University of Virginia Library

Chapter XI

SOLITARY INDIGNATION[1]

Men well versed in the principles of tact[2] are always farseeing
and clearly observing. For, if not clearly observing,
they cannot discern selfishness. Men able to uphold the
law are always decisive and straightforward. For, if not
straightforward, they cannot correct crookedness.

Ministers who attend to their duties in conformity to
orders and fulfil their posts in accordance with laws, are
not called "heavy-handed men".[3] The heavy-handed men
would without any order act on their will, benefit themselves
by breaking the law, help their families by consuming state
resources, and have enough power to manipulate their
ruler. Such are the so-called[4] "heavy-handed men".

Men well versed in the principles of tact, being clearly
observing, if listened to and taken into service by the ruler,
will discern the secret motives of the heavy-handed men.

Men able to uphold the law, being straightforward, if listened
to and taken into service by the ruler, will correct the crooked
deeds of the heavy-handed men. In short, if these types of
men are taken into service, noble and powerful ministers
will infallibly fall off the inked string.[5] This is the reason
why they and the authorities in charge of the state affairs[6]
are bad enemies and unable to coexist.

If the authorities concerned take all matters of the state
into their own hands, then everybody, whether outside or
inside the court, will be bound to become their tool. Thus,
unless through their good offices, feudal lords from abroad
cannot accomplish any negotiation, wherefore even enemy
states praise[7] them; unless through their good offices, no
official in governmental service can advance his career,
wherefore the body of officials becomes their tool; unless
through their good offices, the courtiers cannot approach
the sovereign, wherefore the courtiers conceal their vices;
and, unless through their good offices, the allowances of
scholars will decrease and the treatment accorded them will
deteriorate, wherefore the learned men speak well of them.
These four assistances are means whereby wicked ministers
embellish themselves.

The heavy-handed men cannot be so loyal to the sovereign
as to recommend their enemies and the lord of men cannot
rise above their four assistances in such wise as to discern
the right types of ministers. Therefore, the more deluded[8]
the sovereign is, the more powerful the chief vassals become.

In general, the authorities concerned, in relation to the
lord of men, are rarely not trusted and beloved, and, moreover,
are his old acquaintances and long time intimates.
To please the sovereign's mind by sharing the same likes
and hates with him, is, of course, their beaten way of self-elevation.
Their posts and ranks are noble and powerful;
their friends and partisans are numerous; and the whole
country praises them with one accord. Contrary to these,
upholders of law and tact, when they want to approach the
Throne, have neither the relationship of the trusted and
beloved nor the favour of the long acquaintances and old
intimates, and, what is still worse, intend to reform the
biased mind of the lord of men with lectures on law and
tact; which altogether is opposed to the taste of the lord
of men. Naturally they have to acquiesce in a low and
humble status and, having no partisans, live in solitude and
singleness.

Indeed, the strange and distant, when contesting with the
near and dear, have no reason to win; newcomers and
travellers, when contesting with long acquaintances and old
intimates, have no reason to win; opponents of the
sovereign's opinion, when contesting with his supporters
of the same taste, have no reason to win; the humble and
powerless, when contesting with the noble and powerful,
have no reason to win; and a single mouth,[9] when contesting
with the whole country, has no reason to win. Confronted
with these five handicaps, upholders of law and tact, though
they wait for a number of years, are still[10] unable to see the

sovereign. On the contrary, the authorities concerned,
possessed of the advantages of five winnings, speak freely
to the Throne at any time. If so, how can upholders of law
and tact distinguish themselves and when can the lord of
men realize his own mistakes?

Being thus hopelessly handicapped in their equipment
and rendered incompatible with the authorities by force of
circumstances, how can upholders of law and tact avoid
dangers? Those who can be falsely accused of criminal
offences are censured with state laws; those who cannot
be indicted as criminals are ended by private swordsmen.
For this reason,[11] those who clarify the principles of law and
tact but act contrary to the sovereign's taste, if not executed
through official censure, are infallibly dispatched by private
swordsmen.

However, friends and partisans who form juntas on
purpose to delude the sovereign and twist their words so as
to benefit themselves, always win the confidence of the
heavy-handed men. Accordingly, those who can be accorded
the pretext of meritorious services are ennobled with official
rank; those who cannot[12] be accorded any good reputation
are empowered through foreign influences. For this reason,
men who delude the sovereign and frequent the gates of
private mansions, if not celebrated for official rank, are
always empowered through foreign influence.

In these days, the lord of men, without investigating

evidence and witness, inflicts censure and punishment upon
upholders of law and tact, and, without waiting for
meritorious services to appear, confers rank and bounties
upon friends and partisans of the authorities. If so, how
can the upholders of law and tact risk their lives in presenting
their ideas to the Throne, and how would the wicked
ministers discard their private advantages and withdraw
themselves from office? Therefore, the more humbled the
sovereign is, the more ennobled are the private clans.

Indeed, the Yüeh State was rich and her army was strong.
Yet the sovereign of every Central State, knowing that she
was useless to him, would say: "She is not within the reach
of my control." Take for example a state at present. However
extensive the territory and however numerous the
people, if the lord of men is deluded and the chief vassals
have all powers to themselves, that state is the same as
Yüeh.[13] If the ruler only perceives[14] no resemblance of his
state to Yüeh but fails to perceive no resemblance of the
state out of his control to the state under his control, he
never thoroughly understands what resemblance is.

People[15] speak of the fall of Ch`i. Not that the land and
cities fell to pieces, but that the Lü Clan failed to rule while
the T`ien Clan assumed the ruling power. They speak of
the fall of Chin. Not that the land and cities fell to pieces,
but that the Chi Clan failed to rule while the Six Nobles
had all powers to themselves. To-day, if chief vassals have

the ruling power in their grip and decide on all state policies
by themselves and the sovereign does not know how to
recover his prerogatives, it is because the lord of men is not
intelligent. Whoever catches the same diseases as dead
people did, cannot survive; whoever shows the same
symptoms as ruined states did, cannot exist. Therefore, the
present followers of the footsteps of Ch`i and Chin, even
though they want to secure and preserve their states, will
find it to be an unattainable task.

In general, the difficulty in enacting law and tact is met
not only by rulers of ten thousand chariots but also by rulers
of one thousand chariots. As the attendants of the lord of
men are not necessarily intelligent, if in estimating new
personnel he first takes counsel from men whom he considers
wise and then discusses their words with his attendants, he
is talking about wise men to fools. As the attendants of the
lord of men are not necessarily worthy, if in estimating new
personnel he first pays respect to men whom he considers
worthy and then discusses their deeds with his attendants,
he is talking about worthies to ruffians. If wise men have to
submit their plans for fools' approval and worthies have to
see their deeds estimated by ruffians, men of worthiness
and wisdom will feel ashamed and the ruler's conclusions
will be full of fallacies.

Among the sovereign's subjects aspiring to official honours,
refined men would keep their characters clean, and wise men
would advance their careers[16] by improving their eloquence.
They cannot please anybody with bribes. Counting on

their cleanness and eloquence,[17] they are unable to join
governmental service by bending the law. Consequently,
refined and intelligent men would neither bribe the attendants
nor comply with private requests.

The attendants of the lord of men are not as upright in
conduct as Poh-i.[18] If they fail to get what they want and
receive the bribes they expect, then the refined and intelligent
men's merits of cleanness and eloquence will come to naught
while words of slander and false accusation will ensue instead.
When merits of eloquence[19] are restricted by the courtiers
and virtues of cleanness are estimated by slanderers, then
refined and intelligent magistrates will be deposed while the
sagacity of the lord of men will be debarred. When the ruler
estimates wisdom and virtue not according to meritorious
services and judges crimes and faults not through the
processes of investigation and testimony but simply listens
to the words of the courtiers and attendants, then incapable
men will fill up the court and stupid and corrupt magistrates
will occupy all posts.

The threat to the ruler of ten thousand chariots is the chief
vassals' being too powerful. The threat to the ruler of one

thousand chariots is the attendants' being too much trusted.
Both these threats, indeed, are common to every lord of
men. Moreover, whether ministers commit major offences
or the lord of men has serious faults, ruler and minister
always have mutually[20] different interests. How is this
known? In reply I say: "The sovereign is interested in
appointing able men to office; the minister is interested in
securing employment with no competent abilities. The
sovereign is interested in awarding rank and bounties for
distinguished services; the minister is interested in obtaining
wealth and honour without merit. The sovereign is interested
in having heroic men exerting their abilities; the minister is
interested in having their friends and partisans effect self-seeking
purposes. Accordingly, when the land of the state
is dismembered, private families are enriched; when the
sovereign is degraded, chief vassals are empowered. In
consequence, when the sovereign loses his influence, ministers
gain the rule over the state; when the sovereign changes
his title into that of a feudatory vassal, the prime minister
splits tallies into halves.[21] These are the reasons why ministers
attempt to beguile the ruler and further their private
interests."

Thus, if the sovereign ever changes the circumstances,[22]
not even two or three out of ten chief vassals of the present
age can remain in favour with him. What is the reason

therefor? It is because crimes committed by ministers are
serious.

Ministers guilty of major offences must have deceived
their sovereign. Such crimes deserve the death penalty.
The wise men, far-seeing and afraid of death, never will
obey the heavy-handed men. Similarly, the worthies,
anxious to cultivate their personal integrity and ashamed
of joining the wicked ministers in deceiving the sovereign,
never will obey the chief vassals. That being so, the adherents
and dependents of the authorities concerned, if not stupid
and ignorant of the impending calamity, must be corrupt
and mind no wickedness.

The chief vassals, holding such stupid and corrupt men
under control, co-operate with them in deceiving the sovereign
from above and collect spoils from below. Their friends
and partisans exploit the masses of the people,[23] associate for
treasonable purposes, bewilder the sovereign by unifying
their words, and disturb the gentry and commoners by
breaking the law. In so doing they incline the state towards
danger and dismemberment and the sovereign towards
hardship and disgrace. Such is a major offence. When
ministers are guilty of such a major offence and the sovereign
never suppresses them, he is then committing a serious
fault. Should the sovereign commit such a serious fault
and ministers commit such a major offence, to prevent the
state from going to ruin would be impossible.