University of Virginia Library

JUNE 13—MISSISSIPPI NEGOTIATIONS.[65]

Mr. Madison.—Mr. Chariman, it is extremely disagreeable
to me to enter into this discussion, as it is foreign to the

object of our deliberations here, and may in the opinion of
some, lead to sully the reputation of our public councils. As
far as my memory will enable me, I will develope the subject.
We will not differ with one another with respect to facts:
perhaps we may differ with respect to principles. I will take
the liberty to observe, that I was led before to make some
observations, which had no relation to the subject under
consideration, as relative to the western country, to obviate
suggestions of gentlemen, which seemed to me to be groundless.
I stated that there was a period when the southern
states were advocates for the alienation or suspension of the
right to the Mississippi (I will not say which), and the eastern
states were against both. I mention this to shew,
that there was no disposition in that part, to surrender that
right or dispose of that country. I do suppose that the
fishery had its influence on those states. No doubt it was
the case.

For that, and other reasons, they still continue against the
alienation. For it might lessen the security of retaining the
fishery. From the best information, it never was the sense
of the people at large, or the prevailing characters of the
eastern states, to approve of the measure. If interest, Sir,
should continue to operate on them, I humbly conceive, that
they will derive more advantage from holding the Mississippi,
than even the southern states. For if the carrying business be
their natural province, how can it be so much extended and
advanced, as by giving the encouragement to agriculture in
the western country, and having the emolument of carrying
their produce to market? The carrying trade must depend
on agriculture for its support in a great measure. In what
place is agriculture so capable of improvement and great extension,
as in the western country? But whatever considerations
may prevail in that quarter or any other, respecting their
interest, I think we may fairly suppose that the consideration
which the honorable member mentioned, and which has been
repeated, I mean the emigrations which are going on to the

westward, must produce the same effect as to them which
it may produce with respect to us. Emigrations are now
going on from that quarter as well as from this state.

I readily confess that neither the old confederation, nor
the new constitution, involves a right to give the navigation
of the Mississippi. It is repugnant to the law of nations.
I have always thought and said so. Although the right be
denied, there may be emergencies which will make it necessary
to make a sacrifice. But there is a material difference between
emergencies of safety in time of war, and those which
may relate in mere commercial regulations. You might on
solid grounds deny in peace, what you give up in war. I do
not conceive, however, that there is that extreme aversion in
the minds of the people of the eastern states, to emigrate to
the westward, which was insinuated by my honorable friend.
Particular citizens, it cannot be doubted, may be averse to it.
But it is the sense of the people at large, which will direct the
public measures. We find, from late arrangements made between
Massachusetts and New York, that a very considerable
country to the westward of New York, was disposed of to
Massachusetts, and by Massachusetts, to some individuals, to
conduct emigrants to that country.

There were seven states who thought it right to give up the
navigation of the Mississippi for twenty-five years, for several
reasons which have been mentioned. As far as I can recollect,
it was nearly as my honorable friend said. But they had no
idea of absolutely alienating it. I think one material consideration
which governed them was, that there were grounds
of serious negotiation between Great Britain and Spain, which
might bring on a coalition between those nations, which
might enable them to bind us on different sides, permanently
withhold that navigation from us, and injure us in other
respects materially. The temporary cession, it was supposed,
would fix the permanent right in our favor, and prevent that
dangerous coalition. It is but justice to myself to say, that
however plausible the reasons urged for its temporary cession

may have been, they never convinced me of its utility. I
have uniformly disapproved of it, and do now.

With respect to the secretary of foreign affairs [Jay], I am
intimately connected with him. I shall say nothing of his
abilities and attachment to his country. His character is
established in both respects. He has given a train of reasoning
which governed him in his project. If he was mistaken,
his integrity and probity, more than compensate for the error.
I am led to think there is no settled disposition in seven states
to give up that object, because New Jersey, on a further consideration
of the subject, actually gave instructions to her
delegates to oppose it. And what was the ground of this?
I do not know the extent and particular reasons of her instructions.
But I recollect, that a material consideration
was, that the cession of that river, would diminish the value
of the western country, which was a common fund for the
United States, and would consequently, tend to impoverish
their public treasury. These, Sir, were rational grounds.

Give me leave, Sir, as I am upon this subject, and as the
honorable gentleman has raised a question, whether it be not
more secure under the old than the new constitution—to
differ from him. I shall enter into the reasoning which, in
my mind, renders it more secure under the new system.
Two thirds of the senators present, (which) will be nine states,
(if all attend to their duty) and the president must concur
in every treaty which can be made. Here are two distinct
and independent branches, which must agree to every treaty;
under the existing system, two thirds of the states must
concur to form a treaty. But it is but one body. Gentlemen
may reason and conclude differently on this subject. I own
that as far as I have any rights, which are but trivial, I would
rather trust them to the new, than the old government. Besides,
let me observe, that the house of representatives will
have a material influence on the government, and will be
additional security in this respect: but there is one thing
which he mentioned, which merits attention. If commercial

policy be a source of great danger, it will have less influence
in the new system, than in the old. For, in the house of
representatives, it will have little or no influence. They are
drawn from the landed interest; taken from the states at
large, and many of them from the western country. Whereas
the present members of congress have been taken from the
Atlantic side of the continent. When we calculate the
dangers that may arise in any case, we judge from the rules
of proportion and chances of numbers. The people at large
choose those who elect the president. The weight of population
will be to the southward, if we include the western
country. There will then be a majority of the people in favor
of this right. As the president must be influenced by the
sense and interest of his electors, as far as it depends on him
(and his agency in making treaties is equal to that of the
senate) he will oppose the cession of that navigation. As far
as the influence of the representative goes, it will also operate
in favor of this right.—The power of treaties is not lodged in
the senators of particular states. Every state has an equal
weight. If ten senators can make a treaty, ten senators can
prevent one from being made. It is from a supposition, that
all the southern delegates will be absent, that ten senators or
two thirds of a majority, can give up this river. The possibility
of absence operates equally as much against the northern
states. If one fifth of the members present think the measure
erroneous the votes of the states are to be taken upon it, and
entered on the journals. Every gentlemen here ought to
recollect, that this is some security, as the people will thereby
know those who advocate iniquitous measures. If we consider
the number of changes in the members of the government,
we will find it another security. But after all, Sir,
what will this policy signify, which tends to surrender the navigation
of the Mississippi? Resolutions of congress to retain
it, may be repeated, and re-echoed from every part of
United States. It is not resolutions of this sort, which
the people of this country wish for. They want an actual
possession of the right, and protection in its enjoyment.
Similar resolutions have been taken under the existing system,
on many occasions. But they have been, heretofore, and
will be hereafter, in my opinion, nugatory and fruitless unless
a change takes place, which will give energy to the acts
of the government.

I will take the liberty to touch once more on the several
considerations which produced the question, because perhaps
the committee may not yet thoroughly comprehend it. In
justice to those gentlemen who concluded in favor of the
temporary cession, I mention their reasons, although I think
the measure wrong. The reasons for so doing under the old
system, will be done away by the new system. We could not,
without national dishonor, assert our right to the Mississippi,
and suffer any other nation to deprive us of it. This consideration,
with others before mentioned, influenced them.
I admit it was wrong. But it is sufficient to prove that they
acted on principles of integrity. Will they not be bound by
honor and conscience, when we are able to enjoy and retain
our right, not to give it up, or suffer it to be interrupted? A
weak system produced this project. A strong system will
remove the inducement. For may we not suppose it will be
reversed by a change of system? I was called up to say, what
was its present situation. There are some circumstances
within my knowledge, which I am not at liberty to communicate
to this house. I will not go farther than to answer the
objections of gentlemen. I wish to conceal no circumstance,
which I can relate consistently with my duty. As to matters
of fact, I have advanced nothing which I presume will be contradicted.
On matters of opinion, we may differ. Were
I at liberty, I could develope some circumstances, which
would convince this house, that this project will never be
revived in congress, and that therefore no danger is to be
apprehended.

JUNE 14—ELECTION OF SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES.

Mr. Madison.—Mr. Chairman, the reason of the exception
was, that if congress could fix the place of choosing the
senators, it might compel the state legislatures to elect them
in a different place from that of their usual sessions, which
would produce some inconvenience, and was not necessary
for the object of regulating the elections. But it was necessary
to give the general government a control over the time
and manner of choosing the senators, to prevent its own dissolution.

With respect to the other point, it was thought that the
regulation of time, place, and manner, of electing the representatives,
should be uniform throughout the continent. Some
states might regulate the elections on the principles of equality,
and others might regulate them otherwise. This diversity
would be obviously unjust. Elections are regulated now
unequally in some states, particularly South Carolina, with
respect to Charleston, which is represented by thirty members.
Should the people of any state, by any means be deprived of
the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be
remedied by the general government. It was found impossible
to fix the time, place, and manner, of the election of representatives
in the constitution. It was found necessary to
leave the regulation of these, in the first place, to the state
governments, as being best acquainted with the situation of
the people, subject to the control of the general government,
in order to enable it to produce uniformity, and prevent its
own dissolution. And considering the state governments and
general governments as distinct bodies, acting in different and
independent capacities for the people, it was thought the
particular regulations should be submitted to the former, and
the general regulations to the latter. Were they exclusively
under the control of the state governments, the general government
might easily be dissolved. But if they be regulated
properly by the state legislatures, the congressional control
will very probably never be exercised. The power appears to

me satisfactory, and as unlikely to be abused as any part of
the constitution.

[Mr. Monroe wished to hear an explanation of the clause
which prohibits either house, during the session of congress,
from adjourning for more than three days without the consent
of the other.]

Mr. Madison wondered that this clause should meet with a
shadow of objection. It was possible, he observed, that the
two branches might not agree concerning the time of adjournment,
and that this possibility suggested the power given the
president of adjourning both houses to such time as he should
think proper, in case of their disagreement. That it would be
very exceptionable to allow the senators, or even the representatives,
to adjourn without the consent of the other house,
at any season whatsoever, without any regard to the situation
of public exigencies. That it was possible, in the nature of
things, that some inconvenience might result from it; but
that it was as well secured as possible.