Section I
Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral
Sentiments
If we examine the most celebrated and remarkable of the
different theories which have been given concerning the nature
and origin of our moral sentiments, we shall find that almost all
of them coincide with some part or other of that which I have
been endeavouring to give an account of; and that if every thing
which has already been said be fully considered, we shall be at
no loss to explain what was the view or aspect of nature which
led each particular author to form his particular system. From
some one or other of those principles which I have been
endeavouring to unfold, every system of morality that ever had
any reputation in the world has, perhaps, ultimately been
derived. As they are all of them, in this respect, founded upon
natural principles, they are all of them in some measure in the
right. But as many of them are derived from a partial and
imperfect view of nature, there are many of them too in some
respects in the wrong.
In treating of the principles of morals there are two
questions to be considered. First, wherein does virtue consist?
Or what is the tone of temper, and tenour of conduct, which
constitutes the excellent and praise-worthy character, the
character which is the natural object of esteem, honour, and
approbation? And, secondly, by what power or faculty in the mind
is it, that this character, whatever it be, is recommended. to
us? Or in other words, how and by what means does it come to
pass, that the mind prefers one tenour of conduct to another,
denominates the one right and the other wrong; considers the one
as the object of approbation, honour, and reward, and the other
of blame, censure, and punishment?
We examine the first question when we consider whether virtue
consists in benevolence, as Dr Hutcheson imagines; or in acting
suitably to the different relations we stand in, as Dr Clarke
supposes; or in the wise and prudent pursuit of our own real and
solid happiness, as has been the opinion of others.
We examine the second question, when we consider, whether the
virtuous character, whatever it consists in, be recommended to us
by self-love, which makes us perceive that this character, both
in ourselves and others, tends most to promote our own private
interest; or by reason, which points out to us the difference
between one character and another, in the same manner as it does
that between truth and falsehood; or by a peculiar power of
perception, called a moral sense, which this virtuous character
gratifies and pleases, as the contrary disgusts and displeases
it; or last of all, by some other principle in human nature, such
as a modification of sympathy, or the like.
I shall begin with considering the systems which have been
formed concerning the first of these questions, and shall proceed
afterwards to examine those concerning the second.