The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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JUNE 16—POWER OVER SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
JUNE 16—POWER OVER SEAT OF GOVERNMENT.
Mr Madison.—Mr Chairman, I did conceive, sir, that the
clause under consideration, was one of those parts which
would speak its own praise. It is hardly necessary to say any
thing concerning it. Strike it out of the system, and let me
ask, whether there would not be much larger scope for those
dangers? I cannot comprehend that the power of legislating
over a small district, which cannot exceed ten miles square,
and may not be more than one mile, will involve the dangers
which he apprehends. If there be any knowledge in my
mind, of the nature of man, I should think it would be the
last thing that would enter into the mind of any man, to grant
exclusive advantages in a very circumscribed district to the
prejudice of the community at large. We make suppositions,
and afterwards deduce conclusions from them, as if they were
established axioms. But after all, bring home this question
to ourselves. Is it probable that the members from Georgia,
New Hampshire, &c., will concur to sacrifice the privileges of
their friends? I believe, that whatever state may become the
seat of the general government, it will become the object of
jealousy, and of the envy of the other states. Let me remark,
if not already remarked, that there must be a cession by particular
states, of the district to congress, and that the states
may settle the terms of the cession. The states may make
what stipulation they please in it, and if they apprehend any
danger, they may refuse it altogether. How could the general
government be guarded from the undue influence of particular
states, or from insults, without such exclusive power? If it
were at the pleasure of a particular state to control the cession
and deliberations of congress, would they be secure from
depended for the freedom of deliberation, or the laws of any
state where it might be necessary to sit, would it not be liable
to attacks of that nature (and with more indignity) which have
been already offered to congress? With respect to the government
of Holland, I believe the states general have no jurisdiction
over the Hague. But I have heard that mentioned as a
circumstance which gave undue influence to Holland over the
rest. We must limit our apprehensions to certain degrees of
probability. The evils which they urge must result from this
clause, are extremely improbable: nay, almost impossible.
| The writings of James Madison, | |