University of Virginia Library

MAY 14. DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

When he offered this amendment to the bill, he thought
its propriety was so obvious and striking, that it would meet
no opposition. To pass a bill,[109] not limited in duration,
which was to draw revenue from the pockets of the people,
appeared to be dangerous in the administration of any Government;
he hoped, therefore, the House would not be less
cautious in this particular than other nations are, who profess
to act upon sound principles. He imagined it might be
considered by their constituents as incompatible with the
spirit of the Constitution, and dangerous to republican principles,
to pass such a law unlimited in its duration.

He hoped it would not be understood by gentlemen who
opposed his motion, that he supposed them to be actuated
with a desire to do injury to either of those principles; he
believed them to be moved only by an ardent desire to promote
the general welfare, by the re-establishment of public

credit. He would heartily join his labors with theirs, to
effect this object, but wished to do it in a way, that while
they served their country, they might secure the liberties of
the people, and do honor to themselves. Besides the restoration
of public credit, he thought the act had in view the encouragement
of a particular description of people, which
might lead them into enterprises of a peculiar nature, for the
protection of which the public faith seemed to be pledged.
But would gentlemen infer from hence, that no alteration
ought to take place if the manufactures were well established?
The subject appeared to him in a twofold point of view; first,
to provide for the exigencies of Government, and second, for
the establishment of public credit; but he thought both
these objects could be obtained without making the bill perpetual.
If the Government showed a proper attention to the
punctual performance of its engagements, it would obtain the
latter; the other would be secured by making provision as
the occasion demanded. If the bill was to be made perpetual,
it would be continued after the purpose for which it was
adopted had ceased; the error would in this case be irremediable;
whereas, if its limitation was determined, it would
always be in the power of the Government to make it commensurate
with what the public debts and contingencies
required.

The Constitution, as had already been observed, places the
power in the House of originating money bills. The principal
reason why the Constitution had made this distinction
was, because they were chosen by the people, and supposed
to be best acquainted with their interests and ability. In
order to make them more particularly acquainted with these
objects, the democratic branch of the Legislature consisted
of a greater number, and were chosen for a shorter period,
so that they might revert more frequently to the mass of the
people. Now, if a revenue law was made perpetual, however
unequal its operation might be, it would be out of the power
of this House to effect an alteration; for if the President

chose to object to the measure, it would require two-thirds
of both Houses to carry it. Even if the House of Representatives
were unanimous in their opinion that the law ought
to be repealed, they would not be able to carry it, unless a
great majority appeared in the Senate also.

He observed, that an honorable gentleman had thought
that no appropriation of the public money could be made for
a longer term than two years. This was true, as it related to
the support of armies; but the question here did not appear
to be respecting an appropriation. It was the revenue itself,
which, without any appropriation, might continue flowing
into the public treasury independent of the will of the people,
and might thereby become a convenience in the hands of
some other department of the Government, for the purpose
of oppression. Experience might also forcibly suggest the
necessity and importance of alterations in the law, yet, without
this clause, it might never be in the power of the House
to make them.[110]