In "The Meaning of Copy-Text" (SB, XXII, 311-318),
Paul Baender traces the historical development of the term "copy-text" and
argues that the word has now become "ambiguous and misleading."
Bibliographers can readily concur with his view that one must be prepared
"to redefine or abandon words that have lost general relevance and common
meaning" without at the same time finding his dissatisfaction with this
particular word convincing. As he has shown, its significance has shifted
somewhat in the years since McKerrow invented it, as a result of changes
in
editorial thinking; but its essential meaning has not altered nor, it seems to
me, has it become outmoded or irrelevant.
Mr. Baender begins by commenting on "the two most common
meanings
of copy-text" — "basic text" and "printer's copy" — and says
that they
"are not necessarily incompatible meanings, and they may in effect mean
the
same thing" (p. 312). It is true that some writers have occasionally
employed
the word to mean "printer's copy," but the general use of the word by
bibliographers for over half a century has been in the sense of "basic text."
To speak of "the two most common meanings of copy-text,"
therefore, is somewhat misleading. If the meaning of a technical term is
established through its use by a group of authorities in a particular field
who
have occasion to employ it, then "copy-text" has never meant anything but
the text which an editor takes as the basis for his own text; and those who
have used "copy-text" to mean "printer's copy" have used it erroneously.
Whether or not more people outside the field are beginning to use the word
erroneously is a separate question, and one that need not affect its use in
technical contexts — just as the term "first edition" often means
something
quite different to the general public from what it means to the
bibliographer.
On the other hand, if the usage among bibliographers themselves begins to
shift, one cannot simply dismiss the new usage as erroneous or the word as
ambiguous; instead one must scrutinize the concepts involved in an effort
to
discover what conceptual changes may have produced the blurring of a
previously useful
distinction.
When Mr. Baender asserts that "basic text" and "printer's copy"
sometimes may "in effect mean the same thing," it is significant that he
employs the phrase "in effect," for the two expressions refer to distinct and
radically different concepts which cannot, without some sort of
qualification,
be said to "mean the same thing." "Copy-text" (which I shall use in the
standard sense of "basic text") is an abstract term; "printer's copy" is
concrete. "Copy-text" refers to that form of a literary text which an editor
has decided, on whatever grounds, is the best one for him to follow as the
basis for his edition; "printer's copy" refers to the unique document which
a
printer follows in setting type. "Copy-text" signifies an arrangement of
words, abstracted from their physical embodiment; "printer's copy"
signifies
one particular physical document.[1]
In
those cases in which an editor makes no emendations in his copy-text, the
printer's copy will consist
of an unaltered transcription or photographic reproduction of one copy of
the copy-text. The fact that the text embodied in the printer's copy can be
identical with the copy-text should not lead one to conclude that the two
terms can sometimes mean the same thing, since the two concepts remain
as
distinct as ever: the copy-text may exist in numerous embodiments (copies
of
an impression, transcriptions or reproductions of a manuscript), but only
one
embodiment of it is the printer's copy. If a bibliographer uses both terms
to
mean the same thing, he has necessarily altered the meaning of at least one
of
them, for the concepts themselves still exist unaltered. This sort of shift in
meaning, therefore, is not the kind which emerges from an evolution in
thought and fundamental changes in concepts; it is simply a change in
terminology, which may or may not have resulted from a misunderstanding
of the concepts distinguished by the original terms. It does not really make
any difference,
of course, what terms are finally
attached to the concepts; the point is that the concepts remain, whatever
they may be called.
This line of reasoning suggests a few further comments on what Mr.
Baender considers the two main reasons for the "ambiguity" of the term
"copy-text." First is "the prestige that copy-text has acquired," which
causes
the word "to imply authority beyond its denotation, as though the term itself
ratified an editor's choice of text" (p. 312). It is often the fate of widely
accepted and respectable technical terms to be employed by uninformed
persons as a substitute for thought; but it is difficult to see how this
situation
can be corrected by abandoning or altering those terms. The concept
referred to by "copy-text" could be referred to by any term; but all terms
would be subject to abuse by incompetent editors, and "copy-text" at least
has the advantage of a tradition. To say that "the stature of copy-text in
current usage makes the hypothetical edition sound as prestigious as the
word is in our respect" is to suggest that a label can successfully hide the
thought which lies behind
it. But if an edition does not deserve the "prestige" conferred upon it by the
designation "copy-text," the sloppiness of the argument defending it cannot
stand for long, regardless of the terminology employed. Whether or not
"copy-text" is a "banner-word" which "tends toward the superlative," it
cannot be held responsible for the foolishness of some of the arguments in
which it appears.
The second, and more serious, reason adduced for the ambiguity of
"copy-text" is that it is "not suited to the full range and complexity of
editorial problems" (p. 312). Mr. Baender points out that McKerrow, when
he originated the term, was "operating on a single-text or best-text
assumption" (p. 314) and that Greg's more eclectic approach still
maintained
"with respect to accidentals . . . a single-text criterion." Such a view,
however, oversimplifies Greg's position, for his statement that "the
copy-text
should govern (generally) in the matter of accidentals" was descriptive, not
prescriptive. Whenever there is strong evidence, he was saying, for
emending
the copy-text — whether in substantives or in accidentals —
that
evidence should of course be followed; but when the evidence is
inconclusive, one's chances of adopting what the author wrote —
both in
substantives and accidentals — are greatest by following the
copy-text.[2] Greg's
point, quite simply, was that one will normally have far less conclusive
evidence with regard to accidentals than to substantives and will therefore
follow the copy-text for accidentals more often than for substantives.
Mr. Baender offers two illustrations of situations that he finds beyond
the range of "copy-text." The first concerns several authoritative, and
substantively variant, texts which derive independently from a lost original
(p. 312). Since in his view the "eclectic" (i.e., critical) approach of Greg
and
Bowers "in the long run rules out the designation of a single text, basic
text,
or copy-text when there is more than one text of substantive authority"
(p. 314), it would be "misleading," he feels, to label one of these texts as
copy-text. Nevertheless, the editor must follow something, and what he
follows is by definition his copy-text. There may well be instances of such
divided authority that one text serves as copy-text for certain passages,
another text (or several other texts) for other passages. But whether one
regards this situation as involving two (or several) copy-texts, or one
copy-text with emendations, is merely a statistical matter, a question of
relative proportions. If "copy-text" is used to mean the text an editor
follows
except in those readings which he deems it necessary to emend, he cannot
find himself without a copy-text — that is, if he produces his edition
at all.
To argue that the selection of one copy-text out of several authoritative
substantive texts "misrepresents its stature vis-a-vis the others" does not
make any allowance for the editor's statement explaining his position; even
in
simpler cases
one cannot hope to understand the relationship among the texts merely by
noting which one is copy-text, without turning to an editorial
statement.
The second situation cited by Mr. Baender is one in which a second
printing of a plated book involves substantive revisions extensive enough to
require the resetting of entire pages, and in the course of the resetting a
number of accidentals are inadvertently altered. In such a case, "the modern
editor," in order to "avoid the awkward procedure of inserting the
authoritative second-edition [or second-printing] readings in a reproduction
of the first" (p. 313), uses a photographic reproduction of a copy of the
second as printer's copy and restores in it the accidentals of the first. The
illustration is similar to an actual instance referred to later (p. 315), in
which
a periodical version is copy-text but the "first book setting" is used as the
basis of printer's copy since it contains three hundred authoritative
substantive variants. Such practice, we are told, represents "sound editorial
procedure despite this convention of copy-text." It is difficult to understand,
however,
in what way the "convention of copy-text" is a hindrance here, for no
theoretical question is involved — only the practical question of how
most
efficiently to prepare printer's copy. If, because of a large number of
authoritative revisions, the easiest method of preparing printer's copy is to
photograph a copy of some text other than the copy-text and mark it to
conform to the copy-text wherever its variants are not judged authoritative,
there can be no objection to the procedure on theoretical grounds: the
copy-text is still the "basic text," and the mechanical details by which the
printer's copy is made to reflect that copy-text are irrelevant. The only
objections which could be raised would have to be on practical grounds;
and,
from a practical point of view, the procedure is indeed a dangerous one. A
classic illustration is described in Harrison Hayford and Merton M. Sealts's
account of the history of the Billy Budd text: F. Barron
Freeman,
instead of making an
independent transcription of the manuscript for his 1948 edition, used a
copy
of Raymond Weaver's
1928 edition which he had attempted to correct by comparison with the
manuscript; the result was that Freeman overlooked more than three
hundred
of Weaver's errors and therefore incorporated them in his own edition.
[3] The supposed practical advantages
of working
in certain cases from a text other than the copy-text may often prove to be
illusory; the effort of making certain that the authoritative copy-text
readings
are reinstated may be more troublesome and risky than the inconveniences
sometimes associated with using a reproduction of a copy of the copy-text
in
the first place.
Although Greg's discussion of copy-text was limited to works which
exist in more than one edition but in no manuscripts, there is no reason why
his principles cannot be applied to any situation, regardless of the range of
pre-publication forms which survive. It is quite true, as Mr. Baender says,
that "the survival of pre-publication forms does not in all cases merely add
another stage for a retrogressive pursuit of copy-text" (p. 316) — but
surely Greg, if he had discussed the matter, would not have suggested that
it
does. The fact that a manuscript exists is obviously not sufficient
justification
in itself for choosing its text as copy-text; no two authors work in the same
fashion, and the precise relationship of the manuscript to the earliest printed
text must be ascertained in every case. Whenever there is persuasive
evidence that an author worked in such a way as to make the earliest
printed
text closer to his hypothetical fair copy[4]
than
the extant manuscript is, the choice for copy-text would naturally be the
printed text, not the manuscript. But when the evidence is inconclusive,
one's
best course of action is to select the earliest text as copy-text — for
Greg's
principle, to use the adjective which Mr. Baender aptly applies to it, is
"prudential" in nature, instructing one how to proceed when there is
otherwise no means for deciding. The greatness of Greg's theory of
copy-text is precisely that it does apply to all situations.
It is well, however, to keep in mind the distinction between
"copy-text"
as a descriptive term and as a theory of editing. As a term, "copy-text"
simply means the text an editor chooses as the basis for his own text;
Greg's
theory sets forth a particular rationale for making that choice. So long as
it is
clearly understood that one is working within the framework of Greg's
theory, it does no harm to use "copy-text" as a convenient shorthand for
"copy-text according to Greg's rationale." If one is to speak of two current
senses of "copy-text," this meaning — not "printer's copy" —
can more
properly be thought of as the second. All I am suggesting here is that, both
as a term and as Greg's theory, "copy-text" has by no means
outlived its usefulness. Though other words could be employed to make the
crucial distinction between "copy-text" and "printer's copy," those terms
are
at once simple, suggestive,
[5] and
well-established; though other methods of selecting a copy-text could be
devised, Greg's applies to all situations with impeccable logic. That an
editor
may use the word "to support doctrinaire procedures or to suggest a
rationale he did not provide" (p. 318) casts no aspersions on the integrity
of
the word or the theory, but only of its user. Far from agreeing that the
definition of "copy-text" as "basic text" is a "hindrance to precise editing,"
I
should prefer to claim that any usage which blurs a basic conceptual
distinction is a hindrance to precise thought and expression.
