§ 2. THE MEANS OF ACTION OF THE LEADERS:
AFFIRMATION, REPETITION, CONTAGION.
When it is wanted to stir up a crowd for a short space of time, to
induce it to commit an act of any nature — to pillage a palace, or to die
in defence of a stronghold or a barricade, for instance — the crowd must
be acted upon by rapid suggestion, among which example is the most
powerful in its effect. To attain this end, however, it is necessary
that the crowd should have been previously prepared by
certain
circumstances, and, above all, that he who wishes to work upon it should
possess the quality to be studied farther on, to which I give the name
of prestige.
When, however, it is proposed to imbue the mind of a crowd with
ideas and beliefs — with modern social theories, for instance — the
leaders have recourse to different expedients. The principal of them
are three in number and clearly defined — affirmation, repetition, and
contagion. Their action is somewhat slow, but its effects, once
produced, are very lasting.
Affirmation pure and simple, kept free of all reasoning and all
proof, is one of the surest means of making an idea enter the mind of
crowds. The conciser an affirmation is, the more destitute of every
appearance of proof and demonstration, the more weight it carries. The
religious books and the legal codes of all ages have always resorted to
simple affirmation. Statesmen called upon to defend a political cause,
and commercial men pushing the sale of their products by means of
advertising are acquainted with the value of affirmation.
Affirmation, however, has no real influence unless it be constantly
repeated, and so far as possible in the same terms. It was Napoleon, I
believe, who said that there is only one figure in rhetoric of serious
importance, namely, repetition. The thing
affirmed comes by
repetition to fix itself in the mind in such a way that it is accepted
in the end as a demonstrated truth.
The influence of repetition on crowds is comprehensible when the
power is seen which it exercises on the most enlightened minds. This
power is due to the fact that the repeated statement is embedded in the
long run in those profound regions of our unconscious selves in which
the motives of our actions are forged. At the end of a certain time we
have forgotten who is the author of the repeated assertion, and we
finish by believing it. To this circumstance is due the astonishing
power of advertisements. When we have read a hundred, a thousand, times
that X's chocolate is the best, we imagine we have heard it said in many
quarters, and we end by acquiring the certitude that such is the fact.
When we have read a thousand times that Y's flour has cured the most
illustrious persons of the most obstinate maladies, we are tempted at
last to try it when suffering from an illness of a similar kind. If we
always read in the same papers that A is an arrant scamp and B a most
honest man we finish by being convinced that this is the truth, unless,
indeed, we are given to reading another paper of the contrary opinion,
in which the two qualifications are reversed. Affirmation and
repetition are alone powerful enough to combat each other.
When an affirmation has been sufficiently repeated and there is
unanimity in this repetition — as has occurred in the case of certain
famous financial undertakings rich enough to purchase every assistance —
what is called a current of opinion is formed and the powerful mechanism
of contagion intervenes. Ideas, sentiments, emotions, and beliefs
possess in crowds a contagious power as intense as that of microbes.
This phenomenon is very natural, since it is observed even in animals
when they are together in number. Should a horse in a stable take to
biting his manger the other horses in the stable will imitate him. A
panic that has seized on a few sheep will soon extend to the whole
flock. In the case of men collected in a crowd all emotions are very
rapidly contagious, which explains the suddenness of panics. Brain
disorders, like madness, are themselves contagious. The frequency of
madness among doctors who are specialists for the mad is notorious.
Indeed, forms of madness have recently been cited — agoraphobia, for
instance — which are communicable from men to animals.
For individuals to succumb to contagion their simultaneous presence
on the same spot is not indispensable. The action of contagion may be
felt from a distance under the influence of events which give all minds
an individual trend and the characteristics peculiar to crowds. This is
especially
the case when men's minds have been prepared to undergo
the influence in question by those remote factors of which I have made a
study above. An example in point is the revolutionary movement of 1848,
which, after breaking out in Paris, spread rapidly over a great part of
Europe and shook a number of thrones.
Imitation, to which so much influence is attributed in social
phenomena, is in reality a mere effect of contagion. Having shown its
influence elsewhere, I shall confine myself to reproducing what I said
on the subject fifteen years ago. My remarks have since been developed
by other writers in recent publications.
"Man, like animals, has a natural tendency to imitation. Imitation
is a necessity for him, provided always that the imitation is quite
easy. It is this necessity that makes the influence of what is called
fashion so powerful. Whether in the matter of opinions, ideas, literary
manifestations, or merely of dress, how many persons are bold enough to
run counter to the fashion? It is by examples not by arguments that
crowds are guided. At every period there exists a small number of individualities
which react upon the remainder and are imitated by the
unconscious mass. It is needful however, that these individualities
should not be in too pronounced disagreement with received ideas. Were
they so, to imitate them would be too difficult
and their influence
would be nil. For this very reason men who are too superior to their
epoch are generally without influence upon it. The line of separation
is too strongly marked. For the same reason too Europeans, in spite of
all the advantages of their civilisation, have so insignificant an
influence on Eastern people; they differ from them to too great an
extent.
"The dual action of the past and of reciprocal imitation renders,
in the long run, all the men of the same country and the same period so
alike that even in the case of individuals who would seem destined to
escape this double influence, such as philosophers, learned men, and men
of letters, thought and style have a family air which enables the age to
which they belong to be immediately recognised. It is not necessary to
talk for long with an individual to attain to a thorough knowledge of
what he reads, of his habitual occupations, and of the surroundings amid
which he lives."
[17]
[_]
Gustave le Bon, "L'Homme et les Sociétés," vol. ii. p.
116. 1881.
Contagion is so powerful that it forces upon individuals not only
certain opinions, but certain modes of feeling as well. Contagion is
the cause of the contempt in which, at a given period, certain works are
held — the example of "Tannhaüser" may be cited — which, a few years
later, for the same
reason are admired by those who were foremost
in criticising them.
The opinions and beliefs of crowds are specially propagated by
contagion, but never by reasoning. The conceptions at present rife
among the working classes have been acquired at the public-house as the
result of affirmation, repetition, and contagion, and indeed the mode of
creation of the beliefs of crowds of every age has scarcely been
different. Renan justly institutes a comparison between the first
founders of Christianity and "the socialist working men spreading their
ideas from public-house to public-house"; while Voltaire had already
observed in connection with the Christian religion that "for more than a
hundred years it was only embraced by the vilest riff-raff."
It will be noted that in cases analogous to those I have just
cited, contagion, after having been at work among the popular classes,
has spread to the higher classes of society. This is what we see
happening at the present day with regard to the socialist doctrines
which are beginning to be held by those who will yet be their first
victims. Contagion is so powerful a force that even the sentiment of
personal interest disappears under its action.
This is the explanation of the fact that every opinion adopted by
the populace always ends in implanting itself with great vigour in the
highest
social strata, however obvious be the absurdity of the
triumphant opinion. This reaction of the lower upon the higher social
classes is the more curious, owing to the circumstance that the beliefs
of the crowd always have their origin to a greater or less extent in
some higher idea, which has often remained without influence in the
sphere in which it was evolved. Leaders and agitators, subjugated by
this higher idea, take hold of it, distort it and create a sect which
distorts it afresh, and then propagates it amongst the masses, who carry
the process of deformation still further. Become a popular truth the
idea returns, as it were, to its source and exerts an influence on the
upper classes of a nation. In the long run it is intelligence that
shapes the destiny of the world, but very indirectly. The philosophers
who evolve ideas have long since returned to dust, when, as the result
of the process I have just described, the fruit of their reflection ends
by triumphing.