Chapter XVIII
FACING THE SOUTH[1]
The fault of the lord of men is: After having entrusted[2]
certain ministers with the state affairs, he guards against them
with ministers not entrusted. His reason for so doing is
that the non-entrusted and the entrusted will become enemies.
Contrary to his expectation, the sovereign will fall under the
spell of the non-entrusted. In consequence, the ministers
with whom he is now guarding against the entrusted, are
mostly those whom he used to guard against. If the lord of
men cannot make the law clear and thereby restrain the
power of chief vassals, there will be no other way to win
confidence from the petty officials.[3]
If the lord of men casts the law aside and guards against
ministers with ministers, then those who love one another
will associate for wicked purposes and speak well of one
another while those who hate one another will form cliques
and speak ill of one another. When blame and praise are
crossing each other, the sovereign will fall into bewilderment
and confusion.
Those who minister to a ruler, unless they have good
reputations and make frequent requests, cannot advance
their careers; unless they act contrary to the law and take
all powers to themselves, they cannot uplift their prestige;
and, unless they pretend to loyalty and faithfulness, they
cannot rid themselves of prohibitions. These three ways
are means of deluding the sovereign and destroying the law.
The lord of men, when employing ministers, should not
allow them, however wise and able they may be, to act
contrary to the law and take all powers to themselves;
should not allow them, however worthy and virtuous they
may be, to claim any priority among the men of merit and
take precedence of the hard-working people; and should
not discard the law and refrain from restricting them, however
loyal and faithful they may be. Such a ruler is called an
illustrator of the law.
The lord of men is sometimes tempted to tasks and
sometimes deluded by words; wherefore both tasks and
words need due consideration.
Ministers who imprudently propose tasks, usually underestimate
the expenditure and thereby deceive the sovereign
with the proposition. Deluded thereby, the sovereign does
not carefully consider the tasks but thinks much of the
ministers. If so, they will in turn restrain the sovereign with
the enterprises. Such is called "temptation to tasks".[4]
The ruler once tempted to tasks will be harassed by worries.
If the proposition purports a small task but the actual
expenses are enormous, then, though meritorious services
are performed, the proposition is not one of faith. If the
ministers whose propositions are of no faith are found
guilty, and if the tasks, though they provide results, get no
reward,[5]
nobody would dare to twist his words to blind
the sovereign. The way to be a sovereign is to make the
ministers' previous words never deviate from their subsequent
sayings and the subsequent never deviate from the previous
and to find them guilty in case of any deviation, although
the tasks may have provided results. This is called "skilfully
employing subordinates".[6]
The minister, when he devises a project for his master and
fears disapproval, will make out a case and declare such a
warning as, "Whoever criticizes the project of this task
is jealous of the projector." Suppose the lord of men, keeping
it in secret, never consults any other minister. The rest of
the ministers, frightened by the premonition, dare not
criticize the project. If these two sets of circumstances[7]
prevail, loyal ministers will not be accepted but well-reputed
ministers will be employed exclusively. Such is called
"delusion by words". The ruler once deluded by words
will be restrained by ministers.
The right way to be the sovereign is to make all ministers
understand the reasons why they are blamed for giving
opinions and why they are blamed for not giving opinions.
If they utter words that have neither beginning nor ending
or an argument that has no proof, then they are blamed for
giving opinions. If they attempt to evade responsibilities
by not giving any opinion so as to maintain their high posts,
then they are blamed for not giving opinions.
The lord of men in keeping ministers in service ought to
know the motive and purpose[8]
of every speaker in order to
hold his words responsible for an equivalent fact, and ask the
non-speakers to decide between the pros and cons of the
proposition so as to hold them accountable for the result of
the work. If so, nobody will dare to give any arbitrary
opinions nor to keep silent. Because both speaking and silence
equally involve accountabilities.
When the lord of men wants to accomplish a task, if he
does not understand its beginning and ending so as to
clarify the object of his desire, and then if he attempts to
accomplish it, his work will gain no advantage but will incur
disadvantage instead. If he understands this principle, he
will trust to reason and get rid of avarice. The accomplishment
of every task has its proper course. If its income is
estimated to be big and its outgo is estimated to be small,
the project is practicable.
Such is not the case with the deluded sovereign. For he
estimates the income but never estimates the outgo. As a
result, even though the outgo is twice as much as the income,
he never notices the harm. Thus in name he gains but in
fact he loses. If such is the case, the achievement will be
little while the harm is great.
In general, an achievement implies a big income and a
small outgo. Only in such a case can it be called an achievement.
Now that much waste incurs no crime and little gain
is a merit, ministers naturally waste enormous expenses and
perform small merits. As small merits are performed, so the
sovereign suffers losses.
Those who do not know the right way to political order,
always say, "Never change ancient traditions, never remove
existing institutions." Change or no change, the sage does
not mind. For he aims only at the rectification of government.
Whether or not ancient traditions should be changed,
whether or not existing institutions should be removed, all
depends upon the question whether or not such traditions
and such institutions are still useful for present-day political
purposes.
If Yi Yin had made no reform on behalf of Yin and T`aikung
Wang[9]
had made no reform on behalf of Chou, neither
T`ang nor Wu could become King. If Kuan Chung had
made no reform on behalf of Ch`i and Kuo Yen[10]
had made no
reform on behalf of Chin, neither Duke Huan nor Duke
Wên could have become hegemonic.
Generally speaking, men hesitate to change ancient
traditions because they are diffident about affecting the peace
of the people. Indeed, not to change ancient traditions is to
inherit the traces of disorder; to accord with the mind of the
people is to tolerate villainous deeds. If the people are stupid
and ignorant of disorder and the superior is weak-spirited
and unable to reform traditions and institutions, it is a
failure in the process of government.
The lord of men must be intelligent enough to know the
true path to order and severe enough to carry out his orders
without reserve. Therefore, though he has to act contrary
to the mind of the people, he should by all means
[11]
establish
an orderly government.
The basis of this argument is found in the "External and
Internal Affairs" by Lord Shang, who had iron spears and
heavy shields around him whenever going out to provide
against accidents. Likewise, when Kuo Yen began to assume
the reins of government, Duke Wên had an official bodyguard.
When Kuan Chung began to assume the reins of
government, Duke Huan had an armoured carriage. Thus
they all took precautions against mobs.
For the same reason, in dealing[12]
with stupid and idle
people, if one worries himself about small expenses, then
he is forgetting big profits. For instance, Yin Hu, bullied[13]
and slandered, was very afraid[14]
of even small changes and
lost his permanent advantage in consequence. Likewise, the
salesman of Tsou was not a carrier, but he was accustomed
to chaotic conditions and chary[15]
of living in an orderly
world. Therefore, the man of Chêng could not go home. . . .[16]
