7. Confiding in the Law[63]
Officials are over-powerful because there are no effective
laws. Laws stop functioning because the superior is stupid.
If the superior is stupid and upholds no rule, the officials will
act at random. As the officials act at random, their salaries
will be surpassed by no precedent. If their salaries are
surpassed by no predecessor, taxes will be increased. As
taxes are increased, they will become wealthy. The wealth
and powerfulness of the officials eventually breed chaos.[64]
Under the intelligent sovereign's Tao, only trustworthy
men are taken into service, only dutiful officials are praised,
and only men of merit are rewarded. When anybody
recommends anybody else to the sovereign, if his word
materializes truly and thereby delights the ruler, then both
he and the official should be equally benefited; if his word
does not truly materialize and thereby angers the ruler, then
both he and that official should be equally punished. If so,
ministers will not dare grant their uncles and cousins personal
favours, but will recommend their enemies who have the
required abilities. Their influences are sufficient to enforce
the law, their allowances are sufficient to perform their duties,
and their self-seeking activities find no room to grow in.
In consequence, the people will work hard and lessen the
officials' burden.
Whoever is entrusted with public affairs, should not be
over-powerful. Only to his rank should the ruler ascribe his
honour. Whoever holds office should not be self-seeking.
Only to his bounty should the ruler limit his income. In
consequence, the people will honour ranks and esteem
bounties. Thus, rank and bounty will become means of
reward. When the people esteem these means of reward, the
state will be in good order.
If norms are intricate, it is because terms are mistaken. If
prizes and praises are not adequate, the people will hang in
suspense. Now that the people hold both fame and prizes in
equal esteem, if the rewarded are slandered, reward will not
be fit to encourage people; if the punished are admired, then
punishment will not be fit to suppress culprits. It is the
intelligent sovereign's way that rewards always result from
contributions to public benefit and that fame always originates
in services to the superior. If reward and fame follow the
same track and slander and censure proceed in parallel, the
people will find nothing more glorious than to be rewarded[65]
and the receivers of heavy penalties will always incur bad
names. In consequence, the people will fear punishment, that
is, means of prohibition. If the people fear means of prohibition,
the state will be in good order.
