University of Virginia Library

TO EDMUND PENDLETON.[1]

Dear Sir,—The two circumstances relating to the
proposed duty on trade, mentioned in your favor
of the first instant, were subjects of discussion when
the measure was on the anvil. It was evident that
the disposition of the States to invest Congress with
such a power would be influenced by the length of
the term assigned for the exercise of it. It was
equally evident that no provision would satisfy the
present creditors of the United States, or obtain
future loans, that was not commensurate to all the
public engagements. In order to reconcile these

points, the duration of the impost was limited, but
limited in so indefinite a manner as not to defeat
the object of it. Should the increase of trade render
the duty more productive than was estimated,
it must the sooner extinguish the public debts, and
cease. The application of Congress for such a
power supposes, indeed, a confidence in them, on the
part of the States, greater perhaps than many may
think consistent with republican jealousy; but if the
States will not enable their Representatives to fulfil
their engagements, it is not to be expected that
individuals either in Europe or America will confide
in them. The second objection you mention was
also a subject of much discussion in Congress. On
one side it was contended that the powers incident
to the collection of a duty on trade were in their
nature so municipal, and in their operation so irritative,
that it was improbable that the States could be
prevailed on to part with them; and that, consequently,
it would be most prudent to ask from the
States nothing more than the duty itself, to be collected
by State officers, and paid to a Continental
Receiver; and not the right of collecting it by officers
of Congress. On the opposite side it was
urged, that as Congress would be held responsible
for the public debts, it was necessary, and would be
expected, that the fund granted for discharging them
should be exclusively and independently in their
hands; that if the collectors were under the control
of the States, the urgency of their wants would be
constantly diverting the revenue from its proper
destination; that if the States were willing to give
up the thing itself, it was not likely they would cavil
at any form that would be most effectual; that the
term proposed might be reconciled with their internal
jurisdictions, by annexing to the office of collector
all the powers incident thereto, and leaving
to Congress the right of appointing the officer. How
far it may be best to appoint the established naval
officer, I am not prepared to say; but should that
be found to be the case, they will exercise their new
functions, not as naval officers of the State, but as
invested with a separate commission by Congress, in
such manner that in the former respect they are
wholly exempt from the jurisdiction of Congress,
and in the latter from that of the State. Such a
junction of powers, derived from different sources,
in the same person, certainly has its inconveniences,
but there will be many instances of it in our complex
government. I have met with so many interruptions
this morning, that I fear I may have not
done justice to the subject in my explanation of it.
Another consequence is, that I must be very brief
on the head of intelligence to make sure of the post.