Book VIII.
Of the Corruption of the Principles of the Three Governments.
8.1. 1. General Idea of this Book.
The corruption of this government generally begins with that of the
principles.
8.2. 2. Of the Corruption of the Principles of Democracy.
The principle of democracy is corrupted not only when the spirit of
equality is extinct, but likewise when they fall into a spirit of
extreme equality, and when each citizen would fain be upon a level with
those whom he has chosen to command him. Then the people, incapable of
bearing the very power they have delegated, want to manage everything
themselves, to debate for the senate, to execute for the magistrate, and
to decide for the judges.
When this is the case, virtue can no longer subsist in the republic.
The people are desirous of exercising the functions of the magistrates,
who cease to be revered. The deliberations of the senate are slighted;
all respect is then laid aside for the senators, and consequently for
old age. If there is no more respect for old age, there will be none
presently for parents; deference to husbands will be likewise thrown
off, and submission to masters. This licence will soon become general,
and the trouble of command be as fatiguing as that of obedience. Wives,
children, slaves will shake off all subjection. No longer will there be
any such thing as manners, order, or virtue.
We find in Xenophon's Banquet a very lively description of a
republic in which the people abused their equality. Each guest gives in
his turn the reason why he is satisfied. "Content I am," says Chamides,
"because of my poverty. When I was rich, I was obliged to pay my court
to informers, knowing I was more liable to be hurt by them than capable
of doing them harm. The republic constantly demanded some new tax of me;
and I could not decline paying. Since I have grown poor, I have acquired
authority; nobody threatens me; I rather threaten others. I can go or
stay where I please. The rich already rise from their seats and give me
the way. I am a king, I was before a slave: I paid taxes to the
republic, now it maintains me: I am no longer afraid of losing: but I
hope to acquire."
The people fall into this misfortune when those in whom they
confide, desirous of concealing their own corruption, endeavour to
corrupt them. To disguise their own ambition, they speak to them only
of the grandeur of the state; to conceal their own avarice, they
incessantly flatter theirs.
The corruption will increase among the corruptors, and likewise
among those who are already corrupted. The people will divide the public
money among themselves, and, having added the administration of affairs
to their indolence, will be for blending their poverty with the
amusements of luxury. But with their indolence and luxury, nothing but
the public treasure will be able to satisfy their demands.
We must not be surprised to see their suffrages given for money. It
is impossible to make great largesses to the people without great
extortion: and to compass this, the state must be subverted. The greater
the advantages they seem to derive from their liberty, the nearer they
approach towards the critical moment of losing it. Petty tyrants arise
who have all the vices of a single tyrant. The small remains of liberty
soon become insupportable; a single tyrant starts up, and the people are
stripped of everything, even of the profits of their corruption.
Democracy has, therefore, two excesses to avoid — the spirit of
inequality, which leads to aristocracy or monarchy, and the spirit of
extreme equality, which leads to despotic power, as the latter is
completed by conquest.
True it is that those who corrupted the Greek republics did not
always become tyrants. This was because they had a greater passion for
eloquence than for the military art. Besides there reigned an implacable
hatred in the breasts of the Greeks against those who subverted a
republican government; and for this reason anarchy degenerated into
annihilation, instead of being changed into tyranny.
But Syracuse being situated in the midst of a great number of petty
states, whose government had been changed from oligarchy to tyranny,
[1]
and being governed by a senate
[2]
scarcely ever mentioned in history,
underwent such miseries as are the consequence of a more than ordinary
corruption. This city, ever a prey to licentiousness
[3]
or oppression, equally labouring under the sudden and alternate succession of liberty
and servitude, and notwithstanding her external strength, constantly
determined to a revolution by the least foreign power — this city, I
say, had in her bosom an immense multitude of people, whose fate it was
to have always this cruel alternative, either of choosing a tyrant to
govern them, or of acting the tyrant themselves.
Footnotes
[1]
See Plutarch in Timoleon and Dion.
[2]
It was that of the Six Hundred, of whom mention is made by
Diodorus, xix. 5.
[3]
Upon the expulsions of the tyrants, they made citizens of
strangers and mercenary troops, which gave rise to civil wars. --
Aristotle, "Politics," v. 3. The people having been the cause of the
victory over the Athenians, the republic was changed. — Ibid., 4. The
passion of two young magistrates, one of whom carried off the other's
boy, and in revenge the other debauched his wife, was attended with a
change in the form of this republic. — Ibid.
8.3. 3. Of the Spirit of extreme Equality.
As distant as heaven is from earth, so is the true spirit of
equality from that of extreme equality. The former does not imply that
everybody should command, or that no one should be commanded, but that
we obey or command our equals. It endeavours not to shake off the
authority of a master, but that its masters should be none but its
equals.
In the state of nature, indeed, all men are born equal, but they
cannot continue in this equality. Society makes them lose it, and they
recover it only by the protection of the laws.
Such is the difference between a well-regulated democracy and one
that is not so, that in the former men are equal only as citizens, but
in the latter they are equal also as magistrates, as senators, as
judges, as fathers, as husbands, or as masters.
The natural place of virtue is near to liberty; but it is not nearer
to excessive liberty than to servitude.
8.4. 4. Particular Cause of the Corruption of the People.
Great success, especially when chiefly owing to the people,
intoxicates them to such a degree that it is impossible to contain them
within bounds. Jealous of their magistrates, they soon became jealous
likewise of the magistracy; enemies to those who govern, they soon prove
enemies also to the constitution. Thus it was that the victory over the
Persians in the straits of Salamis corrupted the republic of Athens;
[4]
and thus the defeat of the Athenians ruined the republic of Syracuse.
[5]
Marseilles never experienced those great transitions from lowness to
grandeur; this was owing to the prudent conduct of that republic, which
always preserved her principles.
Footnotes
8.5. 5. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Aristocracy.
Aristocracy is corrupted if the power of the nobles becomes
arbitrary: when this is the case, there can no longer be any virtue
either in the governors or the governed.
If the reigning families observe the laws, it is a monarchy with
several monarchs, and in its own nature one of the most excellent; for
almost all these monarchs are tied down by the laws. But when they do
not observe them, it is a despotic state swayed by a great many despotic
princes.
In the latter case, the republic consists only in the nobles. The
body governing is the republic; and the body governed is the despotic
state; which forms two of the most heterogeneous bodies in the world.
The extremity of corruption is when the power of the nobles becomes
hereditary;
[6]
for then they can hardly have any moderation. If they are
only a few, their power is greater, but their security less: if they are
a larger number, their power is less, and their security greater,
insomuch that power goes on increasing, and security diminishing, up to
the very despotic prince who is encircled with excess of power and danger.
The great number, therefore, of nobles in an hereditary aristocracy
renders the government less violent: but as there is less virtue, they
fall into a spirit of supineness and negligence, by which the state
loses all its strength and activity.
[7]
An aristocracy may maintain the full vigour of its constitution if
the laws be such as are apt to render the nobles more sensible of the
perils and fatigues than of the pleasure of command: and if the
government be in such a situation as to have something to dread, while
security shelters under its protection, and uncertainty threatens from
abroad.
As a certain kind of confidence forms the glory and stability of
monarchies, republics, on the contrary, must have something to
apprehend.
[8]
A fear of the Persians supported the laws of Greece.
Carthage and Rome were alarmed, and strengthened by each other. Strange,
that the greater security those states enjoyed, the more, like stagnated
waters, they were subject to corruption!
Footnotes
[6]
The aristocracy is changed into an oligarchy.
[7]
Venice is one of those republics that has enacted the best laws
for correcting the inconveniences of an hereditary aristocracy.
[8]
Justin attributes the extinction of Athenian virtue to the death
of Epaminondas. Having no further emulation, they spent their revenues
in feasts, frequentius coenam, quam castra visentes. Then it was that
the Macedonians emerged from obscurity, 9, 1. 6.
8.6. 6. Of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchy.
As democracies are subverted when the people despoil the senate, the
magistrates, the judges of their functions, so monarchies are corrupted
when the prince insensibly deprives societies or cities of their
privileges. In the former case the multitude usurp the power, in the
latter it is usurped by a single person.
"The destruction of the dynasties of Tsin and Soui," says a Chinese
author, "was owing to this: the princes, instead of confining
themselves, like their ancestors, to a general inspection, the only one
worthy of a sovereign, wanted to govern everything immediately by
themselves."
[9]
The Chinese author gives us in this instance the cause
of the corruption of almost all monarchies.
Monarchy is destroyed when a prince thinks he shows a greater
exertion of power in changing than in conforming to the order of things;
when he deprives some of his subjects of their hereditary employments to
bestow them arbitrarily upon others; and when he is fonder of being
guided by fancy than judgment.
Again, it is destroyed when the prince, directing everything
entirely to himself, calls the state to his capital, the capital to his
court, and the court to his own person.
It is destroyed, in fine, when the prince mistakes his authority,
his situation and the love of his people, and when he is not fully
persuaded that a monarch ought to think himself secure, as a despotic
prince ought to think himself in danger.
Footnotes
[9]
Compilation of works made under the Mings, related by Father Du
Halde, "Description of China," ii, p. 648.
8.7. 7. The same Subject continued.
The principle of monarchy is corrupted when the first dignities are
marks of the first servitude, when the great men are deprived of public
respect, and rendered the low tools of arbitrary power.
It is still more corrupted when honour is set up in contradiction to
honours, and when men are capable of being loaded at the very same time
with infamy
[10]
and with dignities.
It is corrupted when the prince changes his justice into severity;
when he puts, like the Roman emperors, a Medusa's head on his
breast;
[11]
and when he assumes that menacing and terrible air which
Commodus ordered to be given to his statues.
[12]
Again, it is corrupted when mean and abject souls grow vain of the
pomp attending their servitude, and imagine that the motive which
induces them to be entirely devoted to their prince exempts them from
all duty to their country.
But if it be true (and indeed the experience of all ages has shown
it) that in proportion as the power of the monarch becomes boundless and
immense, his security diminishes, is the corrupting of this power, and
the altering of its very nature, a less crime than that of high treason
against the prince?
Footnotes
[10]
During the reign of Tiberius statues were erected to, and
triumphal ornaments conferred on, informers; which debased these honours
to such a degree that those who had really merited them disdained to
accept them. Frag. of Dio, lviii. 14, taken from the "Extract of Virtues
and Vices," by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. See in Tacitus in what manner
Nero, on the discovery and punishment of a pretended conspiracy,
bestowed triumphal ornaments on Petronius Turpilianus, Nerva, and
Tigellinus. — "Annals," xiv. 72. See likewise how the generals refused to
serve, because they condemned the military honours: pervulgatis triumphi
insignibus — "Annals," Book xiii. 53.
[11]
In this state the prince knew extremely well the principle of
his government.
8.8. 8. Danger of the Corruption of the Principle of monarchical Government.
The danger is not when the state passes from one moderate to another
moderate government, as from a republic to a monarchy, or from a
monarchy to a republic; but when it is precipitated from a moderate to a
despotic government.
Most of the European nations are still governed by the principles of
morality. But if from a long abuse of power or the fury of conquest,
despotic sway should prevail to a certain degree, neither morals nor
climate would be able to withstand its baleful influence: and then human
nature would be exposed, for some time at least, even in this beautiful
part of the world, to the insults with which she has been abused in the
other three.
8.9. 9. How ready the Nobility are to defend the Throne.
The English nobility buried themselves with Charles the First under
the ruins of the throne; and before that time, when Philip the Second
endeavoured to tempt the French with the allurement of liberty, the
crown was constantly supported by a nobility who think it an honour to
obey a king, but consider it as the lowest disgrace to share the power
with the people.
The house of Austria has ever used her endeavours to oppress the
Hungarian nobility; little thinking how serviceable that very nobility
would be one day to her. She would fain have drained their country of
money, of which they had no plenty; but took no notice of the men, with
whom it abounded. When princes combined to dismember her dominions, the
several parts of that monarchy fell motionless, as it were one upon
another. No life was then to be seen but in those very nobles, who,
resenting the affronts offered to the sovereign, and forgetting the
injuries done to themselves, took up arms to avenge her cause, and
considered it the highest glory bravely to die and to forgive.
8.10. 10. Of the Corruption of the Principle of despotic Government.
The principle of despotic government is subject to a continual
corruption, because it is even in its nature corrupt. Other governments
are destroyed by particular accidents, which do violence to the
principles of each constitution; this is ruined by its own intrinsic
imperfections, when some accidental causes do not prevent the corrupting
of its principles. It maintains itself therefore only when
circumstances, drawn from the climate, religion, situation, or genius of
the people, oblige it to conform to order, and to admit of some rule. By
these things its nature is forced without being changed; its ferocity
remains; and it is made tame and tractable only for a time.
8.11. 11. Natural Effects of the Goodness and Corruption of the
Principles of Government.
When once the principles of government are corrupted, the very best
laws become bad, and turn against the state: but when the principles are
sound, even bad laws have the same effect as good; the force of the
principle draws everything to it.
The inhabitants of Crete used a very singular method to keep the
principal magistrates dependent on the laws, which was that of
Insurrection. Part of the citizens rose up in arms,
[13]
put the magistrates to flight, and obliged them to return to a private life.
This was supposed to be done in consequence of the law. One would have
imagined that an institution of this nature, which established sedition
to hinder the abuse of power, would have subverted any republic
whatsoever; and yet it did not subvert that of Crete. The reason is
this.
[14]
When the ancients would cite a people that had the strongest
affection for their country, they were sure to mention the inhabitants
of Crete: "Our Country," said Plato,
[15]
"a name so dear to the Cretans." They called it by a name which signifies the
love of a mother for her children.
[16]
Now the love of our country sets everything right.
The laws of Poland have likewise their Insurrection: but the
inconveniences thence arising plainly show that the people of Crete
alone were capable of using such a remedy with success.
The gymnic exercises established among the Greeks had the same
dependence on the goodness of the principle of government. "It was the
Lacedmonians and Cretans," said Plato,
[17]
"that opened those celebrated
academies which gave them so eminent a rank in the world. Modesty at
first was alarmed; but it yielded to the public utility." In Plato's
time these institutions were admirable:
[18]
as they bore a relation to a
very important object, which was the military art. But when virtue fled
from Greece, the military art was destroyed by these institutions;
people appeared then on the arena, not for improvement, but for
debauch.
[19]
Plutarch informs us
[20]
that the Romans in his time were of
opinion that those games had been the principal cause of the slavery
into which the Greeks had fallen. On the contrary, it was the slavery of
the Greeks that corrupted those exercises. In Plutarch's time,
[21]
their fighting naked in the parks, and their wrestling, infected the young
people with a spirit of cowardice, inclined them to infamous passions,
and made them mere dancers. But under Epaminondas the exercise of
wrestling made the Thebans win the famous battle of Leuctra.
[22]
There are very few laws which are not good, while the state retains
its principles: here I may apply what Epicurus said of riches. "It is
not the liquor, but the vessel that is corrupted."
Footnotes
[13]
Aristotle, "Politics," ii. 10.
[14]
They always united immediately against foreign enemies, which
was called Syncretism. — Plutarch "Mor.," p. 88.
[16]
Plutarch's "Morals," treatise "Whether a Man Advanced in Years Ought to Meddle with
Public Affairs."
[18]
The Gymnic art was divided into two parts, dancing and
wrestling. In Crete they had the armed dances of the Curetes; at Sparta
they had those of Castor and Pollux; at Athens the armed dances of
Pallas, which were extremely proper for those that were not yet of age
for military service. "Wrestling is the image of war," said Plato "Laws,"
vii. He commends antiquity for having established only two dances, the
pacific and the Pyrrhic. See how the latter dance was applied to the
military art, Plato, ibid.
[19]
Aut libidinoscæ. Ladæas Lacedæmonis palæstras. — Mutual, iv, 55.
[20]
Plutarch's "Morals," in the treatise entitled "Questions Concerning the
Affairs of the Romans," question 40.
[22]
Plutarch's "Morals," "Table Propositions," book ii, question 5.
7.12. 12. The same Subject continued.
In Rome the judges were chosen at first from the order of senators.
This privilege the Gracchi transferred to the knights; Drusus gave it to
the senators and knights; Sulla to the senators only: Cotta to the
senators, knights, and public treasurers; Csar excluded the latter;
Antony made decuries of senators, knights, and centurions.
When once a republic is corrupted, there is no possibility of
remedying any of the growing evils, but by removing the corruption and
restoring its lost principles; every other correction is either useless
or a new evil. While Rome preserved her principles entire, the judicial
power might without any abuse be lodged in the hands of senators; but as
soon as this city became corrupt, to whatsoever body that power was
transferred, whether to the senate, to the knights, to the treasurers,
to two of those bodies, to all three together, or to any other, matters
still went wrong. The knights had no more virtue than the senate, the
treasurers no more than the knights, and these as little as the
centurions.
After the people of Rome had obtained the privilege of sharing the
magistracy with the patricians, it was natural to think that their
flatterers would immediately become arbiters of the government. But no
such thing ever happened. — It was observable that the very people who
had rendered the plebeians capable of public offices ever fixed their
choice upon the patricians. Because they were virtuous, they were
magnanimous; and because they were free, they had a contempt of power.
But when their morals were corrupted, the more power they were
possessed of, the less prudent was their conduct, till at length, upon
becoming their own tyrants and slaves, they lost the strength of liberty
to fall into the weakness and impotency of licentiousness.
8.13. 13. The Effect of an Oath among virtuous People.
There is no nation, says Livy,
[23]
that has been longer uncorrupted
than the Romans; no nation where moderation and poverty have been longer
respected.
Such was the influence of an oath among those people that nothing
bound them more strongly to the laws. They often did more for the
observance of an oath than they would ever have performed for the thirst
of glory or for the love of their country.
When Quintus Cincinnatus, the consul, wanted to raise an army in the
city against the qui and the Volsci, the tribunes opposed him. "Well,"
said he, "let all those who have taken an oath to the consul of the
preceding year march under my banner."
[24]
In vain did the tribunes cry
out that this oath was no longer binding, and that when they took it
Quintus was but a private person: the people were more religious than
those who pretended to direct them; they would not listen to the
distinctions or equivocations of the tribunes.
When the same people thought of retiring to the Sacred Mount, they
felt some remorse from the oath they had taken to the consuls, that they
would follow them into the field.
[25]
They entered then into a design of
killing the consuls; but dropped it when they were given to understand
that their oath would still be binding. Now it is easy to judge of the
notion they entertained of the violation of an oath from the crime they
intended to commit.
After the battle of Cann, the people were seized with such a panic
that they would fain have retired to Sicily. But Scipio having prevailed
upon them to swear they would not stir from Rome, the fear of violating
this oath surpassed all other apprehensions. Rome was a ship held by two
anchors, religion and morality, in the midst of a furious tempest.
Footnotes
[24]
Livy, Book iii., chap. 20.
8.14. 14. How the smallest Change of the Constitution is attended with
the Ruin of its Principles.
Aristotle mentions the city of Carthage as a well-regulated
republic. Polybius tells us
[26]
that there was this inconvenience at
Carthage in the second Punic war, that the senate had lost almost all
its authority. We are informed by Livy that when Hannibal returned to
Carthage he found that the magistrates and the principal citizens had
abused their power, and converted the public revenues to their private
emolument. The virtue, therefore, of the magistrates, and the authority
of the senate, both fell at the same time; and all was owing to the same
cause.
Every one knows the wonderful effects of the censorship among the
Romans. There was a time when it grew burdensome; but still it was
supported because there was more luxury than corruption. Claudius
[27]
weakened its authority, by which means the corruption became greater
than the luxury, and the censorship dwindled away of itself.
[28]
After various interruptions and resumptions, it was entirely laid aside, till
it became altogether useless, that is, till the reigns of Augustus and
Claudius.
Footnotes
[26]
About a hundred years after.
[27]
See Book xi, chap. 12.
[28]
See Dio, xxxviii, Cicero in Plutarch, Cicero to Atticus, iv. 10,
15. Asconius on Cicero, "De Divinatione."
8.15. 15. Sure Methods of preserving the three Principles.
I shall not be able to make myself rightly understood till the
reader has perused the four following chapters.
8.16. 16. Distinctive Properties of a Republic.
It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory;
otherwise it cannot long subsist. In an extensive republic there are men
of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts
too considerable to be placed in any single subject; he has interests of
his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious, by
oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to
grandeur on the ruins of his country.
In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand
private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on
accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is more obvious,
better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses
have less extent, and of course are less protected.
The long duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to her having
continued in the same extent of territory after all her wars. The sole
aim of Sparta was liberty; and the sole advantage of her liberty, glory.
It was the spirit of the Greek republics to be as contented with
their territories as with their laws. Athens was first fired with
ambition and gave it to Lacedmon; but it was an ambition rather of
commanding a free people than of governing slaves; rather of directing
than of breaking the union. All was lost upon the starting up of
monarchy — a government whose spirit is more turned to increase of
dominion.
Excepting particular circumstances,
[29]
it is difficult for any
other than a republican government to subsist longer in a single town. A
prince of so petty a state would naturally endeavour to oppress his
subjects, because his power would be great, while the means of enjoying
it or of causing it to be respected would be inconsiderable. The
consequence is, he would trample upon his people. On the other hand,
such a prince might be easily crushed by a foreign or even a domestic
force; the people might any instant unite and rise up against him. Now
as soon as the sovereign of a single town is expelled, the quarrel is
over; but if he has many towns, it only begins.
Footnotes
[29]
As when a petty sovereign supports himself between two great
powers by means of their mutual jealousy; but then he has only a
precarious existence.
8.17. 17. Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy.
A monarchical state ought to be of moderate extent. Were it small,
it would form itself into a republic; were it very large, the nobility,
possessed of great estates, far from the eye of the prince, with a
private court of their own, and secure, moreover, from sudden executions
by the laws and manners of the country — such a nobility, I say, might
throw off their allegiance, having nothing to fear from too slow and too
distant a punishment.
Thus Charlemagne had scarcely founded his empire when he was obliged
to divide it; whether the governors of the provinces refused to obey; or
whether, in order to keep them more under subjection, there was a
necessity of parcelling the empire into several kingdoms.
After the decease of Alexander his empire was divided. How was it
possible for those Greek and Macedonian chiefs, who were each of them
free and independent, or commanders at least of the victorious bands
dispersed throughout that vast extent of conquered land — how was it
possible, I say, for them to obey?
Attila's empire was dissolved soon after his death; such a number of
kings, who were no longer under restraint, could not resume their
fetters.
The sudden establishment of unlimited power is a remedy, which in
those cases may prevent a dissolution: but how dreadful the remedy,
which after the enlargement of dominion opens a new scene of misery!
The rivers hasten to mingle their waters with the sea; and
monarchies lose themselves in despotic power.
8.18. 18. Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy.
Let not the example of Spain be produced against me, it rather
proves what I affirm. To preserve America she did what even despotic
power itself does not attempt: she destroyed the inhabitants. To
preserve her colony, she was obliged to keep it dependent even for its
subsistence.
In the Netherlands, she essayed to render herself arbitrary; and as
soon as she abandoned the attempt, her perplexity increased. On the one
hand the Walloons would not be governed by Spaniards; and on the other,
the Spanish soldiers refused to submit to Walloon officers.
[30]
In Italy she maintained her ground, merely by exhausting herself and
by enriching that country. For those who would have been pleased to have
got rid of the king of Spain were not in a humour to refuse his gold.
Footnotes
[30]
See M. Le Clerc, the "History of the United Provinces."
8.19. 19. Distinctive Properties of a despotic Government.
A large empire supposes a despotic authority in the person who
governs. It is necessary that the quickness of the prince's resolutions
should supply the distance of the places they are sent to; that fear
should prevent the remissness of the distant governor or magistrate;
that the law should be derived from a single person, and should shift
continually, according to the accidents which necessarily multiply in a
state in proportion to its extent.
8.20. 20. Consequence of the preceding Chapters.
If it be, therefore, the natural property of small states to be
governed as a republic, of middling ones to be subject to a monarch, and
of large empires to be swayed by a despotic prince; the consequence is,
that in order to preserve the principles of the established government,
the state must be supported in the extent it has acquired, and that the
spirit of this state will alter in proportion as it contracts or extends
its limits.
8.21. 21. Of the Empire of China.
Before I conclude this book, I shall answer an objection that may be
made to the foregoing doctrine.
Our missionaries inform us that the government of the vast empire of
China is admirable, and that it has a proper mixture of fear, honour,
and virtue. Consequently I must have given an idle distinction in
establishing the principles of the three governments.
But I cannot conceive what this honour can be among a people who act
only through fear of being bastinadoed.
[31]
Again, our merchants are far from giving us any such accounts of the
virtue so much talked of by the missionaries; we need only consult them
in relation to the robberies and extortions of the mandarins.
[32]
I likewise appeal to another unexceptional witness, the great Lord Anson.
Besides, Father Perennin's letters concerning the emperor's
proceedings against some of the princes of the blood
[33]
who had incurred his displeasure by their conversion, plainly show us a settled
plan of tyranny, and barbarities committed by rule, that is, in cold
blood.
We have likewise Monsieur de Mairan's, and the same Father
Perennin's, letters on the government of China. I find therefore that
after a few proper questions and answers the whole mystery is unfolded.
Might not our missionaries have been deceived by an appearance of
order? Might not they have been struck with that constant exercise of a
single person's will — an exercise by which they themselves are
governed, and which they are so pleased to find in the courts of the
Indian princes; because as they go thither only in order to introduce
great changes, it is much easier to persuade those princes that there
are no bounds to their power, than to convince the people that there are
none to their submission.
[34]
In fine, there is frequently some kind of truth even in errors
themselves. It may be owing to particular and, perhaps, very
extraordinary circumstances that the Chinese government is not so
corrupt as one might naturally expect. The climate and some other
physical causes may, in that country, have had so strong an influence on
their morals as in some measure to produce wonders.
The climate of China is surprisingly favourable to the propagation
of the human species.
[35]
The women are the most prolific in the whole
world. The most barbarous tyranny can put no stop to the progress of
propagation. The prince cannot say there like Pharaoh, "Let us deal
wisely with them, lest they multiply." He would be rather reduced to
Nero's wish, that mankind had all but one head. In spite of tyranny,
China by the force of its climate will be ever populous, and triumph
over the tyrannical oppressor.
China, like all other countries that live chiefly upon rice, is
subject to frequent famines. When the people are ready to starve, they
disperse in order to seek for nourishment; in consequence of which,
gangs of robbers are formed on every side. Most of them are extirpated
in their very infancy; others swell, and are likewise suppressed. And
yet in so great a number of such distant provinces, some band or other
may happen to meet with success. In that case they maintain their
ground, strengthen their party, form themselves into a military body,
march up to the capital, and place their leader on the throne.
From the very nature of things, a bad administration is here
immediately punished. The want of subsistence in so populous a country
produces sudden disorders. The reason why the redress of abuses in other
countries is attended with such difficulty is because their effects are
not immediately felt; the prince is not informed in so sudden and
sensible a manner as in China.
The Emperor of China is not taught like our princes that if he
governs ill he will be less happy in the other life, less powerful and
less opulent in this. He knows that if his government be not just he
will be stripped both of empire and life.
As China grows every day more populous, notwithstanding the exposing
of children,
[36]
the inhabitants are incessantly employed in tilling the
lands for their subsistence. This requires a very extraordinary
attention in the government. It is their perpetual concern that every
man should have it in his power to work, without the apprehension of
being deprived of the fruits of his labour. Consequently this is not so
much a civil as a domestic government.
Such has been the origin of those regulations which have been so
greatly extolled. They wanted to make the laws reign in conjunction with
despotic power; but whatever is joined to the latter loses all its
force. In vain did this arbitrary sway, labouring under its own
inconveniences, desire to be fettered; it armed itself with its chains,
and has become still more terrible.
China is therefore a despotic state, whose principle is fear.
Perhaps in the earliest dynasties, when the empire had not so large an
extent, the government might have deviated a little from this spirit;
but the case is otherwise at present.
Footnotes
[31]
"It is the cudgel that governs China," says Father Du Halde,
"Disc. de la Chine," ii, p. 134.
[32]
Among others, De Lange's account.
[33]
Of the Family of Sourniama, "Edifying Letters," coll. xviii.
[34]
See in Father Du Halde how the missionaries availed themselves
of the authority of Canhi to silence the mandarins, who constantly
declared that by the laws of the country no foreign worship could be
established in the empire.
[35]
See "Lettres persanes,"210.
[36]
See the order of Tsongtou for tilling the land, in the "Edifying
Letters," coll. xxi.