University of Virginia Library

JUNE l6—POWER OVER THE MILITIA.

Mr Madison.—Mr Chairman, let me ask this committee, and
the honorable member last up [Henry], what we are to understand
from this reasoning? The power must be vested in
congress, or in the state governments. Or there must be a
division or concurrence. He is against division—It is a
political monster. He will not give it to congress, for fear
of oppression. Is it to be vested in the state governments?
If so, where is the provision for general defence? If ever
America should be attacked, the states would fall successively.
It will prevent them from giving aid to their sister states.
For as each state will expect to be attacked, and wish to guard
against it, each will retain its own militia for its own defence.
Where is this power to be deposited then, unless in the general
government, if it be dangerous to the public safety to give
it exclusively to the states. If it must be divided, let him
shew a better manner of doing it than that which is in the
constitution. I cannot agree with the other honorable
gentleman, that there is no check. There is a powerful check
in that paper. The state governments are to govern the
militia, when not called forth for general national purposes;
and congress is to govern such part only as may be in the
actual service of the union. Nothing can be more certain and
positive than this. It expressly empowers congress to govern
them when in the service of the United States. It is then
clear, that the states govern them when they are not. With
respect to suppressing insurrections, I say that those clauses
which were mentioned by the honorable gentleman, are compatible

with a concurrence of the power. By the first, congress
is to call them forth to suppress insurrections and repel
invasions of foreign powers. A concurrence in the former
case, is necessary, because a whole state may be in insurrection
against the union. What has passed, may perhaps justify
this apprehension. The safety of the union and particular
states, requires that the general government should have
power to repel foreign invasions. The fourth section of the
fourth article, is perfectly consistent with the exercise of the
power by the states. The words are, "The United States shall
guarantee to every state in this union, a republican form of
government, and shall protect each of them against invasion;
and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when
the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence."
The word invasion here, after power had been given
in the former clause to repel invasions may be thought tautologous,
but it has a different meaning from the other. This
clause speaks of a particular state. It means that it shall be
protected from invasion by other states. A republican government
is to be guaranteed to each state, and they are to be
protected from invasion from other states, as well as from
foreign powers: And on application by the legislature or
executive as the case may be, the militia of the other states
are to be called to suppress domestic insurrections. Does this
bar the states from calling forth their own militia? No; but
it gives them a supplementary security to suppress insurrection
and domestic violence.

The other clause runs in these words, "No state shall, without
the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep
troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement
or compact with another state, or with a foreign power,
or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
danger as will not admit of delay." They are restrained
from making war, unless invaded, or in imminent
danger. When in such danger, they are not restrained. I
can perceive no competition in these clauses. They cannot be

said to be repugnant to a concurrence of the power. If we
object to the constitution in this manner, and consume our
time in verbal criticism, we shall never put an end to the
business.