University of Virginia Library

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.[11]

.  .    .  .  .  .  .  .

Your favor of June 20 has been already acknowledged.
The last Packet from France brought me

that of August 2d. I have recd also by the Mary Capt.
Howland the three Boxes for W. H., [12] B.F. [13] and myself.
The two first have been duly forwarded. The
contents of the last are a valuable addition to former
literary remittances and lay me under additional
obligations, which I shall always feel more strongly
than I express. The articles for Congress have been
delivered & those for the two Universities [14] and for
General Washington have been forwarded, as have
been the various letters for your friends in Virginia
and elsewhere. The parcel of rice referred to in your
letter to the Delegates of S. Carolina has met with
some accident. No account whatever can be gathered
concerning it. It probably was not shipped
from France. Ubbo's book I find was not omitted as
you seem to have apprehended. The charge for it
however is, which I must beg you to supply. The
duplicate vol of the Encyclopedie, I left in Virginia,
and it is uncertain when I shall have an opportunity
of returning it. Your Spanish duplicates will I fear
be hardly vendible. I shall make a trial whenever
a chance presents itself. A few days ago I recd. your
favor of 15 of Augst. via L'Orient & Boston. The
letters inclosed along with it were immediately sent
to Virga.

You will herewith receive the result of the Convention,

which continued its session till the 17th of
September. I take the liberty of making some observations
on the subject, which will help to make up a
letter, if they should answer no other purpose.

It appeared to be the sincere and unanimous wish
of the Convention to cherish and preserve the Union
of the States. No proposition was made, no suggestion
was thrown out, in favor of a partition of the
Empire into two or more Confederacies.

It was generally agreed that the objects of the
Union could not be secured by any system founded
on the principle of a confederation of Sovereign
States. A voluntary observance of the federal law
by all the members could never be hoped for. A
compulsive one could evidently never be reduced to
practice, and if it could, involved equal calamities to
the innocent & the guilty, the necessity of a military
force both obnoxious & dangerous, and in general a
scene resembling much more a civil war than the
administration of a regular Government.

Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government
which instead of operating, on the States,
should operate without their intervention on the individuals
composing them; and hence the change in
the principle and proportion of representation.

This ground-work being laid, the great objects
which presented themselves were 1. to unite a
proper energy in the Executive, and a proper stability
in the Legislative departments, with the essential
characters of Republican Government. 2. to draw
a line of demarkation which would give to the

General Government every power requisite for general
purposes, and leave to the States every power
which might be most beneficially administered by
them. 3. to provide for the different interests of
different parts of the Union. 4. to adjust the clashing
pretensions of the large and small States. Each
of these objects was pregnant with difficulties. The
whole of them together formed a task more difficult
than can be well conceived by those who were not
concerned in the execution of it. Adding to these
considerations the natural diversity of human opinions
on all new and complicated subjects, it is impossible
to consider the degree of concord which
ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle.

The first of these objects, as respects the Executive,
was peculiarly embarrassing. On the question
whether it should consist of a single person, or a
plurality of co-ordinate members, on the mode of appointment,
on the duration in office, on the degree of
power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated
discussions took place. The plurality of co-ordinate
members had finally but few advocates. Governour
Randolph was at the head of them. The modes
of appointment proposed were various, as by the
people at large—by electors chosen by the people
—by the Executives of the States—by the Congress,
some preferring a joint ballot of the two Houses
—some a separate concurrent ballot, allowing to each
a negative on the other house—some, a nomination of
several candidates by one House, out of whom a
choice should be made by the other. Several other

modifications were started. The expedient at length
adopted seemed to give pretty general satisfaction to
the members. As to the duration in office, a few
would have preferred a tenure during good behaviour
—a considerable number would have done so in case
an easy & effectual removal by impeachment could
be settled. It was much agitated whether a long
term, seven years for example, with a subsequent &
perpetual ineligibility, or a short term with a capacity
to be re-elected, should be fixed. In favor of the
first opinion were urged the danger of a gradual
degeneracy of re-elections from time to time, into first
a life and then a hereditary tenure, and the favorable
effect of an incapacity to be reappointed on the independent
exercise of the Executive authority. On the
other side it was contended that the prospect of
necessary degradation would discourage the most
dignified characters from aspiring to the office, would
take away the principal motive to ye. faithful discharge
of its duties—the hope of being rewarded with
a reappointment would stimulate ambition to violent
efforts for holding over the Constitutional term—
and instead of producing an independent administration,
and a firmer defence of the constitutional rights
of the department, would render the officer more
indifferent to the importance of a place which he
would soon be obliged to quit forever, and more
ready to yield to the encroachmts. of the Legislature
of which he might again be a member. The questions
concerning the degree of power turned chiefly on
the appointment to offices, and the controul on the
Legislature. An absolute appointment to all offices
—to some offices—to no offices, formed the scale of
opinions on the first point. On the second, some
contended for an absolute negative, as the only possible
mean of reducing to practice the theory of a free
Government which forbids a mixture of the Legislative
& Executive powers. Others would be content
with a revisionary power, to be overruled by three
fourths of both Houses. It was warmly urged that
the judiciary department should be associated in the
revision. The idea of some was that a separate revision
should be given to the two departments—that
if either objected two thirds, if both, three fourths,
should be necessary to overrule.

In forming the Senate, the great anchor of the
Government the questions, as they came within the
first object, turned mostly on the mode of appointment,
and the duration of it. The different modes
proposed were 1. by the House of Representatives.
2. by the Executive. 3. by electors chosen by the people
for the purpose. 4. by the State Legislatures.—
On the point of duration, the propositions descended
from good behavior to four years, through the intermediate
terms of nine, seven, six, & five years. The
election of the other branch was first determined to
be triennial, and afterwards reduced to biennial.

The second object, the due partition of power between
the General & local Governments, was perhaps
of all, the most nice and difficult. A few contended
for an entire abolition of the States; Some for indefinite
power of Legislation in the Congress, with a

negative on the laws of the States; some for such a
power without a negative; some for a limited power
of legislation, with such a negative; the majority
finally for a limited power without the negative.
The question with regard to the negative underwent
repeated discussions, and was finally rejected by a
bare majority. As I formerly intimated to you my
opinion in favor of this ingredient, I will take this
occasion of explaining myself on the subject. Such
a check on the States appears to me necessary 1. to
prevent encroachments on the General authority.
2. to prevent instability and injustice in the legislation
of the States.

1.

• Without such a check in the whole over the
  parts, our system involves the evil of imperia in imperio.
  If a compleat supremacy somewhere is not
  necessary in every Society, a controuling power at
  least is so, by which the general authority may be
  defended against encroachments of the subordinate
  authorities, and by which the latter may be restrained
  from encroachments on each other. If the supremacy
  of the British Parliament is not necessary as has
  been contended, for the harmony of that Empire;
  it is evident I think that without the royal negative
  or some equivalent controul, the unity of the system
  would be destroyed. The want of some such provision
  seems to have been mortal to the antient Confederacies,
  and to be the disease of the modern. Of
  the Lycian confederacy little is known. That of the
  Amphyctions is well known to have been rendered
  of little use whilst it lasted, and in the end to have
  

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  been destroyed, by the predominance of the local
  over the federal authority. The same observation
  may be made, on the authority of Polybius, with regard
  to the Achæan League. The Helvetic System
  scarcely amounts to a confederacy, and is disguished
  by too many peculiarities, to be a ground of
  comparison. The case of the United Netherlands is
  in point. The authority of a Stadtholder, the influence
  of a Standing Army, the common interest in the
  conquered possessions, the pressure of surrounding
  danger, the guarantee of foreign powers, are not
  sufficient to secure the authority and interest of
  the generality agst. the anti-federal tendency of the
  provincial sovereignties. The German Empire is another
  example. A Hereditary chief with vast independent
  resources of wealth and power, a federal
  Diet, with ample parchment authority, a regular
  Judiciary establishment, the influence of the neighbourhood
  of great & formidable Nations have been
  found unable either to maintain the subordination of
  the members, or to prevent their mutual contests &
  encroachments. Still more to the purpose is our
  own experience both during the war and since the
  peace. Encroachments of the States on the general
  authority, sacrifices of national to local interests, interferences
  of the measures of different States, form
  a great part of the history of our political system.
  It may be said that the new Constitution is founded
  on different principles, and will have a different
  operation. I admit the difference to be material.
  It presents the aspect rather of a feudal system of
  

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  republics, if such a phrase may be used, than of a
  Confederacy of independent States. And what has
  been the progress and event of the feudal Constitutions?
  In all of them a continual struggle between
  the head and the inferior members, until a final victory
  has been gained in some instances by one, in
  others, by the other of them. In one respect indeed
  there is a remarkable variance between the two cases.
  In the feudal system the sovereign, though limited,
  was independent; and having no particular sympathy
  of interests with the Great Barons, his ambition had
  as full play as theirs in the mutual projects of usurpation.
  In the American Constitution The general
  authority will be derived entirely from the subordinate
  authorities. The Senate will represent the
  States in their political capacity; the other House
  will represent the people of the States in their individual
  capãcy.. The former will be accountable
  to their constituents at moderate, the latter at
  short periods. The President also derives his
  appointment from the States, and is periodically
  accountable to them. This dependence of the General
  on the local authorities, seems effectually to
  guard the latter against any dangerous encroachments
  of the former; whilst the latter, within their
  respective limits, will be continually sensible of the
  abridgement of their power, and be stimulated by
  ambition to resume the surrendered portion of it.
  We find the representatives of Counties and Corporations
  in the Legislatures of the States, much more
  disposed to sacrifice the aggregate interest, and even
  

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  authority, to the local views of their constituents,
  than the latter to the former. I mean not by these
  remarks to insinuate that an esprit de corps will not
  exist in the National Government or that opportunities
  may not occur of extending its jurisdiction in
  some points. I mean only that the danger of encroachments
  is much greater from the other side, and
  that the impossibility of dividing powers of legislation,
  in such a manner, as to be free from different
  constructions by different interests, or even from ambiguity
  in the judgment of the impartial, requires
  some such expedient as I contend for. Many illustrations
  might be given of this impossibility. How long
  has it taken to fix, and how imperfectly is yet fixed
  the legislative power of corporations, though that
  power is subordinate in the most compleat manner?
  The line of distinction between the power of regulating
  trade and that of drawing revenue from it,
  which was once considered the barrier of our liberties,
  was found on fair discussion, to be absolutely undefinable.
  No distinction seems to be more obvious than
  that between spiritual and temporal matters. Yet
  wherever they have been made objects of Legislation,
  they have clashed and contended with each other,
  till one or the other has gained the supremacy. Even
  the boundaries between the Executive, Legislative,
  & Judiciary powers, though in general so strongly
  marked in themselves, consist in many instances of
  mere shades of difference. It may be said that the
  Judicial authority, under our new system will keep
  the States within their proper limits, and supply the
  

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  place of a negative on their laws. The answer is,
  that it is more convenient to prevent the passage of
  a law than to declare it void after it is passed; that
  this will be particularly the case, where the law aggrieves
  individuals, who may be unable to support
  an appeal agst. a State to the supreme Judiciary; that
  a State which would violate the Legislative rights of
  the Union, would not be very ready to obey a Judicial
  decree in support of them, and that a recurrence to
  force, which, in the event of disobedience would be
  necessary, is an evil which the new Constitution
  meant to exclude as far as possible.

2.

• A constitutional negative on the laws of the
  States seems equally necessary to secure individuals
  agst. encroachments on their rights. The mutability
  of the laws of the States is found to be a serious evil.
  The injustice of them has been so frequent and so
  flagrant as to alarm the most stedfast friends of Republicanism.
  I am persuaded I do not err in saying
  that the evils issuing from these sources contributed
  more to that uneasiness which produced the Convention,
  and prepared the Public mind for a general reform,
  than those which accrued to our national
  character and interest from the inadequacy of the
  Confederation to its immediate objects. A reform
  therefore which does not make provision for private
  rights, must be materially defective. The restraints
  agst. paper emissions, and violations of contracts are
  not sufficient. Supposing them to be effectual as far
  as they go, they are short of the mark. Injustice
  may be effected by such an infinitude of legislative
  

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  expedients, that where the disposition exists it can
  only be controuled by some provision which reaches
  all cases whatsoever. The partial provision made,
  supposes the disposition which will evade it. It may
  be asked how private rights will be more secure under
  the Guardianship of the General Government than
  under the State Governments, since they are both
  founded on the republican principle which refers the
  ultimate decision to the will of the majority, and are
  distinguished rather by the extent within which they
  will operate, than by any material difference in their
  structure. A full discussion of this question would,
  if I mistake not, unfold the true Principles of Republican
  Government, and prove in contradiction to the
  concurrent opinions of the theoretical writers, that
  this form of Government, in order to effect its purposes,
  must operate not within a small but an extensive
  sphere. I will state some of the ideas which
  have occurred to me on the subject. Those who contend
  for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic,
  actuated by the sense of the majority, and operating
  within narrow limits, assume or suppose a case which
  is altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning
  on the idea, that the people composing the Society,
  enjoy not only an equality of political rights; but that
  they have all precisely the same interests, and the
  same feelings in every respect. Were this in reality
  the case, their reasoning would be conclusive. The
  interest of the majority would be that of the minority
  also; the decisions could only turn on mere
  opinion concerning the good of the whole, of which
  

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  the major voice would be the safest criterion; and
  within a small sphere, this voice could be most easily
  collected, and the public affairs most accurately
  managed. We know however that no society ever
  did or can consist of so homogeneous a mass of Citizens.
  In the savage state indeed, an approach is
  made towards it; but in that state little or no Government
  is necessary. In all civilized societies, distinctions
  are various and unavoidable. A distinction
  of property results from that very protection which
  a free Government gives to unequal faculties of acquiring
  it. There will be rich and poor; creditors
  and debtors; a landed interest, a monied interest, a
  mercantile interest, a manufacturing interest. These
  classes may again be subdivided according to the
  different productions of different situations & soils,
  & according to different branches of commerce and of
  manufactures. In addition to these natural distinctions,
  artificial ones will be founded, on accidental
  differences in political, religious, or other opinions,
  or an attachment to the persons of leading individuals.
  However erroneous or ridiculous these grounds
  of dissention and faction may appear to the enlightened
  Statesman or the benevolent philosopher, the
  bulk of mankind who are neither Statesmen nor
  Philosophers, will continue to view them in a different
  light. It remains then to be enquired whether a
  majority having any common interest, or feeling any
  common passion, will find sufficient motives to restrain
  them from oppressing the minority. An individual
  is never allowed to be a judge or even a witness,
  

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  in his own cause. If two individuals are under the
  bias of interest or enmity agst. a third, the rights of the
  latter could never be safely referred to the majority
  of the three. Will two thousand individuals be less
  apt to oppress one thousand, or two hundred thousand
  one hundred thousand? Three motives only
  can restrain in such cases: 1. a prudent regard to
  private or partial good, as essentially involved in the
  general and permanent good of the Whole. This
  ought no doubt to be sufficient of itself. Experience
  however shews that it has little effect on individuals,
  and perhaps still less on a collection of individuals,
  and least of all on a majority with the public authority
  in their hands. If the former are ready to
  forget that honesty is the best policy; the last do
  more. They often proceed on the converse of the
  maxim, that whatever is politic is honest. 2. respect
  for character. This motive is not found sufficient to
  restrain individuals from injustice. And loses its
  efficacy in proportion to the number which is to
  divide the pain or the blame. Besides as it has reference
  to public opinion, which is that of the majority,
  the standard is fixed by those whose conduct is to be
  measured by it. 3. Religion. The inefficacy of this
  restraint on individuals is well known. The conduct
  of every popular Assembly, acting on oath, the
  strongest of religious ties, shews that individuals join
  without remorse in acts agst. which their consciences
  would revolt, if proposed to them separately in their
  closets. When Indeed Religion is kindled into enthusiasm,
  its force like that of other passions is
  

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  increased by the sympathy of a multitude. But enthusiasm
  is only a temporary state of Religion, and
  whilst it lasts will hardly be seen with pleasure at the
  helm. Even in its coolest state, it has been much
  oftener a motive to oppression than a restraint from
  it. If then there must be different interests and
  parties in society; and a majority when united by a
  common interest or passion cannot be restrained from
  oppressing the minority, what remedy can be found
  in a republican Government, where the majority
  must ultimately decide, but that of giving such an
  extent to its sphere, that no common interest or passion
  will be likely to unite a majority of the whole
  number in an unjust pursuit. In a large Society, the
  people are broken into so many interests and parties,
  that a common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and
  the requisite concert less likely to be formed, by a
  majority of the whole. The same security seems
  requisite for the civil as for the religious rights of
  individuals. If the same sect form a majority and
  have the power, other sects will be sure to be depressed.
  Divide et impera, the reprobated axiom of
  tyranny, is under certain qualifications, the only
  policy, by which a republic can be administered on
  just principles. It must be observed however that
  this doctrine can only hold within a sphere of a mean
  extent. As in too small a sphere oppressive combinations
  may be too easily formed agst. the weaker
  party; so in too extensive a one, a defensive concert
  may be rendered too difficult against the oppression
  of those entrusted with the administration. The
  

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  great desideratum in Government is, so to modify the
  sovereignty as that it may be sufficiently neutral between
  different parts of the Society to controul one
  part from invading the rights of another, and at the
  same time sufficiently controuled itself, from setting
  up an interest adverse to that of the entire Society.
  In absolute monarchies, the Prince may be tolerably
  neutral towards different classes of his subjects but
  may sacrifice the happiness of all to his personal
  ambition or avarice. In small republics, the sovereign
  will is controuled from such a sacrifice of the
  entire Society, but is not sufficiently neutral towards
  the parts composing it. In the extended Republic of
  the United States. The General Government would
  hold a pretty even balance between the parties of
  particular States, and be at the same time sufficiently
  restrained by its dependence on the community,
  from betraying its general interests.

Begging pardon for this immoderate digression I
return to the third object above mentioned, the adjustments
of the different interests of different parts
of the Continent. Some contended for an unlimited
power over trade including exports as well as imports,
and over slaves as well as other imports; some for
such a power, provided the concurrence of two thirds
of both Houses were required; Some for such a
qualification of the power, with an exemption of exports
and slaves, others for an exemption of exports
only. The result is seen in the Constitution. S.
Carolina & Georgia were inflexible on the point of the
slaves.

The remaining object created more embarrassment,
and a greater alarm for the issue of the Convention
than all the rest put together. The little States insisted
on retaining their equality in both branches,
unless a compleat abolition of the State Governments
should take place; and made an equality in the
Senate a sine qua non. The large States on the other
hand urged that as the new Government was to be
drawn principally from the people immediately and
was to operate directly on them, not on the States;
and consequently as the States wd. lose that importance
which is now proportioned to the importance of
their voluntary compliances with the requisitions of
Congress, it was necessary that the representation in
both Houses should be in proportion to their size. It
ended in the compromise which you will see, but very
much to the dissatisfaction of several members from
the large States.

It will not escape you that three names only from
Virginia are subscribed to the Act. Mr. Wythe did
not return after the death of his lady. Docr. M'Clurg
left the Convention some time before the adjournment.
The Governour and Col. Mason refused to
be parties to it. Mr. Gerry was the only other member
who refused. The objections of the Govr. turn
principally on the latitude of the general powers, and
on the connection established between the President
and the Senate. He wished that the plan should be
proposed to the States with liberty to them to suggest
alterations which should all be referred to another
general Convention, to be incorporated into the plan

as far as might be judged expedient. He was not inveterate
in his opposition, and grounded his refusal to
subscribe pretty much on his unwillingness to commit
himself, so as not to be at liberty to be governed
by further lights on the subject. Col. Mason left
Philada. in an exceeding ill humour indeed. A number
of little circumstances arising in part from the
impatience which prevailed towards the close of the
business, conspired to whet his acrimony. He returned
to Virginia with a fixed disposition to prevent
the adoption of the plan if possible. He considers the
want of a Bill of Rights as a fatal objection. His
other objections are to the substitution of the Senate
in place of an Executive Council & to the powers
vested in that body—to the powers of the Judiciary—
to the vice President being made President of the
Senate—to the smallness of the number of Representatives
—to the restriction on the States with regard
to ex post facto laws—and most of all probably
to the power of regulating trade, by a majority only
of each House. He has some other lesser objections.
Being now under the necessity of justifying his refusal
to sign, he will of course muster every possible one.
His conduct has given great umbrage to the County
of Fairfax, and particularly to the Town of Alexandria.
He is already instructed to promote in the Assembly
the calling of a Convention, and will probably
be either not deputed to the Convention, or be tied up
by express instructions. He did not object in general
to the powers vested in the National Government, so
much as to the modification. In some respects he
admitted that some further powers would have improved
the system. He acknowledged in particular
that a negative on the State laws, and the appointment
of the State Executive ought to be ingredients;
but supposed that the public mind would not now
bear them, and that experience would hereafter produce
these amendments.

The final reception which will be given by the people
at large to the proposed system cannot yet be
decided. The Legislature of N. Hampshire was sitting
when it reached that State and was well pleased
with it. As far as the sense of the people there has
been expressed, it is generally favorable. Boston is
warm and almost unanimous in embracing it. The
impression on the country is not yet known. No
symptoms of disapprobation have appeared. The
Legislature of that State is now sitting, through which
the sense of the people at large will soon be promulged
with tolerable certainty. The paper money faction
in R. Island is hostile. The other party zealously
attached to it. Its passage through Connecticut is
likely to be very smooth and easy. There seems to
be less agitation in this State N. York than anywhere.
The discussion of the subject seems confined to the
Newspapers. The principal characters are known
to be friendly. The Governour's party which has
hitherto been the popular & most numerous one, is
supposed to be on the opposite side; but considerable
reserve is practiced, of which he sets the example.
N. Jersey takes the affirmative side of course. Meetings
of the people are declaring their approbation and

instructing their representatives. Penna. will be divided.
The City of Philada., the Republican party, the
Quakers, and most of the Germans espouse the
Constitution. Some of the Constitutional leaders,
backed by the Western Country will oppose. An
unlucky ferment on the subject in their Assembly
just before its late adjournment has irritated both
sides, particularly the opposition, and by redoubling
the exertions of that party may render the event
doubtful. The voice of Maryland I understand from
pretty good authority, is, as far as it has been declared,
strongly in favor of the Constitution. Mr.
Chase is an enemy, but the Town of Baltimore which
he now represents, is warmly attached to it, and will
shackle him as far as it can. Mr. Paca will probably
be, as usual, in the politics of Chase. My information
from Virginia is as yet extremely imperfect. I have
a letter from Genl. Washington which speaks favorably
of the impression within a circle of some extent;
and another from Chancellor Pendleton which expresses
his full acceptance of the plan, and the popularity
of it in his district, I am told also that Innes
and Marshall are patrons of it. In the opposite scale
are Mr. James Mercer, Mr. R. H. Lee, Docr. Lee and
their connections of course, Mr. M. Page according to
Report, and most of the Judges & Bar of the general
Court. The part which Mr. Henry will take is unknown
here. Much will depend on it. I had taken
it for granted from a variety of circumstances that he
wd. be in the opposition, and still think that will be
the case. There are reports however which favor a
contrary supposition. From the States South of Virginia
nothing has been heard. As the deputation
from S. Carolina consisted of some of its weightiest
characters, who have returned unanimously zealous
in favor of the Constitution, it is probable that State
will readily embrace it. It is not less probable that
N. Carolina will follow the example unless that of Virginia
should counterbalance it. Upon the whole,
although, the public mind will not be fully known, nor
finally settled, for a considerable time, appearances
at present augur a more prompt, and general adoption
of the plan than could have been well expected.

When the plan came before Congress for their
sanction, a very serious effort was made by R. H.
Lee & Mr. Dane, from Massts. to embarrass it. It was
first contended that Congress could not properly give
any positive countenance to a measure which had for
its object the subversion of the Constitution under
which they acted. This ground of attack failing, the
former gentleman urged the expediency of sending
out the plan with amendments, & proposed a number
of them corresponding with the objections of Col.
Mason. This experiment had still less effect. In
order however to obtain unanimity it was necessary
to couch the resolution in very moderate terms.

Mr. Adams has recd. permission to return, with
thanks for his services. No provision is made for
supplying his place, or keeping up any representation
there. Your reappointment for three years will be
notified from the office of F. Affrs. It was made[15]

without a negative, eight States being present. Connecticut,
notwithstanding put in a blank ticket, the
sense of that State having been declared against embassies.
Massachusts. betrayed some scruple on like
ground. Every personal consideration was avowed, &
I believe with sincerity, to have militated against these
scruples. It seems to be understood that letters to &
from the foreign Ministers of the U. S. are not free of
Postage; but that the charge is to be allowed in
their accounts.

The exchange of our French for Dutch Creditors
has not been countenanced either by Congress or the
Treasury Board. The paragraph in your last letter
to Mr. Jay, on the subject of applying a loan in Holland
to the discharge of the pay due to the foreign
officers has been referred to the Board since my arrival
here. No report has yet been made. But I
have little idea that the proposition will be adopted.
Such is the state & prospect of our fiscal department,
that any new loan however small, that should now be
made, would probably subject us to the reproach of
premeditated deception. The balance of Mr. Adams's
last loan will be wanted for the interest due in Holland,
and with all the income here, will it is feared,
not save our credit in Europe from farther wounds.
It may well be doubted whether the present Government
can be kept alive during the ensuing year, or
until the new one may take its place.

Upwards of 100,000 Acres of the lands of the U. S.
have been disposed of in open market. Five millions
of unsurveyed have been sold by private contract to

a N. England company, at 2/3 of a dollar per Acre, payment
to be made in the principal of the public securities.
A negotiation is nearly closed with a N. Jersey
company for two millions more on like terms, and
another commenced with a company of this City for
four millions. Col. Carrington writes more fully on
this subject.

You will receive herewith the desired information
from Alderman Broome in the case of Mr. Burke, also
the Virga. Bill on Crimes & punishments. Sundry
alterations having been made in conformity to the
sense of the House in its latter stages, it is less accurate
& methodical than it ought to have been. To
these papers I add a Speech of Mr. C. P. on the
Missĩppi business. It is printed under precautions
of secrecy, but surely could not have been properly
exposed to so much risk of publication.[16] You will
find also among the pamphlets & papers I send by
Com̃odore Jones, another printed speech of the same
Gentleman. The Museum [?], Magazine, & Philada.
Gazettes will give you a tolerable idea of the objects
of present attention.

The summer crops in the Eastern & Middle States
have been extremely plentiful. Southward of Virga.
—They differ in different places. On the whole I do
not know that they are bad in that region. In
Virginia the drought has been unprecedented, particularly
between the falls of the Rivers & the Mountains.
The crops of Corn are in general alarmingly
short. In Orange I find there will be scarcely subsistence

for the inhabitants. I have not heard from
Albemarle. The crops of Tobo. are every where said
to be pretty good in point of quantity, & the quality
unusually fine. The crops of wheat were also in
general excellent in quality & tolerable in quantity.

Novr. 1. Commodore Paul Jones having preferred
another vessel to the packet, has remained here till
this time. The interval has produced little necessary
to be added to the above. The Legislature of Massts.
has it seems taken up the act of the Convention, and
has appointed or probably will appoint an early day
for its State Convention. There are letters also from
Georgia which denote a favorable disposition. I
am informed from Richmond that the New Election-law
from the Revised Code produced a pretty full
House of Delegates, as well as a Senate, on the first
day. It had previously had equal effect in producing
full meetings of the freeholders for the County elections.
A very decided majority of the Assembly is
said to be zealous in favor of the New Constitution.
The same is said of the Country at large. It appears
however that individuals of great weight both within
& without the Legislature are opposed to it. A letter
I just have from Mr. A. Stuart,[17] names Mr. Henry,

Genl. Nelson, W. Nelson, the family of Cabels, St.
George Tucker, John Taylor, and the Judges of the
Genl. Court except P. Carrington. The other opponents
he describes as of too little note to be mentioned,
which gives a negative information of the
Characters on the other side. All are agreed that the
plan must be submitted to a Convention.

We hear from Georgia that that State is threatened
with a dangerous war with the Creek Indians. The
alarm is of so serious a nature that law-martial has
been proclaimed, and they are proceeding to fortify
even the Town of Savannah. The idea there is, that
the Indians derive their motives as well as their
means from their Spanish neighbours. Individuals
complain also that their fugitive slaves are encouraged
by East Florida. The policy of this is explained by
supposing that it is considered as a discouragement to
the Georgians to form settlements near the Spanish
boundaries.

There are but few States on the spot here which
will survive the expiration of the federal year, and it
is extremely uncertain when a Congress will again be
formed. We have not yet heard who are to be in the
appointment of Virginia for the next year

With the most affectionate attachment I remain
Dear Sir