25.19
Hannibal left the neighbourhood of
Beneventum and encamped close to Capua. Three days afterwards he led out
his force to battle, feeling quite certain that as the Campanians had fought a
successful action a short time before in his absence, the Romans would be far
less able to withstand him and the army which had been so often victorious.
As soon as the battle commenced the Roman line was in difficulties, chiefly
owing to the attack of cavalry, as they were almost overwhelmed by their
darts. The signal was given for the Roman cavalry to charge the enemy at
full gallop, and now it had become simply a cavalry engagement when the
sight of Sempronius' army in the distance commanded by Cn. Cornelius
created equal alarm on both sides, as each feared that a fresh enemy was
coming on. The signal to retire was given in both armies as if by mutual
consent, and the combatants separated on almost equal terms and returned
to camp. The loss on the Roman side was, however, somewhat the greater
owing to the cavalry attack at the beginning. In order to draw Hannibal away
from Capua the consuls left in the night after the battle for different
destinations; Fulvius went into the neighbourhood of Cumae and Claudius
into Lucania. On being informed the next day that the Roman camp was
evacuated, and that they had gone in two divisions by different routes,
Hannibal was at first undecided which he should follow; he decided to follow
Appius. After leading his enemy about just as he pleased, Appius returned by
a circuitous route to Capua.
Another chance of achieving success in this country presented itself
to Hannibal. There was a certain M. Centenius, surnamed Paenula, who was
conspicuous among the centurions of the first rank for his physical stature
and his courage. After completing his period of service he was introduced by
P. Cornelius Sulla, the praetor, to the senate. He requested the senators to
allow him 5000 men; he was well acquainted with the enemy and the country
where he was operating and would very soon do something worth the doing;
the tactics by which our generals and their armies had been outwitted up to
that time he would employ against the man who invented them. Stupid as the
promise was it was quite as stupidly given credence to, as though the
qualifications of a soldier were the same as those of a general. Instead of
5000 he was given 8000 men, half of them Romans and half troops furnished
by the allies. He himself, too, picked up a considerable number of volunteers
in the country through which he was marching, and he arrived in Lucania
with double the army he started with. Here Hannibal had come to a halt after
his fruitless pursuit of Claudius. The result could not be doubtful, seeing it
was a contest between armies one of which consisted of veterans habituated
to victory, the other a hastily raised and half-armed force. As soon as they
caught sight of each other, neither side declined battle and they at once got
into fighting order. For more than two hours, however, in spite of the utterly
unequal conditions, the Roman army kept up the fighting as long as their
leader stood his ground. At last, out of regard for his former reputation and
also fearing the disgrace he would incur if he survived a defeat brought on by
his own headlong folly, he rushed upon the weapons of the foe and fell, and
the Roman army was instantly routed. But even when they fled they found
no way of escape, for all avenues were closed by the cavalry, so that out of
that multitude of men only a thousand escaped, all the rest perished in one
way or another.