1. The common word “utility” was introduced into
the special vocabulary of the social scientist only in
the last half of the eighteenth century. By it the initia-
tors understood that inherent property of a thing which
in English is best rendered by “usefulness.” Thus, Abbot
Ferdinando Galiani (Della moneta, 1750) defined utilità
as “the power of a thing to procure us felicity.” Simi-
larly, Jeremy Bentham at first spoke of utility as “that
property in any object, whereby it tends to produce
benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness” (An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
1780). But the meaning of the term has shifted contin-
uously and even today “utility” circulates with various,
albeit cognate, connotations. By referring to the prin-
ciple of utility as the principle of the greatest happiness
of the greatest number, Bentham himself paved the
way for this terminological license. The ensuing confu-
sion prompted W. Stanley Jevons to insist that “Utility
is not an Intrinsic Quality,” but “the sum of the pleas-
ure created and the pain prevented” (The Theory of
Political Economy, 1871).
In the end, Bentham was disturbed by his license,
but blamed the unfortunate choice of the term for his
confusion, and the French for insisting on that choice.
The choice was indeed unfortunate, especially in the
case of those Romance languages which do not distin-
guish between “utility” and “usefulness.” But even an
English-speaking person needs some mental effort to
relate “utility” to pleasure. Moreover, “utility” can
hardly evoke a relationship between an individual and
the things and services available to him, which is the
core of every modern definition of the concept. Several
other economists have also expressed their dissatisfac-
tion with the term and made various suggestions, not
always well inspired, for a new label. Unfortunately,
even “ophelimity,” the term coined by Vilfredo Pareto
to cleanse the terminology of any vernacular overtones,
did not prevail. The prestige of Jevons added to that
of Bentham sufficed to enthrone “utility” in economics.
A passage from an Oxford lecture delivered in 1833
by W. F. Lloyd admirably illustrates how clear the
whole picture becomes if one is not entrapped by the
ambiguity of Bentham's license:
The utility [usefulness] of corn is the same after an abundant
harvest as in time of famine.... The term value [utility]
therefore does not express a quality inherent in a commod-
ity, [but] a feeling of the mind, and is variable with the
variations of the external circumstances which can influence
that feeling, without any variation of the intrinsic qualities
of the commodity which is the object of it
(pp. 174, 181).
Carl Menger, one of the founders of the modern theory
of utility (“Principles of Economics,” 1950; German
original, 1871), also used “value” for what others called
“utility” and even decried the use of this last term
otherwise than as a synonym of “usefulness.” Jevons
himself began by emphasizing that “value depends
entirely on utility.” And nowadays most economists
would agree with his position. All this shows that the
modern concept of utility is so intimately connected
with that of economic value that it is well-nigh impos-
sible to separate them in thought or analysis.
