University of Virginia Library

MAY 9. DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

The right understanding of this subject is of great importance.
The discussion has been drawn out to a very considerable
length on former occasions. The chain of ideas on
which the subject is suspended, is not very long, nor consists
of many links. The present Constitution was framed to
supply the defects of the one that has preceded it. The great
and material defects of it are well known to have arisen from

its inability to provide for the demands of justice and security
of the Union. To supply those defects, we are bound to
fulfil the public engagements: expectation is anxiously waiting
the result of our deliberations; it cannot be satisfied
without a sufficient revenue to accomplish its purposes. We
cannot obtain the money any other way but by taxation.
Among the various objects of this nature, an impost on merchandise
imported is preferable to all others, and among the
long list of articles included in the bill, there is not one more
proper for the purpose than the article under consideration.
The public sentiment has strongly pointed it out as an object
of revenue. I conceive, therefore, that it will be our duty to
draw from this source all the money that it is capable of
yielding, I am sure that it will not exceed our wants, nor
extend to the injury of our commerce. How far the powers
of Government are capable of going on this occasion, is matter
of opinion; we have had no direct experiment of what
ean be done under the energy and popularity of the new
system; we must recur to other sources for information, and
then, unless the circumstances are alike, the comparison may
not be true. We have been referred to the experience of
other nations; if that is to guide us on this subject, I am sure
we shall find precedents for going much further than is now
proposed. If I do not mistake the calculations that I have
seen of duties on importation, they amount to more on an
average than fifteen per cent.; the duty on ardent spirits in
all nations exceeds what is in contemplation to be laid in the
United States. I am sensible that the means which are used
by those nations to ensure the collection, would be odious and
improper in this country; but 1 believe the means which this
country is capable of using, without exciting complaint or
incurring too much expense, would be as adequate to secure
a duty of fifteen per cent, as the powers of any other nation
could be to obtain ninety or one hundred per cent. If we
consult the experience of the United States, it does not admonish
us that we are proceeding too far; there are duties
now under collection, in some States, that amount nearly to
the same as those we have in contemplation. A duty collected
under the feeble operation of the State Governments,
cannot be supposed beyond our powers, when those duties
have been collected by them, with feeble powers, but under
a competition, not to say opposition, of the neighboring
States. I am led, from a knowledge of these circumstances,
to believe that when we have established some general rule,
and have the co-operation of all the members of the Union,
we shall be able to do what is proposed by this bill, better
than any one State could execute it with its separate strength.
If we consult the opinion of the merchants, we shall not find
them a very sure guide. Merchants do not pretend to infallibility;
but if they did, they have given a proof to the
contrary, by their difference of opinion on this subject. Gentlemen
of that profession, both within these walls and out of
doors, have been as much divided on this point as any other
description of men. I believe them to be the best informed
as to the probable effects of an impost system, but they are
not exempt from the infirmities of human nature. We know
there is an essential difference between the interest of merchants
and the interest of commerce; we know there may be
distinctions also between the interest of commerce and of
revenue; and that in some cases we must sacrifice the one
to the other. I am not sure that we are not under the necessity
of doing both in the business before us. It is barely
matter of opinion what revenue the General Government will
be able to draw from the system now proposed. This being
the case I have endeavored to make up mine, from the best
materials in my power. I pay great respect to the opinions
of mercantle gentlemen, and am willing to concede much to
them, so far as their opinions are regulated by experience;
but if I am to be guided by this information, it will not lead
me to agree to the reduction of the duties in the maner contended
for. It is said, that is we reduce at all, we must
go through the whole. Now I doubt whether the duty on the
article of rum exceeds that proportion which pervades the
long list before us. It does not amount to more than thirty
per cent., while some other articles stand at forty; some
articles again that are not enumerated, but which fall within
the general mass at five per cent., are more likely to be introduced
clandestinely than this article, if it stood at fifty per
cent. I am sure, if we reduce the whole system in the manner
now proposed, all the duty we shall be able to collect will
be very incompetent to what the public necessities demand.
We must turn our eyes, then, to some other source that will
fill up the deficiency. There are but two objects to which,
in this dilemma, we can have recourse—direct taxation and
excises. Direct taxation is not contemplated by any gentleman
on this floor, nor are our constituents prepared for such a
system of revenue; they expect it will not be applied to,
until it is found that sufficient funds cannot be obtained in
any other way. Excises would give particular disgust in
some States, therefore gentlemen will not make up the deficiency
from that quarter. I think, upon the whole, it is
better to try what will be produced by a plan which is favored
by the public sentiment. This will give a support to
our laws equal to the greatest energy of a strong execution.
The citizens of America know that their individual interest is
connected with the public. We shall then have the strong
motive of interest acting in favor of the Government in a
peculiar manner. But I am not inclined to trust too much
to this security. I would take in the aid of the best regulations
in our power to provide; these, acting in concert, would
give a moral certainty to the faithful collection of the revenue.
But if gentlemen notwithstanding will persist in contending
against such a system, and cannot offer us a substitute, we
must fail of the primary object for which the Government was
created. If upon experience we find that the duties cannot
be safely collected, it may be proper to reduce them; but if
we set them too low in the first instance, and they do not
yield a sufficiency to answer the just demands of the public
creditors and the expenses of Government, the public reputation
must suffer.

I need not inform gentlemen we are surrounded with difficulties;
they are seen on every side; but they appear as few
and as surmountable on the side of the bill, as they do in any
other part of the prospect. If we give way on this article,
we are to do so upon all others. It is not for any reason
peculiar to Jamaica spirits that the reduction is moved for;
hence, I conceive, if gentlemen meet with success in opposing
this duty, we shall be reduced to a system inadequate to our
wants, and thereby defeat the chief object of our appointment.[108]