The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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JUNE 7—POWER TO LAY TAXES. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
JUNE 7—POWER TO LAY TAXES.
Mr. MADISON.—Mr. Chairman, in considering this great subject
I trust we shall find that part which gives the general
and essential to the existence of any efficient, or well
organized system of government: if we consult reason, and
be ruled by its dictates, we shall find its justification there; if
we review the experience we have had, or contemplate the
history of nations, here we find ample reasons to prove its
expediency. There is little reason to depend for necessary
supplies on a body which is fully possessed of the power of
withholding them. If a government depends on other governments
for its revenues: if it must depend on the voluntary
contributions of its members, its existence must be precarious.
A government which relies on thirteen independent sovereignties,
for the means of its existence, is a solecism in theory,
and a mere nullity in practice. Is it consistent with reason,
that such a government can promote the happiness of any
people? It is subversive of every principle of sound policy,
to trust the safety of a community with a government, totally
destitute of the means of protecting itself or its members.
Can congress, after the repeated unequivocal proofs it has
experienced of the utter inutility and inefficacy of requisitions,
reasonably expect, that they would be hereafter effectual
or productive? Will not the same local interests, and other
causes, militate against a compliance? Whoever hopes the
contrary must ever be disappointed. The effect, sir, cannot
be changed without a removal of the cause. Let each county
in this commonwealth be supposed free and independent; let
your revenues depend on requisitions of proportionate quotas
from them: let application be made to them repeatedly: is it
to be presumed that they would comply, or that an adequate
collection could be made from partial compliances? It is now
difficult to collect the taxes from them: how much would that
difficulty be enhanced, were you to depend solely on their
generosity? I appeal to reason or every gentleman here,
whether he is not persuaded, that the present confederation
is as feeble, as the government of Virginia would be in that
case, to the same reason I appeal, whether it be incompatible
palpable debility.
If we recur to history, and review the annals of mankind, I
undertake to say that no instance can be produced by the
most learned man of any confederate government, that will
justify a continuation of the present system; or that will not
demonstrate the necessity of this change: and of substituting
to the present pernicious and fatal plan, the system now under
consideration, or one equally energetic. The uniform conclusion
drawn from a review of ancient and modern confederacies,
is, that instead of promoting the public happiness, or
securing public tranquility, they have, in every instance, been
productive of anarchy and confusion; ineffectual for the preservation
of harmony, and a prey to their own dissentions
and foreign invasions.
The Amphyctionic league resembled our confederation in
its nominal powers; it was possessed of rather more power.
The component states retained their sovereignty, and enjoyed
an equality of suffrage in the federal council. But though its
powers were more considerable in many respects than those
of our present system; yet it had the same radical defect. Its
powers were exercised over its individual members, in their
political capacities. To this capital defect it owed its disorders,
and final destruction. It was compelled to recur to
the sanguinary coercion of war to enforce its decrees.—The
struggles consequent on a refusal to obey a decree, and an
attempt to enforce it, produced the necessity of applying to
foreign assistance; by complying with such an application,
together with his intrigues, Philip of Macedon acquired sufficient
influence to become a member of the league. This
artful and insidious prince, soon after became master of their
liberties.
The Achean league, though better constructed than the
Amphyctionic, in material respects, was continually agitated
with domestic dissentions, and driven to the necessity of
calling in foreign aid; this, also, eventuated in the demolition
their people would have been happier; and their united wisdom
and strength, would not only have rendered unnecessary
all sovereign interpositions in their affairs, but would have
enabled them to repel the attack of an enemy. If we descend
to more modern examples, we shall find the same evils resulting
from the same sources.
The Germanic system is neither adequate to the external
defence, nor internal felicity of the people; the doctrine of
quotas and requisitions flourishes here. Without energy—
without stability—the empire is a nerveless body. The most
furious conflicts, and the most implacable animosities between
its members, strikingly distinguish its history. Concert and
co-operation are incompatible with such an injudiciously constructed
system.
The republic of the Swiss is sometimes instanced for its
stability, but even there, dissentions and wars of a bloody
nature have been frequently seen between the cantons. A
peculiar coincidence of circumstances contributes to the continuance
of their political connection. Their feeble association
owes its existence to their singular situation. There is a
schism this moment, in their confederacy, which, without the
necessity of uniting for their external defence, would immediately
produce its dissolution.
The confederate government of Holland, is a further confirmation
of the characteristic imbecility of such governments.
From the history of this government we might derive lessons
of the most important utility.
(Here Mr. Madison quoted sundry passages from De Witt,
respecting the people of Holland, and the war which they had
so long supported against the Spanish monarch: shewing the
impolitic and injudicious structure of their confederacy; that
it was entirely destitute of energy, because their revenues
depended chiefly on requisitions; that during that long war,
the provinces of Guelderland, and Overyssel had not paid
their respective quotas, but had evaded, altogether, their payments;
of the community had never been brought into action, nor
contributed in the least toward the prosecution of the war;
that the fear of pressing danger stimulated Holland and the
other provinces to pay all the charges of the war; that those
two provinces had continued their delinquences; that the
province of Holland alone, paid more than all the rest; still
those provinces who paid up their proportional shares, claimed
from the failing states the amounts of their arrearages; that
the most fatal consequences had nearly resulted from the
difficulty of adjusting those claims; and from the extreme
aversion of the delinquent states to discharge even their most
solemn engagements; that there are existing controversies
between the provinces on this account at present; and to add
to the evils consequent upon requisitions, that unanimity and
the revision and sanction of their constituents, were necessary
to give validity to the decisions of the states general.)
Mr. Madison then added—that these radical defects in their
confederacy must have dissolved their association long ago,
were it not for their peculiar position—circumscribed in a narrow
territory; surrounded by the most powerful nations in the
world; possessing peculiar advantages from their situation;
an extensive navigation and a powerful navy—advantages
which it was clearly the interest of those nations to diminish
or deprive them of; and that their late unhappy dissentions
were manifestly produced by the vices of their system. He
then continued—We may derive much benefit from the experience
of that unhappy country. Governments destitute
of energy, will ever produce anarchy. These facts are worthy
the most serious consideration of every gentleman here. Does
not the history of these confederacies coincide with the lesson
drawn from our own experience? I most earnestly pray that
America may have sufficient wisdom to avail herself of the
instructive information she may derive from a contemplation
of the sources of their misfortunes, and that she may escape a
similar fate by avoiding the causes from which their infelicity
contribution of the states for its support, dismemberment
of the United States may be the consequence. In
cases of eminent danger, the states more immediately exposed
to it, would only exert themselves—those remote from it,
would be too supine to interest themselves warmly in the fate
of those whose distresses they did not immediately perceive.
The general government ought, therefore, to be empowered to
defend the whole union.
Must we not suppose, that those parts of America which are
most exposed, will first be the scenes of war? Those nations
whose interest is incompatible with an extension of our power,
and who are jealous of our resources to become powerful and
wealthy, must naturally be inclined to exert every means to
prevent our becoming formidable. Will they not be impelled
to attack the most exposed parts of the union? Will not their
knowledge of the weakness of our government stimulate them
the more readily to such an attack? Those parts to which
relief can be afforded with most difficulty, are the extremities
of the country, and will be the first objects of our enemies.
The general government having no resources beyond what are
adequate to its existing necessities, will not be able to afford
any effectual succor to those parts which may be invaded.
America, in such a case, would palpably perceive the danger
and folly of withholding from the union, a power sufficient to
protect the whole territory of the United States. Such an
attack is far from improbable, and if it be actually made, it is
difficult to conceive a possibility of escaping the catastrophe
of a dismemberment. On this subject we may receive an
estimable and instructive lesson from an American confederacy;
from an example which has happened in our country
and which applies to us with peculiar force, being most analogous
to our situation. I mean that species of association or
union which subsisted in New England. The colonies of
Massachusetts, Bristol, Connecticut, and New Hampshire,
were confederated together.
The object of that confederacy was primarily to defend
themselves against the inroads and depredations of the Indians,
They had a common council, consisting of deputies
from each party, with an equality of suffrage in their deliberations.
The general expenditures and charges were to be
adequately defrayed. Its powers were very similar to those
of the confederation. Its history proves clearly, that a government
founded on such principles must ever disappoint the
hopes of those who expect its operation to be conducive to the
public happiness.
There are facts on record to prove, that instead of answering
the end of its institution, or the expectation of its framers, it
was violated with impunity, and only regarded when it coincided
perfectly with the views and immediate interests of their
respective parties.
The strongest member of the union availed itself of its circumstances
to infringe their confederacy. Massachusetts refused
to pay its quotas. In the war between England and
Holland, it was found particularly necessary to make exertions
for the protection of that country.
Massachusetts being then more powerful and less exposed
than the other colonies, refused its contributions to the general
defence. In consequence of this, the common council remonstrated
against the council of Massachusetts. This altercation
terminated in the dissolution of their union. From this brief
account of a system, perfectly resembling our present one we
may easily divine the inevitable consequences of a longer
adherence to the latter.
(Mr. Madison then recapitulated many instances of the prevalent
persuasion of the wisest patriots of the states, that the
safety of all America depended on union; and that the government
of the U. States must be possessed of an adequate degree
of energy, or that otherwise their connection could not be
justly denominated an union. He likewise enumerated the
expedients that had been attempted by the people of America
to form an intimate association, from the meeting at New York
subject had been uniform, both in their colonial and independent
conditions: and that a variety of courses had hitherto
prevented the adoption of an adequate system.)
He then continued thus—If we take experience for our
guide, we shall find still more instructive direction on this subject.
The weakness of the existing articles of the union, shewed
itself during the war. It has manifested itself since the peace,
to such a degree, as admits of no doubt to a rational, intelligent,
and unbiassed mind, of the necessity of alteration—nay,
this necessity is obvious to all America—it has forced itself on
the minds of the people. The committee has been informed,
that the confederation was not completed till the year 1781,
when a great portion of the war was ended, consequently no
part of the merit of the antecedent operations of the war could
justly be attributed to that system. Its debility was perceived
almost as soon as it was put in operation. A recapitulation
of the proofs which have been experienced of its
inefficacy is necessary. It is most notorious, that feebleness
universally marked its character. Shall we be safe in another
war in the same situation? That instrument required the
voluntary contributions of the states, and thereby sacrificed
some of our best privileges. The most intolerable and unwarrantable
oppressions were committed on the people during
the late war. The gross enormity of those oppressions might
have produced the most serious consequences, were it not
for the spirit of liberty, which preponderated against every
consideration.
A scene of injustice, partiality and oppression, may bring
heavenly vengeance on any people. We are now by our suffering
expiating the crimes of the otherwise glorious revolution.
Is it not known to every member of this committee,
that the great principles of a free government, were reversed
through the whole progress of that scene? Was not every state
harrassed? Was not every individual oppressed and subjected
to repeated distresses? Was this right? Was it a
overlooked, the most wanton deprivation of property? Had
the government been vested with complete power to procure
a regular and adequate supply of revenue, those oppressive
measures would have been unnecessary. But, sir, can it be
supposed that a repetition of such measures would ever be
acquiesced in? Can a government that stands in need of such
measures secure the liberty or promote the happiness or glory
of any country? If we do not change this system, consequences
must ensue that gentlemen do not now apprehend.
If other testimony were necessary, I might appeal to that
which I am sure is very weighty, but which I mention with
reluctance. At the conclusion of the war, the man who had
the most extensive acquaintance with the nature of the
country, who well understood its interests, and who had
given the most unequivocal and most brilliant proofs of his
attachment to its welfare—when he laid down his arms,
wherewith he had so nobly and successfully defended his
country publicly testified his disapprobation of the present
system; and suggested that some alteration was necessary to
render it adequate to the security of our happiness. I did not
introduce that great name to bias any gentleman here. Much
as I admire and revere the man, I consider these members as
not to be actuated by the influence of any man; but I introduced
him as a respectable witness to prove that the articles
of the confederation were inadequate, and that we must resort
to something else. His modesty did not point out what ought
to be done, but said, that some great change was necessary.
But, sir, testimony if wished for, may be found in abundance,
and numerous conclusive reasons urged for this change. Experience
was daily producing such irresistible proofs of the
defects of this system, this commonwealth was induced to
exert her influence to meliorate it: she began that noble work,
in which I hope she will persist: she proposed to revise it—
her proposition met with that concurrence, which that of a
respectable party will always meet. I am sure if demonstration
reasons have been abundantly heard in the course of this debate,
manifold and cogent enough, not only to operate conviction;
but to disgust an attentive hearer. Recollect the
resolution of the year 1784. It was then found that the whole
burthen of the union was sustained by a few states. This
state was likely to be saddled with a very disproportionate
share. That expedient was proposed (to obviate this inconvenience)
which has been placed in its true light. It has been
painted in sufficient horrors by the honorable gentleman who
spoke last.
I agree with the honorable gentleman, Mr. Henry, that
national splendour and glory are not our objects—but does
he distinguish between what will render us secure and happy
at home, and what will render us respectable abroad? If we
be free and happy at home, we shall be respectable abroad.
The confederation is so notoriously feeble, that foreign
nations are unwilling to form any treaties with us—they are
apprised that our general government cannot perform any of
its engagements; but, that they may be violated at pleasure
by any of the states. Our violation of treaties already entered
into, proves this truth unequivocally. No nation will, therefore,
make any stipulations with congress, conceding any
advantages of importance to us: they will be the more averse
to entering into engagements with us, as the imbecility of our
government enables them to derive many advantages from
our trade, without granting us any return. But were this
country united by proper bands, in addition to other great
advantages, we could form very beneficial treaties with foreign
states. But this can never happen without a change in our
system. Were we not laughed at by the minister of that
nation, from which we may be able yet to extort some of the
most salutary measures for this country? Were we not told
that it was necessary to temporize till our government acquired
consistency? Will any nation relinquish national
advantages to us? You will be greatly disappointed, if you
Let us recollect our conduct to that country from which we
have received the most friendly aid. How have we dealt
with that benevolent ally? Have we complied with our most
sacred obligations to that nation? Have we paid the interest
punctually from year to year? Is not the interest accumulating,
while not a shilling is discharged of the principal? The
magnanimity and forbearance of that ally are so great, that
she has not called upon us for her claims, even in her own distress
and necessity. This, sir, is an additional motive to
increase our exertions. At this moment of time a very considerable
amount is due from us to that country and others.
(Here Mr. Madison mentioned the amount of the debts due
to different foreign nations.)
We have been obliged to borrow money, even to pay the
interest of our debts. This is a ruinous and most disgraceful
expedient. Is this a situation on which America can rely for
security and happiness? How are we to extricate ourselves?
The honorable member told us, we might rely on the punctuality
and friendship of the states, and that they will discharge
their quotas for the future. The contributions of the states
have been found inadequate from the beginning, and are
diminishing instead of increasing. From the month of June
1787, till June 1788, they have only paid 276,641 dollars into
the federal treasury for the purposes of supporting the national
government, and discharging the interest of the national
debts: a sum so very insufficient, that it must greatly alarm
the friends of their country. Suggestions and strong assertions
dissipate before these facts. I shall no longer fatigue the
committee at this time, but will resume the subject as early
as I can.
| The writings of James Madison, | |