Chapter XV
PORTENTS OF RUIN[1]
1. As a rule, if the state of the lord of men is small but the
fiefs of private families are big, or if the ruler's sceptre is
insignificant but the ministers are powerful, then ruin is
possible.
2. If the ruler neglects laws and prohibitions, indulges in
plans and ideas, disregards the defence works within the
boundaries and relies on foreign friendship and support,
then ruin is possible.
3. If all officials indulge in studies, sons of the family are
fond of debate, peddlars and shopkeepers hide money in
foreign countries, and poor people suffer miseries at home,
then ruin is possible.
4. If the ruler is fond of palatial decorations, raised kiosks,
and embanked pools, is immersed in pleasures of having
chariots, clothes, and curios, and thereby tires out the
hundred surnames and exhausts public wealth, then ruin is
possible.
5. If the ruler believes in date-selecting,[2]
worships devils
and deities, believes in divination and lot-casting, and likes
fêtes and celebrations, then ruin is possible.
6. If the ruler takes advice only from ministers of high
rank, refrains from comparing different opinions and
testifying to the truth, and uses only one man as a channel
of information, then ruin is possible.
7. If posts and offices can be sought through influential
personages and rank and bounties can be obtained by means
of bribes, then ruin is possible.
8. If the ruler, being easy-going, accomplishes nothing,
being tender-hearted, lacking in decision, and, wavering
between acceptance and rejection, has no settled opinion,
then ruin is possible.
9. If the ruler is greedy, insatiable, attracted to profit,
and fond of gain, then ruin is possible.
10. If the ruler enjoys inflicting unjust punishment and
does not uphold the law, likes debate and persuasion but
never sees to their practicability, and indulges in style and
wordiness but never considers their effect, then ruin is
possible.
11. If the ruler is shallow-brained and easily penetrated,
reveals everything but conceals nothing, and cannot keep
any secret but communicates the words of one minister to
another, then ruin is possible.
12. If the ruler is stubborn-minded, uncompromising,
and apt to dispute every remonstrance and fond of surpassing
everybody else, and never thinks of the welfare of the Altar
of the Spirits of Land and Grain but sticks to self-confidence
without due consideration, then ruin is possible.
13. The ruler who relies on friendship and support from
distant countries, makes light of his relations with close
neighbours, counts on the aid from big powers, and provokes
surrounding countries, is liable to ruin.
14. If foreign travellers and residents, whose property
and families are abroad, take seats in the state council and
interfere in civil affairs, then ruin is possible.
15. If the people have no[3]
confidence in the premier and
the inferiors do not obey the superiors while the sovereign
loves and trusts the premier and cannot depose him, then
ruin is possible.
16. If the ruler does not take able men of the country
into service but searches after foreign gentlemen, and if he
does not make tests according to meritorious services but
would appoint and dismiss officials according to their mere
reputations till foreign residents are exalted and ennobled
to surpass his old acquaintances, then ruin is possible.
17. If the ruler disregards the matter of legitimacy and
lets bastards rival legitimate sons, or if the sovereign dies
before he inaugurates the crown prince, then ruin is possible.
18. If the ruler is boastful but never regretful, makes much
of himself despite the disorder prevailing in his country, and
insults the neighbouring enemies without estimating the
resources within the boundaries, then ruin is possible.
19. If the state is small but the ruler will not acquiesce in
a humble status; if his forces are scanty but he never fears
strong foes; if he has no manners and insults big neighbours;
or if he is greedy and obstinate but unskilful in diplomacy;
then ruin is possible.
20. If, after the inauguration of the crown prince, the
ruler take in a woman from a strong enemy state, the crown
prince will be endangered and the ministers will be worried.
Then ruin is possible.
21. If the ruler is timid and weak in self-defence and his
mind is paralysed by the signs of future events; or if he
knows what to decide on[4]
but dare not take any drastic
measure; then ruin is possible.
22. If the exiled ruler is abroad but the country sets up
a new ruler, or if before the heir apparent taken abroad as
hostage returns, the ruler changes his successor, then the
state will divide. And the state divided against itself is
liable to ruin.
23. If the ruler keeps near and dear to the chief vassals
whom he has disheartened and disgraced or stands close[5]
by the petty men[6]
whom he has punished, then he will
make them bear anger and feel shame. If he goes on doing
this, rebels are bound to appear. When rebels appear, ruin
is possible.
24. If chief vassals rival each other in power and uncles
and brothers are many and powerful, and if they form
juntas inside and receive support from abroad and thereby
dispute state affairs and struggle for supreme influence,
then ruin is possible.
25. If words of maids and concubines are followed and
the wisdom of favourites is used, and the ruler repeats
committing unlawful acts regardless of the grievances and
resentments inside and outside the court, then ruin is possible.
26. If the ruler is contemptuous to chief vassals and
impolite to uncles and brothers, overworks the hundred
surnames, and slaughters innocent people, then ruin is
possible.
27. If the ruler is fond of twisting laws by virtue of his
wisdom, mixes public with private[7]
affairs from time to
time, alters laws and prohibitions at random, and issues
commands and orders frequently, then ruin is possible.
28. If the terrian has no stronghold,[8]
the city-walls are in
bad repair, the state has no savings and hoardings, resources
and provisions are scarce, and no preparations are made for
defence and attack, but the ruler dares to attack and invade
other countries imprudently, then ruin is possible.
29. If the royal seed is short-lived, new sovereigns succeed
to each other continuously, babies become rulers, and chief
vassals have all the ruling authority to themselves and
recruit partisans from among foreign residents and maintain
inter-state friendship by frequently ceding territories, then
ruin is possible.
30. If the crown prince is esteemed and celebrated, has
numerous dependents and protégés, develops friendships
with big powers, and exercises his authority and influence
from his early years, then ruin is possible.
31. If the ruler is narrow-minded,[9]
quick-tempered,
imprudent, easily affected, and, when provoked, becomes
blind with rage, then ruin is possible.
32. If the sovereign is easily provoked and fond of
resorting to arms and neglects agricultural and military
training but ventures warfare and invasion heedlessly, then
ruin is possible.
33. If nobles are jealous of one another, chief vassals are
prosperous, seeking support from enemy states and harassing
the hundred surnames at home so as to attack their wrongdoers,
but the lord of men never censures them, then ruin
is possible.
34. If the ruler is unworthy but his half-brothers are
worthy; if the heir apparent is powerless and the bastard
surpasses him; or if the magistrates are weak and the people
are fierce; then the state will be seized with a panic. And a
panic-stricken state is liable to ruin.
35. If the ruler conceals his anger, which he would never
reveal, suspends a criminal case, which he never would
censure, and thereby makes the officials hate him in secret
and increases their worries and fears, and if he never comes
to know the situation even after a long time, then ruin is
possible.
36. If the commander in the front line has too much
power, the governor on the frontier has too much nobility,
and if they have the ruling authority to themselves, issue
orders at their own will and do just as they wish without
asking permission of the ruler, then ruin is possible.
37. If the queen is adulterous, the sovereign's mother is
corrupt, attendants inside and outside the court intercommunicate,
and male and female have no distinction, such
a régime is called "bi-regal".[10]
Any country having two
rulers is liable to ruin.
38. If the queen is humble but the concubine is noble,
the heir apparent is low but the bastard is high, the prime
minister is despised but the court usher is esteemed, then disobedience
will appear in and out of the court. If disobedience
appears in and out of the court, the state is liable to ruin.
39. If chief vassals are very powerful, have many strong
partisans, obstruct the sovereign's decisions, and administer
all state affairs on their own authority, then ruin is possible.
40. If vassals of private families are employed but
descendants of military officers[11]
are rejected,[12]
men who do
good to their village communities are promoted but those
who render distinguished services to their official posts are
discarded, self-seeking deeds are esteemed but public-spirited
works are scorned, then ruin is possible.
41. If the state treasury is empty but the chief vassals
have plenty of money, native subjects are poor but foreign
residents are rich, farmers and warriors have hard times but
people engaged in secondary professions are benefited, then
ruin is possible.
42. The ruler who sees a great advantage but does not
advance towards it, hears the outset of a calamity but does
not provide against it, thus neglecting preparations for attack
and defence and striving to embellish himself with the
practice of benevolence and righteousness, is liable to ruin.
43. If the ruler does not practise the filial piety of the
lord of men but yearns after the filial piety of the commoner,
does not regard the welfare of the Altar of the Spirits of
Land and Grain but obeys the orders of the dowager queen,
and if he allows women to administer the state affairs and
eunuchs to meddle with politics, then ruin is possible.
44. If words are eloquent but not legal, the mind is
sagacious but not tactful, the sovereign is versatile but
performs his duties not in accordance with laws and regulations,
then ruin is possible.
45. If new[13]
ministers advance when old officials withdraw,
the unworthy meddle with politics when the virtuous pass
out of the limelight, and men of no merit are esteemed when
hard-working people are disdained, then the people left
behind will resent it. If the people left behind resent it,
ruin is possible.
46. If the bounties and allowances of uncles and brothers
exceed their merits, their badges and uniforms override their
grades, and their residences and provisions are too
extravagant, and if the lord of men never restrains them,
then ministers will become insatiable. If ministers are
insatiable, then ruin is possible.
47. If the ruler's sons-in-law and grandsons live behind
the same hamlet gate with the commoners and behave
unruly and arrogantly towards their neighbours, then ruin
is possible.
Thus, portents of ruin do not imply certainty of ruin but
liability to ruin.
Indeed, two Yaos[14]
cannot rule side by side, nor can two
Chiehs[15]
ruin each other. The secrets of rule or ruin lie in
the inclination towards order or chaos, strength or weakness.
It is true, the tree breaks down because[16]
of vermin, the
fence gives way on account[17]
of cracks. Yet, despite the
vermin, if no sudden gale blows, the tree will not break
down; despite the cracks, if no heavy rain falls, the fence
does not give way.
If the sovereign of ten thousand chariots can exercise
tact and enforce law and thereby function as gale and rain
to rulers having portents of ruin, his annexation of Allunder-Heaven
will have no difficulty.
