University of Virginia Library

32.18

Though he was making no progress, what vexed the consul most was that he was allowing a comparison to be made between the tactics and weapons of the contending armies; he recognised that there was no near prospect of a successful assault, and no means of wintering so far from the sea in a country utterly wasted by the ravages of war, and under these circumstances he raised the siege. There was no harbour on the whole of the Acarnanian and Aetolian coast-line which would admit all the transports employed in provisioning the troops and at the same time furnish covered winter-quarters for the legionaries. Anticyra in Phocis, facing the Corinthian Gulf, seemed the most suitable place, as it was not far from Thessaly and the positions held by the enemy, and only separated from the Peloponnese by a narrow strip of sea. There he would have Aetolia and Acarnania behind him, and Locris and Boeotia on either side of him. Phanotea in Phocis was taken without any fighting; Anticyra only made a brief resistance; the captures of Ambrysus and Hyampolis speedily followed. Owing to the position of Daulis on a lofty hill, its capture could not be effected by escalade or direct assault. By harassing the defending garrison with missiles and, when they made sorties, skirmishing against them, alternately advancing and retiring without attempting anything decisive, he brought them to such a pitch of carelessness and contempt for their opponents that when they retired within their gates the Romans rushed in with them and took the place by storm. Other unimportant strongholds fell into Roman hands more through fear than through force of arms. Elatea closed its gates against him and there seemed little probability of its admitting either a Roman general or a Roman army unless it were compelled to do so by force.