered to serve on board the
fleet. Camerinum, a city leagued on a basis of equal rights with Rome, sent a
cohort of six hundred men-at-arms. The keels of thirty ships -twenty
quinqueremes and ten quadriremes -were laid down, and Scipio pressed on
the work so rapidly that forty-five days after the timber had been brought
from the forests, the ships were launched with their tackle and armament
complete.
28.46
Scipio
sailed to Sicily with 7000 volunteers on board his thirty warships, and P.
Licinius proceeded to Bruttium. Of the two consular armies stationed there
he selected the one which the former consul L. Veturius had commanded.
He allowed Metellus to keep the legions he was in command of, as he
thought he would do better with men accustomed to his leadership. The
praetors also departed for their several provinces. As money was needed for
the war the quaestors received instructions to sell that part of the Capuan
territory which extends from the Fossa Graeca to the coast, and evidence
was asked for of any cases where land had been appropriated by a citizen of
Capua, that it might be included in the Roman stateland. The informer was
to receive a gratuity of ten per cent. of the value of the land. The City
praetor, Cnaeus Servilius, was also to see that the citizens of Capua were
residing where the senate had given them permission to reside, and any who
were living elsewhere were to be punished. During the summer Mago who
had been wintering in Minorca embarked with a force of 12,000 infantry and
2000 cavalry, and set sail for Italy with about thirty warships and a large
number of transports. The coast was quite unguarded and he surprised and
captured Genua. From there he went on to the Ligurian coast on the chance
of rousing the Gauls. One of their tribes -the Ingauni -were at the time
engaged in a war with the Epanterii, an Alpine tribe. After storing his
plunder in Savo and leaving ten vessels as guardships, Mago sent the
remainder of his ships to Carthage to protect the coast, as it was rumoured
that Scipio intended to invade Africa, and then he formed an alliance with
the Ingauni, from whom he expected more support than from the
mountaineers, and commenced to attack the latter. His army grew in
numbers every day; the Gauls, drawn by the spell of his name, flocked to him
from all parts. The movement became known in Rome through a despatch
from Spurius Lucretius, and the senate were filled with the gravest
apprehensions. It seemed as though the joy with which they heard of the
destruction of Hasdrubal and his army two years before would be completely
stultified by the outbreak of a fresh war in the same quarter, quite as serious
as the former one, the only difference being in the commander. They sent
orders to the proconsul M. Livius to move the army of Etruria up to
Ariminum, and the City praetor, Cnaeus Servilius, was empowered, in case
he thought it advisable, to order the City legions to be employed elsewhere
and give the command to the man whom he thought most capable. M.
Valerius Laevinus led these legions to Arretium. About this time Cnaeus
Octavius who was commanding in Sardinia captured as many as eighty
Carthaginian transports in the neighbourhood. According to Coelius' account
they were loaded with corn and supplies for Hannibal; Valerius, however,
says that they were carrying the plunder from Etruria and the Ligurian and
Epanterian prisoners to Carthage. Hardly anything worth recording took
place in Bruttium this year. A pestilence attacked the Romans and the
Carthaginians and was equally fatal to both, but in addition to the epidemic,
the Carthaginians were suffering from scarcity of food. Hannibal spent the
summer near the temple of Juno Lacinia, where he built and dedicated an
altar with a long inscription recording his exploits in Phoenician and also in
Greek.
End of Book 28