University of Virginia Library

JUNE 14—COMPENSATION OF CONGRESS.

Mr. Madison.—Mr. Chairman, I most sincerely wish to give
a proper explanation on this subject, in such a manner as may
be to the satisfaction of every one. I shall suggest such considerations
as led the convention to approve of this clause.
With respect to the right of ascertaining their own pay, I will
acknowledge, that their compensations, if practicable, should
be fixed in the constitution itself, so as not to be dependent
on congress itself, or on the state legislatures. The various
vicissitudes, or rather the gradual diminution of the value of
all coins and circulating medium, is one reason against ascertaining
them immutably, as what may be now an adequate
compensation, might by the progressive reduction of the value
of our circulating medium, be extremely inadequate at a
period not far distant.

It was thought improper to leave it to the state legislatures,
because it is improper that one government should be dependent
on another: and the great inconveniences experienced
under the old confederation, show the states would be operated
upon by local considerations, as contradistinguished from general
and national interests.

Experience shows us that they have been governed by such
heretofore, and reason instructs us that they would be influenced
by them again. This theoretic inconvenience of
leaving to Congress the fixing their compensations is more
than counterbalanced by this in the Confederation—that
the state legislatures had a right to determine the pay of the
members of Congress, which enabled the states to destroy the
general government. There is no instance where this power
has been abused. In America, legislative bodies have reduced
their own wages lower, rather than augmented them.
This is a power which cannot be abused without rousing universal
attention and indignation. What would be the consequence
of the Virginia legislature raising their pay to four
or five pounds each per day? The universal indignation of
the people. Should the general Congress annex wages disproportionate
to their services, or repugnant to the sense of
the community, they would be universally execrated. The
certainty of incurring the general detestation of the people
will prevent abuse.

It was conceived that the great danger was in creating new
offices, which would increase the burdens of the people; and
not in a uniform admission of all meritorious characters to
serve their country in the old offices. There is no instance
of any state constitution which goes as far as this. It was
thought to be a mean between two extremes. It guards
against abuse by taking away the inducement to create new
offices, or increase the emolument of old offices; and it gives
them an opportunity of enjoying, in common with other citizens,
any of the existing offices which they may be capable
of executing; to have precluded them from this, would have

been to exclude them from a common privilege to which every
citizen is entitled, and to prevent those who had served their
country with the greatest fidelity and ability from being on
a par with their fellow-citizens. I think it as well guarded as
reason requires; more so than the constitution of any other
nation.