The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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FRIDAY, FEBY. 21. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
FRIDAY, FEBY. 21.
Mr. Mercer made some remarks tending to a re-consideration
of ye. act declaring general funds to be necessary, which revived
the discussion of that subject.
Mr. Madison said that he had observed throughout the proceedings
of Congress relative to the establishment of such funds
that the power delegated to Congress by the Confederation had
been very differently construed by different members & that this
difference of construction had materially affected their reasonings
& opinions on the several propositions which had been made;
that in particular it had been represented by sundry members
that Congress was merely an Executive body; and therefore that
it was inconsistent with the principles of liberty & the spirit of
the Constitution, to submit to them a permanent revenue which
wd. be placing the purse & the sword in the same hands; that he
wished the true doctrine of the Confederation to be ascertained
as it might perhaps remove some embarrassments; and towards
that end would offer his ideas on the subject.
He said, that he did not conceive in the first place that the
opinion was sound that the power of Congress in cases of revenue
was in no respect Legislative, but merely Executive; and, in the
second place that admitting the power to be Executive a permanent
revenue collected & dispensed by them in the discharge of
the debts to wch. it sd. be appropriated would be inconsistent with
the nature of an Executive body, or dangerous to the liberties of
the Republic.
As to the first opinion he observed that by the Articles of
Confederation, Congs. had clearly & expressly the right to fix
the quantum of revenue necessary for the public exigencies, &
to require the same from the States respectively in proportion to
the value of their land; that the requisitions thus made were a
law to the States, as much as the Acts of the latter for complying
with them were a law to their individual members; that the
federal constitution was as sacred and obligatory as the internal
constitutions of the several States; and that nothing could justify
the States in disobeying acts warranted by it, but some previous
abuse and infraction on the part of Congs.; that as a proof that
was considered as a legislative power over the purse, he would
appeal to the proposition made by the British Minister of giving
this power to the B. Parliamt., & leaving to the American Assemblies
the privilege of complying in their own modes, & to the
reasonings of Congress & the several States on that proposition.
He observed further that by the articles of Confederation was
delegated to Congs. a right to borrow money indefinitely, and
emit bills of Credit which was a species of borrowing, for repayment
& redemption of which the faith of the States was pledged
& their legislatures constitutionally bound. He asked whether
these powers were reconcileable with the idea that Congress was
a body merely Executive? He asked what would be thought in
G. B., from whose Constitution our Political reasonings were so
much drawn, of an attempt to prove that a power of making
requisitions of money on ye. Parliament & of borrowing money
for discharge of which the Parlt. sd. be bound, might be annexed
to the Crown without changing its quality of an Executive
branch, and that the leaving to the Parliamt. the mode only of
complying with the requisitions of the Crown would be leaving
to it its supreme & exclusive power of Legislation?
As to the second point he referred again to the British Constitution
& the mode in which provision was made for the public
debts, observing that although the Executive had no authority to
contract a debt, yet that when a debt had been authorized or
admitted by the Parliament a permanent & irrevocable revenue
was granted by the Legislature, to be collected & dispensed by
the Executive; and that this practice had never been deemed a
subversion of the Constitution, or a dangerous association of a
power over the purse with the power of the Sword.
If these observations were just as he conceived them to be, the
establishment of a permanent revenue not by any assumed authority
of Congress, but by the authority of the States at the recommendation
of Congs, to be collected & applied by the latter to the
discharge of the public debts, could not be deemed inconsistent
with the spirit of the federal Constitution, or subversive of the
principles of liberty; and that all objections drawn from such a
supposition ought to be withdrawn. Whether other objections of
question. For his part although for various reasons[56] he had
wished for such a plan as most eligible, he had never been sanguine
that it was practicable & the discussions which had taken
place had finally satisfied him that it would be necessary to limit
the call for a general revenue to duties on commerce & to call for
the deficiency in the most permanent way that could be reconciled
with a revenue established within each State separately & appropriated
to the Common Treasury. He said the rule which he had
laid down to himself in this business was to concur in every arrangemt.
that sd. appear necessary for an honorable & just fulfilment
of the public engagements; & in no measure tending to augment
the power of Congress which sd. appear to be unnecessary; and
particularly disclaimed the idea of perpetuating a public debt.
Mr. Lee, in answer to Mr. Madison, said the doctrine maintained
by him was pregnant with dangerous consequences to the liberties
of the confederated States; that, notwithstanding the specious
arguments that had been employed it was an established truth
that the purse ought not to be put into the same hands with the
Sword; that like arguments had been used in favor of ship money
the support of the Govt., that the Executive should be assured of
the means of fulfilling its engagements for the public service. He
said it had been urged by several in behalf of such an establishment
for public credit that without it Congress was nothing more
than a rope of sand. On this head he would be explicit; he had
rather see Congress a rope of sand than a rod of Iron. He urged
finally as a reason why some States would not & ought not to concur
in granting to Congress a permanent revenue, that some States
as Virga., would receive back a small part by paymt. from the U. S.
to its Citizens, whilst others as Pena., wa. receive a vast surplus; &
consequently by draining the former of its wealth.
Mr. Mercer said if he conceived the federal compact to be such
as it had been represented he would immediately withdraw from
Congress & do every thing in his power to destroy its existence;
that if Congs. had a right to borrow money as they pleased and to
make requisitions on the States that wd. be binding on them, the
liberties of the States were ideal; that requisitions ought to be
consonant to the Spirit of liberty; that they should go frequently
& accompanied with full information, that the States must be left
to judge of the nature of them, of their abilities to comply with
them & to regulate their compliance accordingly; he laid great
stress on the omission of Congs. to transmit half yearly to the States
an acct. of the monies borrowed by them &c. and even insinuated
that this omission had absolved the States in some degree from
the engagements. He repeated his remarks on the injustice of
the rule by which loan office Certificates had been settled & his
opinion that some defalcations would be necessary.
Mr. Holten was opposed to all permanent funds, and to every
arrangement not within the limits of the Confederation.
Mr. Hamilton enlarged on the general utility of permanent
funds to the federal interests of this Country, & pointed out the
difference between the nature of the Constitution of the British
Executive & that of the U. S. in answer to Mr. Lee's reasoning
from the case of Ship money.
Mr. Ghoram adverted with some warmth to the doctrines advanced
by Mr. Lee & Mercer, concerning the loan office Creditors.
He said the Union could never be maintained on any other
from the deficiencies of others already; that if Justice was not to
be obtained through the federal system & this system was to fail
as would necessarily follow, it was time this should be known that
some of the States might be forming other confederacies adequate
to the purposes of their safety.
This debate was succeeded by a discharge of the Committee
from the business of devising the means requisite for restoring
Public credit, &c &c. and the business referred to a Come. , consisting
of Mr. Ghoram, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, Mr. Fitzsimmons
& Mr. Rutledge.[57]
No Congress till
Among other reasons privately weighing with him, he had observed that
many of the most respectable people of America supposed the preservation of
the Confederacy essential to secure the blessings of the revolution; and permanent
funds for discharging debts essential to the preservation of Union. A
disappointment to this class wd. certainly abate their ardor & in a critical
emergency, might incline them to prefer some political connection with G. B.,
as a necessary cure for our internal instability. Again Without permanent &
general funds he did not conceive that the danger of convulsions from the army
could be effectually obviated. Lastly he did not think that any thing wd. be so
likely to prevent disputes among the States with the calamities consequent on
them. The States were jealous of each other, each supposing itself to be on the
whole a creditor to the others. The Eastern States in particular thought themselves
so with regard to the S. States. (See Mr. Ghoram, in the debates of this
day.) If general funds were not introduced it was not likely the balances wd.
ever be discharged, even if they sd. be liquidated. The consequence wd. be
a rupture of the confederacy. The E. States would at sea be powerful &
rapacious; the Southern, opulent & weak. This wd. be a temptation; the demands
on the S. St. would be an occasion; reprisals wd. be instituted; Foreign
aid would be called in by first the weaker then the stronger side, & finally both
be made subservient to the wars & politics of Europe. [Note in MS.]
"Congress are still engaged on the subject of providing adequate revenues
for the public debts, particularly that due to the army. The recommendation
of the Impost will be renewed with perhaps some little variation, to which will
be superadded probably a duty on a few enumerated articles. Mr. Mercer
altho' he continues to be adverse to the measure declares now that he will not
carry his opposition out of Congress. Whether any other general revenues will
be recommended is very uncertain. A poll tax seems to be the only one sufficiently
simple & equal for the purpose, and besides other objections to which
even that is liable, the Constitution of Maryland which interdicts such a fax is
an insuperable bar. The plan talked of by some for supplying the deficiency
is to call on the States to provide each its proportion of a permanent revenue
within itself, and to appropriate it to the continental debt. The objections
against this plan are that as the execution of it will depend on a unanimous &
continued punctuality in the 13 States, it is a precarious basis for public credit,
that this precariousness will be increased by mutual jealousies among the States
that others may be sparing themselves exertions which they are submitting to;
and that these jealousies will be still more increased by the mutual opinion
which prevails that they are comparatively in advance to the U. States; an
opinion which cannot be corrected without closing the accounts between all of
them & the U. States; pre-requisites to which are a valuation of the land, and
a final discrimination of such parts of the separate expenditures of the States
as ought to be transferred to the common mass, from such parts as ought in
justice to fall on the particular States themselves. Some States also will contend
and it would seem neither agst. the principles of justice nor the spirit of
the Confederation, for a retrospective abatement of their share of the past debt
according to their respective disabilities from year to year throughout the war.
What will be the end of this complication of embarrassments time only can
disclose. But a greater embarrassment than any is still behind. The discontents
and designs of the army are every day taking a more solemn form. It is
now whispered that they have not only resolved not to lay down their arms till
justice shall be done them but that to prevent surprise a public declaration will be
made to that effect. It is added and I fear with too much certainty, that the influence
of General Washington is rapidly decreasing in the army insomuch that
it is even in contemplation to substitute some less scrupulous guardian of their
interests.
"There are a variety of rumors concerning peace but none of them of sufficient
authority to be particularized. The speech of the King of G. B. to his
parliament, and the letter to the Lord Mayor of London from Secy. Townsend
as it is stated, are the only respectable evidence yet recd. There are also
rumors on the adverse side which have still less the complexion of authenticity.
" A quantity of clothing on its passage through this State to the British prisoners
of war under a passport of Genl. Washington was lately seized and condemned
under a law of this State agst. the importation of British goods. After
several fruitless experiments to prevail on the Seizors to relinquish their appeal
to the law, the Legislature have I am told cut the business short by declaring
the law as far as it interfered with the authority of the passport to be unconstitutional
& void ab initio.
"You will suffer me to renew my exhortations to an exchange of your office
under the State for a seat in the Legislature. It depends much in my opinion
on the measures which may be pursued by Congress & the several States within
the ensuing period of 6 months whether prosperity & tranquillity, or confusion
and disunion are to be the fruits of the Revolution. The seeds of the latter
are so thickly sown, that nothing but the most enlightened and liberal policy
will be able to stifle them. The Eastern States, particularly Massachusetts
conceive that compared with the Southern, they are greatly in advance in the
general account. A respectable Delegate from Massachusetts, a few days ago,
being a little chafed by some expressions of Messrs. Lee & Mercer unfavorable
to loan-office creditors said that if justice was not to be obtained thro' general
confederacy, the sooner it was known the better, that some States might be
forming other confederacies adequate to the purpose adding that some had suffered
immensely from the want of a proportional compliance with demands for
men & money by others. However erroneous these ideas may be, do they not
merit serious attention? Unless some amicable & adequate arrangements be
speedily taken for adjusting all the subsisting accounts, and discharging the
public engagements, a dissolution of the Union will be inevitable. Will not,
in that event, the Southern States which at sea will be opulent & weak, be an
easy prey to the Eastern, which will be powerful & rapacious? and particularly
if supposed claims of justice are on the side of the latter will there not be a
ready pretext for reprisals? The consequence of such a situation would probably
be that alliances would be sought first by the weaker & then by the stronger
party & this country be made subject to the wars & politics of Europe."—Madison
to Edmund Randolph, February 25, 1783. (Italics for cypher.)
| The writings of James Madison, | |