University of Virginia Library

SPEECHES IN THE FIRST CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION.[105]

APRIL 9. DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

From what has been suggested by the gentlemen that have
spoken on the subject before us, I am led to apprehend we
shall be under the necessity of travelling further into an
investigation of principles than what I supposed would be
necessary, or had in contemplation when I offered the propositions
before you.

It was my view to restrain the first essay on this subject
principally to the object of revenue, and make this rather a
temporary expedient than any thing permanent.[106] I see,

however, that there are strong exceptions against deciding
immediately on a part of the plan, which I had the honor to
bring forward, as well as against an application to the resources
mentioned in the list of'articles just proposed by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania. (Mr. Hartley.)

I presume, that, however much we may be disposed to
promote domestic manufactures, we ought to pay some
regard to the present policy of obtaining revenue. It may
be remarked also, that by fixing on a temporary expedient
for this purpose, we may gain more than we shall lose by
suspending the consideration of the other subject until we
obtain fuller information of the state of our manufactures.
We have at this time the strongest motives for turning our
attention to the point I have mentioned; every gentleman
sees that the prospect of our harvest from the Spring importations
is daily vanishing; and if the committee delay levying
and collecting an impost until a system of protecting duties

shall be perfected, there will be no importations of any consequence
on which the law is to operate, because, by that
time, all the Spring vessels will have arrived. Therefore,
from a pursuit of this policy, we shall suffer a loss equal to
the surplus which might be expected from a system of higher
duties.

I am sensible that there is great weight in the observation
that fell from the honorable gentleman from South Carolina,
(Mr. Tucker,) that it will be necessary, on the one hand, to
weigh and regard the sentiments of the gentlemen from the
different parts of the United States; but, on the other hand,
we must limit our consideration on this head, and, notwithstanding
all the deference and respect we pay to those sentiments,
we must consider the general interest of the Union;
for this is as much every gentleman's duty to consider as is
the local or State interest—and any system of impost that
this committee may adopt must be founded on the principles
of mutual concession.

Gentlemen will be pleased to recollect, that those parts of
the Union which contribute more under one system than
the other, are also those parts more thinly planted, and consequently
stand most in need of national protection; therefore
they will have less reason to complain of unequal burdens.

There is another consideration: the States that are most
advanced in population, and ripe for manufactures, ought to
have their particular interests attended to in some degree.
While these States retained the power of making regulations
of trade, they had the power to protect and cherish such
institutions; by adopting the present Constitution they have
thrown the exercise of this power into other hands; they
must have done this with an expectation that those interests
would not be neglected here.

I am afraid, sir, on the one hand, that if we go fully into a
discussion of the subject, we shall consume more time than
prudence would dictate to spare; on the other hand, if we do
not develope it, and see the principles on which we mutually

act, we shall subject ourselves to great difficulties. I beg
leave, therefore, to state the grounds on which my opinion,
with respect to the matter under consideration, is founded,
namely, whether our present system should be a temporary
or a permanent one? In the first place, I own myself the
friend to a very free system of commerce, and hold it as a
truth, that commercial shackles are generally unjust, oppressive,
and impolitic; it is also a truth, that if industry and
labor are left to take their own course, they will generally
be directed to those objects which are the most productive,
and this in a more certain and direct manner than the wisdom
of the most enlightened Legislature could point out.
Nor do I think that the national interest is more promoted
by such restrictions than that the interest of individuals
would be promoted by legislative interference directing the
particular application of its industry. For example, we
should find no advantage in saying that every man should
be obliged to furnish himself, by his own labor, with those
accommodations which depend on the mechanic arts, instead
of employing his neighbor, who could do it for him on better
terms. It would be of no advantage to the shoemaker to
make his own clothes to save the expense of the tailor's bill,
nor of the tailor to make his own shoes to save the expense
of procuring them from the shoemaker. It would be better
policy to suffer each of them to employ his talents in his own
way. The case is the same between the exercise of the arts
and agriculture—between the city and the country—and
between city and town; each capable of making particular
articles in abundance to supply the other: thus all are benefited
by exchange, and the less this exchange is cramped by
Government, the greater are the proportions of benefit to
each. The same argument holds good between nation and
nation, and between parts of the same nation.

In my opinion it would be proper also for gentlemen to
consider the means of encouraging the great staple of America,
I mean agriculture; which I think may justly be styled

the staple of the United States, from the spontaneous productions
which nature furnishes, and the manifest advantage
it has over every other object of emolument in this country.
If we compare the cheapness of our land with that of other
nations, we see so decided an advantage in that cheapness,
as to have full confidence of being unrivalled. With respect
to the object of manufactures, other countries may and do
rival us; but we may be said to have a monopoly in agriculture;
the possession of the soil, and the lowness of its price,
give us as much a monopoly in this case as any nation or
other parts of the world have in the monopoly of any article
whatever; but with this advantage to us, that it cannot be
shared nor injured by rivalship.

If nay general principle is a good one, that commerce ought
to be free, and labor and industry left at large to find its
proper object, the only thing which remains will be to discover
the exceptions that do not come within the rule I have
laid down. I agree with the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
that there are exceptions important in themselves, and
which claim the particular attention of the committee. Although
the freedom of commerce would be advantageous to
the world, yet, in some particulars, one nation might suffer
to benefit others, and this ought to be for the general good
of society.

If America was to leave her ports perfectly free, and make
no discrimination between vessels owned by her citizens and
those owned by foreigners, while other nations make this
discrimination, it is obvious that such policy would go to
exclude American shipping altogether from foreign ports,
and she would be materially affected in one of her most
important interests. To this we may add another consideration,
that by encouraging the means of transporting our
productions with facility, we encourage the raising them:
and this object, I apprehend, is likely to be kept in view by
the General Government.

Duties laid on imported articles may have an effect which

comes within the idea of national prudence. It may happen
that materials for manufactures may grow up without any
encouragement for this purpose; it has been the case in some.
of the States, but in others regulations have been provided,
and have succeeded in producing some establishments, which
ought not to be allowed to perish, from the alteration which
has taken place: it would be cruel to neglect them and divert
their industry to other channels; for it is not possible for the
hand of man to shift from one employment to another without
being injured by the change. There may be some manufactures,
which, being once formed, can advance towards
perfection without any adventitious aid, while others, for
want of the fostering hand of Government, will be unable to
go on at all. Legislative attention will therefore be necessary
to collect the proper objects for this purpose, and this
will form another exception to my general principle.

I observe that a sumptuary prohibition is within the view
of some of the proposed articles, and forms another exception.
I acknowledge that I do not, in general, think any great
national advantage arises from restrictions passed on this
head, because, as long as a distinction in point of value subsists,
sumptuary duties, in some form or other, will prevail
and take effect.

Another exception is embargoes in time of war. These
may necessarily occur and shackle the freedom of commerce;
but the reasons for this are so obvious, that it renders any
remark unnecessary.

The next exception that occurs, is one on which great stress
is laid by some well informed men, and this with great plausibility.
That each nation should have within itself the means
of defence, independent of foreign supplies: that in whatever
relates to the operations of war, no State ought to depend
upon a precarious supply from any part of the world. There
may be some truth in this remark, and therefore it is proper
for legislative attention. I am, though, well persuaded that
the reasoning on this subject has been carried too far. The

difficulties we experienced a few years ago of obtaining
military supplies, ought not furnish too much in favor of
an establishment which would be difficult and expensive;
because our national character is now established and recognised
throughout the world, and the laws of war favor national
exertion more than intestine commotion, so that there
is good reason to believe that, when it becomes necessary, we
may obtain supplies from abroad as readily as any other
nation whatsoever. I have mentioned this because I think
I see something among the enumerated articles that seems
to favor such a policy.

The impost laid on trade for the purpose of obtaining
revenue may likewise be considered as an exception; so far,
therefore, as revenue can be more conveniently and certainly
raised by this than any other method, without injury to the
community, and its operation will be in due proportion to
the consumption, which consumption is generally proportioned
to the circumstances of individuals, I think sound
policy dictates to use this means; but it will be necessary to
confine our attention at this time peculiarly to the object of
revenue, because the other subject involves some intricate
questions, to unravel which we perhaps are not prepared. I
have no objection to the committee's accepting the propositions
offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, because
so far as we can enumerate the proper objects, and apply
specific duties to them, we conform to the practice prevalent
in many of the States, and adopt the most laudable method
of collecting revenue; at least preferable to laying a general
tax. Whether, therefore, we consult ease and convenience in
collection, or pursuing habits already adopted and approved,
specific duties, as far as the articles can be properly enumerated,
is the most eligible mode of obtaining the end in
contemplation. Upon the whole, as I think some of the
propositions may be productive of revenue, and some may
protect our domestic manufactures, though the latter subject
ought not to be too confusedly blended with the former,

I hope the committee will receive them, and let them lie
over, in order that we may have time to consider how far
they are consistent with justice and policy.[107]

APRIL 21. DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

Some gentlemen have seemed to call in question the policy
of discriminating between nations in commercial alliance with
the United States, and those with whom no treaties exist.
For my own part, I am well satisfied that there are good and
'substantial reasons for making it. In the first place, it may
not be unworthy of consideration, that the public sentiments
of America will be favorable to such discrimination. I am
sure, with respect to that part from which I come, it will not
be a pleasing ingredient in your laws, if they find foreigners of

every nation put on a footing with those in alliance with us.
There is another reason, which, perhaps, is more applicable
to some parts of the Union than others; one of the few nations
with which America has formed commercial connexions has
relaxed considerably in that rigid policy it before pursued—
not so far, to be sure, as America could wish, with respect
to opening her ports to our trade; but she has permitted our
ready built ships a sale, and entitles them to the same advantage,
when owned by her own citizens, as if they had
been built in France, subjecting the sale to a duty of five per
cent. The British market receives none; the disabilities of
our ships to trade with their colonies continue, even if they
are purchased by the subjects of Great Britain; of consequence,
they cannot be sold without a considerable loss.
Nay, so cautious are they to prevent the advantages we
naturally possess, that they will not suffer a British ship to
be repaired in America, beyond a certain proportion of her
value; they even will not permit our vessels to be repaired
in their ports.

Another consideration has some weight with me in deciding
the question of discrimination. The policy of our ally,
from the views of the minister employed, has frequently been
adverse to the interest of this country. The person who has
had the charge of our affairs at that Court has long been
soliciting a relaxation in our favor, and although it cannot
be declared that he has succeeded, yet there is reason to
believe he has made some impressions, which our conduct
ought to avoid effacing; they are such as merit national
attention, and might justify a discrimination at this time,
although it may be proper to hold ourselves at liberty to
pursue that policy which a change may make necessary.
There are also other considerations which ought to be taken
into view. From artificial or adventitious causes, the commerce
between America and Great Britain exceeds what may
be considered its natural boundary. I find from an examination
of the accounts of tonnage for the three large States of

Massachusetts, Virginia, and South Carolina, that the tonnage
of nations in alliance with us holds no proportion with
that of Great Britain, or of the United States. This is a
proof that a very small direct commerce takes place between
those countries and this; that there is less of direct intercourse
than there would naturally be if those extraneous and
adventitious causes did not prevent it; such as the long
possession of our trade, their commercial regulations calculated
to retain it, their similarity of language and manners,
their conformity of laws and other circumstances—all these
concurring have made their commerce with us more extensive
than their natural situation would require it to be. I would
wish, therefore, to give such political advantages to those
nations, as might enable them to gain their proportion of our
direct trade from the nation who has acquired more than it
is naturally her due. From this view of the subject, I am
led to believe it would be good policy to make the proposed
discrimination between them. Is it not also of some importance,
that we should enable nations in treaty with us
to draw some advantage from our alliance, and thereby impress
those Powers that have hitherto neglected to treat with
us, with the idea that advantages are to be gained by a reciprocity
of friendship? If we give every thing equally to
those who have or have not formed treaties, surely we do
not furnish to them any motive for courting our connexion.

It has been objected, that the price of our produce at foreign
markets would not bear this additional burden, and that
the freight must be paid by the planters. It will be unnecessary,
after what was said by the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
(Mr. Fitzsimons,) to take up the time of the committee
in observing that foreigners must receive our tobacco, rice,
&c., in American shipping, if they cannot be otherwise got.
There may be a discrimination made in other respects besides
in tonnage, so that a very high impost on this article
need not be insisted upon. But will any gentleman say,
British vessels ought to enjoy in American ports greater

advantages than are enjoyed by Americans in British ports?
Yet were theduties laid equal in both cases, the British
merchant would have a very great superiority. In the first
place, some of the most valuable ports which she possesses,
and most conducive to our interest, are absolutely closed,
while every port in the United States is open to her without
restriction or limitation. Again, even in those which it is
permitted America to enter her vessels, she must bring nothing
but the produce of her own soil, whilst the British ship
makes circuitous voyages, and brings with her the produce of
every quarter of the globe. These are material advantages;
and take the whole of these observations together, I think
they furnish substantial reasons for making the proposed
discrimination.

APRIL 21. DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

I am a friend to free commerce, and, at the same time, a
friend to such regulations as are calculated to promote our
own interest, and this on national principles. The great
principle of interest is a leading one with me, and yet my
combination of ideas on this head leads me to a very different
conclusion from that made by the gentleman from New York,
(Mr. Lawrence.) I wish we were under less necessity than
I find we are to shackle our commerce with duties, restrictions,
and preferences; but there are cases in which it is
impossible to avoid following the example of other nations in
the great diversity of our trade. Some reasons for this were
mentioned on a former occasion; they have been frequently
illustrated in the progress of this business, and the decision
of the committee has proved them to be necessary.

I beg leave to remark, in answer to a train of ideas which
the gentleman last up has brought into view, that although
interest will, in general, operate effectually to produce political
good, yet there are causes in which certain factitious circumstances
may divert it from its natural channel, or throw

or retain it in an artificial one. Have we not been exercised
on this topic for a long time past? Or why has it been necessary
to give encouragement to particular species of industry,
but to turn the stream in favor of an interest that would not
otherwise succeed? But laying aside the illustration of these
causes, so well known to all nations, where cities, companies,
or opulent individuals engross the business from others, by
having had an uninterrupted possession of it, or by the extent
of their capitals being able to destroy a competition,
let us proceed to examine what ought to be our conduct on
this principle, upon the present occasion. Suppose two commercial
cities, one possessed of enormous capitals and long
habits of business, whilst the other is possessed of superior
natural advantages, but without that course of business and
chain of connexions which the other has: is it possible, in
the nature of things, that the latter city should carry on a
successful competition with the former? Thus it is with
nations; and when we consider the vast quantities of our
produce sent to the different parts of Europe, and the great
importations from the same places; that almost all of this
commerce is transacted through the medium of British ships
and British merchants, I cannot help conceiving that, from
the force of habit and other conspiring causes, that nation is
in possession of a much greater proportion of our trade than
she is naturally entitled to. Trade, then, being restrained to
an artificial channel, is not so advantageous to America as
a direct intercourse would be; it becomes therefore the duty
of those to whose care the public interest and welfare are
committed, to turn the tide to a more favorable direction.

In the trade of South Carolina is employed annually about
56,977 tons of shipping. The proportion of French and
Dutch is about 2,100 tons, while that of Great Britain is about
19,000. In Massachusetts the quantity is about 85,551 tons;
it is stated, that there are belonging to the State, 76,857, the
remainder is foreign, and mostly British. In Virginia we
have 56,272 tons; 26,903 British, and only 2,664 of the

French and Dutch. I cannot, from this view of the subject,
be persuaded to believe that every part of our trade flows
in those channels which would be most natural and profitable
to us, or those which reason would dictate to us, if we were
unincumbered of old habits and other accidental circumstances
that hurry us along.

It has been asked by the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Lawrence) what evidence we had that the public sentiments
of America were in favor of discrimination? Perhaps it
would be improper on this occasion to adduce any other
proof of the fact than from the transactions of public bodies;
and here, I think, is abundant proof to be found. The State
of Virginia, if I am not mistaken, lays a double duty on tonnage;
French and Dutch vessels pay half a dollar per ton,
while the vessels of Great Britain are subjected to one dollar.
There are other distinctions in our revenue laws manifesting
the same principle; some of them establish a preference to
French wines and brandy. In Maryland, a similar policy has
prevailed. I believe the difference there is about one-third
in favor of our allies, (if I err, the gentlemen from that State
can set me right;) in Pennsylvania, there is a discrimination
of about a fourth. I do not certainly recollect, but I believe
the like policy exists in other States; but I have not had an
opportunity of searching their laws on this point, but what
I have enumerated are facts affording substantial proof that
the public sentiment does favor the discrimination.

MAY 9. DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

The right understanding of this subject is of great importance.
The discussion has been drawn out to a very considerable
length on former occasions. The chain of ideas on
which the subject is suspended, is not very long, nor consists
of many links. The present Constitution was framed to
supply the defects of the one that has preceded it. The great
and material defects of it are well known to have arisen from

its inability to provide for the demands of justice and security
of the Union. To supply those defects, we are bound to
fulfil the public engagements: expectation is anxiously waiting
the result of our deliberations; it cannot be satisfied
without a sufficient revenue to accomplish its purposes. We
cannot obtain the money any other way but by taxation.
Among the various objects of this nature, an impost on merchandise
imported is preferable to all others, and among the
long list of articles included in the bill, there is not one more
proper for the purpose than the article under consideration.
The public sentiment has strongly pointed it out as an object
of revenue. I conceive, therefore, that it will be our duty to
draw from this source all the money that it is capable of
yielding, I am sure that it will not exceed our wants, nor
extend to the injury of our commerce. How far the powers
of Government are capable of going on this occasion, is matter
of opinion; we have had no direct experiment of what
ean be done under the energy and popularity of the new
system; we must recur to other sources for information, and
then, unless the circumstances are alike, the comparison may
not be true. We have been referred to the experience of
other nations; if that is to guide us on this subject, I am sure
we shall find precedents for going much further than is now
proposed. If I do not mistake the calculations that I have
seen of duties on importation, they amount to more on an
average than fifteen per cent.; the duty on ardent spirits in
all nations exceeds what is in contemplation to be laid in the
United States. I am sensible that the means which are used
by those nations to ensure the collection, would be odious and
improper in this country; but 1 believe the means which this
country is capable of using, without exciting complaint or
incurring too much expense, would be as adequate to secure
a duty of fifteen per cent, as the powers of any other nation
could be to obtain ninety or one hundred per cent. If we
consult the experience of the United States, it does not admonish
us that we are proceeding too far; there are duties
now under collection, in some States, that amount nearly to
the same as those we have in contemplation. A duty collected
under the feeble operation of the State Governments,
cannot be supposed beyond our powers, when those duties
have been collected by them, with feeble powers, but under
a competition, not to say opposition, of the neighboring
States. I am led, from a knowledge of these circumstances,
to believe that when we have established some general rule,
and have the co-operation of all the members of the Union,
we shall be able to do what is proposed by this bill, better
than any one State could execute it with its separate strength.
If we consult the opinion of the merchants, we shall not find
them a very sure guide. Merchants do not pretend to infallibility;
but if they did, they have given a proof to the
contrary, by their difference of opinion on this subject. Gentlemen
of that profession, both within these walls and out of
doors, have been as much divided on this point as any other
description of men. I believe them to be the best informed
as to the probable effects of an impost system, but they are
not exempt from the infirmities of human nature. We know
there is an essential difference between the interest of merchants
and the interest of commerce; we know there may be
distinctions also between the interest of commerce and of
revenue; and that in some cases we must sacrifice the one
to the other. I am not sure that we are not under the necessity
of doing both in the business before us. It is barely
matter of opinion what revenue the General Government will
be able to draw from the system now proposed. This being
the case I have endeavored to make up mine, from the best
materials in my power. I pay great respect to the opinions
of mercantle gentlemen, and am willing to concede much to
them, so far as their opinions are regulated by experience;
but if I am to be guided by this information, it will not lead
me to agree to the reduction of the duties in the maner contended
for. It is said, that is we reduce at all, we must
go through the whole. Now I doubt whether the duty on the
article of rum exceeds that proportion which pervades the
long list before us. It does not amount to more than thirty
per cent., while some other articles stand at forty; some
articles again that are not enumerated, but which fall within
the general mass at five per cent., are more likely to be introduced
clandestinely than this article, if it stood at fifty per
cent. I am sure, if we reduce the whole system in the manner
now proposed, all the duty we shall be able to collect will
be very incompetent to what the public necessities demand.
We must turn our eyes, then, to some other source that will
fill up the deficiency. There are but two objects to which,
in this dilemma, we can have recourse—direct taxation and
excises. Direct taxation is not contemplated by any gentleman
on this floor, nor are our constituents prepared for such a
system of revenue; they expect it will not be applied to,
until it is found that sufficient funds cannot be obtained in
any other way. Excises would give particular disgust in
some States, therefore gentlemen will not make up the deficiency
from that quarter. I think, upon the whole, it is
better to try what will be produced by a plan which is favored
by the public sentiment. This will give a support to
our laws equal to the greatest energy of a strong execution.
The citizens of America know that their individual interest is
connected with the public. We shall then have the strong
motive of interest acting in favor of the Government in a
peculiar manner. But I am not inclined to trust too much
to this security. I would take in the aid of the best regulations
in our power to provide; these, acting in concert, would
give a moral certainty to the faithful collection of the revenue.
But if gentlemen notwithstanding will persist in contending
against such a system, and cannot offer us a substitute, we
must fail of the primary object for which the Government was
created. If upon experience we find that the duties cannot
be safely collected, it may be proper to reduce them; but if
we set them too low in the first instance, and they do not
yield a sufficiency to answer the just demands of the public
creditors and the expenses of Government, the public reputation
must suffer.

I need not inform gentlemen we are surrounded with difficulties;
they are seen on every side; but they appear as few
and as surmountable on the side of the bill, as they do in any
other part of the prospect. If we give way on this article,
we are to do so upon all others. It is not for any reason
peculiar to Jamaica spirits that the reduction is moved for;
hence, I conceive, if gentlemen meet with success in opposing
this duty, we shall be reduced to a system inadequate to our
wants, and thereby defeat the chief object of our appointment.[108]

May 11. titles.

I may be well disposed to concur in opinion with gentlemen
that we ought not to recede from our former vote on
this subject, yet at the same time I may wish to proceed with
due respect to the Senate, and give dignity and weight to
our own opinion, so far as it contradicts theirs, by the deliberate
and decent manner in which we decide. For my

part, Mr. Speaker, I do not conceive titles to be so pregnant
with danger as some gentlemen apprehend. I believe
a President of the United States, clothed with all the
powers given in the Constitution, would not be a dangerous
person to the liberties of America, if you were to load him
with all the titles of Europe or Asia. We have seen superb
and august titles given, without conferring power and influence,
or without even obtaining respect. One of the most
impotent sovereigns in Europe has assumed a title as high as
human invention can devise; for example, what words can
imply a greater magnitude of power and strength than that
of High Mightiness? This title seems to border almost upon
impiety; it is assuming the pre-eminence and omnipotence of
the Deity; yet this title, and many others cast in the same
mould, have obtained a long time in Europe, but have they
conferred power? Does experience sanction such an opinion?
Look at the Republic I have alluded to, and say if their
present state warrants the idea?

I am not afraid of titles, because I fear the danger of any
power they could confer, but I am against them because they
are not very reconcilable with the nature of our Government
or the genius of the people. Even if they were proper in
themselves, they are not so at this juncture of time. But
my strongest objection is founded in principle; instead of increasing,
they diminish the true dignity and importance of
a Republic, and would in particular, on this occasion, diminish
the true dignity of the first magistrate himself. If we
give titles, we must either borrow or invent them. If we
have recourse to the fertile fields of luxuriant fancy, and deck
out an airy being of our own creation, it is a great chance
but its fantastic properties would render the empty phantom
ridiculous and absurd. If we borrow, the servile imitation
will be odious, not to say ridiculous also; we must copy from
the pompous sovereigns of the East, or follow the inferior
potentates of Europe; in either case, the splendid tinsel
or grogeous robe would disgrace the manly shoulders of our

chief. The more truly honorable shall we be, by showing a
total neglect and disregard to things of this nature; the
more simple, the more Republican we are in our manners, the
more rational dignity we shall acquire; therefore, I am better
pleased with the report adopted by the House, than I should
have been with any other whatsoever.

The Senate, no doubt, entertain different sentiments on
this subject. I would wish, therefore, to treat their opinion
with respect and attention. I would desire to justify the
reasonable and republican decision of this House to the other
branch of Congress, in order to prevent a misunderstanding.
But that the motion of my worthy colleague (Mr. Parker)
has possession of the House, I would move a more temperate
proposition, and I think it deserves some pains to bring about
that good will and urbanity, which, for the despatch of public
business, ought to be kept up between the two Houses.
I do not think it would be a sacrifice of dignity to appoint
a Committee of Conference, but imagine it would tend to
cement that harmony which has hitherto been preserved
between the Senate and this House; therefore, while I concur
with the gentlemen who express, in such decided terms, their
disapprobation of bestowing titles, I concur also with those
who are for the appointment of a Committee of Conference,
not apprehending they will depart from the principles adopted
and acted upon by the House.

MAY 12. DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

Mr. Madison said his mind was incapable of discovering
any plan that would answer the purpose the committee have
in view, and not produce greater evils than the one under
consideration. He thought an excise very objectionable, but
as no actual proposition for entering into such a system was
before the committee, he forebore to say any thing further
about it. He admitted an excise would obviate in part some
of the difficulties; but he did not think the answer given to

his argument altogether satisfactory; yet there was another
argument he urged on a former occasion remaining unanswered
—it was, that, at this moment, the fisheries, distilleries,
and all their connexions, were laboring under heavier
duties than what is now proposed; true, the duty is collected
in a different mode, but it affects the consumer in the same
manner. The gentlemen have said, to be sure, that the duty
is evaded; but if half is collected, it will amount to more than
six cents per gallon.

It is said that a tax on molasses will be unpopular, but not
more so than a tax on salt. Can gentlemen state more serious
apprehensions in the former than the latter case? yet
the committee did not forego a productive fund, because the
article was a necessary of life, and in general consumption.
If there is the disposition that is represented for people to
complain of the oppression of Government, have not the
citizens of the Southern States more just ground of complaint
than others? The system can only be acceptable to
them, because it is essentially necessary to be adopted for
the public good.

Gentlemen argue, that a tax on molasses is unpopular, and
prove it by experience under the British Government. If
this is to be adduced as a proof of the popularity of the measure,
what are we to say with respect to a tax on tea? Gentlemen
remembered, no doubt, how odious this kind of tax was
thought to be throughout America; yet the House had, without
hesitation, laid a considerable duty upon it. He did not
imagine that a duty on either of those articles, was in itself
objectionable; it was the principle upon which the tax was
laid that made them unpopular under the British Government.

It is said that this tax is unjust; now, he had not a single
idea of justice, that did not contradict the position. If it be
considered as it relates to rum, he was certain the consumers
of foreign rum paid a larger proportion of revenue into the
Treasury than the consumers of country rum; they paid
more than equal distributive justice required; if it was considered

as it respected molasses, there would appear no injustice.
Molasses was consumed in other States; but if it was
not, sugar was used in its stead, and subjected to a duty full
as high as that on molasses. But dismissing both these considerations,
and even admitting the whole weight to fall on
the Northern States, it would not be disproportioned, because,
in the long list of enumerated articles subject to a
high duty, they imported few or none; indeed, the articles
were pretty generally taxed for the benefit of the manufacturing
part of the northern community; see loaf sugar,
candles, cheese, soap, &c. He hoped gentlemen would not
infer from this observation, that he thought the encouragement
held out by the bill to manufactures improper; far from
it; he was glad to see their growing consequence, and was
disposed to give them every aid in his power. From this
view of the subject, he was inclined to adhere to the bill, and
not make any reduction.

MAY 14. DUTIES ON IMPORTS.

When he offered this amendment to the bill, he thought
its propriety was so obvious and striking, that it would meet
no opposition. To pass a bill,[109] not limited in duration,
which was to draw revenue from the pockets of the people,
appeared to be dangerous in the administration of any Government;
he hoped, therefore, the House would not be less
cautious in this particular than other nations are, who profess
to act upon sound principles. He imagined it might be
considered by their constituents as incompatible with the
spirit of the Constitution, and dangerous to republican principles,
to pass such a law unlimited in its duration.

He hoped it would not be understood by gentlemen who
opposed his motion, that he supposed them to be actuated
with a desire to do injury to either of those principles; he
believed them to be moved only by an ardent desire to promote
the general welfare, by the re-establishment of public

credit. He would heartily join his labors with theirs, to
effect this object, but wished to do it in a way, that while
they served their country, they might secure the liberties of
the people, and do honor to themselves. Besides the restoration
of public credit, he thought the act had in view the encouragement
of a particular description of people, which
might lead them into enterprises of a peculiar nature, for the
protection of which the public faith seemed to be pledged.
But would gentlemen infer from hence, that no alteration
ought to take place if the manufactures were well established?
The subject appeared to him in a twofold point of view; first,
to provide for the exigencies of Government, and second, for
the establishment of public credit; but he thought both
these objects could be obtained without making the bill perpetual.
If the Government showed a proper attention to the
punctual performance of its engagements, it would obtain the
latter; the other would be secured by making provision as
the occasion demanded. If the bill was to be made perpetual,
it would be continued after the purpose for which it was
adopted had ceased; the error would in this case be irremediable;
whereas, if its limitation was determined, it would
always be in the power of the Government to make it commensurate
with what the public debts and contingencies
required.

The Constitution, as had already been observed, places the
power in the House of originating money bills. The principal
reason why the Constitution had made this distinction
was, because they were chosen by the people, and supposed
to be best acquainted with their interests and ability. In
order to make them more particularly acquainted with these
objects, the democratic branch of the Legislature consisted
of a greater number, and were chosen for a shorter period,
so that they might revert more frequently to the mass of the
people. Now, if a revenue law was made perpetual, however
unequal its operation might be, it would be out of the power
of this House to effect an alteration; for if the President

chose to object to the measure, it would require two-thirds
of both Houses to carry it. Even if the House of Representatives
were unanimous in their opinion that the law ought
to be repealed, they would not be able to carry it, unless a
great majority appeared in the Senate also.

He observed, that an honorable gentleman had thought
that no appropriation of the public money could be made for
a longer term than two years. This was true, as it related to
the support of armies; but the question here did not appear
to be respecting an appropriation. It was the revenue itself,
which, without any appropriation, might continue flowing
into the public treasury independent of the will of the people,
and might thereby become a convenience in the hands of
some other department of the Government, for the purpose
of oppression. Experience might also forcibly suggest the
necessity and importance of alterations in the law, yet, without
this clause, it might never be in the power of the House
to make them.[110]

MAY 19. POWER OF REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.

Mr. Madison did not concur with the gentleman in his
interpretation of the Constitution.[111] What, said he, would

be the consequence of such construction? It would in effect
establish every officer of the Government on the firm tenure
of good behaviour; not the heads of Departments only, but
all the inferior officers of those Departments, would hold
their offices during good behaviour, and that to be judged of
by one branch of the Legislature only on the impeachment of
the other. If the Constitution means this by its declarations
to be the case, we must submit; but I should lament it as a
fatal error interwoven in the system, and one that would
ultimately prove its destruction. I think the inference
would not arise from a fair construction of the words of that
instrument.

It is very possible that an officer who may not incur the
displeasure of the President, may be guilty of actions that
ought to forfeit his place. The power of this House may
reach him by the means of an impeachment, and he may be
removed even against the will of the President; so that the
declaration in the Constitution was intended as a supplemental
security for the good behaviour of the public officers.
It is possible the case I have stated may happen. Indeed, it
may, perhaps, on some occasion, be found necessary to impeach
the President himself; surely, therefore, it may happen
to a subordinate officer, whose bad actions may be connived
at or overlooked by the President. Hence the people have
an additional security in this Constitutional provision.

I think it absolutely necessary that the President should
have the power of removing from office; it will make him, in
a peculiar manner, responsible for their conduct, and subject
him to impeachment himself, if he suffers them to perpetrate
with impunity high crimes or misdemeanors against the
United States, or neglects to superintend their conduct, so as
to check their excesses. On the Constitutionality of the
declaration I have no manner of doubt.

I look upon every Constitutional question, whatever its
nature may be, as of great importance. I look upon the
present to be doubly so, because its nature is of the highest
moment to the well-being of the Government. I have listened
with attention to the objections which have been
stated, and to the replies that have been made, and I think
the investigation of the meaning of the Constitution has supported
the doctrine I brought forward. If you consult the
expediency, it will be greatly against the doctrine advanced
by gentlemen on the other side of the question. See to what
inconsistency gentlemen drive themselves by their construction
of the Constitution. The gentleman from South Carolina,
(Mr. Smith,) in order to bring to conviction and punishment
an offender in any of the principal offices, must have
recourse to a breach of the common law, and yet he may
there be found guilty, and maintain his office, because he is
fixed by the Constitution. It has been said, we may guard
against the inconveniency of that construction, by limiting
the duration of the office to a term of years; but, during
that term, there is no way of getting rid of a bad officer but
by impeachment. During the time this is depending, the
person may continue to commit those crimes for which he is
impeached, because if his construction of the Constitution is
right, the President can have no more power to suspend than
he has to remove.

What fell from one of my colleagues (Mr. Bland) appears
to have more weight than any thing hitherto suggested. The
Constitution, at the first view, may seem to favor his opinion;
but that must be the case only at the first view; for, if we
examine it, we shall find his construction incompatible with
the spirit and principles contained in that instrument.

It is said, that it comports with the nature of things, that
those who appoint should have the power of removal; but I
cannot conceive that this sentiment is warranted by the Constitution;
I believe it would be found very inconvenient in
practice. It is one of the most prominent features of the

Constitution, a principle that pervades the whole system, that
there should be the highest possible degree of responsibility
in all the Executive officers thereof; any thing, therefore,
which tends to lessen this responsibility, is contrary to its
spirit and intention, and, unless it is saddled upon us expressly
by the letter of that work, I shall oppose the admission
of it into any act of the Legislature. Now, if the heads
of the Executive departments are subjected to removal by
the President alone, we have in him security for the good
behaviour of the officer. If he does not conform to the
judgment of the President in doing the executive duties of
his office, he can be displaced. This makes him responsible
to the great Executive power, and makes the President responsible
to the public for the conduct of the person he has
nominated and appointed to aid him in the administration
of his department. But if the President shall join in a collusion
with this officer, and continue a bad man in office, the
case of impeachment will reach the culprit, and drag him
forth to punishment. But if you take the other construction,
and say he shall not be displaced but by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, the President is no longer answerable
for the conduct of the officer; all will depend upon the
Senate. You here destroy a real responsibility without obtaining
even the shadow; for no gentleman will pretend to
say the responsibility of the Senate can be of such a nature
as to afford substantial security. But why, it may be asked,
was the Senate joined with the President in appointing to
office, if they have no responsibility? I answer, merely for
the sake of advising, being supposed, from their nature, better
acquainted with the character of the candidates than an
individual; yet even here the President is held to the responsibility
—he nominates, and, with their consent, appoints.
No person can be forced upon him as an assistant by any
other branch of the Government.

There is another objection to this construction, which I
consider of some weight, and shall therefore mention to the

committee. Perhaps there was no argument urged with more
success, or more plausibly grounded against the Constitution,
under which we are now deliberating, than that founded on
the mingling of the Executive and Legislative branches of the
Government in one body. It has been objected, that the
Senate have too much of the Executive power even, by having
a control over the President in the appointment to office.
Now, shall we extend this connexion between the Legislative
and Executive departments, which will strengthen the objection,
and diminish the responsibility we have in the head of
the Executive? I cannot but believe, if gentlemen weigh
well these considerations, they will think it safe and expedient
to adopt the clause.

MAY 22. CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES.

I think the merit of the question is now to be decided,
whether the gentleman is eligible to a seat in this House or
not; but it will depend on the decision of a previous question,
whether he has been seven years a citizen of the United
States or not.

From an attention to the facts which have been adduced,
and from a consideration of the principles established by the
Revolution, the conclusion I have drawn is, that Mr. Smith
was, on the declaration of independence, a citizen of the
United States; and unless it appears that he has forfeited his
right, by some neglect or overt act, he had continued a citizen
until the day of his election to a seat in this House. I take
it to be a clear point, that we are to be guided, in our decision,
by the laws and constitution of South Carolina, so far as they
can guide us; and where the laws do not expressly guide us,
we must be guided by principles of a general nature, so far
as they are applicable to the present case.

It were to be wished, that we had some law adduced, more
precisely defining the qualities of a citizen or an alien; particular
laws of this kind have obtained in some of the States;

if such a law existed in South Carolina, it might have prevented
this question from ever coming before us; but since
this has not been the case, let us settle some general principle
before we proceed to the presumptive proof arising from public
measures under the law, which tend to give support to the
inference drawn from such principles.

It is an established maxim that birth is a criterion of allegiance.
Birth, however, derives its force sometimes from
place, and sometimes from parentage; but, in general, place
is the most certain criterion; it is what applies in the United
States; it will, therefore, be unnecessary to investigate any
other. Mr. Smith founds his claim upon his birthright; his
ancestors were among the first settlers of that colony.

It is well known to many gentlemen on this floor, as well
as to the public, that the petitioner[112] is a man of talents, one
who would not lightly hazard his reputation in support of
visionary principles: yet I cannot but think he has erred in
one of the principles upon which he grounds his charge. He supposes,
when this country separated from Great Britain, the tie
of allegiance subsisted between the inhabitants of America and
the King of that nation, unless, by some adventitious circumstance,
the allegiance was transferred to one of the United
States. I think there is a distinction which will invalidate
his doctrine in this particular, a distinction between that
primary allegiance which we owe to that particular society
of which we are members, and the secondary allegiance we

owe to the Sovereign established by that society. This distinction
will be illustrated by the doctrine established by the
laws of Great Britain, which were the laws of this country
before the Revolution. The Sovereign cannot make a citizen
by any act of his own; he can confer denizenship: but this
does not make a man either a citizen or subject. In order to
make a citizen or subject, it is established, that allegiance
shall first be due to the whole nation; it is necessary that a
national act should pass to admit an individual member. In
order to become a member of the British empire, where birth
has not endowed the person with that privilege, he must be
naturalized by an act of Parliament.

What was the situation of the people of America, when the
dissolution of their allegiance took place by the declaration of
independence? I conceive that every person who owed this
primary allegiance to the particular community in which he
was born, retained his right of birth, as a member of a new
community; that he was consequently absolved from the
secondary allegiance he had owed to the British Sovereign.
If he were not a minor, he became bound, by his own act, as
a member of the society who separated with him from a submission
to a foreign country. If he were a minor, his consent
was involved in the decision of that society to which he belonged
by the ties of nature. What was the allegiance, as a
citizen of South Carolina, he owed to the King of Great
Britain? He owed his allegiance to him as a King of that
society to which, as a society, he owed his primary allegiance.
When that society separated from Great Britain, he was
bound by that act, and his allegiance transferred to that
society, or the Sovereign which that society should set up;
because it was through his membership of the society of
South Carolina that he owed allegiance to Great Britain.

This reasoning will hold good, unless it is supposed that the
separation which took place between these States and Great
Britain, not only dissolved the union between those countries,
but dissolved the union among the citizens themselves: that

the original compact, which made them altogether one society,
being dissolved, they could not fall into pieces, each
part making an independent society; but must individually
revert into a state of nature; but I do not conceive that this
was, of necessity, to be the case; I believe such a revolution
did not absolutely take place. But in supposing that this
was the case, lies the error of the memorialist. I conceive the
colonies remained as a political society, detached from their
former connexion with another society, without dissolving
into a state of nature; but capable of substituting a new form
of Government in the place of the old one, which they had,
for special considerations, abolished. Suppose the State of
South Carolina should think proper to revise her constitution,
abolish that which now exists, and establish another form of
Government: surely this would not dissolve the social compact.
It would not throw them back into a state of nature.
It would not dissolve the union between the individual members
of that society. It would leave them in perfect society,
changing only the mode of action, which they are always at
liberty to arrange. Mr. Smith being then, at the declaration
of independence, a minor, but being a member of that particular
society, he became, in my opinion, bound by the
decision of the society, with respect to the question of independence
and change of Government; and if afterwards he
had taken part with the enemies of his country, he would have
been guilty of treason against that Government to which he
owed allegiance, and would have been liable to be prosecuted
as a traitor.

If it be said, that very inconvenient circumstances would
result from this principle, that it would constitute all those
persons who are natives of America, but who took part against
the revolution, citizens of the United States, I would beg
leave to observe, that we are deciding a question of right,
unmixed with the question of expediency, and must, therefore,
pay a proper attention to this principle. But I think it
can hardly be expected by gentlemen that the principle will

operate dangeruosly. Those who left their country, to take
part with Britain, were of two descriptions—minors, or persons
of mature age. With respect to the latter, nothing can
be inferred with respect to them from the decision of the
present case; because they had the power of making an
option between the contending parties; whether this was a
matter of right or not is a question which need not be agitated
in order to settle the case before us. Then, with respect to
those natives who were minors at the Revolution, and whose
case is analogous to Mr. Smith's, if we are bound by the precedent
of such a decision as we are about to make, and it is
declared that they owe a primary allegiance to this country, I
still think we are not likely to be inundated with such characters;
so far as any of them took part against us, they violated
their allegiance, and opposed our laws; so, then, there can be
only a few characters, such as were minors at the Revolution,
and who have never violated their allegiance by a foreign
connexion, who can be affected by the decision of the present
question. The number, I admit, is large who might be acknowledged
citizens on my principles; but there will very few
be found daring enough to face the laws of the country they
have violated, and against which they have committed high
treason.

So far as we can judge by the laws of Carolina, and the
practice and decision of that State, the principles I have
adduced are supported; and I must own, that I feel myself
at liberty to decide, that Mr. Smith was a citizen at the declaration
of independence, a citizen at the time of his election
and, consequently, entitled to a seat in this Legislature.[113]

JUNE 8. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

I am sorry to be accessary to the loss of a single moment of
time by the House. If I had been indulged in my motion,
and we had gone into a Committee of the Whole, I think we
might have rose and resumed the consideration of other
business before this time; that is, so far as it depended upon
what I proposed to bring forward. As that mode seems not
to give satisfaction, I will withdraw the motion, and move
you, sir, that a select committee be appointed to consider and
report such amendments as are proper for Congress to propose
to the Legislatures of the several States, conformably to
the fifth article of the Constitution.

I will state my reasons why I think it proper to propose
amendments, and state the amendments themselves, so far as
I think they ought to be proposed. If I thought I could
fulfil the duty which I owe to myself and my constituents, to
let the subject pass over in silence, I most certainly should
not trespass upon the indulgence of this House. But I cannot
do this, and am therefore compelled to beg a patient hearing

to what I have to lay before you. And I do most sincerely
believe, that if Congress will devote but one day to this subject,
so far as to satisfy the public that we do not disregard
their wishes, it will have a salutary influence on the public
councils, and prepare the way for a favorable reception of our
future measures. It appears to me that this House is bound
by every motive of prudence, not to let the first session pass
over without proposing to the State Legislatures, some things
to be incorporated into the Constitution, that will render it
as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as
it has been found acceptable to a majority of them. I wish,
among other reasons why something should be done, that
those who had been friendly to the adoption of this Constitution
may have the opportunity of proving to those who were
opposed to it that they were as sincerely devoted to liberty
and a Republican Government, as those who charged them
with wishing the adoption of this Constitution in order to lay
the foundation of an aristocracy or despotism. It will be a
desirable thing to extinguish from the bosom of every member
of the community, any apprehensions that there are those
among his countrymen who wish to deprive them of the
liberty for which they valiantly fought and honorably bled.
And if there are amendments desired of such a nature as will
not injure the Constitution, and they can be ingrafted so as
to give satisfaction to the doubting part of our fellow-citizens,
the friends of the Federal Government will evince that spirit
of deference and concession for which they have hitherto been
distinguished.

It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this House, that,
notwithstanding the ratification of this system of Government
by eleven of the thirteen United States, in some cases unanimously,
in others by large majorities; yet still there is a
great number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it,
among whom are many respectable for their talents and
patriotism, and respectable for the jealousy they have for
their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object is laudable
in its motive. There is a great body of the people falling
under this description, who at present feel much inclined to
join their support to the cause of Federalism, if they were
satisfied on this one point. We ought not to disregard their
inclination, but, on principles of amity and moderation, conform
to their wishes, and expressly declare the great rights of
mankind secured under this Constitution. The acquiescence
which our fellow-citizens show under the Government, calls
upon us for a like return of moderation. But perhaps there
is a stronger motive than this for our going into a consideration
of the subject. It is to provide those securities for liberty
which are required by a part of the community; I allude

in a particular manner to those two States that have not
thought fit to throw themselves into the bosom of the Confederacy.
It is a desirable thing, on our part as well as
theirs, that a re-union should take place as soon as possible.
I have no doubt, if we proceed to take those steps which
would be prudent and requisite at this juncture, that in a
short time we should see that disposition prevailing in those
States which have not come in, that we have seen prevailing
in those States which have embraced the Constitution.

But I will candidly acknowledge, that, over and above all
these considerations, I do conceive that the Constitution may
be amended; that is to say, if all power is subject to abuse,
that then it is possible the abuse of the powers of the General
Government may be guarded against in a more secure manner
than is now done, while no one advantage arising from the
exercise of that power shall be damaged or endangered by it.
We have in this way something to gain, and, if we proceed
with caution, nothing to lose. And in this case it is necessary
to proceed with caution; for while we feel all these inducements
to go into a revisal of the Constitution, we must feel for
the Constitution itself, and make that revisal a moderate one.
I should be unwilling to see a door opened for a reconsideration
of the whole structure the Government—for a re-consideration
of the principles and the substance of the powers
given; because I doubt, if such a door were opened, we should
be very likely to stop at that point which would be safe to the
Government itself. But I do wish to see a door opened to
consider, so far as to incorporate those provisions for the
security of rights, against which I believe no serious objection
has been made by any class of our constituents: such as
would be likely to meet with the concurrence of two-thirds of
both Houses, and the approbation of three-fourths of the
State Legislatures. I will not propose a single alteration
which I do not wish to see take place, as intrinsically proper
in itself, or proper because it is wished for by a respectable
number of my fellow-citizens; and therefore I shall not propose

a single alteration but is likely to meet the concurrence required
by the Constitution. There have been objections of
various kinds made against the Constitution. Some were
levelled against its structure because the President was without
a council; because the Senate, which is a legislative body,
had judicial powers in trials on impeachments; and because
the powers of that body were compounded in other respects,
in a manner that did not correspond with a particular theory;
because it grants more power than is supposed to be necessary
for every good purpose, and controls the ordinary powers of
the State governments. I know some respectable characters
who opposed this Government on these grounds; but I believe
that the great mass of the people who opposed it, disliked
it because it did not contain effectual provisions against
the encroachments on particular rights, and those safeguards
which they have been long accustomed to have interposed
between them and the magistrate who exercises the sovereign,
power; nor ought we to consider them safe, while a great
number of our fellow-citizens think these securities necessary.

It is a fortunate thing that the objection to the Government
has been made on the ground I stated; because it will
be practicable, on that ground, to obviate the objection, so
far as to satisfy the public mind that their liberties will be
perpetual, and this without endangering any part of the Constitution,
which is considered as essential to the existence of
the Government by those who promoted its adoption.

The amendments which have occurred to me, proper to be
recommended by Congress to the State Legislatures, are these:
First. That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration,
that all power is originally vested in, and consequently
derived from, the people.

That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised
for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property,
and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.

That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible
right to reform or change their Government, whenever
it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its
institution.

Secondly. That in article 1st, section 2, clause 3, these
words be struck out, to wit: "The number of Representatives
shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each
State shall have at least one Representative, and until such
enumeration shall be made;" and that in place thereof be
inserted these words, to wit: "After the first actual enumeration,
there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand,
until the number amounts to—after which the
proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that the number
shall never be less than—, nor more than—, but
each State shall, after the first enumeration, have at least two
Representatives; and prior thereto."

Thirdly. That in article 1st, section 6, clause 1, there be
added to the end of the first sentence, these words, to wit:
"But no law varying the compensation last ascertained shall
operate before the next ensuing election of Representatives."

Fourthly. That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3
and 4, be inserted these clauses, to wit: The civil rights of
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on
any pretext, infringed.

The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom
of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall
be inviolable.

The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling
and consulting for their common good; nor from applying
to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for
redress of their grievances.

The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the

best security of a free country: but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military
service in person.

No soldiers shall in time of peace be quartered in any house
without the consent of the owner; nor at any time, but in a
manner warranted by law.

No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment,
to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offence;
nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where it
may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their
houses, their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated by
warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be
searched, or the persons or things to be seized.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the cause
and nature of the accusation, to be confronted with his accusers,
and the witnesses against him; to have a compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.

The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made
in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution;
but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as
inserted merely for greater caution.

Fifthly. That in article 1st, section 10, between clauses 1
and 2, be inserted this clause, to wit:

No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.

Sixthly. That, in article 3d, section 2, be annexed to the
end of clause 2d, these words, to wit:

But no appeal to such court shall be allowed where the
value in controversy shall not amount to—dollars:
nor shall any fact triable by jury, according to the course of
common law, be otherwise re-examinable than may consist
with the principles of common law.

Seventhly, That in article 3d, section 2, the third clause
be struck out, and in its place be inserted the clauses following,
to wit:

The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments,
and cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the militia
when on actual service, in time of war or public danger) shall
be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with
the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge,
and other accustomed requisites; and in all crimes
punishable with loss of life or member, presentment or indictment
by a grand jury shall be an essential preliminary, provided
that in cases of crimes committed within any county
which may be in possession of an enemy, or in which a general
insurrection may prevail, the trial may by law be authorized
in some other county of the same State, as near as
may be to the seat of the offence.

In cases of crimes committed not within any county, the
trial may by law be in such county as the laws shall have
prescribed. In suits at common law, between man and man,
the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of
the people, ought to remain inviolate.

Eighthly. That immediately after article 6th, be inserted,
as article 7th, the clauses following, to wit:

The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated
to the departments to which they are respectively distributed:
so that the Legislative Department shall never exercise the
powers vested in the Executive or Judicial, nor the Executive
exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial, nor
the Judicial exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or
Executive Departments.

The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively.

Ninthly. That article 7th be numbered as article 8th.

The first of these amendments relates to what may be
called a bill of rights. I will own that I never considered,
this provision so essential to the Federal Constitution as to
make it improper to ratify it, until such an amendment was
added; at the same time, I always conceived, that in a certain
form, and to a certain extent, such a provision was
neither improper nor altogether useless. I am aware that a
great number of the most respectable friends to the Government,
and champions for republican liberty, have thought
such a provision not only unnecessary, but even improper;
nay, I believe some have gone so far as to think it even dangerous.
Some policy has been made use of, perhaps, by gentlemen
on both sides of the question: I acknowledge the
ingenuity of those arguments which were drawn against the
Constitution, by a comparison with the policy of Great
Britain, in establishing a declaration of rights; but there is
too great a difference in the case to warrant the comparison:
therefore, the arguments drawn from that source were in a
great measure inapplicable. In the declaration of rights
which that country has established, the truth is, they have
gone no farther than to raise a barrier against the power of
the Crown; the power of the Legislature is left altogether
indefinite. Although I know whenever the great rights, the
trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience,
come in question in that body, the invasion of them is resisted
by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not
contain any one provision for the security of those rights,
respecting which the people of America are most alarmed.
The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those
choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the British
Constitution.

But although the case may be widely different, and it may
not be thought necessary to provide limits for the legislative
power in that country, yet a different opinion prevails in the

United States. The people of many States have thought it
necessary to raise barriers against power in all forms and
departments of Government, and I am inclined to believe, if
once bills of rights are established in all the States as well as
the Federal Constitution, we shall find, that, although some
of them are rather unimportant, yet, upon the whole, they
will have a salutary tendency. It may be said, in some instances,
they do no more than state the perfect equality
of mankind. This, to be sure, is an absolute truth, yet it
is not absolutely necessary to be inserted at the head of a
Constitution.

In some instances they assert those rights which are exercised
by the people in forming and establishing a plan of
Government. In other instances, they specify those rights
which are retained when particular powers are given up to be
exercised by the Legislature. In other instances, they specify
positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of
the compact. Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural
right, but a right resulting from a social compact, which
regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to
secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent
rights of nature. In other instances, they lay down dogmatic
maxims with respect to the construction of the Government;
declaring that the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
branches, shall be kept separate and distinct. Perhaps the
best way of securing this in practice is, to provide such checks
as will prevent the encroachment of the one upon the other.

But, whatever may be the form which the several States
have adopted in making declarations in favor of particular
rights, the great object in view is to limit and qualify the
powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of
power those cases in which the Government ought not to act,
or to act only in a particular mode. They point these exceptions
sometimes against the abuse of the Executive power,
sometimes against the Legislative, and, in some cases, against
the community itself; or, in other words, against the majority
in favor of the minority.

In our Government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard
against the abuse in the Executive Department than any
other; because it is not the stronger branch of the system,
but the weaker. It therefore must be levelled against the
Legislative, for it is the most powerful, and most likely to be
abused, because it is under the least control. Hence, so far
as a declaration of rights can tend to prevent the exercise of
undue power, it cannot be doubted but such declaration is
proper. But I confess that I do conceive, that in a Government
modified like this of the United States, the great danger
lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the Legislative
body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be
levelled against that quarter where the greatest danger lies,
namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of
power. But this is not found in either the Executive or
Legislative departments of Government, but in the body of
the people, operating by the majority against the minority.

It may be thought that all paper barriers against the power
of the community are too weak to be worthy of attention. I
am sensible they are not so strong as to satisfy gentlemen of
every description who have seen and examined thoroughly
the texture of such a defence; yet, as they have a tendency to
impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public
opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole
community, it may be one means to control the majority
from those acts to which they might be otherwise inclined.

It has been said, by way of objection to a bill of rights, by
many respectable gentlemen out of doors, and I find opposition
on the same principles likely to be made by gentlemen
on this floor, that they are unnecessary articles of a Republican
Government, upon the presumption that the people have
those rights in their own hands, and that is the proper place
for them to rest. It would be a sufficient answer to say, that
this objection lies against such provisions under the State
Governments, as well as under the General Government; and
there are, I believe, but few gentlemen who are inclined to

push their theory so far as to say that a declaration of rights
in those cases is either ineffectual or improper. It has been
said, that in the Federal Government they are unnecessary,
because the powers are enumerated, and it follows, that all
that are not granted by the Constitution are retained; that
the Constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being
the rights of the people; and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot
be so necessary as if the residuum was thrown into the
hands of the Government. I admit that these arguments are
not entirely without foundation; but they are not conclusive
to the extent which has been supposed. It is true, the powers
of the General Government are circumscribed, they are
directed to particular objects; but even if Government keeps
within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with
respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain
extent, in the same manner as the powers of the State Governments
under their constitutions may to an indefinite
extent; because in the Constitution of the United States,
there is a clause granting to Congress the power to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution all the powers vested in the Government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof; this
enables them to fulfil every purpose for which the Government
was established. Now, may not laws be considered necessary
and proper by Congress, (for it is for them to judge of the
necessity and propriety to accomplish those special purposes
which they may have in contemplation,) which laws in themselves
are neither necessary nor proper; as well as improper
laws could be enacted by the State Legislatures, for fulfilling
the more extended objects of those Governments? I will
state an instance, which I think in point, and proves that
this might be the case. The General Government has a right
to pass all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue;
the means for enforcing the collection are within the direction
of the Legislature: may not general warrants be considered
necessary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which
it was supposed at the framing of their constitutions the
State Governments had in view? If there was reason for
restraining the State Governments from exercising this power,
there is like reason for restraining the Federal Government.

It may be said, indeed it has been said, that a bill of rights
is not necessary, because the establishment of this Government
has not repealed those declarations of rights which are
added to the several State constitutions; that those rights
of the people which had been established by the most solemn
act, could not be annihilated by a subsequent act of that
people, who meant and declared at the head of the instrument,
that they ordained and established a new system, for
the express purpose of securing to themselves and posterity
the liberties they had gained by an arduous conflict.

I admit the force of this observation, but I do not look upon
it to be conclusive. In the first place, it is too uncertain
ground to leave this provision upon, if a provision is at all
necessary to secure rights so important as many of those I
have mentioned are conceived to be, by the public in general,
as well as those in particular who opposed the adoption of
this Constitution. Besides, some States have no bills of
rights, there are others provided with very defective ones,
and there are others whose bills of rights are not only defective,
but absolutely improper; instead of securing some
in the full extent which republican principles would require,
they limit them too much to agree with the common ideas of
liberty.

It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned
into the hands of the General Government, and were
Consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible
arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of
a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may

be guarded against, I have attempted it, as gentlemen may
see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.

It has been said that it is unnecessary to load the Constitution
with this provision, because it was not found effectual in
the constitution of the particular States. It is true, there are
a few particular States in which some of the most valuable
articles have not, at one time or other, been violated; but it
does not follow but they may have, to a certain degree, a
salutary effect against the abuse of power. If they are incorporated
into the Constitution, independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the Legislative or
Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution
by the declaration of rights. Besides this security, there is
a great probability that such a declaration in the federal
system would be enforced; because the State Legislatures
will jealously and closely watch the operations of this Government,
and be able to resist with more effect every assumption
of power, than any other power on earth can do; and
the greatest opponents to a Federal Government admit the
State Legislatures to be sure guardians of the people's liberty.
I conclude, from this view of the subject, that it will be proper
in itself, and highly politic, for the tranquillity of the public
mind, and the stability of the Government, that we should
offer something, in the form I have proposed, to be incorporated
in the system of Government, as a declaration of the
rights of the people.

In the next place, I wish to see that part of the Constitution
revised which declares that the number of Representatives
shall not exceed the proportion of one for every thirty
thousand persons, and allows one Representative to every
State which rates below that proportion. If we attend to the
discussion of this subject, which has taken place in the State
conventions, and even in the opinion of the friends to the

Constitution, an alteration here is proper. It is the sense of
the people of America, that the number of Representatives
ought to be increased, but particularly that it should not be
left in the discretion of the Government to diminish them,
below that proportion, which certainly is in the power of the
Legislature, as the Constitution now stands; and they may,
as the population of the country increases, increase the House
of Representatives to a very unwieldy degree. I confess I
always thought this part of the Constitution defective, though
not dangerous; and that it ought to be particularly attended
to whenever Congress should go into the consideration of
amendments.

There are several minor cases enumerated in my proposition,
in which I wish also to see some alteration take place.
That article which leaves it in the power of the Legislature
to ascertain its own emolument, is one to which I allude. I
do not believe this is a power which, in the ordinary course
of Government, is likely to be abused. Perhaps of all the
powers granted, it is least likely to abuse; but there is a
seeming impropriety in leaving any set of men without control
to put their hand into the public coffers, to take out
money to put in their pockets; there is a seeming indecorum
in such power, which leads me to propose a change. We have
a guide to this alteration in several of the amendments which
the different conventions have proposed. I have gone, therefore,
so far as to fix it, that no law varying the compensation,
shall operate until there is a change in the Legislature; in
which case it cannot be for the particular benefit of those
who are concerned in determining the value of the service.

I wish, also, in revising the Constitution, we may throw
into that section, which interdicts the abuse of certain powers
in the State Legislatures, some other provisions of equal, if
not greater importance than those already made. The
words, "No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post
facto law," &c., were wise and proper restrictions in the Constitution.
I think there is more danger of those powers being

abused by the State Governments than by the Government
of the United States. The same may be said of other powers
which they possess, if not controlled by the general principle,
that laws are unconstitutional which infringe the rights of
the community. I should, therefore, wish to extend this interdiction,
and add, as I have stated in the 5th resolution,
that no State shall violate the equal right of conscience, freedom
of the press, or trial by jury in criminal cases; because
it is proper that every Government should be disarmed of
powers which trench upon those particular rights. I know,
in some of the State constitutions, the power of the Government
is controlled by such a declaration; but others are not.
I cannot see any reason against obtaining even a double
security on those points; and nothing can give a more sincere
proof of the attachment of those who opposed this Constitution
to these great and important rights, than to see them
join in obtaining the security I have now proposed; because
it must be admitted, on all hands, that the State Governments
are as liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the
General Government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously
guarded against.

I think it will be proper, with respect to the judiciary
powers, to satisfy the public mind on those points which I
have mentioned. Great inconvenience has been apprehended
to suitors from the distance they would be dragged to obtain
justice in the Supreme Court of the United States, upon an
appeal on an action for a small debt. To remedy this, declare
that no appeal shall be'made unless the matter in controversy
amounts to a particular sum; this, with the regulations respecting
jury trials in criminal cases, and suits at common
law, it is to be hoped, will quiet and reconcile the minds of
the people to that part of the Constitution.

I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the
State conventions, that several are particularly anxious that
it should be declared in the Constitution, that the powers not
therein delegated should be reserved to the several States.

Perhaps other words may define this more precisely than the
whole of the instrument now does. I admit they may be
deemed unnecessary; but there can be no harm in making
such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as
stated. I am sure I understand it so, and do therefore propose
it.

These are the points on which I wish to see a revision of
the Constitution take place. How far they will accord with
the sense of this body, I cannot take upon me absolutely to
determine; but I believe every gentleman will readily admit
that nothing is in contemplation, so far as I have mentioned,
that can endanger the beauty of the Government in any one
important feature, even in the eyes of its most sanguine
admirers. I have proposed nothing that does not appear to
me as proper in itself, or eligible as patronised by a respectable
number of our fellow-citizens; and if we can make the
Constitution better in the opinion of those who are opposed
to it, without weakening its frame, or abridging its usefulness
in the judgment of those who are attached to it, we act the
part of wise and liberal men to make such alterations as shall
produce that effect.

Having done what I conceived was my duty, in bringing
before this House the subject of amendments, and also stated
such as I wish for and approve, and offered the reasons which
occurred to me in their support, I shall content myself, for the
present, with moving "that a committee be appointed to consider
of and report such amendments as ought to be proposed
by Congress to the Legislatures of the States, to become, if
ratified by three-fourths thereof, part of the Constitution of
the United States." By agreeing to this motion, the subject
may be going on in the committee, while other important
business is proceeding to a conclusion in the House. I should
advocate greater despatch in the business of amendments, if
I were not convinced of the absolute necessity there is of
pursuing the organization of the Government; because I
think we should obtain the confidence of our fellow-citizens,

in proportion as we fortify the rights of the people against the
encroachments of the Government.[118]

JUNE 16. POWER OF REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.

If the construction of the Constitution is to be left to its
natural course, with respect to the Executive powers of this
Government, I own that the insertion of this sentiment[119] in

law may not be of material importance, though, if it is nothing
more than a mere declaration of a clear grant made by the
Constitution, it can do no harm; but if it relates to a doubtful
part of the Constitution, I suppose an exposition of the
Constitution may come with as much propriety from the
Legislature, as any other department of the Government. If
the power naturally belongs to the Government, and the
Constitution is undecided as to the body which is to exercise
it, it is likely that it is submitted to the discretion of
the Legislature, and the question will depend upon its own
merits.

I am clearly of opinion with the gentleman from South
Carolina, (Mr. Smith,) that we ought in this, and every other
case, to adhere to the Constitution, so far as it will serve as a
guide to us, and that we ought not to be swayed in our decisions
by the splendor of the character of the present Chief
Magistrate, but to consider it with respect to the merit of
men who, in the ordinary course of things, may be supposed
to fill the Chair. I believe the power here declared is a high
one, and, in some respects, a dangerous one; but, in order to
come to a right decision on this point, we must consider both
sides of the question: the possible abuses which may spring
from the single will of the First Magistrate, and the abuse
which may spring from the combined will of the Executive
and Senatorial disqualification.

When we consider that the First Magistrate is to be appointed
at present by the suffrages of three millions of people,
and, in all human probability, in a few years' time by double
that number, it is not to be presumed that a vicious or bad
character will be selected. If the Government of any country
on the face of the earth was ever effectually guarded against
the election of ambitious or designing characters to the first
office of the State, I think it may with truth be said to be
the case under the Constitution of the United States. With
all the infirmities incident to a popular election, corrected by
the particular mode of conducting it, as directed under the

present system, I think we may fairly calculate that the
instances will be very rare in which an unworthy man will
receive that mark of the public confidence which is required
to designate the President of the United States. Where the
people are disposed to give so great an elevation to one of
their fellow-citizens, I own that I am not afraid to place my
confidence in him, especially when I know he is impeachable
for any crime or misdemeanor before the Senate, at all times;
and that, at all events, he is impeachable before the community
at large every four years, and liable to be displaced if his
conduct shall have given umbrage during the time he has
been in office. Under these circumstances, although the trust
is a high one, and in some degree, perhaps, a dangerous one,
I am not sure but it will be safer here than placed where some
gentlemen suppose it ought to be.

It is evidently the intention of the Constitution, that the
first Magistrate should be responsible for the Executive department;
so far therefore as we do not make the officers who
are to aid him in the duties of that department responsible to
him, he is not responsible to his country. Again, is there no
danger that an officer, when he is appointed by the concurrence
of the Senate, and has friends in that body, may choose
rather to risk his establishment on the favor of that branch,
than rest it upon the discharge of his duties to the satisfaction
of the Executive branch, which is constitutionally authorized
to inspect and control his conduct? And if it should happen
that the officers connect themselves with the Senate, they
may mutually support each other, and for want of efficacy
reduce the power of the President to a mere vapor; in which
case, his responsibility would be annihilated, and the expectation
of it unjust. The high Executive officers, joined in
cabal with the Senate, would lay the foundation of discord,
and end in an assumption of the Executive power, only to be
removed by a revolution in the Government. I believe no
principle is more clearly laid down in the Constitution than
that of responsibility. After premising this, I will proceed

to an investigation of the merits of the question upon Constitutional
ground.

I have, since the subject was last before the House, examined
the Constitution with attention, and I acknowledge that
it does not perfectly correspond with the ideas I entertained
of it from the first glance. I am inclined to think, that a
free and systematic interpretation of the plan of Government
will leave us less at liberty to abate the responsibility than
gentlemen imagine. I have already acknowledged that the
powers of the Government must remain as apportioned by the
Constitution. But it may be contended, that where the Constitution
is silent, it becomes a subject of legislative discretion;
perhaps, in the opinion of some, an argument in favor
of the clause may be successfully brought forward on this
ground: I, however, leave it for the present untouched.

By a strict examination of the Constitution, on what appears
to be its true principles, and considering the great
departments of the Government in the relation they have to
each other, I have my doubts whether we are not absolutely
tied down to the construction declared in the bill. In the
first section of the first article, it is said, that all Legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States. In the second article, it is affirmed that the
Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America. In the third article, it is declared that
the Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as Congress
may, from time to time, ordain and establish. I suppose it
will be readily admitted, that so far as the Constitution has
separated the powers of these great departments, it would be
improper to combine them together; and so far as it has left
any particular department in the entire possession of the
powers incident to that department, I conceive we ought not
to qualify them further than they are qualified by the Constitution.
The Legislative powers are vested in Congress,
and are to be exercised by them uncontrolled by any other

department, except the Constitution has qualified it otherwise.
The Constitution has qualified the Legislative power, by
authorizing the President to object to any act it may pass,
requiring, in this case, two-thirds of both Houses to concur
in making a law; but still the absolute Legislative power is
vested in the Congress with this qualification alone.

The Constitution affirms, that the Executive power shall be
vested in the President. Are there exceptions to this proposition?
Yes, there are. The Constitution says, that in appointing
to office, the Senate shall be associated with the
President, unless in the case of inferior officers, when the law
shall otherwise direct. Have we a right to extend this exception?
I believe not. If the Constitution has invested all
Executive power in the President, I venture to assert that the
Legislature has no right to diminish or modify his Executive
authority.

The question now resolves itself into this, Is the power of
displacing an Executive power? I conceive that if any
power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power
of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute
the laws. If the Constitution had not qualified the power of
the President in appointing to office, by associating the Senate
with him in that business, would it not be clear that
he would have the right, by virtue of his Executive power,
to make such appointment? Should we be authorized, in
defiance of that clause in the Constitution,—"The Executive
power shall be vested in a President," to unite the Senate,
with the President in the appointment to office? I conceive
not. If it is admitted that we should not be authorized to do
this, I think it may be disputed whether we have a right to
associate them in removing persons from office, the one power
being as much of an Executive nature as the other; and the
first only is authorized by being excepted out of the general
rule established by the Constitution, in these words, "the
Executive power shall be vested in the President."

The Judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court; but will

gentlemen say the judicial power can be placed elsewhere,
unless the Constitution has made an exception? The Constitution
justifies the Senate in exercising a judiciary power in
determining on impeachments; but can the judicial power be
further blended with the powers of that body? They cannot.
I therefore say it is incontrovertible, if neither the Legislative
nor Judicial powers are subjected to qualifications, other than
those demanded in the Constitution, that the Executive
powers are equally unabateable as either of the others; and
inasmuch as the power of removal is of an Executive nature,
and not affected by any Constitutional exception, it is beyond
the reach of the Legislative body.

If this is the true construction of this instrument, the clause
in the bill is nothing more than explanatory of the meaning of
the Constitution, and therefore not liable to any particular
objection on that account. If the Constitution is silent, and
it is a power the Legislature have a right to confer, it will
appear to the world, if we strike out the clause, as if we
doubted the propriety of vesting it in the President of the
United States. I therefore think it best to retain it in the
bill.

JUNE 17. POWER OF REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.

However various the opinions which exist upon the point
now before us, it seems agreed on all sides, that it demands a
careful investigation and full discussion. I feel the importance
of the question, and know that our decision will involve
the decision of all similar cases. The decision that is at this
time made, will become the permanent exposition of the
Constitution; and on a permanent exposition of the Constitution
will depend the genius and character of the whole Government.
It will depend, perhaps, on this decision, whether
the Government shall retain that equilibrium which the Constitution
intended, or take a direction towards aristocracy or
anarchy among the members of the Government. Hence,
how careful ought we to be to give a true direction to a power

so critically circumstanced! It is incumbent on us to weigh
with particular attention, the arguments which have been
advanced in support of the various opinions with cautious
deliberation. I own to you, Mr. Chairman, that I feel great
anxiety upon this question; I feel an anxiety, because I am
called upon to give a decision in a case that may affect the
fundamental principles of the Government under which we
act, and liberty itself. But all that I can do on such an occasion
is, to weigh well every thing advanced on both sides
with the purest desire to find out the true meaning of the
Constitution, and to be guided by that, and an attachment to
the true spirit of liberty, whose influence I believe strongly
predominates here.

Several constructions have been put upon the Constitution
relative to the point in question. The gentleman from Connecticut
(Mr. Sherman) has advanced a doctrine which was
not touched upon before. He seems to think (if I understood
him rightly) that the power of displacing from office is subject
to Legislative discretion; because it having a right to
create, it may limit or modify as it thinks proper. I shall not
say but at first view this doctrine may seem to have some
plausibility. But when I consider that the Constitution
clearly intended to maintain a marked distinction between
the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers of Government;
and when I consider, that, if the Legislature has a
power, such as is contended for, they may subject and transfer
at discretion powers from one department of our Government
to another; they may, on that principle, exclude the
President altogether from exercising any authority in the
removal of officers; they may give it to the Senate alone, or
the President and Senate combined; they may vest it in the
whole Congress, or they may reserve it to be exercised by
this House. When I consider the consequences of this doctrine,
and compare them with the true principles of the Constitution,
I own that I cannot subscribe to it.

Another doctrine, which has found very respectable friends,

has been particularly advocated by the gentleman from South
Carolina, (Mr. Smith.) It is this: when an officer is appointed
by the President and Senate, he can only be displaced
for malfeasance in his office by impeachment. I think
this would give a stability to the Executive department, so
far as it may be described by the heads of departments,
which is more incompatible with the genius of republican
Governments in general, and this Constitution in particular,
than any doctrine which has yet been proposed. The danger
to liberty, the danger of mal-administration, has not yet been
found to lie so much in the facility of introducing improper
persons into office, as in the difficulty of displacing those who
are unworthy of the public trust. If it is said that an officer
once appointed shall not be displaced without the formality
required by impeachment, I shall be glad to know what security
we have for the faithful administration of the Government?
Every individual, in the long chain which extends
from the highest to the lowest link of the Executive Magistracy,
would find a security in his situation which would relax
his fidelity and promptitude in the discharge of his duty.

The doctrine, however, which seems to stand most in opposition
to the principles I contend for, is, that the power to
annul an appointment is, in the nature of things, incidental
to the power which makes the appointment. I agree that if
nothing more was said in the Constitution than that the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
should appoint to office, there would be a great force in saying
that the power of removal resulted by a natural implication
from the power of appointing. But there is another part
of the Constitution, no less explicit than the one on which
the gentleman's doctrine is founded; it is that part which
declares that the Executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States. The association of the Senate
with the President in exercising that particular function, is
an exception to this general rule; and exceptions to general
rules, I conceive, are ever to be taken strictly. But there is

another part of the Constitution, which inclines, in my judgment,
to favor the construction I put upon it; the President
is required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
If the duty to see the laws faithfully executed be required
at the hands of the Executive Magistrate, it would seem that
it was generally intended he should have that species of power
which is necessary to accomplish that end. Now, if the
officer when once appointed is not to depend upon the President
for his official existence, but upon a distinct body, (for
where there are two negatives required, either can prevent
the removal,) I confess I do not see how the President can
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. It is true, by
a circuitous operation he may obtain an impeachment, and
even without this it is possible he may obtain the concurrence
of the Senate, for the purpose of displacing an officer; but
would this give that species of control to the Executive Magistrate
which seems to be required by the Constitution? I
own, if my opinion was not contrary to that entertained by
what I suppose to be the minority on this question, I should
be doubtful of being mistaken, when I discovered how inconsistent
that construction would make the Constitution with
itself. I can hardly bring myself to imagine the wisdom of
the convention who framed the Constitution contemplated
such incongruity.

There is another maxim which ought to direct us in expounding
the Constitution, and is of great importance. It is
laid down, in most of the Constitutions or bills of rights in
the republics of America; it is to be found in the political
writings of the most celebrated civilians, and is every where
held as essential to the preservation of liberty, that the three
great departments of Government be kept separate and distinct;
and if in any case they are blended, it is in order to
admit a partial qualification, in order more effectually to
guard against an entire consolidation. I think, therefore,
when we review the several parts of this Constitution, when
it says that the Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress

of the United States, under certain exceptions, and the
Executive power vested in the President with certain exceptions,
we must suppose they were intended to be kept separate
in all cases in which they are not blended, and ought,
consequently, to expound the Constitution so as to blend
them as little as possible.

Every thing relative to the merits of the question as distinguished
from a Constitutional question, seems to turn on
the danger of such a power vested in the President alone.
But when I consider the checks under which he lies in the
exercise of this power, I own to you I feel no apprehensions but
what arise from the dangers incidental to the power itself;
for dangers will be incidental to it, vest it where you please.
I will not reiterate what was said before with respect to the
mode of election, and the extreme improbability that any
citizen will be selected from the mass of citizens who is not
highly distinguished by his abilities and worth; in this alone
we have no small security for the faithful exercise of this
power. But, throwing that out of the question, let us consider
the restraints he will feel after he is placed in that elevated
station. It is to be remarked, that the power in this
case will not consist so much in continuing a bad man in
office, as in the danger of displacing a good one. Perhaps
the great danger, as has been observed, of abuse in the Executive
power, lies in the improper continuance of bad men in
office. But the power we contend for will not enable him
to do this; for if an unworthy man be continued in office by
an unworthy President, the House of Representatives can at
any time impeach him, and the Senate can remove him,
whether the President chooses or not. The danger then consists
merely in this: the President can displace from office a
man whose merits require that he should be continued in it.
What will be the motives which the President can feel for
such abuse of his power, and the restraints that operate to
prevent it? In the first place, he will be impeachable by this
House, before the Senate for such an act of mal-administration;

for I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious
officers would subject him to impeachment and removal from
his own high trust. But what can be his motives for displacing
a worthy man? It must be that he may fill the place
with an unworthy creature of his own. Can he accomplish
this end? No; he can place no man in the vacancy whom
the Senate shall not approve; and if he could fill the vacancy
with the man he might choose, I am sure he would have
little inducement to make an improper removal. Let us consider
the consequences. The injured man will be supported
by the popular opinion; the community will take side with
him against the President; it will facilitate those combinations,
and give success to those exertions which will be pursued
to prevent his re-election. To displace a man of high
merit, and who from his station may be supposed a man of
extensive influence are considerations in the mind of any man
who may fill the Presidential chair. The friends of those
individuals and the public sympathy will be against him. If
this should not produce his impeachment before the Senate,
it will amount to an impeachment before the community, who
will have the power of punishment, by refusing to re-elect
him. But suppose this persecuted individual cannot obtain
revenge in this mode; there are other modes in which he
could make the situation of the President very inconvenient,
if you suppose him resolutely bent on executing the dictates
of resentment. If he had not influence enough to direct the
vengeance of the whole community, he may probably be able
to obtain an appointment in one or the other branch of the
Legislature; and being a man of weight, talents, and influence,
in either case he may prove to the President troublesome
indeed. We have seen examples in the history of other
nations, which justify the remark I now have made. Though
the prerogatives of the British King are great as his rank, and
it is unquestionably known that he has a positive influence
over both branches of the legislative body, yet there have
been examples in which the appointment and removal of
ministers have been found to be dictated by one or other of
those branches. Now if this be the case with an hereditary
Monarch, possessed of those high prerogatives and furnished
with so many means of influence; can we suppose a President,
elected for four years only, dependent upon the popular
voice, impeachable by the Legislature, little, if at all,
distinguished for wealth, personal talents, or influence from
the head of the department himself; I say, will he bid defiance
to all these considerations, and wantonly dismiss a meritorious
and virtuous officer? Such abuse of power exceeds my
conception. If any thing takes place in the ordinary course
of business of this kind, my imagination cannot extend to it
on any rational principle. But let us not consider the question
on one side only; there are dangers to be contemplated
on the other. Vest this power in the Senate jointly with the
President, and you abolish at once that great principle of
unity and responsibility in the Executive department, which
was intended for the security of liberty and the public good.
If the President should possess alone the power of removal
from office, those who are employed in the execution of the
law will be in their proper situation, and the chain of dependence
be preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and
the highest, will depend, as they ought, on the President, and
the President on the community. The chain of dependence
therefore terminates in the supreme body, namely, in the
people, who will possess, besides, in aid of their original
power, the decisive engine of impeachment. Take the other
supposition; that the power should be vested in the Senate,
on the principle that the power to displace is necessarily connected
with the power to appoint. It is declared by the
Constitution, that we may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers in the heads of departments; the power of
removal being incidental, as stated by some gentlemen.
Where does this terminate? If you begin with the subordinate
officers, they are dependent on their superior, he on
the next superior, and he on—whom? On the Senate, a
permanent body; a body, by its particular mode of election,
in reality existing forever; a body possessing that proportion
of aristocratic power which the Constitution no doubt thought
wise to be established in the system, but which some have
strongly excepted against. And let me ask gentlemen, is
there equal security in this case as in the other? Shall we
trust the Senate, responsible to individual Legislatures, rather
than the person who is responsible to the whole community?
It is true, the Senate do not hold their offices for life, like
aristocracies recorded in the historic page; yet the fact is,
they will not possess that responsibility for the exercise of
Executive powers which would render it safe for us to vest
such powers in them. But what an aspect will this give to
the Executive. Instead of keeping the departments of Government
distinct, you make an Executive out of one branch
of the Legislature; you make the Executive a two-headed
monster, to use the expression of the gentleman from New
Hampshire, (Mr. Livermore,) you destroy the great principle
of responsibility, and perhaps have the creature divided in
its will, defeating the very purposes for which a unity in the
Executive was instituted. These objections do not lie against
Such an arrangement as the bill establishes. I conceive that
the President is sufficiently accountable to the community;
and if this power is vested in him, it will be vested where its
nature requires it should be vested; if anything in its nature
is executive, it must be that power which is employed in
superintending and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed.
The laws cannot be executed but by officers appointed
for that purpose; therefore, those who are over such
officers naturally possess the Executive power. If anv other
doctrine be admitted, what is the consequence? You may
set the Senate at the head of the Executive department, or
you may require that the officers hold their places during the
pleasure of this branch of the Legislature, if you cannot
go so far as to say we shall appoint them; and by this
means, you link together two branches of the Government.
which the preservation of liberty requires to be constantly
separated.

Another species of argument has been urged against this
clause. It is said, that it is improper, or at least unnecessary,
to come to any decision on this subject. It has been said by
one gentleman, that it would be officious in this branch of the
Legislature to expound the Constitution, so far as it relates
to the division of power between the President and Senate;
it is incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch of
the Government as to any other, that the Constitution should
be preserved entire. It is our duty, so far as it depends upon
us, to take care that the powers of the Constitution be preserved
entire to every department of Government; the
breach of the Constitution in one point, will facilitate the
breach in another; a breach in this point may destroy that
equilibrium by which the House retains its consequence
and share of power; therefore we are not chargeable with
an officious interference. Besides, the bill, before it can
have effect, must be submitted to both those branches
who are particularly interested in it; the Senate may negative,
or the President may object, if he thinks it unconstitutional.

But the great objection drawn from the source to which
the last arguments would lead us is, that the Legislature itself
has no right to expound the Constitution; that wherever its
meaning is doubtful, you must leave it to take its course,
until the Judiciary is called upon to declare its meaning. I
acknowledge, in the ordinary course of Government, that the
exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon the
Judiciary. But I beg to know, upon what principle it can
be contended, that any one department draws from the Constitution
greater powers than another, in marking out the
limits of the powers of the several departments? The Constitution
is the charter of the people to the Government;
it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted,
and marks out the departments to exercise them. If the

Constitutional boundary of either be brought into question,
I do not see that any one of these independent departments
has more right than another to declare their sentiments on
that point.

Perhaps this is an omitted case. There is not one Government
on the face of the earth, so far as I recollect, there is
not one in the United States, in which provision is made for
a particular authority to determine the limits of the Constitutional
division of power between the branches of the Government.
In all systems there are points which must be adjusted
by the departments themselves, to which no one of them is
competent. If it cannot be determined in this way, there is
no resource left but the will of the community, to be collected
in some mode to be provided by the Constitution, or
one dictated by the necessity of the case. It is therefore a
fair question, whether this great point may not as well be
decided, at least by the whole Legislature as by a part, by us
as well as by the Executive or Judiciary? As I think it will
be equally Constitutional, I cannot imagine it will be less
safe, that the exposition should issue from the Legislative
authority than any other; and the more so, because it involves
in the decision the opinions of both those departments,
whose powers are supposed to be affected by it. Besides, I
do not see in what way this question could come before the
judges, to obtain a fair and solemn decision; but even if it
were the case that it could, I should suppose, at least while
the Government is not led by passion, disturbed by faction,
or deceived by any discolored medium of sight, but while
there is a desire in all to see and be guided by the benignant
ray of truth, that the decision may be made with the most
advantage by the Legislature itself.

My conclusion from these reflections is, that it will be
Constitutional to retain the clause; that it expresses the
meaning of the Constitution as must be established by
fair construction, and a construction which, upon the
whole, not only consists with liberty, but is more favorable

to it than any one of the interpretations that have been
proposed.[120]

JUNE 18. POWER OF REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.

The question now seems to be brought to this, whether it
is proper or improper to retain these words in the clause, provided
they are explanatory of the Constitution. I think this
branch of the Legislature is as much interested in the establishment
of the true meaning of the Constitution, as either
the President or Senate; and when the Constitution submits

it to us to establish offices by law, we ought to know by what
tenure the office should be held; and whether it should depend
upon the concurrence of the Senate with the President,
or upon the will of the President alone; because gentlemen
may hesitate in either case, whether they will make it for an
indefinite or precise time. If the officer can be removed at
discretion by the President, there may be safety in letting it
be for an indefinite period. If he cannot exert his prerogative,
there is no security even by the mode of impeachment;
because the officer may intrench himself behind the authority
of the Senate, and bid defiance to every other department of
Government. In this case, the question of duration would
take a different turn. Hence it is highly proper that we and
our constituents should know the tenure of the office. And
have we not as good a right as any branch of the Government
to declare our sense of the meaning of the Constitution?

Nothing has yet been offered to invalidate the doctrine,
that the meaning of the Constitution may as well be ascertained
by the legislative as by the judicial authority. When
the question emerges as it does in this bill, and much seems
to depend upon it, I should conceive it highly proper to make
a legislative construction. In another point of view it is
proper that this interpretation should now take place, rather
than at a time when the exigency of the case may require the
exercise of the power of removal. At present, the disposition
of every gentleman is to seek the truth, and abide by its
guidance when it is discovered. I have reason to believe the
same disposition prevails in the Senate. But will this be the
case when some individual officer of high rank draws into
question the capacity of the President, with the Senate, to effect
his removal? If we leave the Constitution to take this course,
it can never be expounded until the President shall think it
expedient to exercise the right of removal, if he supposes he
has it; then the Senate may be induced to set up their pretensions.
And will they decide so calmly as at this time,
when no important officer in any of the great departments is
appointed to influence their judgments? The imagination of
no member here, or of the Senate, or of the President himself,
is heated or disturbed by faction. If ever a proper
moment for decision should offer, it must be one like the
present.

I do not conceive that this question has been truly stated
by some gentlemen. In my opinion it is not whether we
shall take the power from one branch of the Government and
give it to another; but the question is, to which branch has
the Constitution given it? Some gentlemen have said, that it

resides in the people at large; and that if it is necessary to
the Government, we must apply to the people for it, and
obtain it by way of amendment to the Constitution. Some
gentlemen contend, that although it is given in the Constitution,
as a necessary power to carry into execution the other
powers vested by the Constitution, yet it is vested in the
Legislature. I cannot admit this doctrine either; because it
is setting the Legislature at the head of the Executive branch
of the Government. If we take the other construction of the
gentleman from South Carolina, that all officers hold their
places by the firm tenure of good behaviour, we shall find it
still more improper. I think gentlemen will see, upon reflection,
that this doctrine is incompatible with the principles of
free Government. If there is no removability but by way of
impeachment, then all the Executive officers of Government
hold their offices by the firm tenure of good behaviour, from
the Chief Justice down to the tide waiter.

[Mr. Smith interrupted Mr. M., and said that he had admitted
that inferior officers might be removed, because the
Constitution had left it in the power of the Legislature to
establish them on what terms they pleased; consequently, to
direct their appointment and removal.]

Mr. Madison had understood the gentleman as he now
explained himself. But still he contended, that the consequences
he had drawn would necessarily follow; because there
was no express authority given to the Legislature in the Constitution
to enable the President, the courts of law, or heads
of the departments, to remove an inferior officer; all that
was said on that head was confined solely to the power of
appointing them. If the gentleman admits that the Legislature
may vest the power of removal, with respect to inferior
officers, he must also admit that the Constitution vests the
President with the power of removal in the case of superior
officers; because both powers are implied in the same words.
This President may appoint the one class, and the Legislature
may authorize the courts of law or heads of departments to

appoint in the other case. If then it is admitted that the
power of removal vests in the President, or President and
Senate, the arguments which I urged yesterday, and those
which have been urged by honorable gentlemen on this side
of the question for these three days past, will fully evince
the truth of the construction which we give, that the power
is in the President alone. I will not repeat them, because
they must have full possession of every gentleman's mind. I
am willing, therefore, to rest the decision here; and hope
that it will be made in such a manner as to perpetuate the
blessings which this Constitution was intended to embrace.[121]

JUNE 22. POWER OF REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.

I am in favor of the motion for striking out, but not upon
the principles of my worthy colleague.[122] I will briefly state
my reasons for voting in the manner I intend. First, altering
the mode of expression tends to give satisfaction to those
gentlemen who think it not an object of legislative discretion;
and second, because the amendment already agreed to fully
Contains the sense of this House upon the doctrine of the
Constitution; and therefore the words are unnecessary as
they stand here. I will not trouble the House with repeating
reasons why the change of expression is best, as they are
well understood. But gentlemen cannot fairly urge against
us a change of ground, because the point we contended for is
fully obtained by the amendment. It was truly said by the
gentleman from New York, (Mr. Benson,) that these words

carry with them an implication that the Legislature has the
power of granting the power of removal.

It is needless to assign my reasons why I think the Legislature
not in possession of this power; they were fully explained
before, I therefore shall only say, if there is a principle in
our Constitution, indeed in any free Constitution, more sacred
than another, it is that which separates the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial powers. If there is any point in
which the separation of the Legislative and Executive powers
ought to be maintained with greater caution, it is that which
relates to officers and offices. The powers relative to offices
are partly Legislative and partly Executive. The Legislature
creates the office, defines the powers, limits its duration, and
annexes a compensation. This done, the Legislative power
ceases. They ought to have nothing to do with designating
the man to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an Executive
nature. Although it be qualified in the Constitution, I
would not extend or strain that qualification beyond the
limits precisely fixed for it. We ought always to consider
the Constitution with an eye to the principles upon which it
was founded. In this point of view, we shall readily conclude
that if the Legislature determines the powers, the
honors, and emoluments of an office, we should be insecure if
they were to designate the officer also. The nature of things
restrains and confines the Legislative and Executive authorities
in this respect; and hence it is that the Constitution
stipulates for the independence of each branch of the
Government.

Let it be understood that the Legislature is to have some
influence both in appointing and removing officers, and I venture
to say the people of America will justly fear a system of
sinecures. What security have they that offices will not be
created to accommodate favorites or pensioners subservient to
their designs? I never did conceive, that so far as the Constitution
gave one branch of the Legislature an agency in this
business, it was, by any means, one of its most meritorious

parts; but so far as it has gone, I confess I would be as unwilling
to abridge the power of that body as to enlarge it.
But considering, as I do, that the Constitution fairly vests the
President with the power, and that the amendment declares
this to be the sense of the House, I shall concur with the
gentlemen in opposition so far as to strike out these words,
which I now look upon to be useless.

I have a great respect for the abilities and judgment of my
worthy colleague, (Mr. Page,) and am convinced he is inspired
by the purest motives in his opposition to what he
conceives to be an improper measure; but I hope he will not
think so strange of our difference, if he considers the small
proportion of the House which concurs with him with respect
to impeachment being the only way of removing officers. I
believe the opinion is held but by one gentleman besides himself.
If this sentiment were to obtain, it would give rise to
more objections to the Constitution than gentlemen are aware
of; more than any other construction whatever. Yet while
he professes to be greatly alarmed on one account, he possesses
a stoic apathy with respect to the other.

JUNE 29. DUTIES OF THE COMPTROLLER.

Mr. Madison observed, that the committee had gone
through the bill without making any provision respecting the
tenure by which the Comptroller is to hold his office. He
thought it was a point worthy of consideration, and would,
therefore, submit a few observations upon it.

It will be necessary, said he, to consider the nature of this
office, to enable us to come to a right decision on the subject;
in analyzing its properties, we shall easily discover they are
not purely of an Executive nature. It seems to me that they
partake of a Judiciary quality as well as Executive; perhaps
the latter obtains in the greatest degree. The principal duty
seems to be deciding upon the lawfulness and justice of the
claims and accounts subsisting between the United States and

particular citizens: this partakes strongly of the judicial
character, and there may be strong reasons why an officer of
this kind should not hold his office at the pleasure of the
Executive branch of the Government. I am inclined to think
that we ought to consider him something in the light of an
arbitrator between the public and individuals, and that he
ought to hold his office by such a tenure as will make him
responsible to the public generally; then again it may be
thought, on the other side, that some persons ought to be
authorized on behalf of the individual, with the usual liberty
of referring to a third person, in case of disagreement, which
may throw some embarrassment in the way of the first idea.

Whatever, Mr. Chairman, may be my opinion with respect
to the tenure by which an Executive officer may hold his
office according to the meaning of the Constitution, I am very
well satisfied, that a modification by the Legislature may
take place in such as partake of the judicial qualities, and
that the legislative power is sufficient to establish this office
on such a footing as to answer the purposes for which it is
prescribed.

With this view he would move a proposition, to be inserted
in the bill; it was that the Comptroller should hold his office
during—years, unless sooner removed by the President:
he will always be dependent upon the Legislature, by
reason of the power of impeachment; but he might be made
still more so, when the House took up the Salary bill. He
would have the person re-appointable at the expiration of the
term, unless he was disqualified by a conviction on an impeachment
before the Senate; by this means the Comptroller
would be dependent upon the President, because he can be
removed by him; he will be dependent upon the Senate,
because they must consent to his election for every term of
years; and he will be dependent upon this House, through
the means of impeachment, and the power we shall reserve
over his salary; by which means we shall effectually secure
the dependence of this officer upon the Government. But

making him thus thoroughly dependent, would make it necessary
to secure his impartiality, with respect to the individual.
This might be effected by giving any person, who conceived
himself aggrieved, a right to petition the Supreme Court for
redress, and they should be empowered to do right therein;
this will enable the individual to carry his claim before an
independent tribunal.

A provision of this kind exists in two of the United States
at this time, and is found to answer a very good purpose.
He mentioned this, that gentlemen might not think it altogether
novel. The committee, he hoped, would take a little
time to examine the idea.[123]

AUGUST 13. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

Mr. Madison did not think it was an improper time to proceed
in this business; the House had already gone through

with subjects of a less interesting nature; now if the Judiciary
bill was of such vast importance, its consideration ought not
to have been postponed for those purposes.

He would remind gentlemen that there were many who
conceived amendments of some kind necessary and proper in
themselves; while others who are not so well satisfied of the
necessity and propriety, may think they are rendered expedient
from some other consideration. Is it desirable to
keep up a division among the people of the United States on
a point in which they consider their most essential rights are
concerned? If this is an object worthy the attention of such
a numerous part of our constituents, why should we decline
taking it into our consideration, and thereby promote that
spirit of urbanity and unanimity which the Government itself
stands in need of for its more full support?

Already has the subject been delayed much longer than
could have been wished. If after having fixed a day for
taking it into consideration, we should put it off again, a
spirit of jealousy may be excited, and not allayed without
great inconvenience.

Form, sir, is always of less importance than the substance;
but on this occasion I admit that form is of some consequence,
and it will be well for the House to pursue that which, upon
reflection, shall appear to be the most eligible. Now it appears
to me, that there is a neatness and propriety in incorporating
the amendments into the Constitution itself; iii that
case, the system will remain uniform and entire; it will certainly
be more simple when the amendments are interwoven
into those parts to which they naturally belong, than it will
if they consist of separate and distinct parts. We shall then
be able to determine its meaning without references or comparison;
whereas, if they are supplementary, its meaning can
only be ascertained by a comparison of the two instruments,
which will be a very considerable embarrassment. It will be
difficult to ascertain to what parts of the instrument the
amendments particularly refer; they will create unfavorable
comparisons; whereas, if they are placed upon the footing

here proposed, they will stand upon as good foundation as
the original work. Nor is it so uncommon a thing as gentlemen
suppose; systematic men frequently take up the whole
law, and, with its amendments and alterations, reduce it into
one act. I am not, however, very solicitous about the form,
provided the business is but well completed.[124]

SEPTEMBER 3. LOCATION OF THE CAPITAL.

Mr. Madison meant to pay due attention to every argument
that could be urged on this important question. Facts
had been asserted, the impressions of which he wished to be
erased, if they were not well founded. It has been said, that
the communication with the Western Territory, by the Susquehanna,

is more convenient than by the Potomac. I apprehend
this is not the case; and the propriety of our decision
will depend, in a great measure, on the superior advantages
of one of these two streams. It is agreed, on all hands, that
we ought to have some regard to the convenience of the
Atlantic navigation. Now, to embrace this object, a position
must be taken on some navigable river; to favor the communication
with the Western Territory, its arms ought likewise
to extend themselves towards that region. I did not
suppose it would have been necessary to bring forward charts
and maps, as has been done by others, to show the committee
the comparative situation of those rivers. I flattered myself
it was sufficiently understood, to enable us to decide the
question of superiority; but I am now inclined to believe,
that gentlemen have embraced an error, and I hope they are
not determined to vote under improper impressions. I venture
to pledge myself for the demonstration, that the communication
with the Western Territory, by the Potomac, is
more certain and convenient than the other. And if the
question is as important as it is admitted to be, gentlemen
will not shut their ears to information; they will not precipitate
the decision; or if they regard the satisfaction of our
constituents, they will allow them to be informed of all the
facts and arguments that lead to the decision of a question
in which the general and particular interests of all parts of
the Union are involved.[125]

SEPTEMBER 18. LOCATION OF THE CAPITAL.

Mr. Madison felt himself compelled to move for striking
out that part of the bill which provided that the temporary
residence of Congress should continue at New York; as he
conceived it irreconcilable with the spirit of the Constitution.
If it was not from viewing it in this light, lie should have
given the bill no further opposition; and now he did not
mean to enter on the merits of the main question.

From the Constitution, it appeared that the concurrence of
the two Houses of Congress was sufficient to enable them to
adjourn from one place to another; nay, the legal consent of
the President was, in some degree, prescribed in the 7th section
of article 1st, where it is declared, that every order,
resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary, (except on

a question of adjournment,) shall be presented to the President
of the United States, and approved by him, before the
same shall take effect. Any attempt, therefore, to adjourn
by law, is a violation of that part of the Constitution which
gives the power, exclusively, to the two branches of the Legislature.
If gentlemen saw it in the same light, he flattered
himself they would reject that part of the bill; and, however
little they valued the reflection that this city was not central,
which had been so often urged, they would be guided by
arguments springing from a superior source.

He would proceed to state the reasons which induced him
to be of this opinion: it is declared in the Constitution, that
neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days;
nor to any place than that in which the two Houses shall be
sitting; from hence he inferred, that the two Houses, by a concurrence,
could adjourn for more than three days, and to any
other place which they thought proper; by the other clause
he had mentioned, the Executive power is restrained from
any interference with the Legislative on this subject; hence,
he concluded, it would be dangerous to attempt to give to the
President a power which the Constitution expressly denied
him. He did not suppose that the attempt to vest the Executive
with a power over the adjournment of the Legislature
would absolutely convey the power, but he conceived it
wrong to make the experiment. He submitted it to those
gentlemen who were attached to the success of the bill, how
far an unconstitutional declaration may impede its passage
through the other branch of the Legislature.

It has been supposed by some, that the seat of Government
may be at a place different from that where the Congress sits;
and, although the former may be established by law, the
Legislature might remove elsewhere; he could not subscribe
to this doctrine. What is the Government of the United
States for which a seat is to be provided? Will not the Government
necessarily comprehend the Congress as a part? In

arbitrary Governments, the residence of the monarch may be
styled the seat of Government, because he is within himself
the supreme Legislative, Executive, and Judicial power; the
same may be said of the residence of a limited monarchy,
where the efficiency of the Executive operates, in a great
degree, to the exclusion of the Legislative authority; but in
such a Government as ours, according to the legal and common
acceptation of the term, Government must include the
Legislative power; so the term Administration, which in other
countries is specially appropriated to the Executive branch
of Government, is used here for both the Executive and Legislative
branches; we, in official communications, say Legislative
Administration or Executive Administration, according
as the one or the other is employed in the exercise of its Constitutional
powers. He mentioned these circumstances to
show that they ought not to look for the meaning of terms
used in the laws and Constitution of the United States, into
the acceptation of them in other countries, whose situation
and Government were different from that of United America.
If his reasoning was just, he should conclude that the seat of
Government would be at that place where both the Executive
and Legislative bodies are fixed; and this depended upon the
vote of the two branches of the Legislature. There was
another clause favorable to this opinion; it was, that giving
Congress authority to exercise exclusive legislation in all
cases whatsoever over such district as may, by cession of
particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the
seat of the Government of the United States; this was the
only place where any thing respecting the seat of Government
was mentioned; and would any gentleman contend that Congress
might have a seat of Government over which they are
empowered to exercise exclusive legislation, and yet reside
at the distance of two or 300 miles from it? Such a construction
would contradict the plain and evident meaning of the
Constitution, and as such was inadmissible.

He hoped these observations would be attended to; and

did not doubt but if seen in their true light they would induce
the House to reject that part of the bill which he moved to
have struck out.[126]

SEPTEMBER 28. LOCATION OF THE CAPITAL.

Mr. Madison contended that the amendment proposed by
the Senate was a departure from every principle adopted by
the House; but he would not trouble them with a recapitulation
of arguments, which he feared would be unavailing; he
wished, however, that the House would provide against one
inconvenience, which was, to prevent the district in Pennsylvania,
chosen by Congress, from being deprived for a time of

the benefit of the laws. This, he apprehended, would be the
case, unless Congress made provision for the operation of the
laws of Pennsylvania, in the act by which they accepted of
the cession of that State; for the State relinquished the right
of legislation from the moment that Congress accepted of the
district. The propriety of this proposition was so apparent,
that he had not a doubt but the House would consent to it.
He then moved the following proviso: "And provided, that
nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect the
operation of the laws of Pennsylvania, within the district
ceded and accepted, until Congress shall otherwise provide by
law."[127]