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23.48

After this incident the Roman camp was undisturbed; the consul even shifted his camp further away that the Campanians might complete their sowing, and he did not inflict any injury on their land until the corn was high enough in the blade to yield fodder. Then he carried it off to Claudius' camp above Suessula and built huts for his men to winter in there. M. Claudius, the proconsul, received orders to keep a force at Nola sufficient to protect the place and send the rest of his troops to Rome to prevent their being a burden to the allies and an expense to the republic. And Ti. Gracchus, having marched his legions from Cumae to Luceria in Apulia, sent the praetor, M. Valerius, to Brundisium with the army he had had at Luceria, and gave him orders to protect the coast of the Sallentine territory and to make such provision as might be necessary with regard to Philip and the Macedonian war. Towards the end of the summer in which the events we have been describing occurred, despatches from P. and Cn. Scipio arrived, giving an account of the great successes they had achieved, but also stating that money to pay the troops was needed, as also clothing and corn for the army, whilst the seamen were destitute of everything. As regarded the pay, if the treasury were low they (the Scipios) would devise some means by which they could obtain it from the Spaniards, but all the other things must in any case be sent from Rome, otherwise they could neither keep their army nor the province. When the despatches had been read there was no one present who did not admit that the statements were true and the demands fair and just. But other considerations were present to their minds -the enormous land and sea forces they had to keep up; the large fleet that would have to be fitted out if the war with Macedon went forward; the condition of Sicily and Sardinia, which before the war had helped to fill the treasury and were now hardly able to support the armies which were protecting those islands; and, above all, the shrinkage in the revenue. For the war-tax from which the national expenditure was met had diminished with the number of those who paid it after the destruction of the armies at Trasumennus and at Cannae, and if the few survivors had to pay at a very much higher rate, they too, would perish, though not in battle. If, therefore, the State could not be upheld by credit it could not stand by its own resources. After thus reviewing the position of affairs the senate decided that Fulvius, one of the praetors, should appear before the Assembly and point out to the people the pressing needs of the State and ask those who had augmented their patrimonies by making contracts with the government to extend the date of payment for the State, out of which they had made their money, and contract to supply what was needed for the army in Spain on condition that as soon as there was money in the treasury they should be the first to be paid. After making this proposal, the praetor fixed a date for making the contracts for the supply of clothing and corn to the army in Spain, and for furnishing all that was required for the seamen.