Introduction
Whatever praise or blame can be due to any action, must
belong either, first, to the intention or affection of the heart,
from which it proceeds; or, secondly, to the external action or
movement of the body, which this affection gives occasion to; or,
lastly, to the good or bad consequences, which actually, and in
fact, proceed from it. These three different things constitute
the whole nature and circumstances of the action, and must be the
foundation of whatever quality can belong to it.
That the two last of these three circumstances cannot be the
foundation of any praise or blame, is abundantly evident; nor has
the contrary ever been asserted by any body. The external action
or movement of the body is often the same in the most innocent
and in the most blameable actions. He who shoots a bird, and he
who shoots a man, both of them perform the same external
movement: each of them draws the trigger of a gun. The
consequences which actually, and in fact, happen to proceed from
any action, are, if possible, still more indifferent either to
praise or blame, than even the external movement of the body. As
they depend, not upon the agent, but upon fortune, they cannot be
the proper foundation for any sentiment, of which his character
and conduct are the objects.
The only consequences for which he can be answerable, or by
which he can deserve either approbation or disapprobation of any
kind, are those which were someway or other intended, or those
which, at least, show some agreeable or disagreeable quality in
the intention of the heart, from which he acted. To the intention
or affection of the heart, therefore, to the propriety or
impropriety, to the beneficence or hurtfulness of the design, all
praise or blame, all approbation or disapprobation, of any kind,
which can justly be bestowed upon any action, must ultimately
belong.
When this maxim is thus proposed, in abstract and general
terms, there is nobody who does not agree to it. Its self-evident
justice is acknowledged by all the world, and there is not a
dissenting voice among all mankind. Every body allows, that how
different soever the accidental, the unintended and unforeseen
consequences of different actions, yet, if the intentions or
affections from which they arose were, on the one hand, equally
proper and equally beneficent, or, on the other, equally improper
and equally malevolent, the merit or demerit of the actions is
still the same, and the agent is equally the suitable object
either of gratitude or of resentment.
But how well soever we may seem to be persuaded of the truth
of this equitable maxim, when we consider it after this manner,
in abstract, yet when we come to particular cases, the actual
consequences which happen to proceed from any action, have a very
great effect upon our sentiments concerning its merit or demerit,
and almost always either enhance or diminish our sense of both.
Scarce, in any one instance, perhaps, will our sentiments be
found, after examination, to be entirely regulated by this rule,
which we all acknowledge ought entirely to regulate them.
This irregularity of sentiment, which every body feels, which
scarce any body is sufficiently aware of, and which nobody is
willing to acknowledge, I proceed now to explain; and I shall
consider, first, the cause which gives occasion to it, or the
mechanism by which nature produces it; secondly, the extent of
its influence; and, last of all, the end which it answers, or the
purpose which the Author of nature seems to have intended by it.