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THE PSYCHIC FACTORS IN MENTAL DISORDER. Milton A. Harrington, Am. Jour. of Insanity. Vol. LXXI, No. 4, p. 691.
 
 
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THE PSYCHIC FACTORS IN MENTAL DISORDER. Milton A. Harrington, Am. Jour. of Insanity. Vol. LXXI, No. 4, p. 691.

The writer has taken the scheme of the instincts which William McDougall has given in his book, entitled "An Introduction to Social Psychology" and has attempted to show how it may be used in studying the problems of mental disorder. The paper falls into three parts. In the first part McDougall's conception is presented, modified, however, so that it may be better fitted to the needs of the psychiatrist. Briefly it is as follows:

Man has instincts as well as the animals and all his mental activity is due to impulses coming from these instincts. An instinct may be defined as an innate specific tendency of the mind which is common to all members of any one species and which impels the individual to react to certain definite kinds of stimuli with certain definite types of conduct, without having first learned from experience the need of such conduct. For example, there is an instinct of pugnacity which impels us to attack that which injures us or interferes in any way with the attainment of our desires, an instinct of flight which impels us to seek escape from danger, a parental instinct from which come the impulses that lead us to protect and care for our young. But, beside impelling the individual to react to certain definite kinds of stimuli with certain definite types of conduct, an instinct, when stimulated, gives rise in every case to an emotion which is characteristic of it. For example, with the instinct of pugnacity, we have the emotion of anger; with that of flight, the emotion of fear; with the parental instinct, the emotion of love or tender feeling. An instinct, therefore, is regarded as a mechanism made up of three parts:

First, an afferent or cognitive part, through which it is stimulated.

Second, an affective part through which it gives rise to the emotion which is characteristic of it.

Third, an efferent or conative part through which it gives rise to a characteristic type of conduct.

McDougall gives a list of about twelve instincts, each with


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its accompanying emotion. These he regards as primary and the source of all thought and action.

Considering the instincts from the standpoint of evolution, one may assume that they first developed in extremely low forms of life in order to produce the few and simple reactions of which animals low in the scale are capable. One might almost say in regard to such primitive organisms, that for each situation an instinct is provided and the situation calls forth its appropriate reaction almost as automatically as the pressing of an electric button causes the ringing of a bell. But, as animals rise higher in the scale, the kinds of conduct required become more varied and complex. For example, an impulse from the flight or fear instinct, in the lower animals, will always produce some simple reaction such as flight or concealment. But, in man, the forms of conduct, to which it gives rise, may be extremely varied. Thus in one case a man may be impelled to run away, in another to work hard at some disagreeable task in order to escape the harm which might result if he failed to do so. This capacity to direct the instinctive forces into various forms of activity, we call the capacity for adjustment and we may assume that it depends upon the operation of certain mechanisms which we may call the mechanisms of adjustment. The mind may, therefore, be regarded as made up of certain instincts from which come the impulses that give rise to all our mental reactions and certain mechanisms of adjustment by which these impulses are directed into the most useful forms of activity.

This conception of the human mind enables us to form some idea of how a mental disorder may arise from purely mental causes; for it is obvious that conditions may sometimes arise when the mechanisms of adjustment will prove inadequate to the demands made upon them, when they will be unable to control the instinctive forces or find for them satisfactory outlet and, as a result, these impulses will escape by undesirable channels, giving rise to forms of thought and action which we recognize to be abnormal. To show that this theory may be successfully applied to explain the facts of abnormal psychology, the analysis of an illustrative case is presented. This case, which is worked out in considerable detail, forms the second section of the paper. It is the case of a young man who, partly owing to inherited tendencies and partly to environment, developed during early life certain habits and


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characteristics which, when he approached maturity and the sexual instinct awoke to its full activity, caused the impulses from this instinct to be directed into wrong channels, giving rise to a psychosis which took the form of a catatonic stupor.

The conception of mental disorder here presented inevitably leads to certain views regarding the causes which give rise to it. Since mental health is dependent on capacity for adjustment being equal to the demands made upon it, mental disorder must always be due to failure to maintain this relationship between capacity and needs. The causes of insanity must therefore be of two kinds:

First, those which make the task of adjustment so difficult as to overtax the capacity.

Second, those which lessen the capacity so that it is unequal to the demands made upon it.

The third section of the paper is a brief discussion of what these causes are and how we should deal with them.

Author's Abstract.