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Reasons for Wang Mang's fall

It remains to discuss the reasons for Wang Mang's fall. Undoubtedly
the most important cause was the weather. Wang Mang seems to have
come upon a period of severe droughts, which were quite as bad as those
in 1876-9. The resultant social confusion, brought to fruition by failure
in government, caused widespread unrest, rebellion, and his fall.

(1) Wang Mang's whole reign seems to have been a time of poor
harvests. In an edict of A.D. 20, he says that since he ascended the
throne, there had several times been withering droughts, plagues of
locusts and caterpillars, and the harvests of grain had been sparse and
lacking, so that the people had suffered from famine (C: 8a). In A.D. 11,
there was a famine at the northwestern borders (94 B: 19a). In A.D. 14,
there was another famine at the borders, so severe that people took to
cannibalism (99 B: 26a). The most severe droughts occurred in the
years A.D. 18-22, the years immediately preceding Wang Mang's fall.
In A.D. 18, there was a famine in Lang-yeh Commandery (southeastern
Shantung), at which time the Red Eyebrows arose (99 C: 4b). This
famine continued for several years. By A.D. 20, there was already considerable
vagabondage: "In Ch'ing and Hsü Provinces [present Shantung
and Kiangsu], many of the common people left their villages and hamlets
and wandered about as vagabonds. The aged and weak died on the
roads and paths, and the vigorous entered the robber bands" (99 C: 5b).
In that year, there was a prolonged rain for sixty days at the capital
(99 C: 9b), but in A.D. 21, there was a great famine in Honan and east
China (99 C: 12b). In that year, east of Lo-yang, grain was 2000 cash
per picul, about twenty-five times its normal price (99 C: 16a). In the
spring of A.D. 22, east of Shensi, there was cannibalism (99 C: 17a). In

that summer, the locusts even invaded Ch'ang-an, where they crawled
about the palaces (99 C: 18a). Several hundred thousand refugges came
to Shensi from the east, but famine relief in Shensi itself was inadequate
and mismanaged, so that 70% to 80% of these refugees starved (99 C:
18a). At the same time, there was a famine in the middle Yangtze valley
(Nan-yang Commandery; HHS, An. 1 A: 2a). Thus the climatic
cycle made Wang Mang's later years a period of extreme stress and
strain. Had there been consistently good seasons in Wang Mang's
reign, as there were during the reign of Emperor Hsüan, he might have
kept his throne and successfully founded another dynasty.

At the same time there was famine in the capital region itself (Kuan-chung,
central Shensi). The plain in central Shensi north of the Wei
River had been irrigated by some famous canals, the first of which was
dug by the engineer Cheng Kuo in 237 B.C. This first canal had its
intake in the ancient Ku-k'ou prefecture, not far from the place where the
Ching River emerges from the mountains. North of that place, the
river runs through a gorge cut in limestone; south of it the river runs
through soft deep loess. This canal was planned to irrigate a region of
40,000 ch'ing (186,000 acres, 300 sq. miles), but it is doubtful if the canal
was originally built on as large a scale. In 111 B.C., six subsidiary canals
were dug, and in 95 B.C. at the suggestion of a Mr. Po (or Pai [OMITTED]),
another canal was dug nearly 200 li in length. This canal irrigated an
additional 4500-odd ch'ing (20,925 acres).[1] These canals were responsible
for the strength of the Ch'in state and for the economic importance
of Ch'ang-an in Former Han times. It was the one region in northern
China where there were no droughts or famines. The grain in the Great
Granary at Ch'ang-an was untouched for over a century, so that it became
rotten and could not be eaten (HS 24 A: 15b).

The Ching River, after it leaves the mountains, flows through soft
loess to the place where it joins the Wei River. It has a considerable
gradient. Erosion dug the bed of this River deeper and deeper, until
the intake of these canals finally drew less and less. At first, they drew
an inadequate amount of water or none at all except in times of flood,
and finally they drew no water at all. At present the original intake of

these canals is about sixty feet above the river level.[2] The intake for
the canal of 95 B.C. was placed somewhat higher up the river than the
original intake. But continued erosion caused this intake, too, to become
useless.

We are not told when these canals ceased operating. Li Tao-yüan
(vi cent.), in his Shui-ching-chu, says they were then dry. In all probability,
they ceased to draw an adequate supply of water in Wang Mang's
time. On June 2, A.D. 16, the banks of the Ching River collapsed at
the Ch'ang-p'ing Lodge (99 B: 29b), which was located about half-way
between the intake of the canals and the Wei River. (In 35 B.C., an
earthquake had previously caused these banks to collapse [9: 12a], and
on May 7, 25 B.C., the high bank of this River had collapsed in Ch'ang-ling
Prefecture [10: 6a], not far from the junction of this River with the
Wei.) At this time, erosion had already dug the bed of the River so
deep that its sides caved in—in all probability, the canals were then already
useless except when there was a flood on the Ching River. Only
forty miles from its junction with the Wei, the Ching River flows through
the mountains in a deep gorge cut into the rock, so that the intake of any
irrigation canals could not be moved further upstream with the means of
digging then available.

The result was bound to be famine in the capital area itself. Hence
the Ch'ang-an area became economically less important than the Yellow
River area in northern Honan, and Wang Mang talked of moving his
capital to Lo-yang (where Emperor Kuang-wu later actually located his
capital). Already at the time of Chai Yi's rebellion (A.D. 7), there were
robbers in Kuan-chung; in A.D. 21 there was so much trouble in that
region that special officers had to be appointed to deal with the robbers
(99 C: 12b), and in the summer of A.D. 22, there was famine even in
Ch'ang-an itself (99 C: 18a). The failure of this canal, and the impossibility
of relocating it, was another cause for Wang Mang's fall.

In A.D. 11, the Yellow River caused a great flood and changed its
course; because it seemed to have found an easier outlet to the ocean, no
attempt was made to check it (99 B: 18a), especially because Wang
Mang's own ancestral area was thus protected from further floods. The
climatic cycle and failure in irrigation was the most important factor in
Wang Mang's fall.

H. Bielenstein, The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, pp. 145-153, argues
that Wang Mang's fall was ultimately caused by this change in the course
of the Yellow River. He has established the importance of this factor.
But other factors were equally and more important.

(2) North China is a region of recurrent droughts; it was recognized
in ancient times that a drought was to be expected every six or seven
years on an average, and the government maintained granaries for such
occurrences. Hence ordinary famines would not cause widespread suffering
unless at the same time the government was inefficient. A famine
year was really a time when the competence of the government was tested.
The real cause for Wang Mang's fall was the failure of his government
to meet the strains put upon it.

It should not be thought that Wang Mang's time was a period of general
decay. There are signs that just the opposite was the case. Indeed,
some circumstances seem to indicate that the period of cultural advance
during Former Han times was coming to flower in an age of unusual
progress. We are told that the study of anatomy was being pushed to
the extent of human dissection (99 B: 30b), and that geometrical proportion
was used in architectural design (99 C: 9a). Most interesting
of all is the brief and cryptic account of an attempt at aviation in A.D. 19
—the earliest account in human history of an actual flight that was not
mythology (99 C: 5a). The carriage with flowery baldachins (99 C:
13b, 14a) was an outstanding mechanical achievement. It may well be
the case that Wang Mang's Nine Ancestral Temples were more magnificent
than anything previously erected (99 C: 9b).

But Wang Mang's government exhibited many signs of widespread
corruption. During the reign of Emperor Ch'eng, when his uncles controlled
the government, corruption was rife. Wang Mang came to the
throne by fraudulent portents, and so needed officials who would countenance
fraud, with the result that they countenanced fraudulent reports
on the part of their subordinates (99 C: 15b), and the government became
permeated with corruption (99 B: 27a). Wang Mang himself
publicly confessed that some officials would extort ransoms from innocent
persons by illegally condemning them as slaves and removing the sentence
upon payment of a bribe. Yet he was powerless to stop this practise
(99 B: 17b). That the outrageous T'ang Tsun should have become his
minister is only natural.

(3) Wang Mang enacted some very unwise administrative measures.
Emperor Wu had established Inspectors of Regional Divisions, ranking
at only 600 piculs, who were really spies of the central government,
traveling about the commanderies, reporting upon the rule of the Administrators
for those commanderies (who ranked at 2000 piculs). The
Confucians did not like this unhierarchical arrangement, by which a
lower-ranking official supervised a higher-ranking one; in 7 B.C., when

Wang Mang first came to power, the title and rank of these Inspectors
were changed to that of Provincial Shepherd (an ancient name), so that
names should correspond to reality. Emperor Ai changed these officials'
titles back again to Inspector; in 1 B.C., Wang Mang again entitled them
Shepherds, ranking them the same as the highest ministers. But now
these Shepherds lost much of their incentive for careful supervision of
their provinces. Inspectors had previously hoped that they might be
promoted to the post of Administrator, if they did careful and honest
work; the Shepherds could now be promoted only to one of the ministerial
offices, among which there were very few openings. The result was that
they were content to do little and merely held their positions (99 C: 10b).
Consequently, in A.D. 21, Wang Mang was driven by the inefficiency of
the provincial governments to appoint Shepherd's Superintendents and
Associate Shepherds, who were to do the work previously done by the
Inspectors. But it was now too late to reform a corrupt government.

Wang Mang knew how subordinates could thwart their superior, he
had detailed ideas about what should be done in government, and he was
suspicious of his associates. Consequently he did not give his ministers
the power to decide matters themselves, but had every decision referred
to himself. Since the ministers thus found themselves merely executive
officers, they ceased to feel any responsibility for their offices and merely
transmitted business to Wang Mang, awaiting his orders.

He was especially suspicious of his private secretaries, the Masters of
Writing, who could control the government by withholding the information
which came to the throne in the form of memorials. Hence he permitted
eunuchs and members of his entourage to open and read memorials
to the throne, with the result that memorials sometimes never
even reached the Masters of Writing and were not dealt with in proper
fashion.

The most important feature in government, according to Confucius'
supposed teaching, was the rectification of names; if that were done, all
governmental difficulties would automatically be solved. Wang Mang
hence deliberated long and profoundly on geographical arrangements,
rites, and music, endeavoring to make them accord with classical precedents.
From dawn to dark, he discussed these matters with his
ministers. He himself was a learned Confucian, the first such literatus
to be on the throne; he surrounded himself with the best scholars he
could find. But the classical precedents were by no means unambiguous,
many matters were treated only implicitly in the Classics, and there were
good arguments both for and against most decisions. Wang Mang was
not like Emperor Wu, a dilettante who could blithely decide out of his
own consciousness such a weighty matter as the proper rites for the important

imperial sacrifices feng and shan. Wang Mang was a thoroughly
conscientious man, who felt the importance of properly determining each
matter. Hence his discussions with his ministers and advisors were
interminable. Since no one else could make the final decision about
precisely how classical precedents should be applied, Wang Mang had
to decide these matters himself. After he had decided, he would change
his mind again and again. In the case of some place-names, in his
anxiety to get them exactly right, he changed them as much as five times,
finally returning to the original name! (99 B: 25a, b) In addition, he
had himself to decide on the multifarious details of an autocratic government.
He worked all night at his documents, but even then he was
unable to keep up with the government business.

The result was, as Pan Ku says (99 B: 26b-27b), that, since Wang
Mang had little leisure to examine matters conscientiously, and yet was
determined to do so, law-cases were not decided for years, prisoners were
not released from prison except when there was an amnesty, vacancies
in the government were not filled with permanent occupants for years,
and the government in general could do little except routine work. Corruption
could not be checked and things went from bad to worse. The
ruler was too conscientious and too suspicious to delegate power and the
governmental duties were too multifarious for him to manage.

As a result of such an eager concern about general principles, Wang
Mang was led to make serious mistakes in particular matters. When the
famine in the east was at its hight and the bandits were even capturing
cities, Wang Mang decided that they must be put down at all costs.
The man he had put over the Shepherds of that region protested (99 C:
16a), but nevertheless, in A.D. 22, Wang Mang sent 100,000 troops into
the famine regions. The granaries were empty and could not feed them,
so the troops foraged among the people, with dire results. It is not surprising
that the people found the troops a greater calamity than the
bandits, for the soldiers, under the guise of protecting the people, took
what little food was left. The curious verse quoted in 99 C: 17b probably
represents a mild version of what the people felt.

Wang Mang furthermore enacted into a systematized law the procedure,
begun by Emperor Hsüan, of reducing official salaries at a time
of drought or calamity. He made the various officials of the central
court and the provinces each guarantors for a certain region. At the end
of the year, when the yearly reports from the commanderies were presented,
the amount of damage to the crops in each part of the empire
was to be reported in percentages, and the number of dishes on the imperial
table was to be reduced in proportion. At the same time, the
officials guaranteeing the various sections in which there were calamities

were to have their salaries reduced in proportion to the suffering in their
region (99 B: 28a-29b). It was an idealistic proposal, but the result
was that officials could not anticipate the amount of their salaries and
income, so that they exacted fees and presents to support themselves.
So bribery and corruption became general.

Wang Mang furthermore imitated a practise of Chou times, when
official positions were largely hereditary. In A.D. 14, he made all his
important provincial offices hereditary in the clans of his nobles (99 B:
24a). Thus he eliminated the incentive to efficient government that had
been introduced by the Ch'in dynasty and continued by the Han dynasty,
which regimes gave office for merit, not for family connections. Wang
Mang probably thought he was doing away with another of the corruptions
inherited from the Ch'in regime (6: 39a), but a more unwise measure
could hardly have been conceived. As a result, he had to dismiss a noble
from his title in order to get rid of a corrupt provincial official, and promotions
for merit from one grade to another in the provincial government
were made impossible. Wang Mang seems to have removed most of the
stimuli to good government that the Ch'in and Han dynasties had
laboriously set up. It is not surprising that the government in the
provinces degenerated badly.

He furthermore exhibited the conceit that sometimes comes to self-made
men. He did not like to listen to admonitions, and became angry
when his proposals were opposed, even for the wisest reasons. Hence
the people who had the best interests of the country at heart came to
avoid him and he failed to learn the truth about things. He dismissed
those who explained that undue taxation had produced banditry (99 C:
2b). He removed Feng Ch'ang, his Communicator (the state treasurer),
because the latter protested against the state monopolies (99 C: 2a), and
he dismissed a newly appointed Shepherd of the central Yangtze region,
Fei Hsing, who had plans for reducing banditry by lightening the pressure
of these monopolies upon his people (99 C: 3a). He even removed his
best general, Chuang Yu, when the latter remonstrated against his unwise
plans (99 C: 5b). As a consequence, the eunuchs, such as Wang Yeh,
merely flattered Wang Mang and deceived him about the condition of
the people (99 C: 18b).

(4) Wang Mang seems to have been personally stingy and publicly
extravagant with government funds. He hoarded the gold he secured,
and would not expend it even in an emergency (99 C: 25b). He liked
to give noble titles, and at first did not give fiefs to his nobles, on the
pretext that the country's geographical arrangements had not yet been
settled, with the result that some of his nobles had to work for a living
(99 B: 19b). Within noble estates he set up "reserved fields," nominally

later to be used as fiefs for vassals, but really to economize on the incomes
paid to the nobles and to reward or punish them by decreasing or increasing
these reserved areas (99 B: 25a).

Wang Mang seems to have furthermore established quite a number of
sinecure positions in the court. The Han dynasty had three highest
ministers (kung) and nine high ministers (ch'ing); Wang Mang established
four Coadjutors, three highest ministers, and four generals, making eleven
officials who ranked as highest ministers (kung). The number of important
subordinates to the high ministers (ch'ing) was also increased.
The Han dynasty had only a few such, depending on the amount of
business in each office. Such an unsymmetrical arrangement did not however
suit literary Confucian ideals; Wang Mang appointed three grandees
and nine Officers of the First Rank to each one of the nine highest ministers,
making 27 and 81 respectively of these two grades. He also instituted
seven grandees whose duty it was to admonish the emperor (99 B:
4a), Directors of Mandates from the Five Majestic Principles, whose
duty it was to spread propaganda, and four Masters, four Companions
and nine Libation Officers to the Heir-apparent, all of whom ranked the
same as the highest of the high ministers. These additional salaries must
have been quite expensive.

Outside the capital, Wang Mang increased the number of commanderies
from 103 to 125 and the number of prefectures from 1314 to 2203 (28 Bii:
48b; 99 B: 25a), with a corresponding increase in the number of administrative
officials and in the cost of administration. He frequently sent
out commissioners and others to supervise the administration. In A.D.
11, he sent out 55 Generals of the Gentlemen-at-the Palace and 55 Administrators
of the Laws Clad in Embroidered Garments to control the
large commanderies along the border (99 B: 17a). His commissioners
followed each other on the roads, one after another, sometimes ten
chariots-full a day; when the public granaries and post-stations could no
longer supply their needs, these commissioners forcibly took horses, carriages,
and supplies from the people along the road (99 C: 7a).

Wang Mang also greatly expanded his nobility. In the time of Emperor
Wu, before the great purge, there had been some twenty kings and
about two hundred marquises (HFHD, ch. vi, app. III); in A.D. 12,
Wang Mang had already appointed 796 nobles of the first five ranks (who
corresponded to the kings and marquises of Han times). In addition
there were Baronesses and Vassals (99 B: 19b). Thus Wang Mang's
nobility must have been a great drain upon the empire, even though he
did not give his nobles the full amount of their allowances.

(5) Perhaps Wang Mang's greatest extravagance was his military
expeditions. Emperor Wu had flailed the Huns until, after his death,

they were glad to submit and make peace with the Chinese; he had attacked
the barbarians in all directions, so that eventually the border
peoples recognized the might of the Chinese and kept the peace. Wang
Mang upset this peace in the interests of a Confucian imitation of ancient
practises. The Han rulers followed the Ch'in practise of calling themselves
emperors, consequently they could entitle the rulers of neighboring
vassal states kings, just as their own greatest vassals were entitled kings.
But, at the beginning of the Chou period, the ruler had entitled himself
king and his greatest nobles were only dukes, so Wang Mang followed the
Confucian precept, "Heaven has not two suns nor has Earth two kings"
(Mencius V, i, iv, 1 attributes this saying to Confucius), and degraded
all his highest nobles to be dukes. They accepted the change of title
without a murmur, for they knew it was a change in name only. When
however Wang Mang came to change similarly the titles of his barbarian
vassals, trouble ensued. They did not understand the necessity of conforming
to Confucian principles, became suspicious, and felt insulted.
Eventually the Huns, the Kao-chü-li in the present Manchuria, the petty
states in the Western Frontier Regions, and those in Szechuan and
Yünnan all revolted, and Wang Mang had to face border raids and war
in all directions.

The worst trouble was with the Huns. When Shan-yü Hu-han-hsieh
had come to submit to Emperor Hsüan, the latter had treated him as a
guest, had ranked him above all the Chinese nobles, and had given him
an imperial seal as his sign of office, with the word hsi (denoting an imperial
seal) in its inscription. Emperor Hsüan was not Confucian enough
to esteem correct terminology above the establishment of friendly relations
with a neighboring state. Wang Mang's envoys carried to the
Shan-yü a new seal bearing the Hsin dynasty's name, with the word
chang (which was used for a noble or official seal) in its inscription. The
Shan-yü unsuspectingly made the exchange; afterwards, when the seal
was read to him, he thought the Emperor's intention was to degrade him
to be a mere noble, ranking below the Chinese vassal kings, and asked
to have his old seal back. But the senior Lieutenant to the Chinese
envoy had thoughtfully smashed the old seal. As a result of this deed
and some other disagreements, the Huns raided the Chinese borders,
capturing countless prisoners (to be sold as slaves) and animals, welcomed
and shielded Chinese rebels against Wang Mang, and the Shan-yü announced
that he owed allegiance to the Han dynasty, not to the Hsin
dynasty.

Wang Mang now declared war and planned a grandiose attack, which
would send twelve armies by different routes simultaneously into Hun
territory, numbering altogether 300,000 men, carrying provisions for

300 days. He would overthrow this Shan-yü and divide his territory
among fifteen Shan-yü. But General Chuang Yu replied, with the carefulness
of a staff officer, that 300 days' provisions would require 18 hu
(10 bushels or 36 liters) of grain per man, which amount could only be
transported by oxen; that the border commanderies could not furnish so
much grain, so that it would take more than a year to collect and transport
it from the parts of the empire from which it could be secured; that
an ox would need 20 hu more grain; that, since Hun territory was lacking
in water and grass, experience had shown that within 100 days all the
oxen would be dead, while the balance of the provision could not be carried
by men, so that it would be best to send a light expedition in order
to come up with the rapidly moving Huns.

Wang Mang would not heed, and in A.D. 10, he ordered the expedition
to be formed. The result was that large numbers of men collected at
the borders, where they waited for their provisions. Having inadequate
shelter and provisions, they foraged among the Chinese of those regions.
But there had been a famine and scarcity in the northwestern borders
(94 B: 19a); the result was that the farmers of the borders left their
homes and scattered. The armies never started out and the men merely
encamped at the border. Wang Mang had to maintain some 200,000
guards at the borders, who tyrannized over the people, with the result
that the farmers turned robbers and raided neighboring commanderies.
It took more than a year to put down these robbers and by that time the
border commanderies were practically empty (99 B: 27b). In A.D. 19,
he summoned an army and levied taxes for another expedition against the
Huns, planning to put Hsü-pu Tang on the Hun throne. Chuang Yu's
sound arguments led to the army not being sent out, and Wang Mang
had to content himself with dismissing Chuang Yu (99 C: 4b-5b). In
A.D. 21, Wang Mang had grain and currency worth millions of cash
transported to the borders to prepare for an expedition against the Huns.
But the expedition never started out (99 C: 12b). Wang Mang squandered
his people's livelihood and lives in an attempt to secure an empty
fame.

A similar result eventuated on the southwestern borders, with even
greater wastage of men and wealth. By A.D. 16, all the border dependencies
had broken from their allegiance to the Chinese. Wang Mang
showed the typical learned Confucian's inability to understand peoples
who possess a different cultural tradition and he was not sufficiently
teachable to learn how to employ military force efficiently.

(6) Like all rulers who think of themselves as great, Wang Mang entertained
grandiose plans of various sorts. In A.D. 12, he planned a grand
tour to the east, and an order was dispatched that 450,000 rolls of silk

should be collected to defray its cost. Only half of this amount arrived,
so the expedition was put off (99 B: 21b). Wang Mang believed he had
succeeded to the throne by virtue of the power earth, which was equated,
not with one of the four directions, but with the center, so he concluded
that he should make his capital at the center of the earth, and fixed upon
Lo-yang, the ancient capital of the Chou dynasty. In A.D. 14, he
proposed to make four less expensive tours in the four directions, and
afterwards go to Lo-yang (99 B: 22a, b). He was again dissuaded from
making these tours, and put off the change of the capital to a date seven
years later. Meanwhile he sent two ministers to build palaces, temples,
and altars at Lo-yang. In A.D. 20, he also spent some ten billions of
cash in building his Nine Ancestral Temples near Ch'ang-an (99 C: 10a).
In A.D. 23, when rebellion became serious, he exhibited his nonchalance
by marrying a second time, sending the bride's family as betrothal
presents the sum of 30,000 catties of actual gold (235,347 troy oz. or
7,320,000 g.; 99 C: 20a).

(7) With such heavy and unusual expenses, it is not surprising that
Wang Mang should have resorted to depreciating the currency, making
government monopolies out of especially profitable enterprises, and increasing
the taxes. These and other economic measures are discussed
elsewhere (cf. App. II). In so far as they were not soon rescinded, they
represented increased burdens upon the people. Wang Mang seems to
have drained the country's wealth. The suffering drove great hordes of
people to banditry and rebellion, until even the people of the capital
hated him so much that they were anxious to kill him and restore the
Han dynasty to the throne.

(8) Wang Mang mistreated his own relatives and followers, so that he
did not secure the permanent and unchallengeable loyalty of any group.
He did not execute his Lieutenant Chancellors, as Emperor Wu had done,
but he remained severe towards all, so that no one could permanently
count on his favor and he could trust no one completely.

In his own family, he seems to have been the stern and strict father,
who sacrifices his family to his own ambition. He executed three of his
four legitimate sons: his eldest, Yü, because of an intrigue that opposed
his own plans (99 A: 16b); his second, Huo, because he murdered a slave
(99 A: 3b); and the third, Lin1, because an unfortunate liaison had put
him in the position where the son was afraid he would be executed if he
did not first assassinate his father (99 C: 11a, b). The fourth son, An,
was not quite right in his mind and died before his father (99 C: 11b).
People naturally thought this series of deaths was Heaven's judgment
upon Wang Mang.

Wang Mang was equally severe upon his relatives. He executed his

own nephew, Kuang, because the latter had been responsible for a judicial
murder (99 A: 33b). He also executed a grandson and a grand-daughter
Tsung and Fang, because the first had in a silly fashion anticipated
coming to the throne, by having a picture painted of himself in imperial
garb and preparing other imperial paraphernalia (99 C: 3a, b), and the
latter had performed black magical ceremonies against her mother-in-law
and had murdered a slave to hide the matter (99 C: 3b).

In his younger days, Wang Mang, in his intrigues for power, had not
spared his relatives. Shun-yü Chang was his first cousin, and seemed
likely to inherit the power Wang Mang wanted; the latter thereupon had
no scruples about informing on his cousin's crimes and getting him
executed (99 A: 2a). Wang Mang sent away from the court and later
executed his own uncle and another first cousin, Wang Li5 and Wang Jen,
because he feared their influence with the Grand Empress Dowager
(99 A: 4b, 16b).

Chen Han and his son, Feng, were Wang Mang's closest intimates,
and had assisted most actively in securing for Wang Mang his unusual
honors as a minister. When however Wang Mang advanced to the
throne, they were not entirely pleased and were a little frightened at the
prospect, for they were not overweeningly ambitious. Chen Han died
in office; when Chen Feng's son, Hsün, ambitiously presented a portent
ordering him to marry Wang Mang's daughter, the latter decided it was
time to show his power and overawe the court. He executed Chen Feng
and Chen Hsün, together with their associates, who included two sons
of the famous Liu Hsin1a and his own first cousin, Wang Ch'i, a brother
of the Wang Yi5 whom he later made his Heir-apparent (99 B: 16a). A
daughter of Liu Hsin1a, Yin3, who was the wife of Wang Mang's third son,
was executed with her husband. Thus Wang Mang executed three of
Liu Hsin's children.

Wang Mang in this way antagonized his own clan. While he gave
them wealth and high noble rank, yet none felt secure, for they knew not
when the imperial power might uproot and destroy them. His closest
officials felt equally insecure. Consequently he could trust no one and
was constantly suspicious, which made matters worse. Because he
feared a revolt, he would not allow even his provincial Shepherds to maintain
armies for bandit suppression. When he sent his generals to gather
troops for use against the bandits he would not allow them to make a
move without first consulting the throne. Thus the bandits and rebels
could gain a firm foothold before the imperial forces were allowed to
attack them.

It is hence not so surprising that in A.D. 23 another imperial first
cousin, Wang Shê, should have been persuaded by astrology that Wang

Mang would inevitably fall, and should have headed a conspiracy to
remove the Hsin Emperor and put the Han dynasty back on the throne.
He secured the cooperation of Wang Mang's Commander-in-chief and of
Liu Hsin1a. Only the fortunate disclosure of the plot and the pusillanimity
of the Commander-in-chief prevented its success. Wang Shê had
gone to the extreme of making out that Wang Mang was a bastard (99 C:
22b-23b). The plotters were all executed without trouble, but this plot
was a severe shock to Wang Mang. Thereafter he could not eat properly
nor sleep comfortably. His severity had recoiled upon his own head.

The greatest suffering of the country came, not directly from Wang
Mang, but from the robber bands that came into being as an indirect
result of the famine and of his rule. They went through the country,
looting, pillaging, and burning. The Red Eyebrows were merely the
largest of these many illiterate robber armies. They swept over North
China, defeating imperial armies and capturing cities by storm, destroying
as they went. At the death of Wang Mang, only the Wei-yang
Palace was burnt; the rest of Ch'ang-an was undamaged. In A.D. 25,
after the Keng-shih Emperor had established himself in Ch'ang-an, the
Red Eyebrows arrived, plundering along their route. They had set up
another Emperor; they defeated the Keng-shih Emperor's general, captured
Ch'ang-an, and plundered it. The people fled the city; the Red
Eyebrows had to leave when the food in the city was exhausted. Then
they burnt the remainder of the city, went west and north, digging into
the imperial tombs and pillaging the cities. The snow drove them back to
Ch'ang-an, where at last they were defeated by a ruse. A great famine
now raged in the capital region; Ch'ang-an was itself empty and waste.
No one dared to show himself alone for fear of being robbed; honest men
gathered in camps and cities, which they defended desperately, so that
the Red Eyebrows could secure little. In the winter of 26/27, famine
drove them eastwards out of Kuang-chung. Meanwhile, Emperor
Kuang-wu had been putting down robbers and rebels in eastern China.
He met the remnants of the Red Eyebrows with his great army, overawing
them, and they meekly surrendered, transmitting to him the Han
dynastic imperial seals. Pan Ku states that the population of the empire
had been reduced by half (24 B: 27a). So terrible were the forces that
Wang Mang let loose upon his land.