University of Virginia Library

JUNE 24—NECESSITY FOR RATIFICATION.[68]

Mr Madison.—Mr Chairman, nothing has excited more
admiration in the world, than the manner in which free governments
have been established in America. For it was the

first instance from the creation of the world to the American
revolution, that free inhabitants have been seen deliberating
on a form of government, and selecting such of their citizens
as possessed their confidence, to determine upon, and give
effect to it. But why has this excited so much wonder and
applause? Because it is of so much magnitude, and because
it is liable to be frustrated by so many accidents. If it has
excited so much wonder, that the United States have in the
middle of war and confusion, formed free systems of government,
how much more astonishment and admiration will be
excited, should they be able, peaceably, freely and satisfactorily,
to establish one general government, when there is
such a diversity of opinions, and interests, when not cemented
or stimulated by any common danger? How vast must be
the difficulty of concentrating in one government, the interests,
and conciliating the opinions of so many different heterogeneous
bodies?

How have the confederacies of ancient and modern times
been formed? As far as ancient history describes the former
to us, they were brought about by the wisdom of some eminent
sage. How was the imperfect union of the Swiss Cantons
formed? By danger. How was the confederacy of the
United Netherlands formed? By the same. They are surrounded
by dangers. By these and one influential character,
they were stimulated to unite. How was the Germanic system
formed? By danger in some degree, but principally by
the overruling influence of individuals.

When we consider this government, we ought to make great
allowances. We must calculate the impossibility that every
state should be gratified in its wishes, and much less that
every individual should receive this gratification. It has

never been denied by the friends of the paper on the table,
that it has effects. But they do not think that it contains
any real danger. They conceive that they will in all probability
be removed, when experience will shew it to be necessary.
I beg that gentlemen in deliberating on this subject, would
consider the alternative. Either nine states shall have ratified
it or they will not. If nine states will adopt it, can it be
reasonably presumed or required, that nine states having
freely and fully considered the subject, and come to an
affirmative decision, will, upon the demand of a single state,
agree that they acted wrong, and could not see its defect—
tread back the steps which they have taken and come forward
and reduce it to uncertainty, whether a general system shall
be adopted or not? Virginia has always heretofore spoken
the language of respect to the other states, and she has always
been attended to. Will it be that language, to call on a great
majority of the states to acknowledge that they have done
wrong? Is it the language of confidence to say, that we do
not believe that amendments for the preservation of the
common liberty and general interests of the state, will be
consented to by them? This is neither the language of confidence
nor respect. Virginia when she speaks respectfully,
will be as much attended to, as she has hitherto been when
speaking this language.

It is a most awful thing that depends on our decision—no
less than whether the thirteen states shall unite freely,
peaceably, and unanimously, for security of their common
happiness and liberty, or whether every thing is to be put
in confusion and disorder. Are we to embark in this dangerous
enterprise, uniting various opinions to contrary interests,
with the vain hope of coming to an amicable concurrence?

It is worthy of our consideration, that those who prepared
the paper on the table, found difficulties not to be described,
in its formation—mutual deference and concession were absolutely
necessary. Had they been inflexibly tenacious of
their individual opinions they would never have concurred.

Under what circumstances was it formed? When no party
was formed, or particular proposition made, and men's minds
were calm and dispassionate. Yet under these circumstances,
it was difficult, extremely difficult, to agree to any general
system.

Suppose eight states only should ratify, and Virginia should
propose certain alterations, as the previous condition of her
accession. If they should be disposed to accede to her proposition,
which is the most favorable conclusion, the difficulty
attending it will be immense. Every state, which has decided
it, must take up the subject again. They must not
only have the mortification of acknowledging that they had
done wrong, but the difficulty of having a reconsideration of
it among the people, and appointing new conventions to
deliberate upon it. They must attend to all the amendments,
which may be dictated by as great a diversity of political
opinions, as there are local attachments. When brought together
in one assembly, they must go through, and accede to
every one of the amendments. The gentlemen who, within
this house, have thought proper to propose previous amendments,
have brought no less than forty amendments—a bill
of rights which contains twenty amendments, and twenty
other alterations, some of which are improper and inadmissible.
Will not every state think herself equally entitled
to propose as many amendments? And suppose them, to be
contradictory, I leave it to this convention, whether it be
probable that they can agree, or agree to any thing, but the
plan on the table; or whether greater difficulties will not be
encountered, than were experienced in the progress of the
formation of the constitution.

I have said that there was a great contrariety of opinions
among the gentlemen in the opposition. It has been heard
in every stage of their opposition. I can see from their
amendments, that very great sacrifices have been made by
some of them. Some gentlemen think that it contains too
much state influence: others, that it is a complete consolidation,

and a variety of other things. Some of them think
that the equality in the senate, is not a defect; others, that it
is the bane of all good governments. I might, if there were
time, show a variety of other cases, where their opinions are
contradictory. If there be this contrariety of opinions in this
house, what contrariety may not be expected, when we take
into view, thirteen conventions equally or more numerous?
Besides, it is notorious from the debates which have been
published, that there is no sort of uniformity in the grounds
of the opposition.

The state of New York has been adduced. Many in that
state are opposed to it from local views. The two who opposed
it in the general convention from that state, are in the
state convention. Every step of this system was opposed by
those two gentlemen. They were unwilling to part with the
old confederation. Can it be presumed then, sir, that gentlemen
in this state, who admit the necessity of changing, should
ever be able to unite in sentiments with those who are totally
averse to any change.

I have revolved this question in my mind, with as much
serious attention, and called to my aid as much information
as I could, yet I can see no reason for the apprehensions
of gentlemen, but I think that if Virginia will agree to
ratify this system, I shall look upon it as one of the most
fortunate events that ever happened for human nature. I
cannot, therefore, without the most excruciating apprehensions,
see a possibility of losing its blessings. It gives me
infinite pain to reflect, that all the earnest endeavors of the
warmest friends of their country, to introduce a system promotive
of our happiness, may be blasted by a rejection, for
which I think with my honorable friend, that previous amendments
are but another name. The gentlemen in opposition
seem to insist on those amendments, as if they were all necessary
for the liberty and happiness of the people. Were I to
hazard an opinion on the subject, I would declare it infinitely
more safe in its present form, than it would be after introducing

into it that long train of alterations, which they call
amendments.

With respect to the proposition of the honorable gentleman
to my left [Mr Wythe] gentlemen apprehend, that by enumerating
three rights, it implied there were no more. The
observations made by a gentleman lately up, on that subject,
correspond precisely with my opinion. That resolution declares,
that the powers granted by the proposed constitution,
are the gift of the people, and may be resumed by them when
perverted to their oppression, and every power not granted
thereby, remains with the people, and at their will. It adds
likewise, that no right of any denomination, can be cancelled,
abridged, restrained or modified, by the general government,
or any of its officers, except in those instances in which power
is given by the constitution for these purposes. There cannot
be a more positive and unequivocal declaration of the principles
of the adoption, that every thing not granted, is reserved.
This is obviously and self-evidently the case, without the
declaration.—Can the general government exercise any power
not delegated? If an enumeration be made of our rights, will
it not be implied, that every thing omitted, is given to the
general government? Has not the honorable gentleman himself,
admitted, that an imperfect enumeration is dangerous?
Does the constitution say that they shall not alter the law of
descents, or do those things which would subvert the whole
system of the state laws? If he did, what was not excepted,
would be granted. Does it follow from the omission of such
restrictions, that they can exercise powers not delegated?
The reverse of the proposition holds. The delegation alone
warrants the exercise of any power.

With respect to the amendments, proposed by the honorable
gentleman, it ought to be considered how far they are good.
As far as they are palpably and insuperably objectionable,
they ought to be opposed. One amendment he proposes is,
that any army which shall be necessary, shall be raised by the
consent of two-thirds of the states. I most devoutly wish,

that there may never be an occasion for having a single regiment.
There can be no harm in declaring, that standing
armies in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and ought to
be avoided, as far as it may be consistent with the protection,
of the community. But when we come to say, that the national
security shall depend not on a majority of the people of
America, but that it may be frustrated by less than one-third
of the people of America, I ask if this be a safe or proper
mode? What part of the United States are most likely to
stand in need of this protection? The weak parts, which are
the southern states. Will it be safe to leave the United States
at the mercy of one-third of the states, a number, which
may comprise a very small proportion of the American people?
They may all be in that part of America which is least exposed
to danger. As far as a remote situation from danger, would
render exertions for public defence less active, so far the
southern states would be endangered.

The regulation of commerce, he further proposed, should depend
on two-thirds of both houses. I wish I could recollect
the history of this matter; but I cannot call it to mind with
sufficient exactness. But I recollect the reasoning of some
gentlemen on that subject. It was said, and I believe with
truth, that every part of America, does not stand in equal
need of security. It was observed, that the northern states
were most competent to their own safety. Was it reasonable,
asked they, that they should bind themselves to the defence
of the southern states, and still be left at the mercy of the
minority for commercial advantages? Should it be in the
power of the minority to deprive them of this and other advantages,
when they were bound to defend the whole union,
it might be a disadvantage for them to confederate.

These were his arguments. This policy of guarding against
political inconveniences, by enabling a small part of the community
to oppose the government, and subjecting the majority
to a small minority is fallacious. In some cases it
may be good; in others it may be fatal. In all cases it puts

it in the power of the minority to decide a question which
concerns the majority.

I was struck with surprise when I head him express himself
alarmed with respect to the emancipation of slaves. Let me
ask, if they should even attempt it, if it will not be an
usurpation of power? There is no power to warrant it, in
that paper. If there be, I know it not. But why should it be
done? Says the honorable gentleman, for the general welfare
—it will infuse strength into our system. Can any member
of this committee suppose, that it will increase our strength?
Can any one believe, that the American councils will come into
a measure which will strip them of their property, discourage,
and alienate the affections of five-thirteenths of the union.
Why was nothing of this sort aimed at before? I believe
such an idea never entered into any American breast, nor do
I believe it ever will enter into the heads of those gentlemen
who substitute unsupported suspicions for reasons.

I am persuaded that the gentlemen who contend for previous
amendments are not aware of the dangers which must
result. Virginia, after having made opposition, will be
obliged to recede from it. Might not the nine states say with
a great deal of propriety—" It is not proper, decent, or right in
you, to demand that we should reverse what we have done.
Do as we have done—place confidence in us, as we have done
in one another—and then we shall freely, fairly and dispassionately
consider and investigate your propositions, and endeavour
to gratify your wishes; but if you do not do this, it
is more reasonable that you should yield to us, than we to
you. You cannot exist without us—you must be a member
of the union."

The case of Maryland, instanced by the gentleman, does not
hold. She would not agree to confederate, because the other
states would not assent to her claims of the western lands.
Was she gratified? No—she put herself like the rest. Nor
has she since been gratified. The lands are in the common
stock of the union.

As far as his amendments are not objectionable, or unsafe,
so far they may be subsequently recommended. Not because
they are necessary, but because they can produce no possible
danger, and may gratify some gentlemen's wishes. But I
never can consent to his previous amendments, because they
are pregnant with dreadful dangers.