36.7
Whilst
the debate was revolving entirely round these details Hannibal was asked for
his opinion, and in what he said he turned the thoughts of the king and of all
present to the consideration of the war as a whole. He spoke as follows: "If I
had been taken into your counsels after we landed in Greece and you were
deliberating about Euboea and the Achaeans and Boeotia, I should have
expressed the same view which I am expressing now with regard to the
Thessalians. I consider that it is of the first importance that we should use
every possible means to bring Philip and the Macedonians into an armed
alliance with us. As to Euboea and the Boeotians and the Thessalians, who
can doubt that these people who have no strength of their own and always
cringe before a power which is present to their eyes will display the same
craven spirit which marks the proceedings of their councils in suing for
pardon, and as soon as they see a Roman army in Greece will turn to their
accustomed obedience? Nor will they be blamed for refusing to try
conclusions with your strength when you and your army are amongst them
and the Romans are far away. How much sooner ought we -how much
better would it be -to secure the adhesion of Philip than of these people! For
if he once takes up the cause he will have everything at stake, and he will
contribute an amount of strength which will not only be an accession to us in
a war with Rome, but was not long ago sufficient of itself to withstand the
Romans. I trust I shall not give offence in saying that with him as our ally I
cannot feel doubtful as to the issue, for I see that those through whose
assistance the Romans prevailed against Philip will now be the men by whom
the Romans themselves are opposed. The Aetolians, who as is universally
admitted defeated Philip, will now be fighting in company with him against
the Romans. Amynander and the Athamanians, who next to the Aetolians
rendered the greatest service in the war, will be on our side. While you,
Antiochus, had not yet moved, Philip sustained the whole weight of the war;
now you and he, the mightiest monarchs in Asia and Europe, will direct your
united strength against a single people who -to say nothing of my own
fortunes, good or bad -were at all events in the days of our fathers no match
for even one king of Epirus, and how can he possibly be compared with you?
"What considerations then give me ground for believing that Philip
can be made our ally? One is the identity of interests, which is the surest
bond of alliance. The other is your own assurance, Aetolians. For amongst
the reasons which your envoy Thoas gave for inducing Antiochus to come to
Greece, the strongest was his constant asseveration that Philip was
complaining and chafing under the servile conditions imposed upon him in
the guise of peace. He used to compare the king's rage to that of some
animal chained or shut up and longing to burst his prison bars. If that is his
state of mind, let us loose his chains and burst the bars that hold him in so
that he can vent his long-restrained rage on our common foe. But if our
delegates are unable to influence him, let us at all events see to it that if we
cannot get him on our side the enemy does not get him on his side. Your son
Seleucus is at Lysimachia; if with the army he has with him he traverses
Thrace and begins to lay waste the adjacent parts of Macedonia, he will
easily turn Philip aside from actively assisting the Romans to the defence of
his own dominions.
"You are in possession of my opinions about Philip. As regards the
general strategy of the war, you have known from the outset what my views
are. Had I been listened to then, it would not have been the capture of
Chalcis or the storming of a fort on the Euripus that the Romans would have
heard about; they would have learnt that Etruria and Liguria and the coastal
districts of Cisalpine Gaul were wrapped in the flames of war and, what
would have alarmed them most of all, that Hannibal was in Italy. I am of
opinion that even now you ought to bring up the whole of your military and
naval forces and let a fleet of transports accompany them laden with
supplies. We here are too few for the requirements of war and too many for
our scanty commissariat. When you have concentrated your entire strength,
Antiochus, you might divide your fleet and keep one division cruising off
Corcyra, that there may be no safe and easy passage for the Romans, the
other you would send across to the coast of Italy opposite Sardinia and
Africa. You yourself would advance with all your land forces into the
country round Byllis; from there you would protect Greece and give the
Romans the impression that you are going to sail to Italy, and should
circumstances render it necessary you will be in readiness to do so. This is
what I advise you to do, and though I may not be profoundly versed in every
phase of war, how to war with the Romans at all events I have learnt
through success and failure alike. In the measures which I have advised you
to take I promise to co-operate most loyally and energetically. I trust that
whatever course, Antiochus, seems best to you may receive the approval of
the gods."