University of Virginia Library

Search this document 
The writings of James Madison,

comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed.
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
collapse section
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUNE 16—POWER OVER SEAT OF GOVERNMENT.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
collapse section
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
collapse section
 
 
 
 

JUNE 16—POWER OVER SEAT OF GOVERNMENT.

Mr. Madison—Mr Chairman, I am astonished that the
honorable member should launch out into such strong descriptions
without any occasion. Was there ever a legislature
in existence that held their sessions at a place where they had
not jurisdiction? I do not mean such a legislature as they
have in Holland; for it deserves not the name.—Their powers
are such as congress have now; which we find not reducible to
practice. If you be satisfied with the shadow and form instead
of the substance, you will render them dependent on the
local authority. Suppose the legislature of this country
should sit in Richmond, while the exclusive jurisdiction of the
place was in some particular country, would this country
think it safe that the general good should be subject to the
paramount authority of a part of the community?

The honorable member asks, why ask for this power, and
if the subsequent clause be not fully competent for the same
purpose? If so what new terrors can arise from this particular
clause? It is only a superfluity. If that latitude of construction
which he contends for, were to take place with
respect to the sweeping clause, there would be room for those
horrors. But it gives no supplementary power: It only


208

Page 208
enables them to execute the delegated powers. If the delegation
of their powers be safe, no possible inconvenience can
arise from this clause. It is at most but explanatory. For
when any power is given, its delegation necessarily involves
authority to make laws to execute it. Were it possible to
delineate on paper, all those particular cases and circumstances
in which legislation by the general legislature would be necessary
and leave to the states all the other powers, I imagine
no gentleman would object to it. But this is not within the
limits of human capacity. The particular powers which are
found necessary to be given, are therefore delegated generally,
and particular and minute specification is left to the legislature.

(Here Mr Madison spoke of the distinction between regulation
of police and legislation; but so low he could not be heard.)

When the honorable member objects to giving the general
government jurisdiction over the place of their session, does
he mean that it should be under the control of any particular
state, that might at a critical moment seize it? I should have
thought that this clause would have met with the most cordial
approbation. As the consent of the state in which it may be,
must be obtained, and as it may stipulate the terms of the
grant, should they violate the particular stipulations, it would
be an usurpation: So that if the members of congress were
to be guided by the laws of their country, none of those
dangers could arise.

(Mr Madison made several other remarks, which could not
be heard.)