Book XIX.
Of Laws in Relation to the Principles Which Form the
General Spirit, Morals, and Customs of a Nation.
19.2. 1. Of the Subject of this Book.
This subject is very extensive. In
that crowd of ideas which presents itself to my mind, I shall be more
attentive to the order of things than to the things themselves. I shall
be obliged to wander to the right and to the left, that I may
investigate and discover the truth.
19.2. 2. That it is necessary People's Minds should be prepared for the
Reception of the best Laws.
Nothing could appear more insupportable to
the Germans than the tribunal of Varus.
[1]
That which Justinian
[2]
erected amongst the Lazi, to proceed against the murderers of their
king, appeared to them as an affair most horrid and barbarous.
Mithridates,
[3]
haranguing against the Romans, reproached them more
particularly for their law proceedings.
[4]
The Parthians could not bear
with one of their kings who, having been educated at Rome, rendered
himself affable and easy of access to all.
[5]
Liberty itself has
appeared intolerable to those nations who have not been accustomed to
enjoy it. Thus pure air is sometimes disagreeable to such as have lived
in a fenny country.
Baibi, a Venetian, being at Pegu, was introduced to the king.
[6]
When the monarch was informed that they had no king at Venice, he burst
into such a fit of laughter that he was seized with a cough, and with
difficulty could speak to his courtiers. What legislator could propose a
popular government to a people like this?
Footnotes
[1]
They cut out the tongues of the advocates, and cried, "Viper,
don't hiss." — Tacitus.
[4]
"Calumnias litium" -- Ibid.
[5]
"Prompti aditus, nova comitas, ignotæ Parthis virtutes, nova vitia." Tacitus.
[6]
He has described this interview, which happened in 1596, in the
Collection of Voyages that Contributed to the Establishment of the East
India Company, iii, part I, p. 33.
19.3. 3. Of Tyranny.
There are two sorts of tyranny: one real, which
arises from oppression; the other is seated in opinion, and is sure to
be felt whenever those who govern establish things shocking to the
existing ideas of a nation.
Dio
[7]
tells us that Augustus was desirous of being called Romulus;
but having been informed that the people feared that he would cause
himself to be crowned king, he changed his design. The old Romans were
averse to a king, because they could not suffer any man to enjoy such
power; these would not have a king, because they could not bear his
manners. For though Csar, the Triumvirs, and Augustus were really
invested with regal power, they had preserved all the outward appearance
of equality, while their private lives were a kind of contrast to the
pomp and luxury of foreign monarchs; so that when the Romans were
resolved to have no king, this only signified that they would preserve
their customs, and not imitate those of the African and eastern nations.
The same writer informs us that the Romans were exasperated against
Augustus for making certain laws which were too severe; but as soon as
he had recalled Pylades the comedian, whom the jarring of different
factions had driven out of the city, the discontent ceased. A people of
this stamp have a more lively sense of tyranny when a player is banished
than when they are deprived of their laws.
Footnotes
[7]
Book liv. 17, p. 532.
19.4. 4. Of the general Spirit of Mankind.
Mankind are influenced by
various causes: by the climate, by the religion, by the laws, by the
maxims of government, by precedents, morals, and customs; whence is
formed a general spirit of nations.
In proportion as, in every country, any one of these causes acts
with more force, the others in the same degree are weakened. Nature and
the climate rule almost alone over the savages; customs govern the
Chinese; the laws tyrannise in Japan; morals had formerly all their
influence at Sparta; maxims of government, and the ancient simplicity of
manners, once prevailed at Rome.
19.5. 5. How far we should be attentive lest the general Spirit of a
Nation be changed.
Should there happen to be a country whose inhabitants
were of a social temper, open-hearted, cheerful, endowed with taste and
a facility in communicating their thoughts; who were sprightly and
agreeable; sometimes imprudent, often indiscreet; and besides had
courage, generosity, frankness, and a certain notion of honour, no one
ought to endeavour to restrain their manners by laws, unless he would
lay a constraint on their virtues. If in general the character be good,
the little foibles that may be found in it are of small importance.
They might lay a restraint upon women, enact laws to reform their
manners and to reduce their luxury, but who knows but that by these
means they might lose that peculiar taste which would be the source of
the wealth of the nation, and that politeness which would render the
country frequented by strangers?
It is the business of the legislature to follow the spirit of the
nation, when it is not contrary to the principles of government; for we
do nothing so well as when we act with freedom, and follow the bent of
our natural genius.
If an air of pedantry be given to a nation that is naturally gay,
the state will gain no advantage from it, either at home or abroad.
Leave it to do frivolous things in the most serious manner, and with
gaiety the things most serious.
19.6. 6. That Everything ought not to be corrected.
Let them but leave us
as we are, said a gentleman of a nation which had a very great
resemblance to that we have been describing, and nature will repair
whatever is amiss. She has given us a vivacity capable of offending, and
hurrying us beyond the bounds of respect: this same vivacity is
corrected by the politeness it procures, inspiring us with a taste of
the world, and, above all, for the conversation of the fair sex.
Let them leave us as we are; our indiscretions joined to our good
nature would make the laws which should constrain our sociability not at
all proper for us.
19.7. 7. Of the Athenians and Lacedmonians.
The Athenians, this gentleman
adds, were a nation that had some relation to ours. They mingled gaiety
with business; a stroke of raillery was as agreeable in the senate as in
the theatre. This vivacity, which discovered itself in their councils,
went along with them in the execution of their resolves. The
characteristic of the Spartans was gravity, seriousness, severity, and
silence. It would have been as difficult to bring over an Athenian by
teasing as it would a Spartan by diverting him.
19.8. 8. Effects of a sociable Temper.
The more communicative a people
are, the more easily they change their habits, because each is in a
greater degree a spectacle to the other and the singularities of
individuals are better observed. The climate which influences one nation
to take pleasure in being communicative, makes it also delight in
change, and that which makes it delight in change forms its taste.
The society of the fair sex spoils the manners and forms the taste;
the desire of giving greater pleasure than others establishes the
embellishments of dress; and the desire of pleasing others more than
ourselves gives rise to fashions. Thus fashion is a subject of
importance; by encouraging a trifling turn of mind, it continually
increases the branches of its commerce.
[8]
Footnotes
19.9. 9. Of the Vanity and Pride of Nations. Vanity is as advantageous to
a government as pride is dangerous.
To be convinced of this we need only
represent, on the one hand, the numberless benefits which result from
vanity, as industry, the arts, fashions, politeness, and taste; on the
other, the infinite evils which spring from the pride of certain
nations, as laziness, poverty, a total neglect of everything — in fine,
the destruction of the nations which have happened to fall under their
government, as well as of their own. Laziness is the effect of pride;
[9]
labour, a consequence of vanity. The pride of a Spaniard leads him to
decline labour; the vanity of a Frenchman to work better than others.
All lazy nations are grave; for those who do not labour regard
themselves as the sovereigns of those who do.
If we search among all nations, we shall find that for the most part
gravity, pride, and indolence go hand in hand.
The people of Achim
[10]
are proud and lazy; those who have no
slaves, hire one, if it be only to carry a quart of rice a hundred
paces; they would be dishonoured if they carried it themselves.
In many places people let their nails grow, that all may see they do
not work.
Women in the Indies
[11]
believe it shameful for them to learn to
read: this is, they say, the business of their slaves, who sing their
spiritual songs in the temples of their pagods. In one tribe they do not
spin; in another they make nothing but baskets and mats; they are not
even to pound rice; and in others they must not go to fetch water. These
rules are established by pride, and the same passion makes them
followed. There is no necessity for mentioning that the moral qualities,
according as they are blended with others, are productive of different
effects; thus pride, joined to a vast ambition and notions of grandeur,
produced such effects among the Romans as are known to all the world.
Footnotes
[9]
The people who follow the khan of Malacamber, those of Carnataca
and Coromandel, are proud and indolent; they consume little, because
they are miserably poor; while the subjects of the Mogul and the people
of Hindostan employ themselves, and enjoy the conveniences of life, like
the Europeans. — "Collection of Voyages that Contributed to the
Establishment of the East India Company," vol. i, p. 54.
[11]
"Edifying Letters," coll. xil, p. 80.
19.10. 10. Of the Character of the Spaniards and Chinese.
The characters of the several nations are formed of virtues and vices, of good and bad
qualities. From the happy mixture of these, great advantages result, and
frequently where it would be least expected; there are others whence
great evils arise — evils which one would not suspect.
The Spaniards have been in all ages famous for their honesty.
Justin
[12]
mentions their fidelity in keeping whatever was entrusted to
their care; they have frequently suffered death rather than reveal a
secret. They have still the same fidelity for which they were formerly
distinguished. All the nations who trade at Cadiz trust their fortunes
to the Spaniards, and have never yet repented it. But this admirable
quality, joined to their indolence, forms a mixture whence such effects
result as to them are most pernicious. The rest of the European nations
carry on in their very sight all the commerce of their monarchy.
The character of the Chinese is formed of another mixture, directly
opposite to that of the Spaniards; the precariousness of their
subsistence
[13]
inspires them with a prodigious activity, and such an
excessive desire of gain, that no trading nation can confide in
them.
[14]
This acknowledged infidelity has secured them the possession
of the trade to Japan. No European merchant has ever dared to undertake
it in their name, how easy soever it might be for them to do it from
their maritime provinces in the north.
Footnotes
[13]
By the nature of the soil and climate.
[14]
Father Du Halde, vol. ii.
19.11. 11. A Reflection.
I have said nothing here with a view to lessen
that infinite distance which must ever be between virtue and vice. God
forbid that I should be guilty of such an attempt! I would only make my
readers comprehend that all political are not all moral vices; and that
all moral are not political vices; and that those who make laws which
shock the general spirit of a nation ought not to be ignorant of this.
19.12. 12. Of Customs and Manners in a despotic State.
It is a capital maxim that the manners and customs of a despotic empire ought never to
be changed; for nothing would more speedily produce a revolution. The
reason is that in these states there are no laws, that is, none that can
be properly called so; there are only manners and customs; and if you
overturn these you overturn all.
Laws are established, manners are inspired; these proceed from a
general spirit, those from a particular institution: now it is as
dangerous, nay more so, to subvert the general spirit as to change a
particular institution.
There is less communication in a country where each, either as
superior or inferior, exercises or is oppressed by arbitrary power, than
there is in those where liberty reigns in every station. They do not,
therefore, so often change their manners and behaviour. Fixed and
established customs have a near resemblance to laws. Thus it is here
necessary that a prince or a legislator should less oppose the manners
and customs of the people than in any other country upon earth.
Their women are commonly confined, and have no influence in society.
In other countries, where they have intercourse with men, their desire
of pleasing, and the desire men also have of giving them pleasure,
produce a continual change of customs. The two sexes spoil each other;
they both lose their distinctive and essential quality; what was
naturally fixed becomes quite unsettled, and their customs and behaviour
alter every day.
19.13. 13. Of the Behaviour of the Chinese.
But China is the place where
the customs of the country can never be changed. Besides their women
being absolutely separated from the men, their customs, like their
morals, are taught in the schools. A man of letters may be known by his
easy address.
[15]
These things being once taught by precept, and
inculcated by grave doctors, become fixed, like the principles of
morality, and are never changed.
Footnotes
19.14. 14. What are the natural Means of changing the Manners and Customs
of a Nation.
We have said that the laws were the particular and precise
institutions of a legislator, and manners and customs the institutions
of a nation in general. Hence it follows that when these manners and
customs are to be changed, it ought not to be done by laws; this would
have too much the air of tyranny: it would be better to change them by
introducing other manners and other customs.
Thus when a prince would make great alterations in his kingdom, he
should reform by law what is established by law, and change by custom
what is settled by custom; for it is very bad policy to change by law
what ought to be changed by custom.
The law which obliged the Muscovites to cut off their beards and to
shorten their clothes, and the rigour with which Peter I made them crop,
even to their knees, the long cloaks of those who entered into the
cities, were instances of tyranny. There are means that may be made use
of to prevent crimes; these are punishments: there are those for
changing our customs; these are examples.
The facility and ease with which that nation has been polished
plainly shows that this prince had a worse opinion of his people than
they deserved; and that they were not brutes, though he was pleased to
call them so. The violent measures which he employed were needless; he
would have attained his end as well by milder methods.
He himself experienced the facility of bringing about these
alterations. The women were shut up, and in some measure slaves; he
called them to court; he sent them silks and fine stuffs, and made them
dress like the German ladies. This sex immediately relished a manner of
life which so greatly flattered their taste, their vanity, and their
passions; and by their means it was relished by the men.
What rendered the change the more easy was that their manners at
that time were foreign to the climate, and had been introduced among
them by conquest and by a mixture of nations. Peter I, in giving the
manners and customs of Europe to a European nation, found a facility
which he did not himself expect. The empire of the climate is the first,
the most powerful, of all empires. He had then no occasion for laws to
change the manners and customs of his country; it would have been
sufficient to have introduced other manners and other customs.
Nations are in general very tenacious of their customs; to take them
away by violence is to render them unhappy: we should not therefore
change them, but engage the people to make the change themselves.
All punishment which is not derived from necessity is tyrannical.
The law is not a mere act of power; things in their own nature
indifferent are not within its province.
19.15. 15. The Influence of domestic Government on the political.
This alteration in the manners of women will doubtless have a great influence
on the government of Muscovy. One naturally follows the other: the
despotic power of the prince is connected with the servitude of women;
the liberty of women with the spirit of monarchy.
19.16. 16. How some Legislators have confounded the Principles which govern
Mankind.
Manners and customs are those habits which are not established
by legislators, either because they were not able or were not willing to
establish them.
There is this difference between laws and manners, that the laws are
most adapted to regulate the actions of the subject, and manners to
regulate the actions of the man. There is this difference between
manners and customs, that the former principally relate to the interior
conduct, the latter to the exterior.
These things have been sometimes confounded.
[16]
Lycurgus made the
same code for the laws, manners, and customs, and the legislators of
China have done the same.
We ought not to be surprised that the legislators of China and
Sparta should confound the laws, manners, and customs; the reason is,
their manners represent their laws, and their customs their manners.
The principal object which the legislators of China had in view was
to make their subjects live in peace and tranquillity. They would have
people filled with a veneration for one another, that each should be
every moment sensible of his dependence on society, and of the
obligations he owed to his fellow-citizens. They therefore gave rules of
the most extensive civility.
Thus the inhabitants of the villages of China
[17]
practise amongst
themselves the same ceremonies as those observed by persons of an
exalted station; a very proper method of inspiring mild and gentle
dispositions, of maintaining peace and good order, and of banishing all
the vices which spring from an asperity of temper. In effect, would not
the freeing them from the rules of civility be to search out a method
for them to indulge their own humours?
Civility is in this respect of more value than politeness.
Politeness flatters the vices of others, and civility prevents ours from
being brought to light. It is a barrier which men have placed within
themselves to prevent the corruption of each other.
Lycurgus, whose institutions were severe, had no regard to civility;
in forming the external behaviour he had a view to that warlike spirit
with which he would fain inspire his people. A people who were in a
continual state of discipline and instruction, and who were endued with
equal simplicity and rigour, atoned by their virtues for their want of
complaisance.
Footnotes
[16]
Moses made the same code for laws and religion. The old Romans
confounded the ancient customs with the laws.
[17]
See Father Du Halde.
19.17. 17. Of the peculiar Quality of the Chinese Government.
The legislators of China went further.
[18]
They confounded their religion,
laws, manners, and customs; all these were morality, all these were
virtue. The precepts relating to these four points were what they
called rites; and it was in the exact observance of these that the
Chinese government triumphed. They spent their whole youth in learning
them, their whole life in the practice. They were taught by their men of
letters, they were inculcated by the magistrates; and as they included
all the ordinary actions of life, when they found the means of making
them strictly observed, China was well governed.
Two things have contributed to the ease with which these rites are
engraved on the hearts and minds of the Chinese; one, the difficulty of
writing, which during the greatest part of their lives wholly employs
their attention,
[19]
because it is necessary to prepare them to read and
understand the books in which they are comprised; the other, that the
ritual precepts having nothing in them that is spiritual, but being
merely rules of common practice, are more adapted to convince and strike
the mind than things merely intellectual.
Those princes who, instead of ruling by these rites, governed by the
force of punishments, wanted to accomplish that by punishments which it
is not in their power to produce, that is, to give habits of morality.
By punishments, a subject is very justly cut off from society, who,
having lost the purity of his manners, violates the laws; but if all the
world were to lose their moral habits, would these reestablish them?
Punishments may be justly inflicted to put a stop to many of the
consequences of the general evil, but they will not remove the evil
itself. Thus when the principles of the Chinese government were
discarded, and morality was banished, the state fell into anarchy, and
revolutions succeeded.
Footnotes
[18]
See the classic books from which Father Du Halde gives us some
excellent extracts.
[19]
It is this which has established emulation, which has banished
laziness, and cultivated a love of learning.
19.18. 18. A Consequence drawn from the preceding Chapter.
Hence it follows that the laws of China are not destroyed by conquest. Their customs,
manners, laws, and religion being the same thing, they cannot change all
these at once; and as it will happen that either the conqueror or the
conquered must change, in China it has always been the conqueror. For
the manners of the conquering nation not being their customs, nor their
customs their laws, nor their laws their religion, it has been more easy
for them to conform by degrees to the vanquished people than the latter
to them.
There still follows hence a very unhappy consequence, which is that
it is almost impossible for Christianity ever to be established in
China.
[20]
The vows of virginity, the assembling of women in churches,
their necessary communication with the ministers of religion, their
participation in the sacraments, auricular confession, extreme unction,
the marriage of only one wife — all these overturn the manners and
customs of the country, and with the same blow strike at their religion
and laws.
The Christian religion, by the establishment of charity, by a public
worship, by a participation of the same sacraments, seems to demand that
all should be united; while the rites of China seem to ordain that all
should be separated.
And as we have seen that this separation
[21]
depends, in general, on
the spirit of despotism, this will show us the reason why monarchies,
and indeed all moderate governments, are more consistent with the
Christian religion.
[22]
Footnotes
[20]
See the reasons given by the Chinese magistrates in their
decrees for proscribing the Christian religion. "Edifying Letters," coll. xvii.
[21]
See Book iv, chap. 3, Book xix, chap. 12.
[22]
See Book xxiv, chap. 3.
19.19. 19. How this Union of Religion, Laws, Manners, and Customs among the
Chinese was effected.
The principal object of government which the
Chinese legislators had in view was the peace and tranquillity of the
empire; and subordination appeared to them as the most proper means to
maintain it. Filled with this idea, they believed it their duty to
inspire a respect for parents, and therefore exerted all their power to
effect it. They established an infinite number of rites and ceremonies
to do them honour when living, and after their death. It was impossible
for them to pay such honours to deceased parents without being led to
reverence the living. The ceremonies at the death of a father were more
nearly related to religion; those for a living parent had a greater
relation to the laws, manners, and customs: however, these were only
parts of the same code; but this code was very extensive.
A veneration for their parents was necessarily connected with a
suitable respect for all who represented them; such as old men, masters,
magistrates, and the sovereign. This respect for parents supposed a
return of love towards children, and consequently the same return from
old men to the young, from magistrates to those who were under their
jurisdiction, and from the emperor to his subjects. This formed the
rites, and these rites the general spirit of the nation.
We shall now show the relation which things in appearance the most
indifferent may bear to the fundamental constitution of China. This
empire is formed on the plan of a government of a family. If you
diminish the paternal authority, or even if you retrench the ceremonies
which express your respect for it, you weaken the reverence due to
magistrates, who are considered as fathers; nor would the magistrates
have the same care of the people, whom they ought to look upon as their
children; and that tender relation which subsists between the prince and
his subjects would insensibly be lost. Retrench but one of these habits
and you overturn the state. It is a thing in itself very indifferent
whether the daughter-in-law rises every morning to pay such and such
duties to her mother-in-law; but if we consider that these exterior
habits incessantly revive an idea necessary to be imprinted on all minds
-- an idea that forms the ruling spirit of the empire — we shall see
that it is necessary that such or such a particular action be performed.
19.20. 20. Explanation of a Paradox relating to the Chinese.
It is very remarkable that the Chinese, whose lives are guided by rites, are
nevertheless the greatest cheats upon earth. This appears chiefly in
their trade, which, in spite of its natural tendency, has never been
able to make them honest. He who buys of them ought to carry with him
his own weights;
[23]
every merchant having three sorts, the one heavy
for buying, another light for selling, and another of the true standard
for those who are upon their guard. It is possible, I believe, to
explain this contradiction.
The legislators of China had two objects in view: they were desirous
that the people should be submissive and peaceful, and that they should
also be laborious and industrious. By the nature of the soil and
climate, their subsistence is very precarious; nor can it be in any
other way secured than by industry and labour.
When every one obeys, and every one is employed, the state is in a
happy situation. It is necessity, and perhaps the nature of the climate,
that has given to the Chinese an inconceivable greediness for gain, and
laws have never been made to restrain it. Everything has been forbidden
when acquired by acts of violence; everything permitted when obtained by
artifice or labour. Let us not then compare the morals of China with
those of Europe. Every one in China is obliged to be attentive to what
will be for his advantage; if the cheat has been watchful over his own
interest, he who is the dupe ought to be attentive to his. At Sparta
they were permitted to steal; in China they are suffered to deceive.
Footnotes
[23]
Lange, Journal in 1721 and 1722; in "Voyages to the North," vol. viii, p. 363.
19.21. 21. How the Laws ought to have a Relation to Manners and Customs.
It is only singular institutions which thus confound laws, manners, and
customs — things naturally distinct and separate; but though they are
in themselves different, there is nevertheless a great relation between
them.
Solon being asked if the laws he had given to the Athenians were the
best, he replied, "I have given them the best they were able to
bear"
[24]
-- a fine expression, that ought to be perfectly understood by
all legislators! When Divine Wisdom said to the Jews, "I have given you
precepts which are not good," this signified that they had only a
relative goodness; which is the sponge that wipes out all the
difficulties in the law of Moses.
Footnotes
[24]
Plutarch, "Life of Solon."
19.22. 22. The same Subject continued.
When a people have pure and regular
manners, their laws become simple and natural. Plato
[25]
says that
Rhadamanthus, who governed a nation extremely religious, finished every
process with extraordinary despatch, administering only the oath on each
accusation. "But," says the same Plato,
[26]
"when a people are not
religious we should never have recourse to an oath, except he who swears
is entirely disinterested, as in the case of a judge and a witness."
Footnotes
19.23. 23. How the Laws are founded on the Manners of a People.
At the time when the manners of the Romans were pure, they had no particular law
against the embezzlement of the public money. When this crime began to
appear, it was thought so infamous, that to be condemned to restore
[27]
what they had taken was considered as a sufficient disgrace: for a proof
of this, see the sentence of L. Scipio.
[28]
Footnotes
19.24. 24. The same Subject continued.
The laws which gave the right of
tutelage to the mother were most attentive to the preservation of the
infant's person; those which granted it to the next heir were most
attentive to the preservation of the state. When the manners of a people
are corrupted, it is much better to give the tutelage to the mother.
Among those whose laws confide in the manners of the subjects, the
guardianship is granted either to the next heir or to the mother, and
sometimes to both.
If we reflect on the Roman laws, we shall find that the spirit of
these was conformable to what I have advanced. At the time when the laws
of the Twelve Tables were made, the manners of the Romans were most
admirable. The guardianship was given to the nearest relative of the
infant, from a consideration that he ought to have the trouble of the
tutelage who might enjoy the advantage of possessing the inheritance.
They did not imagine the life of the heir in danger though it was put
into a person's hands who would reap a benefit by his death. But when
the manners of Rome were changed, her legislators altered their conduct.
"If, in the pupillary substitution," say Gaius
[29]
and Justinian,
[30]
"the testator is afraid that the substitute will lay any snares for the
pupil, he may leave the vulgar substitution open,
[31]
and put the pupillary into a part of the testament, which cannot be opened till
after a certain time." These fears and precautions were unknown to the
primitive Romans.
Footnotes
[29]
"Institutes," lib. ii. tit. 6, section 2. Ozel's compilation, Leyden,
1658.
[30]
Ibid., lib. ii., De Pupil. substit. 3.
[31]
The form of the vulgar substitution ran thus: "If such a one is
unwilling to take the inheritance, I substitute in his stead," &c.;
the pupillary substitution: "If such a one dies before he arrives at the
age of puberty, I substitute," &c.
19.25. 25. The same Subject continued.
The Roman law gave the liberty of
making presents before marriage; after the marriage they were not
allowed. This was founded on the manners of the Romans, who were led to
marriage only by frugality, simplicity, and modesty; but might suffer
themselves to be seduced by domestic cares, by complacency, and the
constant tenor of conjugal felicity.
A law of the Visigoths
[32]
forbade the man giving more to the woman
he was to marry than the tenth part of his substance, and his giving her
anything during the first year of their marriage. This also took its
rise from the manners of the country. The legislators were willing to
put a stop to that Spanish ostentation which only led them to display an
excessive liberality in acts of magnificence.
The Romans by their laws put a stop to some of the inconveniences
which arose from the most durable empire in the world — that of virtue;
the Spaniards, by theirs, would prevent the bad effects of a tyranny the
most frail and transitory — that of beauty.
Footnotes
[32]
Book iii, tit. 5, 5.
19.26. 26. The same Subject continued.
The law of Theodosius and
Valentinian
[33]
drew the causes of repudiation from the ancient manners
and customs of the Romans.
[34]
It placed in the number of these causes
the behaviour of the husband who beat his wife
[35]
in a manner that
disgraced the character of a free-born woman. This cause was omitted in
the following laws:
[36]
for their manners, in this respect, had
undergone a change, the eastern customs having banished those of Europe.
The first eunuch of the empress, wife to Justinian II, threatened, says
the historian, to chastise her in the same manner as children are
punished at school. Nothing but established manners, or those which they
were seeking to establish, could raise even an idea of this kind.
We have seen how the laws follow the manners of a people; let us now
observe how the manners follow the laws.
Footnotes
[33]
Leg. 8, Cod., De Repud.
[34]
And the law of the Twelve Tables. See Cicero, "Philippic," ii. 69.
[35]
"Si verberibus quæ ingenuis aliena sunt, afficientem probaverit."
[36]
In Nov. 117, cap. xiv.
19.27. 27. How the Laws contribute to form the Manners, Customs, and
Character of a Nation.
The customs of an enslaved people are a part of
their servitude, those of a free people are a part of their liberty.
I have spoken in the eleventh book
[37]
of a free people, and have
given the principles of their constitution: let us now see the effects
which follow from this liberty, the character it is capable of forming,
and the customs which naturally result from it.
I do not deny that the climate may have produced a great part of the
laws, manners, and customs of this nation; but I maintain that its
manners and customs have a close connection with its laws.
As there are in this state two visible powers — the legislative and
executive, and as every citizen has a will of his own, and may at
pleasure assert his independence, most men have a greater fondness for
one of these powers than for the other, and the multitude have commonly
neither equity nor sense enough to show an equal affection to both.
And as the executive power, by disposing of all employments, may
give great hopes, and no fears, every man who obtains any favour from it
is ready to espouse its cause; while it is liable to be attacked by
those who have nothing to hope from it.
All the passions being unrestrained, hatred, envy, jealousy, and an
ambitious desire of riches and honours, appears in their extent; were it
otherwise, the state would be in the condition of a man weakened by
sickness, who is without passions because he is without strength.
The hatred which arises between the two parties will always subsist,
because it will always be impotent.
These parties being composed of freemen, if the one becomes too
powerful for the other, as a consequence of liberty, this other is
depressed; while the citizens take the weaker side with the same
readiness as the hands lend their assistance to remove the infirmities
and disorders of the body.
Every individual is independent, and being commonly led by caprice
and humour, frequently changes parties; he abandons one where he left
all his friends, to unite himself to another in which he finds all his
enemies: so that in this nation it frequently happens that the people
forget the laws of friendship, as well as those of hatred.
The sovereign is here in the same case with a private person; and
against the ordinary maxims of prudence is frequently obliged to give
his confidence to those who have most offended him, and to disgrace the
men who have best served him: he does that by necessity which other
princes do by choice.
As we are afraid of being deprived of the blessing we already enjoy,
and which may be disguised and misrepresented to us; and as fear always
enlarges objects, the people are uneasy under such a situation, and
believe themselves in danger, even in those moments when they are most
secure.
As those who with the greatest warmth oppose the executive power
dare not avow the self-interested motives of their opposition, so much
the more do they increase the terrors of the people, who can never be
certain whether they are in danger or not. But even this contributes to
make them avoid the real dangers, to which they may, in the end, be
exposed.
But the legislative body having the confidence of the people, and
being more enlightened than they, may calm their uneasiness, and make
them recover from the bad impressions they have entertained.
This is the great advantage which this government has over the
ancient democracies, in which the people had an immediate power; for
when they were moved and agitated by the orators, these agitations
always produced their effect.
But when an impression of terror has no certain object, it produces
only clamour and abuse; it has, however, this good effect, that it puts
all the springs of government into motion, and fixes the attention of
every citizen. But if it arises from a violation of the fundamental
laws, it is sullen, cruel, and produces the most dreadful catastrophes.
Soon we should see a frightful calm, during which every one would
unite against that power which had violated the laws.
If, when the uneasiness proceeds from no certain object, some
foreign power should threaten the state, or put its prosperity or its
glory in danger, the little interests of party would then yield to the
more strong and binding, and there would be a perfect coalition in
favour of the executive power.
But if the disputes were occasioned by a violation of the
fundamental laws, and a foreign power should appear, there would be a
revolution that would neither alter the constitution nor the form of
government. For a revolution formed by liberty becomes a confirmation
of liberty.
A free nation may have a deliverer: a nation enslaved can have only
another oppressor.
For whoever is able to dethrone an absolute prince has a power
sufficient to become absolute himself.
As the enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation,
consists in every man's being allowed to speak his thoughts, and to lay
open his sentiments, a citizen in this state will say or write whatever
the laws do not expressly forbid to be said or written.
A people like this, being always in a ferment, are more easily
conducted by their passions than by reason, which never produces any
great effect in the mind of man; it is therefore easy for those who
govern to make them undertake enterprises contrary to their true
interest.
This nation is passionately fond of liberty, because this liberty is
real; and it is possible for it, in its defence, to sacrifice its
wealth, its ease, its interest, and to support the burden of the
heaviest taxes, even such as a despotic prince durst not lay upon his
subjects.
But as the people have a certain knowledge of the necessity of
submitting to those taxes, they pay them from the well-founded hope of
their discontinuance; their burdens are heavy, but they do not feel
their weight; whilst in other states the uneasiness is infinitely
greater than the evil.
This nation must therefore have a fixed and certain credit, because
it borrows of itself and pays itself. It is possible for it to undertake
things above its natural strength, and employ against its enemies
immense sums of fictitious riches, which the credit and nature of the
government may render real.
To preserve its liberty, it borrows of its subjects: and the
subjects, seeing that its credit would be lost if ever it were
conquered, have a new motive to make fresh efforts in defence of its
liberty.
This nation, inhabiting an island, is not fond of conquering,
because it would be weakened by distant conquests — especially as the
soil of the island is good, for it has then no need of enriching itself
by war; and as no citizen is subject to another, each sets a greater
value on his own liberty than on the glory of one or any number of
citizens.
Military men are there regarded as belonging to a profession which
may be useful but is often dangerous, and as men whose very services are
burdensome to the nation: civil qualifications are therefore more
esteemed than the military.
This nation, which liberty and the laws render easy, on being freed
from pernicious prejudices, has become a trading people; and as it has
some of those primitive materials of trade out of which are manufactured
such things as from the artist's hand receive a considerable value, it
has made settlements proper to procure the enjoyment of this gift of
heaven in its fullest extent.
As this nation is situated towards the north, and has many
superfluous commodities, it must want also a great amount of merchandise
which its climate will not produce: it has therefore entered into a
great and necessary intercourse with the southern nations; and making
choice of those states whom it is willing to favour with an advantageous
commerce, it enters into such treaties with the nation it has chosen as
are reciprocally useful to both.
In a state where, on the one hand, the opulence is extreme, and on
the other the taxes are excessive, they are hardly able to live on a
small fortune without industry. Many, therefore, under a pretence of
travelling, or of health, retire from among them, and go in search of
plenty, even to the countries of slavery.
A trading nation has a prodigious number of little particular
interests; it may then injure or be injured in an infinite number of
ways. Thus it becomes immoderately jealous, and is more afflicted at the
prosperity of others than it rejoices at its own.
And its laws, otherwise mild and easy, may be so rigid with respect
to the trade and navigation carried on with it, that it may seem to
trade only with enemies.
If this nation sends colonies abroad, it must rather be to extend
its commerce than its dominion.
As men are fond of introducing into other places what they have
established among themselves, they have given the people of the colonies
their own form of government; and this government carrying prosperity
along with it, they have raised great nations in the forests they were
sent to inhabit.
Having formerly subdued a neighbouring nation, which by its
situation, the goodness of its ports, and the nature of its products,
inspires it with jealousy, though it has given this nation its own laws,
yet it holds it in great dependence: the subjects there are free and the
state itself in slavery.
The conquered state has an excellent civil government, but is
oppressed by the law of nations. Laws are imposed by one country on the
other, and these are such as render its prosperity precarious and
dependent on the will of a master.
The ruling nation inhabiting a large island, and being in possession
of a great trade, has with extraordinary ease grown powerful at sea; and
as the preservation of its liberties requires that it should have
neither strongholds nor fortresses nor land forces, it has occasion for
a formidable navy to defend it against invasions; a navy which must be
superior to that of all other powers, who, employing their treasures in
wars on land, have not sufficient for those at sea.
The empire of the sea has always given those who have enjoyed it a
natural pride; because, thinking themselves capable of extending their
insults wherever they please, they imagine that their power is as
boundless as the ocean.
This nation has a great influence in the affairs of its neighbours;
for as its power is not employed in conquests, its friendship is more
courted, and its resentment more dreaded, than could naturally be
expected from the inconstancy of its government, and its domestic
divisions.
Thus it is the fate of the executive power to be almost always
disturbed at home and respected abroad.
Should this nation on some occasions become the centre of the
negotiations of Europe, probity and good faith would be carried to a
greater height than in other places; because the ministers being
frequently obliged to justify their conduct before a popular council,
their negotiations could not be secret; and they would be forced to be,
in this respect, a little more honest.
Besides, as they would in some sort be answerable for the events
which an irregular conduct might produce, the surest, the safest way for
them would be to take the straightest path.
If the nobles were formerly possessed of an immoderate power, and
the monarch had found the means of abasing them by raising the people,
the point of extreme servitude must have been that between humbling the
nobility and that in which the people began to feel their power.
Thus this nation, having been formerly subject to an arbitrary
power, on many occasions preserves the style of it, in such a manner as
to let us frequently see upon the foundation of a free government the
form of an absolute monarchy.
With regard to religion, as in this state every subject has a free
will, and must consequently be either conducted by the light of his own
mind or by the caprice of fancy, it necessarily follows that every one
must either look upon all religion with indifference, by which means
they are led to embrace the established religion, or they must be
zealous for religion in general, by which means the number of sects is
increased.
It is not impossible but that in this nation there may be men of no
religion, who would not, however, bear to be obliged to change that
which they would choose, if they cared to choose any; for they would
immediately perceive that their lives and fortunes are not more
peculiarly theirs than their manner of thinking, and that whoever would
deprive them of the one might even with better reason take away the
other.
If, among the different religions, there is one that has been
attempted to be established by methods of slavery, it must there be
odious; because as we judge of things by the appendages we join with
them, it could never present itself to the mind in conjunction with the
idea of liberty.
The laws against those who profess this religion could not, however,
be of the sanguinary kind; for liberty can never inflict such
punishments; but they may be so rigorous as to do all the mischief that
can be done in cold blood.
It is possible that a thousand circumstances might concur to give
the clergy so little credit, that other citizens may have more.
Therefore, instead of a separation, they have chosen rather to support
the same burdens as the laity, and in this respect to make only one body
with them; but as they always seek to conciliate the respect of the
people, they distinguish themselves by a more retired life, a conduct
more reserved, and a greater purity of manners.
The clergy not being able to protect religion, nor to be protected
by it, only seek to persuade; their pens therefore furnish us with
excellent works in proof of a revelation and of the providence of the
Supreme Being.
Yet the state prevents the sitting of their assemblies, and does not
suffer them to correct their own abuses; it chooses thus, through a
caprice of liberty, rather to leave their reformation imperfect than to
suffer the clergy to be the reformers.
Those dignities which make a fundamental part of the constitution
are more fixed than elsewhere; but, on the other hand, the great in this
country of liberty are nearer upon a level with the people; their ranks
are more separated, and their persons more confounded.
As those who govern have a power which, in some measure, has need of
fresh vigour every day, they have a greater regard for such as are
useful to them than for those who only contribute to their amusement: we
see, therefore, fewer courtiers, flatterers, and parasites; in short,
fewer of all those who make their own advantage of the folly of the
great.
Men are less esteemed for frivolous talents and attainments than for
essential qualities; and of this kind there are but two, riches and
personal merit.
They enjoy a solid luxury, founded, not on the refinements of
vanity, but on that of real wants; they ask nothing of nature but what
nature can bestow.
The rich enjoy a great superfluity of fortune, and yet have no
relish for frivolous amusements; thus, many having more wealth than
opportunities of expense, employ it in a fantastic manner: in this
nation they have more judgment than taste.
As they are always employed about their own interest, they have not
that politeness which is founded on indolence; and they really have not
leisure to attain it.
The era of Roman politeness is the same as that of the establishment
of arbitrary power. An absolute government produces indolence, and this
gives birth to politeness.
The more people there are in a nation who require circumspect
behaviour, and care not to displease, the more there is of politeness.
But it is rather the politeness of morals than that of manners which
ought to distinguish us from barbarous nations.
In a country where every man has, in some sort, a share in the
administration of the government, the women ought scarcely to live with
the men. They are therefore modest, that is, timid; and this timidity
constitutes their virtue: whilst the men without a taste for gallantry
plunge themselves into a debauchery, which leaves them at leisure, and
in the enjoyment of their full liberty.
Their laws not being made for one individual more than another, each
considers himself a monarch; and, indeed, the men of this nation are
rather confederates than fellow-subjects.
As the climate has given many persons a restless spirit and extended
views, in a country where the constitution gives every man a share in
its government and political interests, conversation generally turns
upon politics: and we see men spend their lives in the calculation of
events which, considering the nature of things and the caprices of
fortune, or rather of men, can scarcely be thought subject to the rules
of calculation.
In a free nation it is very often a matter of indifference whether
individuals reason well or ill; it is sufficient that they do reason:
hence springs that liberty which is a security from the effects of these
reasonings.
But in a despotic government, it is equally pernicious whether they
reason well or ill; their reasoning is alone sufficient to shock the
principle of that government.
Many people who have no desire of pleasing abandon themselves to
their own particular humour; and most of those who have wit and
ingenuity are ingenious in tormenting themselves: filled with contempt
or disgust for all things, they are unhappy amidst all the blessings
that can possibly contribute to promote their felicity.
As no subject fears another, the whole nation is proud; for the
pride of kings is founded only on their independence.
Free nations are haughty; others may more properly be called vain.
But as these men who are naturally so proud live much by themselves,
they are commonly bashful when they appear among strangers; and we
frequently see them behave for a considerable time with an odd mixture
of pride and ill-placed shame.
The character of the nation is more particularly discovered in their
literary performances, in which we find the men of thought and deep
meditation.
As society gives us a sense of the ridicule of mankind, retirement
renders us more fit to reflect on the folly of vice. Their satirical
writings are sharp and severe, and we find among them many Juvenals,
without discovering one Horace.
In monarchies extremely absolute, historians betray the truth,
because they are not at liberty to speak it; in states remarkably free,
they betray the truth, because of their liberty itself; which always
produces divisions, every one becoming as great a slave to the
prejudices of his faction as he could be in a despotic state.
Their poets have more frequently an original rudeness of invention
than that particular kind of delicacy which springs from taste; we there
find something which approaches nearer to the bold strength of a Michl
Angelo than to the softer graces of a Raphl.
Footnotes