Chapter LII
THE LORD OF MEN[1]
The reason why the lord of men finds himself endangered
and sees his state ruined is that chief vassals are too influential
and the attendants are too rampant. Who is called powerful,
observes no law but simply acts at random and manipulates
the handles of the state for facilitating his self-seeking
purposes. Who is called rampant, exercises all undue powers
and influence at his pleasure and makes arbitrary determinations
of right and wrong. These two types of officials the
lord of men must observe carefully.
Indeed, the horse can carry a heavy load, pull the wagon,
and make a distant trip, because of its muscular strength;
the sovereign of ten thousand chariots and the ruler of one
thousand chariots can rule over the world and subdue the
feudal lords, because of their prestige and position. Thus,
prestige and position are the muscular strength of the lord of
men. Now suppose chief vassals gain the sovereign's prestige
and attendants abuse the august position. Then the lord of
men will lose his strength. The lord of men who has lost his
strength and is still able to keep the state, is none out of a
thousand.
The tiger and the leopard can overcome men and catch the
hundred beasts[2]
by virtue of their claws and fangs. Supposing
the tiger and the leopard lost their claws and fangs, they
would fall under the control of men. Now that the august
position is the claws and fangs of the lord of men, if any ruler
of men loses his claws and fangs, he will be like the tiger and
the leopard that have lost theirs. For instance, the Ruler of
Sung lost his claws and fangs to Tzŭ-han, and Duke Chien
lost his claws and fangs to T`ien Ch`ang. Because they failed
to recover them early enough, they were themselves killed and
their states were ruined.
Today, the tactless sovereigns all know very well the
errors of the Ruler of Sung and Duke Chien, but never
comprehend their own mistakes. For they never observe
closely the similarities between things.
Moreover, upholders of law and tact and the authorities
in power are incompatible with each other. How can this
be proved? Well, if the sovereign has upholders of tact
around, then chief vassals will not be able to control matters
of decision and the courtiers will not dare to abuse their
privileges. Once the power and influence of the chief
vassals and attendants stop, the Tao of the lord of men will
become illustrious.
The same is not so in these days. The ministers in power
arrogate favourable positions and manage the state affairs
at random in order to further[3]
their private interests.
The attendants and the courtiers would form juntas and
associate for the wicked purpose of checking distant officials.
If so, when will the upholders of law and tact be able to
go into the ruler's service? And when will the lord of men
settle his opinion and make his decision? Naturally the
upholders of tact are not necessarily engaged by the ruler and
cannot stand together with the authorities in power. Then
how can the upholders of law and tact have no danger?
For such reasons, unless the ruler of men can reject the
chief vassals' counsels, oppose the attendants' opinions, and
conform independently to reasonable theories, how can the
upholders of law and tact venture their lives in presenting
their ideas to the Throne? This is the reason why the present
age is not orderly.
The intelligent sovereign confers ranks and bounties
according to merits and assigns offices and tasks in correspondence
with abilities. Therefore, the persons appointed always
have worthy qualities; those taken into service always have
required abilities. If worthy and able men are in governmental
service, all requests by private clans will disappear.
Indeed, if men of merit receive great bounties and men of
ability attain high offices, then private swordsmen will
infallibly stop their self-seeking bravery and attack
[4]
public
enemies. So will the itinerant politicians stop handing around
the private residences of influential clans and start striving
for purity and cleanliness. This is the way to gather the worthy
and able men and scatter the dependents of influential clans.
Now the courtiers are not necessarily wise. Yet, if the lord
of men in his personnel administration first considers somebody
wise[5]
and heeds his advice, and, after going inside, if
he esteems the advice of the courtiers and listens to them
regardless of the adviser's wisdom, he will thereby esteem the
wise with the stupid. Again, the authorities in power are
not necessarily worthy. Yet, if the lord of men in his personnel
administration first considers somebody worthy and
respects him, and, after going inside, if he esteems the worthy's
conduct with the authorities in power and listens to them
regardless of his worthiness, he will thereby esteem the
worthy with the worthless. Therefore, if wise men have to
see their plans acknowledged by fools and worthies have
to see their characters estimated by worthless men, when will
the men of worthiness and wisdom be able to enter the ruler's
service? So will the lord of men's sight be obscured.
Of old, Kuan Lung-p`êng admonished Chieh but had his
four limbs injured; Prince Pi-kan remonstrated with Chow
but had his heart cut open; and Tzŭ-hsü was loyal and
honest to Fu-ch`a but was censured with the Shu-lou
[6]
sword. These three personages, while ministering to their
rulers, were not disloyal; nor were their counsels untrue.
However, they could not evade the disaster of unjust death
penalties, because of the calamity that their sovereigns never
deliberated carefully on the words of the wise and the worthy
but were deluded by the stupid and the worthless.
In these days, if the lord of men does not want to engage
upholders of law and tact but listens only to stupid and unworthy
ministers, then who among the worthy and wise men
dare face the risk of these three personages in presenting
their wisdom and ability to the Throne? This is the reason
why the present age is disorderly.
