I
The concept of ideal copy is central to descriptive
bibliography, because it is the element that distinguishes bibliographical
description from cataloguing: whereas a catalogue entry, regardless of its
level of detail, exists to record a particular copy, a bibliographical
description aims to provide a standard against which individual copies can
be measured.[8] Thus the catalogue
entry is tied to the physical features of a given copy, even if some of the
features are actually post-publication imperfections of that copy. The
bibliographical description, on the other hand, must be purged of such
deficiencies of individual copies; it must be based on an examination of as
much of the evidence as possible (that is, as many copies as possible), since
there is no way to tell from the scrutiny of one or two or three copies how
they compare to the edition as a whole without checking a considerably
larger sample of that edition. Sometimes a thorough
catalogue of a collection does make reference to additional copies outside
the collection, but in doing so it is going beyond the function of a
catalogue; and such a catalogue is particularly useful, for the very reason
that a descriptive bibliography—being based on more evidence than
a
single collection can provide—has a broader usefulness than a
catalogue.
The bibliographical description rises above the limitations of a single copy
by reporting what emerges as standard after an examination of multiple
copies.
This much is widely understood and indeed seems elementary. The
difficulty arises in attempting to define more precisely the rationale for
making decisions about what is abnormal or defective in a given copy and
what is not. Some defects seem obvious, as when a leaf present in many
copies is missing from another copy. But rarely are such matters as obvious
as they may seem at first. Is it possible that the leaf was supposed to be
canceled and that the presence of the leaf in some copies results from an
oversight? Is it possible that the leaf was to be replaced with a cancel leaf,
not present in the copies thus far examined? The answers to such questions
can in some instances be deduced from the content of the text on this leaf
and the adjacent leaves. But the principal evidence, of course, must come
from still more copies. And if no other copies are extant, conclusive
answers may not be possible. As is always the case with inductive
investigation, what may seem clear at one stage may be shown to be
incorrect when more instances are observed.
Furthermore, when there are numerous differences among copies, no single
surviving copy may be free of what the bibliographer concludes are
deficiencies. Thus the
ideal copy presented in the
bibliographer's description may be an abstraction, for no such actual copy
may be known to exist. The description is a historical reconstruction, based
on the evidence of the extant copies; as such it is a hypothesis dependent
on the bibliographer's judgment. But to say that raises more questions than
it settles, questions that must be thought about if one is to understand what
one is doing in setting up a bibliographical description.
The best point of departure is the matter of intention, which the
concept of ideal copy is generally thought to entail: deciding
that certain copies are anomalous is equated with deciding that they do not
conform to what the producer of the edition intended. Greg, defining the
aim of the descriptions in his Bibliography, says, "what I
have
in view is not any particular copy of a book, which may have its own
imperfections or abnormalities, but a standard or ideal copy as it was
designed and intended by its producer" (IV, cxlviii).[9] If only an imperfect copy is
known, he
adds, "I give the register of such a book in the fullest form that can be
inferred from the existing evidence, with due warning of course of its
possibly hypothetical character."[10]
That the goal is the intended form of the book is reinforced by his
explanation that his collation formulas represent "issue-registers" (the
arrangement of the
leaves as published) rather than "printing-registers" (the arrangement
as printed). He had been even more explicit in "A Formulary of Collation,"
where he equates "issue-formula" with the register of signatures defining
"the make-up of the book . . . as it was meant to be issued" (p. 371). Thus
when a printer uses the last leaf of the last gathering for the title, with the
intention that the leaf will be placed first in the book as published, the
bibliographer is to record the leaf in its intended place.
[11] (Of course, for books that were
sold in
sheets and later bound to individual order, "binding-register" would
sometimes be a more appropriate term than "issue-register.") Even if all
copies examined by the bibliographer retain the leaf in its original position
at the end, Greg was saying, the description would still place it at the
beginning, for that is clearly its intended location, and the copies examined
happen to have been anomalies.
[12]
Bowers, in the standard definition of ideal copy,
similarly
makes the printer's intention the determining factor:
an
ideal copy is a book which is complete in all its
leaves
as it ultimately left the printer's shop in perfect condition and in the
complete state that he considered to represent the final and most perfect
state of the book. (
Principles, p. 113)
[13]
In the elaboration of the definition that follows, the producer's intention is
again cited:
An ideal copy contains not only all the blank leaves
intended to be issued as integral parts of its gatherings but also all excisions
and all cancellans leaves or insertions which represent the most perfect state
of the book as the printer or publisher finally intended to issue it in the
issue described.
The emphasis here is on the physical form of the book, on the order and
completeness of the leaves
[14] and not
of their content. As Bowers points out,
ideal copy does not
imply "freedom from textual errors, misprints, variant uncorrected formes"
and does not refer to "the quality of the text in any way as a criticism of
the printer's final result." Nevertheless, textual considerations are not
entirely irrelevant. A textual
correction that results in a cancel leaf of course affects the physical
structure of the book; but textual differences may exist that are not locatable
through an alteration of the structure of the gatherings. Stop-press
corrections may produce (and during the first two and a half centuries of
printing routinely did produce) sheets containing various combinations of
corrected and uncorrected formes, and books may be made up of various
combinations of such sheets; no physical anomaly would call attention to the
differences in text, which would be discoverable only through textual
collation. Yet corrections or revisions of this kind are also encompassed in
the concept of
ideal copy. According to Bowers, while
"
ideal copy in its true sense of physical makeup is not
affected,"
one would nevertheless "certainly choose the details of the corrected form
to transcribe or note in one's description as the 'ideal' form, listing the
other as a variant" (p. 114); the standards for
ideal copy apply not only to the collation formula but also to
the
contents paragraph, "which should contain the contents in their most perfect
state," including the correct form of variant catchwords, and the like. What
Bowers is saying, in other words, is that the correctness of the text is an
aspect of
ideal copy to the extent that corrections were
actually
made within a given issue;
[15] but
errors that were not corrected do not prevent copies containing them from
being ideal copies.
A principal difficulty in defining ideal copy therefore
has
to do with intention, for it is unreasonable to think that a printer's or
publisher's intention is to produce errors, and yet the presence of
errors—not corrected at any stage in the production of an issue of a
book—is compatible with the concept of ideal copy.
An
analogy with editing—where another kind of intention
figures—is
instructive. Bowers, like Greg, points out that ideal copy may
be "a purely hypothetical reconstruction" (p. 117).[16] One might therefore see a
similarity
between the descriptive bibliographer's usual concept of an ideal
copy—a
copy more nearly resembling the publisher's intention than any single extant
copy may happen to do—and the scholarly editor's concept of a
critical
text—a text more accurately
reflecting the author's intentions than any single extant text may happen to
do. There is an important difference, however. The critical editor's aim is
to rectify errors in a text, whether or not they have ever been corrected in
any previous edition; the editor's material is texts, which are arrangements
of words and punctuation that happen to be given concrete embodiments in
the form of printed editions. But the descriptive bibliographer's goal is to
report the historical facts about an edition and not to perfect it or alter it
beyond the latest point reached by those responsible for producing it; the
bibliographer's material is the concrete embodiment of texts, not the texts
themselves. Thus if all copies of an edition contain an obvious textual error,
that error is a part of the ideal copy; but if some copies do not contain the
error—either because a stop-press alteration rectified it during the
course
of printing or because the leaf or sheet containing the error was canceled
and replaced with a corrected substitute after printing was
completed—the
description of the ideal copy would have to indicate the fact that the
correction had taken place. The critical editor, on the other hand, is not
limited by the fact that an error has not been corrected in documentary
form, if its status as an error can be otherwise established. Both the
bibliographer and the editor produce historical reconstructions; but the
subject of the bibliographer's attention is a physical object, whereas the
focus of the critical editor's attention is an abstraction. Critical editors must
take the physical evidence into account, but it is of concern to them for
what it reveals about the authority of particular readings, not for its own
sake.
[17]
One can see, therefore, that the introduction of the idea of intention
into the definition of ideal copy is not without its difficulties.
How it came about is easy enough to understand: when a leaf is missing,
or a plate is inserted at the wrong point, or a canceled leaf remains
alongside the cancel, the natural reaction is to say that these results were
not intended—and that they are thus characteristics of aberrant or
defective copies. But the recognition that something is unintended clearly
provides no basis for saying that the intended form also exists (or once
existed). If a given page in one copy of a book contains an obviously
garbled text, one would not be inclined to jump to the conclusion that a
corrected text exists in other copies, and one might even say that the matter
is totally irrelevant to the determination of the ideal copy. But if another
copy is located with the garbled text rectified by means of cancellation,
ideal copy is certainly affected,
because the description of the ideal copy would have to make reference to
the cancel. Furthermore,
it is difficult to see how the situation would be any different if the
correction had been made during the press run, though there would then be
no cancel to draw one's attention to the textual alteration. In either case
there is a physical difference among copies of a single issue: in one, the
difference is of inked type-impressions only; in the other, it is that plus a
change in the physical structure of a gathering. To make only one of these
situations a factor in the determination of ideal copy, and the other one not,
would be to insist on an artificial distinction and thus to trivialize the
concept of
ideal copy. As Bowers's discussion recognizes,
stop-press alterations do affect
ideal copy; defining "ideal"
so
as not to imply freedom from textual error does not mean that textual
matters are to be ignored. If a printer corrects one error—either
during
the press run or by cancel—but in the process overlooks another on
the
same page, that remaining error is of
course a part of the ideal copy; but where the alteration is in fact made, the
altered form must be taken into account in thinking about the characteristics
of the ideal copy. It is true that textual correctness is not relevant to ideal
copy; but when textual differences actually exist between copies of an issue,
determining which readings were the replacements (whether or not they
were "corrections") is a necessary activity in describing the ideal copy for
that issue. Authorial intention is beside the point; the question is not
whether the printer's alteration brought the text into greater conformity with
what the author intended but simply the determination of which reading the
printer intended as the replacement. Intention is involved in
ideal
copy, then, only to the extent that alternatives to choose among exist
in physical form in the issue as a whole. Which of two forms a printer
intended as a replacement for the other is the bibliographer's business to
ponder; but when
only a single form was produced, the question of intention does not come
up, even though some of the features of that form are not in fact what the
printer intended.
If some of the differences among copies were created by the activity
of individual owners or were caused in some other way after the time when
the copies involved had left the hands of their producer, one could say that
such differences were not intended by the producer. It could well happen,
however, that some of these differences might actually be a fulfillment of
the producer's intentions. Obviously if a leaf is lost from a book through
rough treatment over the years, this loss is not a cancellation intended by
the printer; but if some owner has a misplaced leaf moved to its correct
location, this action carries out what the printer intended. Yet it is equally
irrelevant to the bibliographer's concerns, for it is not a part of the
production history of the book. Intention of the printer or publisher is
therefore not really the most satisfactory
way of approaching the question of
ideal copy. The crucial
point—at least the first crucial point—is to distinguish those
differences
among copies attributable to the producer of the book from those not so
attributable. The fundamental purpose of establishing such a concept as
ideal copy, after all, is to segregate characteristics of a book
that occurred during its production from those that occurred at some later
time. There are further considerations that the concept leads to, but its basic
function is to enable one to identify which features of a given copy of a
book were present when the book was released or put on sale and which
ones originated after that point. The intention of the printer or publisher of
a book has nothing to do with the matter: unintended features may be
present in copies as they are released, and intended features may be brought
about later.
[18] But the bibliographer,
as a historian of the production of the
book, must be interested in the former and is not concerned with the
latter.
[19]
What the bibliographer must decide, to put it another way, is which
differences among copies constitute states and which result
from
the history of individual copies following their release from the publisher
or printer.[20] In bibliographical
terminology, a state refers to any part of a copy of a book
that
differs, at the time of such release, from the corresponding part of other
copies, within the same issue or impression, as a result of an error or the
correction of an error, or for any other reason
that causes the publisher not to call attention to the difference as a discrete
publishing effort.
[21] A state is one of
the forms of a sheet or a casing available to a purchaser at the time of the
release of individual copies; but it is by no means necessarily an intended
form. States do often, it is true, originate in a printer's or a publisher's
effort to correct an error discovered in previously printed, but not yet
released, copies, and such corrected states are indeed intentional. But states
can equally well derive from errors that occur during the process of
production, making the later states less correct than the earlier. An omitted
or a duplicated gathering, or a page with severe type damage along one
margin, is clearly not an intended feature of a book; but a copy that reached
the market in this condition could not be dismissed by the bibliographer,
because this feature is a part of the production history of the copy. The
number of copies
involved cannot be the test, any more than intention can. Even if only one
copy lacks a given gathering when put on sale, or shows type damage, that
is still one of the states in which the book emerged from production; and
if twenty copies of a book have by coincidence had identical leaves
removed from them after their release, that curious situation has nothing to
do with the production of the book, and those copies would not represent
a state. Of course, the evidence of a single copy (or a very small number)
is often difficult to interpret, and one might conclude on such evidence that
a particular feature was not present when the copy was released, and yet
might conclude differently if more copies exhibiting this feature were
located; if, however, the nature of the evidence allows one to know, even
from a single copy, that a feature was indeed present at the time the copy
was released, one must take it into account somehow, even if one wishes
to stress its
insignificance.
[22] The point is that the
number of copies exhibiting a particular
feature cannot by itself determine whether that feature qualifies for
inclusion in a standard description. The primary decision for the
bibliographer, therefore, is whether or not a given feature of a book is a
product of its printing and publishing history. The decision is not a simple
one: because intention and statistics are not determining factors, an
obviously unintended feature observed in a single copy cannot automatically
be ruled out as not constituting a state.
The concept of the ideal copy of an
issue—though the
term is usually expressed in the singular—must accommodate all the
states of the issue. A single copy cannot be expected to contain all states,
of course, but all the states must be a part of the description of an issue.
The notion that a description of an ideal copy must be set up as a
description of a single copy no doubt results from what is perceived as the
practical necessity of choosing certain features—a particular title
page,
collation formula, list of contents, and so forth—for primary
representation in the description. The only real necessity, however, when
two versions of the same thing exist, is to describe one first, and there is
no reason why the one presented first need be thought of as "primary" in
any qualitative sense. In fact, the historical purpose of the description is
best served by reporting—for any given feature that exists in two
states—the first state first, followed by the
second.[23] It is true that in some cases
this
arrangement would mean that the less correct state would be reported
first—but not always, for a first state is not always less "correct"
than a
second, since a state can result from accident as well as intention. And in
any event, the presence of a less correct state of a given sheet in a copy of
a book does not make that copy any less "ideal," because the copy still
represents one of the forms in which the book was offered to the public. A
state by definition relates only to one part of a book, such as a sheet, and
not to a book as a whole; when several sheets are produced in variant
states, it is possible for a particular copy of a book to have earlier states of
some sheets and later states of others. Thus the description of variant states
must be a part of a description of an issue or impression, and the "ideal"
being described encompasses certain sets of alternatives. Although
alterations to title pages often produce new issues because they identify a
discrete publishing
effort, some variations in title pages may produce only states; in such cases
a description would have to provide two title-page descriptions, one labeled
"first state" and one "second state." When variant states affect the collation
formula or the contents paragraph, alternative accounts of the affected
element can be reported; or when stop-press alterations result in variant
formes, the various possibilities can be outlined. The important point to
recognize is that the standard description, or
ideal copy, of
an
issue must allow for the variations identified as states.
[24] A different issue will be
represented by
a different ideal copy; but for any given issue,
ideal copy is
likely to embrace a set of alternatives.
[25]
The most difficult problem, therefore, is not the mechanical one of
setting up a description so as to accommodate different states but the prior
question of how to decide which variations are in fact states and which are
alterations resulting from the vicissitudes that a copy has endured after the
time of its release. The latter must of course be recorded in the section of
the description identifying the individual copies examined; that section
constitutes the primary documentation on which the description is based, and
peculiarities of particular copies must be mentioned there, so that readers
can know what evidence the bibliographer surveyed. But the variations that
can be classified as states—those occurring during the process of
production—become part of the body of the description itself.
Indeed, the
purpose of the concept of ideal copy is to cause the
bibliographer to think about this distinction; to put the matter concisely,
ideal copy is concerned with those
differences within an issue that can be regarded as states. It follows,
to repeat two points not widely understood, that textual differences are to
be included among the physical variations with which ideal
copy
is concerned; and that the producer's intention is relevant only when
variations actually existed among the copies as they were issued, and then
only to the extent that it may be of use in thinking about the order of those
variations.
All these points inevitably lead to the central question: how one can
possess the requisite physical evidence for knowing whether differences
exist among copies of an issue, and then for deciding which of them
occurred during the production of those copies and which occurred at later
times in their histories. Naturally, one begins by looking at numerous
copies, when they exist. Even though the number of copies exhibiting a
given characteristic is not necessarily a criterion for classifying it as a state,
one can in fact frequently decide that a certain characteristic appears too
many times to be attributed to the independent action of individual owners.
And of course, the inspection of multiple copies is necessary simply to
locate what the points of variation are. But the process raises difficult
questions. How can one know when all variations have been discovered?
How many copies constitute a sufficient sample? May it not happen that all
surviving copies, even when there are
many of them, do not form a large enough proportion of the total
edition to serve as a reliable sample? If it is not feasible to see every copy
of an issue (and generally it is not, either because they do not all survive
or because the issue was too large to make tracking them all down a
practicable undertaking), can the attempt to generalize about the issue as a
whole be justified?
[26] The first answer
is to say that these questions can be asked about any inductive investigation;
that, as one becomes expert through the process of investigation, one is in
a position to make an informed judgment about the extent of the evidence
required or the sufficiency of the obtainable evidence; and that careful
generalization, based on cautious and responsible use of the located
evidence, is valuable, even if it is later shown to be erroneous in certain
respects. These points do of course apply to bibliographical research; but
because descriptive bibliography is not always recognized as the branch of
historical scholarship that
it is, some further comment on these questions may help to clarify the
nature of bibliographical descriptions.
Suppose, for instance, that one has examined four copies of a book,
all of which have a dedication leaf at the end of the last gathering,
presumably intended to be cut out and inserted among the other
preliminaries in the first gathering. Does the seeming obviousness of the
intention justify constructing a collation formula for the ideal copy
indicating the insertion of this leaf into the first gathering? How could one
be certain where in the gathering to indicate its insertion? If the leaf bore
a special signature or a page number or some other guide to its intended
location, would the case for placing it in the preliminaries be strengthened?
If one looked at twenty-five, or fifty, copies of the book and still found all
to have the dedication leaf at the end, would the question be affected?
Would one's thinking about the matter be different depending on whether
the book was issued in a publisher's casing or whether it was from an
earlier period and was bound according to the
wishes of individual owners? These questions illustrate why one has to
consider whether the purposes of bibliographical description ever require
that a printer's or publisher's intention take precedence over the historical
fact of what actually happened. If (for the sake of argument) this
hypothetical book was from the period of publisher's binding and if the
entire issue was bound with the dedication leaf at the end, the bibliographer
would have no justification for altering its position in describing the ideal
copy, even if in fact this position was not the intended one. If the
book was from the period before publisher's binding (or from a later period
but issued in sheets), one might more relevantly raise the question of
intention, because the producer of the sheets would not necessarily have had
control over the binding of any copies. Even so, if all copies were bound
with the dedication leaf at the end, there would be little reason for
presenting a standard description that differed from them—unless
clear
evidence existed to show that all the binders had disregarded the printer's
binding specifications. In practice, of course, one can scarcely ever be in
this omniscient position with regard to the issue as a whole. But the value
of thinking about an extreme situation is that it may make clearer the
framework within which more realistic situations need to be viewed. A
standard description of a book is a historical generalization, rising above the
idiosyncrasies of individual copies but resisting the temptation to substitute
what should have been for
what was. Perhaps there would be less need to make this point if "ideal"
had not been the adjective in the generally accepted term.
In actual situations, much of the difficulty in distinguishing what the
producer was responsible for from what later owners were responsible for
arises from the fact that one does not have access to all the evidence. Even
if one examines all surviving copies of a book, the portion of the original
issue that one has not seen may still be sizable; making generalizations
about the issue as a whole can therefore be an uncertain business. Acts of
historical reconstruction must very often be based on something less than
the full evidence and are thus dependent on the judgment of the historian
in weighing such evidence as there is. Different historians may of course
come to different conclusions, and more than one account may legitimately
exist at the same time. Descriptive bibliographers must make numerous
decisions in the process of interpreting the evidence of individual copies and
constructing from it a generalized account. There are a great many variables
that they must consider,
such as the printing, binding, and publishing customs of the period, any
external evidence bearing on the situation, and the number and nature of the
surviving copies. So much inevitably depends on the learning and judgment
of the bibliographer that it would be futile to attempt to set up detailed rules
regarding ideal copy.
What is important, instead, is to have a clear idea of the rationale that
should underlie specific decisions. Surely such a rationale must start from
the premise that, while the production of a standard description is a creative
activity, none of the points that go into it can be invented. Everything else
follows from that. If a leaf is obviously missing, or an obvious
typographical error is present, in all examined (or known) copies, one
cannot invent a corrected state. But if tangible evidence
exists, one may then be legitimately faced with alternatives. It is then that
one begins to weigh the various characteristics of the specific
instance—the printing practice of the time, the number of copies
seen,
and so on. If a dedication leaf consistently appears at the end of the known
copies of a book, one may still decide to note it in the description at the
conventional location, if one has reason to believe that all the known copies
are idiosyncratic—if few exist, for example, and if they were bound
by
individual owners. Under different circumstances, one might decide that the
standard description should show the leaf in its position at the
end—if,
for example, a great many copies, all in publisher's binding, have been
seen. In neither case is one inventing evidence: the dedication leaf exists.
And in the first case one is not falsifying the evidence, for a standard
description does not purport to be identical with any given copy; by noting
the dedication leaf at its
conventional place, one is expressing an informed and reasoned opinion that
the evidence supports the choice of this position as the place where the
dedication leaf would have appeared if the printer had had control over the
binding. Printer's intention thus can play a role for books not issued in a
binding or casing, but only when compelling evidence exists that the order
of the leaves as bound is not the printer's intended order. Even so, it is
important to have the description show the order as printed as well as the
intended order of issue. And in other respects the printer's intention is
irrelevant, for intention does not necessarily coincide with performance.
Projecting what was true for the issue as a whole is not the same as
projecting what was intended; both activities are of interest, but the
bibliographer must keep the distinction clear and understand which governs
the description of a so-called "ideal" copy. (In making this distinction one
must remember, in other words,
that leaves intentionally printed at one point for insertion at a different point
constitute a special case: in books issued unbound their presence at the
original location at the time of issue is not an error, as it would be in books
issued in publisher's casing, and thus a bibliographer's decision to record
both the proper position as well as the original position of such leaves is not
an instance of correcting an error but simply a way of clarifying the nature
of the issue.)
There are times, of course, when intention and actuality coincide; but
if bibliographers are to have a firm understanding of what they are about,
they must be prepared to deal with situations where the two do not
coincide. All decisions regarding ideal copy must be reasoned
ones; none can be automatic or mechanical. Less misunderstanding about
ideal copy would probably have arisen if the status of
descriptive bibliography as history had been better understood. Once one
leaves the
security of describing individual copies and attempts to produce a standard
description that will accommodate not only all examined copies but those
not examined as well, one is engaging in the creative scholarship of
historical interpretation. Responsible historical accounts do not depart from
the facts, but they are more than assemblages of discrete facts; they bring
the facts together in such a way as to reveal a meaning or order in
them—not
the meaning and order, because the facts
may
well, and probably will, support other interpretations. Such an account is
thus necessarily hypothetical, but for all its lack of certainty it marks an
important advance in understanding; even several conflicting (but
responsible) accounts are more informative than the undigested facts. A
description of a standard or ideal copy of a book, in other words, is "truer"
than the description of any one copy, even though it rests to a greater
degree on subjective judgment. Good descriptive
bibliographies are normally more useful than catalogues because they are
based on a qualified individual's reasoned assessment of the evidence
relating to the edition or issue as an entity. When one focuses on the fact
that a bibliographical description is a piece of historical scholarship, one
can readily see that the standard copy or copies it describes cannot
necessarily be equated with a copy that fulfills its producer's—much
less
its author's—intentions. A standard description reports the "ideal"
only
in the sense that it records the features (or variations in them) thought to
characterize individual copies as they emerged from the printer or
publisher. Any other construction of the word, or of the concept of
ideal copy, would conflict with the historical aims that
"description" suggests and would confuse rather than clarify the orderly
delineation of past events.