Livy's History of Rome:
Book 9: The Second Samnite War -(321 -304 B.C.)
9.1
The following year (321
B.C.) was rendered memorable by the disaster which befell the Romans at
Caudium and the capitulation which they made there. T. Veturius Calvinus
and Spurius Postumius were the consuls. The Samnites had for their
captain-general that year C. Pontius, the son of Herennius, the ablest
statesman they possessed, whilst the son was their foremost soldier and
commander. When the envoys who had been sent with the terms of
surrender returned from their fruitless mission, Pontius made the following
speech in the Samnite council: "Do not suppose that this mission has been
barren of results. We have gained this much by it, whatever measure of
divine wrath we may have incurred by our violation of treaty obligations has
now been atoned for. I am perfectly certain that all those deities whose will it
was that we should be reduced to the necessity of making the restitution
which was demanded under the terms of the treaty, have viewed with
displeasure the haughty contempt with which the Romans have treated our
concessions. What more could we have done to placate the wrath of heaven
or soften the resentment of men than we have done? The property of the
enemy, which we considered ours by the rights of war, we have restored; the
author of the war, whom we could not surrender alive, we gave up after he
had paid his debt to nature, and lest any taint of guilt should remain with us
we carried his possessions to Rome. What more, Romans, do I owe to you
or to the treaty or to the gods who were invoked as witnesses to the treaty?
What arbitrator am I to bring forward to decide how far your wrath, how far
my punishment is to go? I am willing to accept any, whether it be a nation or
a private individual. But if human law leaves no rights which the weak share
with the stronger, I can still fly to the gods, the avengers of intolerable
tyranny, and I will pray them to turn their wrath against those for whom it is
not enough to have their own restored to them and to be loaded also with
what belongs to others, whose cruel rage is not satiated by the death of the
guilty and the surrender of their lifeless remains together with their property,
who cannot be appeased unless we give them our very blood to suck and our
bowels to tear. A war is just and right, Samnites, when it is forced upon us;
arms are blessed by heaven when there is no hope except in arms. Since then
it is of supreme importance in human affairs what things men do under divine
favour and what they do against the divine will, be well assured that, if in
your former wars you were fighting against the gods even more than against
men, in this war which is impending you will have the gods themselves to
lead you."
9.2
After
uttering this prediction, which proved to be as true as it was reassuring, he
took the field and, keeping his movements as secret as possible, fixed his
camp in the neighbourhood of Caudium. From there he sent ten soldiers
disguised as shepherds to Calatia, where he understood that the Roman
consuls were encamped, with instructions to pasture some cattle in different
directions near the Roman outposts. When they fell in with any foraging
parties they were all to tell the same story, and say that the Samnite legions
were in Apulia investing Luceria with their whole force and that its capture
was imminent. This rumour had purposely been spread before and had
already reached the ears of the Romans; the captured shepherds confirmed
their belief in it, especially as their statements all tallied. There was no doubt
but that the Romans would assist the Lucerians for the sake of protecting
their allies and preventing the whole of Apulia from being intimidated by the
Samnites into open revolt. The only matter for consideration was what route
they would take. There were two roads leading to Luceria; one along the
Adriatic coast through open country, the longer one of the two but so much
the safer; the other and shorter one through the Caudine Forks. This is the
character of the spot; there are two passes, deep, narrow, with wooded hills
on each side, and a continuous chain of mountains extends from one to the
other. Between them lies a watered grassy plain through the middle of which
the road goes. Before you reach the plain you have to pass through the first
defile and either return by the same path by which you entered or, if you go
on, you must make your way out by a still narrower and more difficult pass
at the other end.
The Roman column descended into this plain from the first defile
with its overhanging cliffs, and marched straight through to the other pass.
They found it blocked by a huge barricade of felled trees with great masses
of rock piled against them. No sooner did they become aware of the enemy's
stratagem than his outposts showed themselves on the heights above the
pass. A hasty retreat was made, and they proceeded to retrace their steps by
the way they had come when they discovered that this pass also had its own
barricade and armed men on the heights above. Then without any order
being given they called a halt. Their senses were dazed and stupefied and a
strange numbness seized their limbs. Each gazed at his neighbour, thinking
him more in possession of his senses and judgment than himself. For a long
time they stood silent and motionless, then they saw the consuls' tents being
set up and some of the men getting their entrenching tools ready. Though
they knew that in their desperate and hopeless plight it would be ridiculous
for them to fortify the ground on which they stood still, not to make matters
worse by any fault of their own they set to work without waiting for orders
and entrenched their camp with its rampart close to the water. While they
were thus engaged the enemy showered taunts and insults upon them, and
they themselves in bitter mockery jeered at their own fruitless labour. The
consuls were too much depressed and unnerved even to summon a council
of war, for there was no place for either counsel or help, but the
staff-officers and tribunes gathered round them, and the men with their faces
turned towards their tents sought from their leaders a succour which the
gods themselves could hardly render them.
9.3
Night
surprised them while they were lamenting over their situation rather than
consulting how to meet it. The different temperaments of the men came out;
some exclaimed: "Let us break through the barricades, scale the mountain
slopes, force our way through the forest, try every way where we can carry
arms. Only let us get at the enemy whom we have beaten for now nearly
thirty years; all places will be smooth and easy to a Roman fighting against
the perfidious Samnite." Others answered: "Where are we to go? How are
we to get there? Are we preparing to move the mountains from their seat?
How will you get at the enemy as long as these peaks hang over us? Armed
and unarmed, brave and cowardly we are all alike trapped and conquered.
The enemy will not even offer us the chance of an honourable death by the
sword, he will finish the war without moving from his seat." Indifferent to
food, unable to sleep, they talked in this way through the night. Even the
Samnites were unable to make up their minds what to do under such
fortunate circumstances. It was unanimously agreed to write to Herennius,
the captain-general's father, and ask his advice. He was now advanced in
years and had given up all public business, civil as well as military, but
though his physical powers were failing his intellect was as sound and clear
as ever. He had already heard that the Roman armies were hemmed in
between the two passes at the Caudine Forks, and when his son's courier
asked for his advice he gave it as his opinion that the whole force ought to
be at once allowed to depart uninjured. This advice was rejected and the
courier was sent back to consult him again. He now advised that they should
every one be put to death. On receiving these replies, contradicting each
other like the ambiguous utterances of an oracle, his son's first impression
was that his father's mental powers had become impaired through his
physical weakness. However, he yielded to the unanimous wish and invited
his father to the council of war. The old man, we are told, at once complied
and was conveyed in a wagon to the camp. After taking his seat in the
council, it became clear from what he said that he had not changed his mind,
but he explained his reasons for the advice he gave. He believed that by
taking the course he first proposed, which he considered the best, he was
establishing a durable peace and friendship with a most powerful people in
treating them with such exceptional kindness; by adopting the second he was
postponing war for many generations, for it would take that time for Rome
to recover her strength painfully and slowly after the loss of two armies.
There was no third course. When his son and the other chiefs went on to ask
him what would happen if a middle course were taken, and they were
dismissed unhurt but under such conditions as by the rights of war are
imposed on the vanquished, he replied: "That is just the policy which neither
procures friends nor rids us of enemies. Once let men whom you have
exasperated by ignominious treatment live and you will find out your
mistake. The Romans are a nation who know not how to remain quiet under
defeat. Whatever disgrace this present extremity burns into their souls will
rankle there for ever, and will allow them no rest till they have made you pay
for it many times over."
9.4
Neither of
these plans was approved and Herennius was carried home from the camp.
In the Roman camp, after many fruitless attempts had been made to break
out and they found themselves at last in a state of utter destitution, necessity
compelled them to send envoys to the Samnites to ask in the first instance
for fair terms of peace, and failing that to challenge them to battle. Pontius
replied that all war was at an end, and since even now that they were
vanquished and captured they were incapable of acknowledging their true
position, he should deprive them of their arms and send them under the
yoke, allowing them to retain one garment each. The other conditions would
be fair to both victors and vanquished. If they evacuated Samnium and
withdrew their colonists from his country, the Roman and the Samnite would
henceforth live under their own laws as sovereign states united by a just and
honourable treaty. On these conditions he was ready to conclude a treaty
with the consuls, if they rejected any of them he forbade any further
overtures to be made to him. When the result was announced, such a
universal cry of distress arose, such gloom and melancholy prevailed, that
they evidently could not have taken it more heavily if it had been announced
to them all that they must die on the spot. Then followed a long silence. The
consuls were unable to breathe a word either in favour of a capitulation so
humiliating or against one so necessary. At last L. Lentulus, of all the
staff-officers the most distinguished, both by his personal qualities and the
offices he had held, spoke: "I have often," he said, "heard my father, consuls,
say that he was the only one in the Capitol who refused to ransom the City
from the Gauls with gold, for the force in the Capitol was not invested and
shut in with fosse and rampart, as the Gauls were too indolent to undertake
that sort of work; it was therefore quite possible for them to make a sortie
involving, perhaps, heavy loss, but not certain destruction. If we had the
same chance of fighting, whether on favourable or unfavourable ground,
which they had of charging down upon the foe from the Capitol, in the same
way as the besieged have often made sorties against their besiegers, I should
not fall behind my father's spirit and courage in the advice which I should
give. To die for one's country is, I admit, a glorious thing, and as concerns
myself I am ready to devote myself for the people and legions of Rome or to
plunge into the midst of the enemy. But it is here that I behold my country, it
is on this spot that all the legions which Rome possesses are gathered, and
unless they wish to rush to death for their own sakes, to save their honour,
what else have they that they can save by their death. 'The dwellings of the
City,' somebody may reply, ' and its walls, and that crowd of human beings
who form its population.' Nay, on the contrary, all these things are not
saved, they are handed over to the enemy if this army is annihilated. For who
will protect them? A defenceless multitude of non-combatants, I suppose; as
successfully as it defended them from the approach of the Gauls. Or will they
implore the help of an army from Veii with Camillus at its head ? Here and
here alone are all our hopes, all our strength. If we save these we save our
country, if we give these up to death we desert and betray our country. 'Yes,'
you say, 'but surrender is base and ignominious.' It is; but true affection for
our country demands that we should preserve it, if need be, by our disgrace
as much as by our death. However great then the indignity, we must submit
to it and yield to the compulsion of necessity, a compulsion which the gods
themselves cannot evade! Go, consuls, give up your arms as a ransom for
that State which your ancestors ransomed with gold!
9.5
The consuls
left to confer with Pontius. When the victor began to insist upon a treaty,
they told him that a treaty could not possibly be made without the orders of
the people nor without the fetials and the usual ceremonial. So that the
convention of Claudium did not, as is commonly believed and as even
Claudius asserts, take the form of a regular treaty. It was concluded through
a sponsio, i.e. by the officers giving their word of honour to observe the
conditions. For what need would there have been in the case of a treaty for
any pledge from the officers or for any hostages, since in concluding a treaty
the imprecation is always used: "By whosesoever default it may come about
that the said conditions are not observed, may Jupiter so smite that people as
this swine is now struck by the fetials." The consuls, the staff-officers, the
quaestors, and the military tribunes all gave their word on oath, and all their
names are extant today, whereas if a regular treaty had been concluded no
names but those of the two fetials would have survived. Owing to the
inevitable delay in arranging a treaty, 600 equites were demanded as
hostages to answer with their lives if the terms of the capitulation were not
observed. Then a definite time was fixed for surrendering the hostages and
sending the army, deprived of its arms, under the yoke. The return of the
consuls with the terms of surrender renewed the grief and distress in the
camp. So bitter was the feeling that the men had difficulty in keeping their
hands off those "through whose rashness," they said, "they had been brought
into that place and through whose cowardice they would have to leave it in a
more shameful plight than they had come. They had had no guides who
knew the neighbourhood, no scouts had been thrown out, they had fallen
blindly like wild animals into a trap." There they were, looking at each other,
gazing sadly at the armour and weapons which were soon to be given up,
their right hands which were to be defenceless, their bodies which were to be
at the mercy of their enemies. They pictured to themselves the hostile yoke,
the taunts and insulting looks of the victors, their marching disarmed
between the armed ranks, and then afterwards the miserable progress of an
army in disgrace through the cities of their allies, their return to their country
and their parents, whither their ancestors had so often returned in triumphal
procession. They alone, they said, had been defeated without receiving a
single wound, or using a single weapon, or fighting a single battle, they had
not been allowed to draw the sword or come to grips with the enemy;
courage and strength had been given them in vain. While they were uttering
these indignant protests, the hour of their humiliation arrived which was to
make everything more bitter for them by actual experience than they had
anticipated or imagined. First of all they were ordered to lay down their arms
and go outside the rampart with only one garment each. The first to be dealt
with were those surrendered as hostages who were taken away for safe
keeping. Next, the lictors were ordered to retire from the consuls, who were
then stripped of their paludamenta. This aroused such deep commiseration
amongst those who a short time ago had been cursing them and saying that
they ought to be surrendered and scourged, that every man, forgetting his
own plight, turned away his eyes from such an outrage upon the majesty of
state as from a spectacle too horrible to behold.
9.6
The consuls
were the first to be sent, little more than half-clothed, under the yoke, then
each in the order of his rank was exposed to the same disgrace, and finally,
the legionaries one after another. Around them stood the enemy fully armed,
reviling and jeering at them; swords were pointed at most of them, and when
they offended their victors by showing their indignation and resentment too
plainly some were wounded and even killed. Thus were they marched under
the yoke. But what was still harder to bear was that after they had emerged
from the pass under the eyes of the foe though, like men dragged up from
the jaws of hell, they seemed to behold the light for the first time, the very
light itself, serving only to reveal such a hideous sight as they marched along,
was more gloomy than any shape of death. They could have reached Capua
before nightfall, but not knowing how their allies would receive them, and
kept back by a feeling of shame, they all flung themselves, destitute of
everything, on the sides of the road near Capua. As soon as news of this
reached the place, a proper feeling of compassion for their allies got the
better of the inborn disdain of the Campanian; they immediately sent to the
consuls their own insignia of office, the fasces and the lictors, and the
soldiers they generously supplied with arms, horses, clothes, and provisions.
As they entered Capua the senate and people came out in a body to meet
them, showed them all due hospitality, and paid them all the consideration to
which as individuals and as members of an allied state they were entitled. But
all the courtesies and kindly looks and cheerful greetings of their allies were
powerless to evoke a single word or even to make them lift up their eyes and
look in the face the friends who were trying to comfort them. To such an
extent did feelings of shame make their gloom and despondency all the
heavier, and constrain them to shun the converse and society of men. The
next day some young nobles were commissioned to escort them to the
frontier. On their return they were summoned to the Senate-house, and in
answer to inquiries on the part of the older senators they reported that they
seemed to be much more gloomy and depressed than the day before; the
column moved along so silently that they might have been dumb; the Roman
mettle was cowed; they had lost their spirit with their arms; they saluted no
man, nor did they return any man's salutation; not a single man had the
power to open his mouth for fear of what was coming; their necks were
bowed as if they were still beneath the yoke. The Samnites had won not only
a glorious victory but a lasting one; they had not only captured Rome as the
Gauls had done before them, but, what was a still more warlike exploit, they
had captured the Roman courage and hardihood.
9.7
While this
report was being made and listened to with the greatest attention, and the
name and greatness of Rome were being mourned over as though lost for
ever, in the council of her faithful allies, Ofillius Calavius, the son of Ovus,
addressed the senators. He was a man of high birth and with a distinguished
career and now venerable for his age. He is reported to have said: "The truth
is far otherwise. That stubborn silence, those eyes fixed on the ground, those
ears deaf to all consolation, that shame-faced shrinking from the light, are all
indications of a terrible resentment fermenting in their hearts which will
break out in vengeance. Either I know nothing of the Roman character or
that silence will soon call forth amongst the Samnites cries of distress and
groans of anguish. The memory of the capitulation of Caudium will be much
more bitter to the Samnites than to the Romans. Whenever and wherever
they meet each side will be animated by its own courage and the Samnites
will not find the Caudine Forks everywhere. Rome was now aware of its
disaster. The first information they received was that the army was
blockaded, then came the more gloomy news of the ignominious
capitulation. Immediately on receiving the first intelligence of the blockade
they began to levy troops, but when they heard that the army had
surrendered in such a disgraceful way, the preparations for relieving them
were abandoned, and without waiting for any formal order the whole City
presented the aspect of public mourning. The booths round the Forum were
shut up; all public business in the Forum ceased spontaneously before the
proclamation closing it was made; the senators laid aside their purple striped
tunics and gold rings; the gloom amongst the citizens was almost greater
than that in the army. Their indignation was not confined to the generals or
the officers who had made the convention, even the innocent soldiers were
the objects of resentment, they said they would not admit them into the City.
But this angry temper was dispelled by the arrival of the troops; their
wretched appearance awoke commiseration amongst the most resentful.
They did not enter the City like men returning in safety after being given up
for lost, but in the guise and with the expression of prisoners. They came late
in the evening and crept to their homes, where they kept themselves so dose
that for some days not one of them would show himself in public or in the
Forum. The consuls shut themselves up in privacy and refused to discharge
any official functions with the exception of one which was wrung from them
by a decree of the senate, namely, the nomination of a Dictator to conduct
the elections. They nominated Q. Fabius Ambustus, with P. Aelius Paetus as
Master of the Horse. Their appointment was found to be irregular, and they
were replaced by M. Aemilius Papus as Dictator and L. Valerius Flaccus as
Master of the Horse. Even they, however, were not allowed to conduct the
elections; the people were dissatisfied with all the magistrates of that year,
and so matters reverted to an interregnum. Q. Fabius Maximus and M.
Valerius Corvus were successively interreges, and the latter held the
consular elections. Q. Publilius Philo and L. Papirius Cursor -the latter for
the second time -were returned. The choice was universally approved, for
all knew there were no more brilliant generals at that day.
9.8
They
entered upon the active duties of their office on the very day of their
election, for so had the senate decreed, and after disposing of the business
connected with their accession to office, they proceeded at once to introduce
the subject of the capitulation of Caudium. Publilius, who was the presiding
consul, called upon Spurius Postumius to speak. He rose in his place with
just the same expression that he had worn when passing under the yoke, and
began: "Consuls, I am quite aware that I have been called upon to speak
first, not because I am foremost in honour, but because I am foremost in
disgrace and hold the position not of a senator but of a man on his trial who
has to meet the charge not only of an unsuccessful war but also of an
ignominious peace. Since, however, you have not introduced the question of
our guilt or punishment, I shall not enter upon a defence which in the
presence of men not unacquainted with the mutability of human fortunes
would not be a very difficult one to undertake. I will state in a few words
what I think about the question before us, and you will be able to judge from
what I say whether it was myself or your legions that I spared when I
pledged myself to the convention, however shameful or however necessary it
was. This convention, however, was not made by the order of the Roman
people, and therefore the Roman people are not bound by it, nor is anything
due to the Samnites under its terms beyond our own persons. Let us be
surrendered by the fetials, stripped and bound; let us release the people from
their religious obligations if we have involved them in any, so that without
infringing any law human or divine we may resume a war which will be
justified by the law of nations and sanctioned by the gods. I advise, that in
the meantime the consuls enrol and equip an army and lead it forth to war,
but that they do not cross the hostile frontier until all our obligations under
the terms of surrender have been discharged. And you, immortal gods, I pray
and beseech, that as it was not your will that the consuls Sp. Postumius and
T. Veturius should wage a successful war against the Samnites, you may at
least deem it enough to have witnessed us sent under the yoke and
compelled to submit to a shameful convention, enough to witness us
surrendered, naked and in chains, to the enemy, taking upon our heads the
whole weight of his anger and vengeance! May it be in accordance with your
will that the legions of Rome under fresh consuls should wage war against
the Samnites in the same way in which all wars were waged before we were
consuls!" When he finished speaking, such admiration and pity were felt for
him that they could hardly think that it was the same Sp. Postumius who had
concluded such a disgraceful peace. They viewed with the utmost sadness
the prospect of such a man suffering at the hands of the enemy such terrible
punishment as he was sure to meet with, enraged as they would be at the
rupture of the peace. The whole House expressed in terms of the highest
praise their approval of his proposal. They were beginning to vote on the
question when two of the tribunes of the plebs, L. Livius and Q. Maelius,
entered a protest which they afterwards withdrew. They argued that the
people as a whole would not be discharged from their religious obligation by
this surrender unless the Samnites were placed in the same position of
advantage which they held at Caudium. Further, they said they did not
deserve any punishment for having saved the Roman army by undertaking to
procure peace, and they urged as a final reason that as they, the tribunes,
were sacrosanct and their persons inviolable they could not be surrendered
to the enemy or exposed to any violence.
9.9
To this
Postumius replied: "In the meanwhile, surrender us, whom no inviolability
protects and whose surrender will violate no man's conscience. Afterwards
you will surrender those 'sacrosanct ' gentlemen also as soon as their year of
office expires, but if you take my advice you will see that before they are
surrendered they are scourged in the Forum by way of paying interest for a
punishment that will have been delayed. Why, who is so ignorant of fetial
law as not to see that these men are saying this, not because it represents the
fact but to prevent their being surrendered? I do not deny, senators, that
where the pledged words of men are held to possess a binding force only
second to the sanctions of religion, then such undertakings as we have given
are as sacred as formal treaties. But I do say that without the express order
of the people nothing can be ratified which can bind the people. Suppose the
Samnites, in the same spirit of insolent pride in which they extorted this
capitulation from us, had compelled us to recite the formula for the
surrender of cities, would you say, tribunes, that the Roman people was
surrendered and that this City with its shrines and temples, its territory, and
its waters had become the property of the Samnites? I say no more about
surrender because what we are considering is the pledge we gave in the
capitulation. Well now, suppose we had given a pledge that the Roman
people would abandon this City, would burn it, would no longer have its
own magistrates and senates and laws, but would live under the rule of
kings. 'Heaven forbid!' you say. Yes, but the binding force of a capitulation is
not lightened by the humiliating nature of its terms. If the people can be
bound by any article, it can by all. The point which some consider important,
namely whether it is a consul or a Dictator or a praetor who has given the
undertaking is of no weight whatever. The Samnites themselves made this
clear, for it was not enough for them that the consuls pledged themselves,
they compelled the staff-officers, the quaestors, and the military tribunes to
do the same.
"Now no one need say to me, 'Why did you pledge yourself in that
way, seeing that a consul has no right to do so and you were not in a
position to promise them a peace of which you could not guarantee the
ratification, or to act on behalf of the people when they had given you no
mandate to do so?' Nothing that happened at Caudium, senators, was
dictated by human prudence; the gods deprived both the enemy's
commanders and your own of their senses. We did not exercise sufficient
caution in our various movements, they in their folly threw away a victory
when they had won through our folly. They hardly felt safe on the very
ground which gave them their victory, such a hurry were they in to agree to
any conditions if only they could deprive of their arms men who were born
to arms. If they had been in their senses, would they have had any difficulty
in sending envoys to Rome whilst they were fetching an old man from his
home to advise them? Was it impossible for them to enter into negotiations
with the senate and with the people about securing peace and making a
treaty? It is a three days' journey for lightly-equipped horsemen, and in the
meantime there would have been an armistice until the envoys returned
bringing either peace or the certainty of their victory. Then and then only
would there have been a binding agreement, because we should have made it
by order of the people. But you would not have made such an order, nor
should we have given such a pledge. It was not the will of heaven that there
should be any other result than this, namely, that the Samnites should be
vainly deluded by a dream too delightful for their minds to grasp, that the
same Fortune which had imprisoned our army should also release it, that an
illusory victory should be rendered futile by a still more illusory peace, and
that stipulations should be brought in, binding on none but those who
actually made them. For what share have you, senators, what share has the
people in this business? Who can call you to account, who can say that you
have deceived him? The enemy? You have given no pledge to the enemy.
Any fellow-citizen? You have not empowered any fellow-citizen to give a
pledge on your behalf. You are not in any way involved with us, for you
have given us no mandate; you are not answerable to the Samnites, for you
have had no dealings with them. It is we who are answerable, pledged as
debtors and quite able to discharge the debt in respect of what is our own,
which we are prepared to pay, that is, our own persons and lives. On these
let them wreak their vengeance, for these let them sharpen their swords and
their rage. As for the tribunes, you ought to consider whether it is possible
for them to be surrendered at once, or whether it ought to be deferred, but
as for us, T. Veturius and the rest of you who are concerned, let us in the
meantime offer these worthless lives of ours in discharge of our bond, and by
our deaths set free the arms of Rome for action."
9.10
Both the
speech and the speaker produced a great impression on all who heard him,
including the tribunes, who were so far influenced by what they had heard
that they formally placed themselves at the disposal of the senate. They
immediately resigned their office and were handed over to the fetials to be
conducted with the rest to Caudium. After the senate had passed their
resolution, it seemed as though the light of day was once more shining on
the State. The name of Postumius was in all men's mouths, he was extolled
to the skies, his conduct was put on a level with the self-sacrifice of P.
Decius and other splendid deeds of heroism. It was through his counsel and
assistance, men said, that the State had found its way out of a dishonourable
and guilty peace; he was exposing himself to the rage of the enemy and all
the tortures they could inflict as an expiatory victim for the Roman people.
All eyes were turned to arms and war; "shall we ever be allowed," they
exclaimed, "to meet the Samnites in arms?" Amidst this blaze of angry
excitement and thirst for vengeance, a levy was made and nearly all
re-enlisted as volunteers. Nine legions were formed out of the former troops,
and the army marched to Caudium. The fetials went on in advance, and on
arriving at the city gate they ordered the garment to be stripped off from
those who had made the capitulation and their arms to be tied behind their
backs. As the apparitor, out of respect for Postumius' rank, was binding his
cords loosely, "Why do you not," he asked, "draw the cord tight that the
surrender may be made in due form?" When they had entered the council
chamber and reached the tribunal where Pontius was seated, the fetial
addressed him thus: "Forasmuch as these men have, without being ordered
thereto by the Roman people, the Quirites, given their promise and oath that
a treaty shall be concluded and have thereby been guilty of high crime and
misdemeanour, I do herewith make surrender to you of these men, to the
end that the Roman people may be absolved from the guilt of a heinous and
detestable act." As the fetial said this Postumius struck him as hard as he
could with his knee, and in a loud voice declared that he was a Samnite
citizen, that he had violated the law of nations in maltreating the fetial who,
as herald, was inviolable, and that after this the Romans would be all the
more justified in prosecuting the war.
9.11
Pontius
replied: "I shall not accept this surrender of yours nor will the Samnites
regard it as valid. Why do you not, Spurius Postumius, if you believe in the
existence of gods, either cancel the whole agreement or abide by what you
have pledged yourself to. The Samnite people have a right to all those whom
it held in its power, or in their stead it has a right to make peace with Rome.
But why do I appeal to you? You are keeping your word as far as you can
and rendering yourself as prisoner to your conqueror. I appeal to the Roman
people. If they are dissatisfied with the convention of the Caudine Forks, let
them place their legions once more between the passes which imprisoned
them. Let there be no fraudulent dealing on either side, let the whole
transaction be annulled, let them resume the arms which they delivered up at
the capitulation, let them return to that camp of theirs, let them have
everything that they had on the eve of their surrender. When that is done,
then let them take a bold line and vote for war, then let the convention and
the peace agreed to be repudiated. Let us carry on the war with the same
fortune and on the same ground which we held before any mention was
made of peace; the Roman people will not then have any occasion to blame
their consuls for pledges they had no right to give, nor shall we have any
reason to charge the Roman people with any breach of faith.
"Will you never be at a loss for reasons why, after defeat, you
should not abide by your agreements? You gave hostages to Porsena,
afterwards you stole them away. You ransomed your city from the Gauls
with gold, whilst they were in the act of receiving the gold they were cut
down. You made peace with us on condition of our restoring your captured
legions, you are now making that peace null and void. You always cloak
your dishonest dealing under some specious pretext of right and justice.
Does the Roman people not approve of its legions being saved at the cost of
a humiliating peace? Then let it keep its peace to itself, only let it restore to
the victor its captured legions. Such action would be in accord with the
dictates of honour, with the faith of treaties, with the solemn proceedings of
the fetials. But that you should secure what you stipulated for, the safety of
thousands of your countrymen, whilst I am not to secure the peace which I
stipulated for when I released them -is this what you Aulus Cornelius and
you fetials call acting according to the law of nations? "As to those men
whom you make believe to surrender I neither accept them nor do I regard
them as surrendered, nor do I hinder them from returning to their
countrymen, who are bound by a convention, the violation of which brings
down the wrath of all the gods whose majesty is being trifled with. True,
Spurius Postumius has just struck the herald fetial with his knee, then wage
war! Of course the gods will believe that Postumius is a Samnite citizen not
a Roman, and that it is by a Samnite citizen that a Roman herald has been
maltreated, and that for that reason you are justified in making war upon us.
It is sad to think that you feel no shame in exposing this mockery of religion
to the light of day, and that old men of consular rank should invent excuses
for breaking their word which even children would think beneath them. Go,
lictor, remove the bonds from the Romans, let none of them be hindered
from departing where they please." Thus set free they returned to the Roman
camp, their personal obligations and possibly those of the State having been
discharged.
9.12
The
Samnites clearly saw that instead of the peace which they had so arrogantly
dictated, a most bitter war had commenced. They not only had a foreboding
of all that was coming but they almost saw it with their eyes; now when it
was too late they began to view with approval the two alternatives which the
elder Pontius had suggested. They saw that they had fallen between the two,
and by adopting a middle course had exchanged the secure possession of
victory for an insecure and doubtful peace. They realised that they had lost
the chance of doing either a kindness or an injury, and would have to fight
with those whom they might have got rid of for ever as enemies or secured
for ever as friends. And though no battle had yet given either side the
advantage, men's feelings had so changed that Postumius enjoyed a greater
reputation amongst the Romans for his surrender than Pontius possessed
amongst the Samnites for his bloodless victory. The Romans regarded the
possibility of war as involving the certainty of victory, whilst the Samnites
looked upon the renewal of hostilities by the Romans as equivalent to their
own defeat. In the meantime, Satricum revolted to the Samnites. (The latter
made a sudden descent on Fregellae and succeeded in occupying it in the
night, assisted, there is no doubt, by the Satricans. Mutual fear kept both the
Samnites and the Fregellans quiet till daylight, with the return of light the
battle began. For some time the Fregellans held their ground, for they were
fighting for their hearths and homes and the noncombatant population
assisted them from the roofs of the houses. At length the assailants gained
the advantage by adopting a ruse. A proclamation was made that all who laid
down their arms should depart unhurt, and the defenders did not interfere
with the crier who made it. Now that there were hopes of safety they fought
with less energy and in all directions arms were thrown away. Some,
however, showed more determination and made their way fully armed
through the opposite gate. Their courage proved a better protection than the
timid credulity of the others, for these were hemmed in by the Samnites with
a ring of fire, and in spite of their cries for mercy were burnt to death. After
arranging their respective commands, the consuls took the field. Papirius
marched into Apulia as far as Luceria, where the equites who had been given
as hostages at Caudium were interned; Publilius remained in Samnium to
oppose the legions who had been at Caudium. His presence made the
Samnites uncertain how to act; they could not march to Luceria for fear of
exposing themselves to a rear attack, nor did they feel satisfied to remain
where they were, as Luceria might in the meantime be lost. They decided
that the best course would be to try their fortune and hazard a battle with
Publilius.
9.13
Accordingly they drew up their forces for
action. Before engaging them Publilius thought he ought to address a few
words to his men, and ordered the Assembly to be sounded. There was such
an eager rush, however, to the general's tent, and such loud shouts were
raised in all directions as the men clamoured to be led to battle, that none of
the general's address was heard; the memory of their recent disgrace was
quite enough of itself to stimulate every man to fight. They strode rapidly
into battle, urging the standard-bearers to move faster, and, to avoid any
delay in having to hurl their javelins, they flung them away as if at a given
signal and rushed upon the enemy with naked steel. There was no time for
the commander's skill to be shown in maneuvering his men or posting his
reserves, it was all carried through by the enraged soldiers, who charged like
madmen. The enemy were not only routed, they did not even venture to stay
their flight at their camp, but went in scattered parties in the direction of
Apulia. Eventually they rallied and reached Luceria in a body. The same rage
and fury which had carried the Romans through the midst of the enemy
hurried them on to the Samnite camp, and more carnage took place there
than on the battle-field. Most of the plunder was destroyed in their
excitement. The other army under Papirius had marched along the coast and
reached Arpi. The whole of the country through which he passed was
peaceably disposed, an attitude which was due more to the injuries inflicted
by the Samnites than to any services which the Romans had rendered. For
the Samnites used to live at that day in open hamlets among the mountains,
and they were in the habit of making marauding incursions into the low
country and the coastal districts. Living the free open-air life of mountaineers
themselves they despised the less hardy cultivators of the plains who, as
often happens, had developed, a character in harmony with their
surroundings. If this tract of country had been on good terms with the
Samnites, the Roman army would either have failed to reach Arpi or they
would have been unable to obtain provisions on their route, and so would
have been cut off from supplies of every kind. Even as it was, when they had
advanced to Luceria both besieged and besiegers were suffering from
scarcity of provisions. The Romans drew all their supplies from Arpi but in
very small quantities, for, as the infantry were all employed in outpost and
patrol duty and in the construction of the siege-works, the cavalry brought
the corn from Arpi in their haversacks, and sometimes when they
encountered the enemy they were compelled to throw these away so as to be
free to fight. The besieged, on the other hand, were obtaining their
provisions and reinforcements from Samnium. But the arrival of the other
consul, Publilius, with his victorious army led to their being more closely
invested. He left the conduct of the siege to his colleague that he might be
free to intercept the enemy's convoys on all sides. When the Samnites, who
were encamped before Luceria, found that there was no hope of the besieged
enduring their privations any longer, they were compelled to concentrate
their whole strength and offer battle to Papirius.
9.14
Whilst
both sides were making their preparations for battle, a deputation from
Tarentum appeared on the scene with a peremptory demand that both the
Samnites and the Romans should desist from hostilities. They threatened that
whichever side stood in the way of a cessation of arms, they would assist the
other side against them. After hearing the demands which the deputation
advanced and apparently attaching importance to what they had said,
Papirius replied that he would communicate with his colleague. He then sent
for him and employed the interval in hastening the preparations for battle.
After talking over the matter, about which there could be no two opinions,
he displayed the signal for battle. Whilst the consuls were engaged in the
various duties, religious and otherwise, which are customary before a battle,
the Tarentines waited for them, expecting an answer, and Papirius informed
them that the pullarius had reported that the auspices were favourable and
the sacrifice most satisfactory. "You see," he added, "that we are going into
action with the sanction of the gods." He then ordered the standards to be
taken up, and as he marched his men on to the field he expressed his
contempt for a people of such egregious vanity, that whilst quite incapable of
managing their own affairs, owing to domestic strife and discord, they
thought themselves justified in prescribing to others how far they must go in
making peace or war. The Samnites, on the other hand, had given up all
thoughts of fighting, either because they were really anxious for peace or
because it was their interest to appear so, in order to secure the goodwill of
the Tarentines. When they suddenly caught sight of the Romans drawn up
for battle, they shouted that they should act according to the instructions of
the Tarentines; they would neither go down into the field nor carry their
arms outside their rampart, they would rather let advantage be taken of them
and bear whatever chance might bring them than be thought to have flouted
the peaceful advice of Tarentum. The consuls said that they welcomed the
omen, and prayed that the enemy might remain in that mood so as not even
to defend their rampart. Advancing in two divisions up to the entrenchments,
they attacked them simultaneously on all sides. Some began to fill up the
fosse, others tore down the abattis on the rampart and hurled the timber into
the fosse. It was not their native courage only, but indignation and rage as
well which goaded them on, smarting as they were from their recent
disgrace. As they forced their way into the camp, they reminded one another
that there were no Forks of Caudium there, none of those insuperable defiles
where deceit had won an insolent victory over incaution, but Roman valour
which neither rampart nor fosse could check. They slew alike those who
fought and those who fled, armed and unarmed, slaves and freemen, young
and old, men and beasts. Not a single living thing would have survived had
not the consuls given the signal to retire, and by stern commands and threats
driven the soldiers who were thirsting for blood out of the enemy's camp. As
the men were highly incensed at this interruption to a vengeance which was
so delightful, it was necessary to explain to them on the spot why they were
prevented from carrying it further. The consuls assured them that they
neither had yielded nor would yield to any man in showing their hatred of the
enemy, and as they had been their leaders in the fighting so they would have
been foremost in encouraging their insatiable rage and vengeance. But they
had to consider the 600 equites who were being detained as hostages in
Luceria, and to take care that the enemy, despairing of any quarter for
themselves, did not wreak their blind rage on their captives, and destroy
them before they perished themselves. The soldiers quite approved and were
glad that their indiscriminate fury had been checked; they admitted that they
must submit to anything rather than endanger the safety of so many youths
belonging to the noblest families in Rome.
9.15
The
soldiers were dismissed to quarters, and a council of war was held to decide
whether they should press on the siege of Luceria with their whole force or
whether Publilius with his army should visit the Apulians and ascertain their
intentions, about which there was considerable doubt. The latter was decided
upon, and the consul succeeded in reducing a considerable number of their
towns in one campaign, whilst others were admitted into alliance. Papirius,
who had remained behind to prosecute the siege of Luceria, soon found his
expectations realised, for as all the roads by which supplies could be brought
in were blocked, the Samnite garrison in Luceria was so reduced by famine
that they sent to the Roman consul an offer to restore the hostages, for
whose recovery the war had been undertaken, if he would raise the siege. He
replied that they ought to have consulted Pontius, at whose instigation they
had sent the Romans under the yoke, as to what terms he thought ought to
be imposed on the vanquished. As, however, they preferred that equal terms
should be fixed by the enemy rather than proposed by themselves, he told the
negotiators to take back word to Luceria that all the arms, baggage, and
beasts of burden together with the non-combatant population were to be left
behind; the soldiers he should send under the yoke and leave them one
garment apiece. In doing this, he said, he was subjecting them to no novel
disgrace but simply retaliating upon them one which they had themselves
inflicted. They were compelled to accept these terms and 7000 men were
sent under the yoke. An enormous amount of booty was found in Luceria, all
the arms and standards which had been taken at Caudium, and what created
the greatest joy of all -they recovered the equites, the hostages whom the
Samnites had placed there for security. Hardly any victory that Rome ever
won was more noteworthy for the sudden change that it wrought in the
circumstances of the republic, especially if, as I find stated in some annals,
Pontius, the son of Herennius, the Samnite captain-general, was sent under
the yoke with the rest, to expiate the disgrace he had inflicted on the consuls.
I am not, however, so much surprised that uncertainty should exist with
regard to this point as I am that any doubt should be felt as to who really
captured Luceria; whether, that is to say, it was Lucius Cornelius, acting as
Dictator, with L. Papirius Cursor as Master of the Horse, who achieved
those successes at Caudium and afterwards -at Luceria, and as the one man
who avenged the stem on Roman honour celebrated what I am inclined to
think was, with the exception of that of F. Camillus, the most justly earned
triumph that any down to that day had enjoyed, or whether the glory of that
distinction should be attributed to the consuls and especially to Papirius.
There is a further mistake here owing to doubts as to whether at the next
consular elections Papirius Cursor was re-elected for the third time in
consequence of his success at Luceria, together with Q. Aulius Corretanus
for the second time, or whether the name should really be L. Papirius
Mugilanus.
9.16
The
authorities are agreed that the remainder of the war was conducted by the
consuls. Aulius finished the campaign against the Frentanians in one battle.
Their routed army fled to their city, and after giving hostages the consul
received their surrender. The other consul was equally fortunate in his
campaign against the Satricans. Though admitted to Roman citizenship they
had revolted to the Samnites after the Caudine disaster and allowed them to
garrison their city. But when the Roman army was close to their walls they
sent an urgent request, couched in very humble terms, for peace. The consul
replied that unless they handed over the Samnite garrison or put them to
death they were not to go to him again. The severity of this reply created
more terror amongst them than the actual presence of the Roman army.
They repeatedly asked him by what means he thought that such a small and
weak body as they were could attempt to use force against a strong and
well-armed garrison. He told them to seek counsel from those through
whose advice they had admitted the garrison in the first instance. After
having with some difficulty obtained his permission to consult their senate,
they returned to the city. There were two parties in the senate: the leaders of
the one were the authors of the revolt from Rome, the other consisted of
loyal citizens. Both, however, were equally anxious that every effort should
be made to induce the consul to grant peace. As the Samnite garrison were
not in the least prepared to stand a siege, they intended to evacuate the city
the following night. The party who had introduced them thought it would be
quite sufficient to let the consul know at what hour and by what gate they
would leave; the others who had been all along opposed to their coming
actually opened the gate to the consul that very night and admitted his troops
into the city. The Samnites were unexpectedly attacked by a force concealed
in the woods through which they were marching whilst the shouts of the
Romans were resounding in all parts of the city; by this double act of
treachery the Samnites were slain and Satricum captured within the space of
one short hour and the consul became complete master of the situation. He
ordered a strict inquiry to be made as to who were responsible for the revolt,
and those who were found to be guilty were scourged and beheaded. The
Satricans were deprived of their arms and a strong garrison was placed in the
city.
The writers who tell us that it was under Papirius that Luceria was
recovered and the Samnites sent under the yoke, go on to inform us that
after the capture of Satricum he returned to Rome to celebrate his triumph.
And indeed he was, undoubtedly, a man deserving of all praise for his
soldierly qualities, distinguished as he was not only by intellectual force but
also by his physical prowess. He was especially noted for his swiftness of
foot, which gave him his cognomen; he is stated to have beaten all those of
his own age in racing. Owing either to his great strength or the amount of
exercise he took he had an enormous appetite. Under no commander did
either horse or foot find service harder, for he himself never knew what it
was to be tired. On one occasion the cavalry ventured to ask him to excuse
them some of their fatigue duty in consideration of their having fought a
successful action. He replied: "That you may not say I never excuse you
anything, I excuse you from rubbing your horses' backs when you dismount."
He was as much of a martinet to the allies of Rome as he was to his own
countrymen. The commander of the Praenestine detachment had shown a
lack of courage in bringing his men up from the rear into the fighting line.
Papirius, walking in front of his tent, ordered him to be called up, and on his
appearance told the lictor to get the axe ready. The Praenestine, on hearing
this, stood paralysed with fear. "Come, lictor," said Papirius, "cut out this
root; it is in the way of people as they walk." After almost frightening him to
death with this threat, he dismissed him with a fine. No age has been more
prolific in great and noble characters than the one in which he lived, and even
in that age there was no one whose single arm did more to sustain the
commonwealth. Had Alexander the Great, after subjugating Asia, turned his
attention to Europe, there are many who maintain that he would have met
his match in Papirius.
9.17
Nothing
can be thought to be further from my aim since I commenced this task than
to digress more than is necessary from the order of the narrative or by
embellishing my work with a variety of topics to afford pleasant
resting-places, as it were, for my readers and mental relaxation for myself.
The mention, however, of so great a king and commander induces me to lay
before my readers some reflections which I have often made when I have
proposed to myself the question, "What would have been the results for
Rome if she had been engaged in war with Alexander? "The things which tell
most in war are the numbers and courage of the troops, the ability of the
commanders, and Fortune, who has such a potent influence over human
affairs, especially those of war. Any one who considers these factors either
separately or in combination will easily see that as the Roman empire proved
invincible against other kings and nations, so it would have proved invincible
against Alexander. Let us, first of all, compare the commanders on each side.
I do not dispute that Alexander was an exceptional general, but his
reputation is enhanced by the fact that he died while still young and before
he had time to experience any change of fortune. Not to mention other kings
and illustrious captains, who afford striking examples of the mutability of
human affairs, I will only instance Cyrus, whom the Greeks celebrate as one
of the greatest of men. What was it that exposed him to reverses and
misfortunes but the length of his life, as recently in the case of Pompey the
Great? Let me enumerate the Roman generals -not all out of all ages but
only those with whom as consuls and Dictators Alexander would have had
to fight -M. Valerius Corvus, C. Marcius Rutilus, C. Sulpicius, T. Manlius
Torquatus, Q. Publilius Philo, L. Papirius Cursor, Q. Fabius Maximus, the
two Decii, L. Volumnius, and Manlius Curius. Following these come those
men of colossal mould who would have confronted him if he had first turned
his arms against Carthage and then crossed over into Italy later in life. Every
one of these men was Alexander's equal in courage and ability, and the art of
war, which from the beginning of the City had been an unbroken tradition,
had now grown into a science based on definite and permanent rules. It was
thus that the kings conducted their wars, and after them the Junii and the
Valerii, who expelled the kings, and in later succession the Fabii, the
Quinctii, and the Cornelii. It was these rules that Camillus followed, and the
men who would have had to fight with Alexander had seen Camillus as an
old man when they were little more than boys.
Alexander no doubt did all that a soldier ought to do in battle, and
that is not his least title to fame. But if Manlius Torquatus had been opposed
to him in the field, would he have been inferior to him in this respect, or
Valerius Corvus, both of them distinguished as soldiers before they assumed
command? Would the Decii, who, after devoting themselves, rushed upon
the enemy, or Papirius Cursor with his vast physical courage and strength?
Would the clever generalship of one young man have succeeded in baffling
the whole senate, not to mention individuals, that senate of which he, who
declared that it was composed of kings, alone formed a true idea? Was there
any danger of his showing more skill than any of those whom I have
mentioned in choosing the site for his camp, or organising his commissariat,
or guarding against surprises, or choosing the right moment for giving battle,
or disposing his men in line of battle and posting his reserves to the best
advantage? He would have said that it was not with Darius that he had to do,
dragging after him a train of women and eunuchs, wrapped up in purple and
gold, encumbered with all the trappings of state. He found him an easy prey
rather than a formidable enemy and defeated him without loss, without being
called to do anything more daring than to show a just contempt for the idle
show of power. The aspect of Italy would have struck him as very different
from the India which he traversed in drunken revelry with an intoxicated
army; he would have seen in the passes of Apulia and the mountains of
Lucania the traces of the recent disaster which befell his house when his
uncle Alexander, King of Epirus, perished.
9.18
I am
speaking of Alexander as he was before he was submerged in the flood of
success, for no man was less capable of bearing prosperity than he was. If
we look at him as transformed by his new fortunes and presenting the new
character, so to speak, which he had assumed after his victories, it is evident
he would have come into Italy more like Darius than Alexander, and would
have brought with him an army which had forgotten its native Macedonia
and was rapidly becoming Persian in character. It is a disagreeable task in the
case of so great a man to have to record his ostentatious love of dress; the
prostrations which he demanded from all who approached his presence, and
which the Macedonians must have felt to be humiliating, even had they been
vanquished, how much more when they were victors; the terribly cruel
punishments he inflicted; the murder of his friends at the banquet-table; the
vanity which made him invent a divine pedigree for himself. What, pray,
would have happened if his love of wine had become stronger and his
passionate nature more violent and fiery as he grew older? I am only stating
facts about which there is no dispute. Are we to regard none of these things
as serious drawbacks to his merits as a commander? Or was there any danger
of that happening which the most frivolous of the Greeks, who actually extol
the Parthians at the expense of the Romans, are so constantly harping upon,
namely, that the Roman people must have bowed before the greatness of
Alexander's name -though I do not think they had even heard of him -and
that not one out of all the Roman chiefs would have uttered his true
sentiments about him, though men dared to attack him in Athens, the very
city which had been shattered by Macedonian arms and almost well in sight
of the smoking ruins of Thebes, and the speeches of his assailants are still
extant to prove this?
However lofty our ideas of this man's greatness, still it is the
greatness of one individual, attained in a successful career of little more than
ten years. Those who extol it on the ground that though Rome has never lost
a war she has lost many battles, whilst Alexander has never fought a battle
unsuccessfully, are not aware that they are comparing the actions of one
individual, and he a youth, with the achievements of a people who have had
800 years of war. Where more generations are reckoned on one side than
years on the other, can we be surprised that in such a long space of time
there have been more changes of fortune than in a period of thirteen years ?
Why do you not compare the fortunes of one man with another, of one
commander with another? How many Roman generals could I name who
have never been unfortunate in a single battle! You may run through page
after page of the lists of magistrates, both consuls and Dictators, and not find
one with whose valour and fortunes the Roman people have ever for a single
day had cause to be dissatisfied. And these men are more worthy of
admiration than Alexander or any other king. Some retained the Dictatorship
for only ten or twenty days; none held a consulship for more than a year; the
levying of troops was often obstructed by the tribunes of the plebs; they
were late, in consequence, in taking the field, and were often recalled before
the time to conduct the elections; frequently, when they were commencing
some important operation, their year of office expired; their colleagues
frustrated or ruined their plans, some through recklessness, some through
jealousy; they often had to succeed to the mistakes or failures of others and
take over an army of raw recruits or one in a bad state of discipline. Kings
are free from all hindrances; they are lords of time and circumstance, and
draw all things into the sweep of their own designs. Thus, the invincible
Alexander would have crossed swords with invincible captains, and would
have given the same pledges to Fortune which they gave. Nay, he would
have run greater risks than they, for the Macedonians had only one
Alexander, who was not only liable to all sorts of accidents but deliberately
exposed himself to them, whilst there were many Romans equal to
Alexander in glory and in the grandeur of their deeds, and yet each of them
might fulfil his destiny by his life or by his death without imperilling the
existence of the State.
9.19
It
remains for us to compare the one army with the other as regards either the
numbers or the quality of the troops or the strength of the allied forces. Now
the census for that period gives 250,000 persons. In all the revolts of the
Latin league ten legions were raised, consisting almost entirely of city
troops. Often during those years four or five armies were engaged
simultaneously in Etruria, in Umbria (where they had to meet the Gauls as
well), in Samnium, and in Lucania. Then as regards the attitude of the
various Italian tribes -the whole of Latium with the Sabines, Volscians, and
Aequi, the whole of Campania, parts of Umbria and Etruria, the Picentines,
the Marsi, and Paeligni, the Vestinians and Apulians, to which we should add
the entire coast of the western sea, with its Greek population, stretching
from Thurii to Neapolis and Cumae, and from there as far as Antium and
Ostia -all these nationalities he would have found to be either strong allies of
Rome or reduced to impotence by Roman arms. He would have crossed the
sea with his Macedonian veterans, amounting to not more than 30,000 men
and 4000 cavalry, mostly Thracian. This formed all his real strength. If he
had brought over in addition Persians and Indians and other Orientals, he
would have found them a hindrance rather than a help. We must remember
also that the Romans had a reserve to draw upon at home, but Alexander,
warring on a foreign soil, would have found his army diminished by the
wastage of war, as happened afterwards to Hannibal. His men were armed
with round shields and long spears, the Romans had the large shield called
the scutum, a better protection for the body, and the javelin, a much more
effective weapon than the spear whether for hurling or thrusting. In both
armies the soldiers fought in line rank by rank, but the Macedonian phalanx
lacked mobility and formed a single unit; the Roman army was more elastic,
made up of numerous divisions, which could easily act separately or in
combination as required. Then with regard to fatigue duty, what soldier is
better able to stand hard work than the Roman?
If Alexander had been worsted in one battle the war would have
been over; what army could have broken the strength of Rome, when
Caudium and Cannae failed to do so? Even if things had gone well with him
at first, he would often have been tempted to wish that Persians and Indians
and effeminate Asiatics were his foes, and would have confessed that his
former wars had been waged against women, as Alexander of Epirus is
reported to have said when after receiving his mortal wound he was
comparing his own fortune with that of this very youth in his Asiatic
campaigns. When I remember that in the first Punic war we fought at sea for
twenty-four years, I think that Alexander would hardly have lived long
enough to see one war through. It is quite possible, too, that as Rome and
Carthage were at that time leagued together by an old-standing treaty, the
same apprehensions might have led those two powerful states to take up
arms against the common foe, and Alexander would have been crushed by
their combined forces. Rome has had experience of a Macedonian war, not
indeed when Alexander was commanding nor when the resources of
Macedon were still unimpaired, but the contests against Antiochus, Philip,
and Perses were fought not only without loss but even without risk. I trust
that I shall not give offence when I say that, leaving out of sight the civil
wars, we have never found an enemy's cavalry or infantry too much for us,
when we have fought in the open field, on ground equally favourable for
both sides, still less when the ground has given us an advantage. The infantry
soldier, with his heavy armour and weapons, may reasonably fear the arrows
of Parthian cavalry, or passes invested by the enemy, or country where
supplies cannot be brought up, but he has repulsed a thousand armies more
formidable than those of Alexander and his Macedonians, and will repulse
them in the future if only the domestic peace and concord which we now
enjoy remains undisturbed for all the years to come.
9.20
M.
Foslius Flaccina and L. Plautius Venox were the next consuls. In this year
several communities amongst the Samnites made overtures for a fresh treaty.
These deputations, when admitted to an audience, prostrated themselves on
the ground, and their humble attitude influenced the senate in their favour.
Their prayers, however, were by no means so efficacious with the Assembly,
to which they had been referred by the senate. Their request for a treaty was
refused, but after they had spent several days in appealing to individual
citizens, they succeeded in obtaining a two years' truce. In Apulia, too, the
people of Teanum and Canusium, tired of the constant ravages which they
had suffered, gave hostages and surrendered to the consul, L. Plautius. It
was in this year also that prefects were first appointed for Capua and a code
of laws given to that city by the praetor, L. Furius. Both these boons were
granted in response to a request from the Campanians themselves as a
remedy for the deplorable state of things brought about by civic discord.
Two new tribes were formed, the Ufentine and the Falernian. As the power
of Apulia was declining, the people of Teate came to the new consuls, C.
Junius Bubulcus and Q. Aemilius Barbula, to negotiate for a treaty. They
gave a formal undertaking that throughout Apulia peace would be
maintained towards Rome, and the confident assurances they gave led to a
treaty being granted, not, however, as between two independent states; they
were to acknowledge the suzerainty of Rome. After the subjugation of
Apulia -for Forentum, also a place of considerable strength, had been
captured by Junius -an advance was made into Lucania, and the consul,
Aemilius, surprised and captured the city of Nerulum. The order introduced
into Capua by the adoption of Roman institutions had become generally
known amongst the states in alliance with Rome, and the Antiates asked for
the same privilege; as they were without a fixed code of laws or any regular
magistrates of their own. The patrons of the colony were commissioned by
the senate to draw out a system of jurisprudence. Not only the arms of Rome
but her laws were spreading far and wide.
9.21
At the
termination of their year of office the consuls did not hand the legions over
to their successors, Sp. Nautius. and M. Popilius, but to the Dictator, L.
Aemilius. In conjunction with M. Fulvius, the Master of the Horse, he
commenced an attack on Saticula, and the Samnites at once seized this
opportunity to renew hostilities. The Romans were threatened by a double
danger; the Samnites, after getting a large army together, had entrenched
themselves not far from the Roman camp in order to relieve their blockaded
allies, whilst the Saticulans suddenly flung their gates open and made a
tumultuous attack on the Roman outposts. The two bodies of combatants,
each relying more on the help of the other than on its own strength, united in
a regular attack on the Roman camp. Though both sides of the camp were
attacked, the Dictator kept his men free from panic, owing to his having
selected a position which could not easily be turned, and also because his
men presented two fronts. He directed his efforts mainly against those who
had made the sortie, and drove them back, without much trouble, behind
their walls. Then he turned his whole strength against the Samnites. Here the
fighting was more sustained and the victory was longer in coming, but when
it did come it was decisive. The Samnites were driven in disorder to their
camp, and after extinguishing all the camp fires they departed silently in the
night, having abandoned all hope of saving Saticula. By way of retaliation
they invested Plistica, a city in alliance with Rome.
9.22
The year
having expired, the war was thenceforward carried on by the Dictator, Q.
Fabius, whilst the new consuls, like their predecessors, remained in Rome.
Fabius marched with reinforcements to Saticula to take over the army from
Aemilius. The Samnites did not remain before Plistica; they had called up
fresh troops from home, and trusting to their numbers they fixed their camp
on the same ground as in the previous year and endeavoured to distract the
Romans from their siege operations by a series of harassing attacks. This
made the Dictator all the more determined to press the siege, as he
considered that the reduction of the place would largely affect the character
of the war; he treated the Samnites with comparative indifference, and
merely strengthened the pickets on that side of the camp to meet any attack
that might be made. This emboldened the Samnites; they rode up to the
rampart day after day and allowed the Romans no rest. At last they almost
got within the gates of the camp, when Q. Aulius, the Master of the Horse,
without consulting the Dictator, charged them furiously from the camp with
the whole of his cavalry and drove them off. Though this was only a
desultory conflict, Fortune influenced it so largely that she inflicted a signal
loss on both sides and brought about the deaths of both commanders. First,
the Samnite general, indignant at being repulsed and put to flight from the
ground over which he had ridden with such confidence, induced his cavalry
by entreaties and encouragement to renew the combat. Whilst he was
conspicuous amongst them as he urged on the fighting, the Master of the
Horse levelled his lance and spurred his horse against him with such force
that with one thrust he hurled him from his saddle dead. His men were not,
as often happens, dismayed at their leader's fall. All who were round him
flung their missiles on Aulius, who had incautiously ridden on amongst them,
but they allowed the dead general's brother to have the special glory of
avenging his death. In a frenzy of grief and rage he dragged the Master of
the Horse out of his saddle and slew him. The Samnites, amongst whom he
had fallen, would have secured the body had not the Romans suddenly
leaped from their horses, on which the Samnites were obliged to do the
same. A fierce infantry fight raged round the bodies of the two generals in
which the Roman was decidedly superior; the body of Aulius was rescued,
and amidst mingled demonstrations of grief and joy the victors carried it into
camp. After losing their leader and seeing the unfavourable result of the trial
of strength in the cavalry action, the Samnites considered it useless to make
any further efforts on behalf of Saticula and resumed the siege of Plistica. A
few days later Saticula surrendered to the Romans and Plistica was carried
by assault by the Samnites.
9.23
The seat
of war was now changed; the legions were marched from Samnium and
Apulia to Sora. This place had revolted to the Samnites after putting the
Roman colonists to death. The Roman army marched thither with all speed
to avenge the death of their countrymen and to re-establish the colony. No
sooner had they arrived before the place than the reconnoitring parties who
had been watching the different routes brought in reports one after another
that the Samnites were following and were now at no great distance. The
consul marched to meet the enemy, and an indecisive action was fought at
Lautulae. The battle was put a stop to, not by the losses or flight of either
side but by night, which overtook the combatants while still uncertain
whether they were victors or vanquished. I find in some authorities that this
battle was unfavourable to the Romans, and that Q. Aulius, the Master of the
Horse, fell there. C. Fabius was appointed Master of the Horse in his place
and came with a fresh army from Rome. He sent orderlies in advance to
consult the Dictator as to where he should take up his position and also as to
the time and mode of attacking the enemy. After becoming thoroughly
acquainted with the Dictator's plans, he halted his army in a place where he
was well concealed. The Dictator kept his men for some days confined to
their camp, as though he were enduring a siege rather than conducting one.
At last he suddenly displayed the signal for battle. Thinking that brave men
were more likely to have their courage stimulated when all their hopes
depended upon themselves, he kept the arrival of the Master of the Horse
and the fresh army concealed from his soldiers, and as though all their
prospects of safety depended upon their cutting their way out, he said to his
men: "We have been caught in a position where we are shut in, and we have
no way out unless we can open one by our victorious swords. Our standing
camp is sufficiently protected by its entrenchments, but it is untenable owing
to want of provisions; all the places from which supplies could be obtained
have revolted, and even if the people were willing to help us the country is
impassable for convoys. I shall not cheat your courage by leaving a camp
here into which you can retire, as you did on the last occasion, without
winning the victory. Entrenchments are to be protected by arms, not arms by
entrenchments. Let those who think it worth their while to prolong the war
hold their camp as a place of retreat; we must have regard to nothing but
victory. Advance the standards against the enemy, and when the column is
clear of the camp those who have been told off for the purpose will set it on
fire. What you lose, soldiers, will be made up to you in the plunder of all the
surrounding cities which have revolted." The Dictator's words, pointing to
the dire necessity to which they were reduced, produced intense excitement,
and rendered desperate by the sight of the burning camp -although the
Dictator had only ordered some spots nearest to them to be set on fire -they
charged like madmen, and at the first onset threw the enemy into confusion.
At the same moment the Master of the Horse seeing the burning camp in the
distance -the agreed signal -attacked the enemy in the rear. Thus hemmed
in, the Samnites fled in all directions, each as best he could. A vast number,
who had crowded together in their panic and were so close to one another
that they could not use their weapons, were killed between the two armies.
The enemy's camp was captured and plundered, and the soldiers, loaded with
spoil, were marched back to their own camp. Even their victory did not give
them so much pleasure as the discovery that with the exception of a small
part spoilt by fire their camp was unexpectedly safe.
9.24
They
then returned to Sora, and the new consuls, M. Poetilius and C. Sulpicius,
took over the army from the Dictator Fabius, after a large proportion of the
veterans had been sent home and new cohorts brought up as reinforcements.
Owing, however, to the difficulties presented by the position of the city, no
definite plan of attack was yet formed; a long time would be needed to
reduce it by famine, and to attempt to storm it would involve considerable
risk. In the midst of this uncertainty a Soran deserter left the town secretly
and made his way to the Roman sentinels, whom he requested to conduct
him at once to the consuls. On being brought before them he undertook to
betray the place into their hands. When questioned as to the means by which
he would carry out his undertaking, he laid his proposals before them and
they appeared quite feasible. He advised them to remove their camp, which
was almost adjoining the walls, to a distance of six miles from the town, this
would lead to less vigilance on the part of those who were on outpost duty
during the day and sentry duty at night. The following night, after some
cohorts had been ordered to conceal themselves in some wooded spots close
under the town, he conducted a picked body of ten men by a steep and
almost inaccessible path into the citadel. Here a quantity of missile weapons
had been collected, far more than would be required for the men who had
been brought there, and in addition there were large stones, some lying about
as is usual in craggy places, others piled in heaps by the townsmen to use for
the defence of the place. When he had posted the Romans here and had
pointed out to them a steep and narrow path leading up from the town, he
said to them: "From this ascent even three armed men could keep back a
multitude however large. You are ten in number, and what is more you are
Romans, and the bravest of them. You have the advantage of position and
you will be helped by the night, which by its obscurity makes everything look
more terrible. I will now spread panic everywhere; you devote yourselves to
holding the citadel." Then he ran down and created as great a tumult as he
possibly could, shouting: "To arms, citizens! Help, help! The citadel has been
seized by the enemy, hasten to its defence!" He kept up the alarm as he
knocked at the doors of the principal men, he shouted it in the ears of all
whom he met, of all who rushed out terror-struck into the streets. The panic
which one man had started was carried by numbers through the city. The
magistrates hurriedly sent men up to the citadel to find out what had
happened, and when they heard that it was held by an armed force, whose
numbers were grossly exaggerated, they gave up all hopes of recovering it.
All quarters of the city were filled with fugitives; the gates were burst open
by people who were only half awake and mostly without arms, and through
one of these the Roman cohorts, roused by the shouting, rushed in and slew
the frightened crowds who were thronging the streets. Sora was already
captured when in the early dawn the consuls appeared and accepted the
surrender of those whom Fortune had spared from the nocturnal massacre.
Amongst these two hundred and twenty-five were sent in chains to Rome as
they were universally admitted to have been the instigators of the murder of
the colonists and the revolt which followed. The rest of the population were
left uninjured and a garrison was stationed in the town. All those taken to
Rome were scourged and beheaded to the great satisfaction of the plebs,
who felt it to be a matter of supreme importance that those who had been
sent out in such large numbers as colonists should be safe wherever they
were.
9.25
After
leaving Sora the consuls extended the war to the cities and fields of Ausonia,
for the whole country had become restless owing to the presence of the
Samnites after the battle of Lautulae. Plots were being hatched everywhere
throughout Campania, even Capua was not free from disaffection, and it was
found upon investigation that the movement had actually reached some of
the principal men in Rome. It was, however, as in the case of Sora, through
the betrayal of her cities that Ausonia fell under the power of Rome. There
were three cities -Ausona, Menturnae, and Vescia -which some twelve
young men belonging to the principal families there had mutually agreed to
betray to the Romans. They came to the consuls and informed them that
their people had long been looking forward to the arrival of the Samnites,
and after they had heard of the battle of Lautulae, they looked upon the
Romans as vanquished and many of the younger men had volunteered to
serve with the Samnites. After the Samnites, however, had been driven out
of their country they were wavering between peace and war, afraid to close
their gates to the Romans lest they should provoke a war and yet determined
to close them if a Roman army approached their city. In this state of
indecision they would fall an easy prey. Acting on their advice, the Romans
moved their camp into the neighbourhood of these cities, and at the same
time soldiers were despatched, some fully armed, to occupy concealed
positions near the walls, others in ordinary dress, with swords hidden under
their togas, were to enter the cities through the open gates at the approach
of daylight. As soon as the latter began to attack the guards the signal was
given for the others to rush from their ambush. Thus the gates were secured,
and the three towns were captured at the same time and by the same
stratagem. As the generals were not there to direct the attack, there was no
check upon the carnage which ensued, and the nation of the Ausonians was
exterminated, just as if they had been engaged in an internecine war, though
there was no certain proof of their having revolted.
9.26
During
this year the Roman garrison at Luceria was treacherously betrayed, and the
Samnites became masters of the place. The traitors did not go long
unpunished. A Roman army was not far away, and the city, which lay in a
plain, was taken at the first assault. The Lucerines and Samnites were put to
death, no quarter being given, and such deep indignation was felt at Rome
that when the question of sending fresh colonists to Luceria was under
discussion in the senate many voted for the complete destruction of the city.
Not only the bitter feeling towards a people who had been twice subdued but
also the distance from Rome made them shrink from banishing their
countrymen so far from home. However, the proposal to despatch colonists
was adopted; 2500 were sent. Whilst disloyalty was thus manifesting itself
everywhere, Capua also became the centre of intrigues amongst some of her
principal men. When the matter came up in the senate, there was a general
feeling that it ought to be dealt with at once. A decree was passed
authorising the immediate opening of a court of inquiry, and C. Maenius was
nominated Dictator to conduct the proceedings. M. Foslius was appointed
Master of the Horse. The greatest alarm was created by this step, and the
Calavii, Ovius, and Novius, who had been the ringleaders, did not wait to be
denounced to the Dictator, but placed themselves beyond the reach of
prosecution by what was undoubtedly a self-inflicted death. As there was no
longer any matter for investigation at Capua, the inquiry was directed to
those who were suspected in Rome. The decree was interpreted as
authorising an inquiry, not in regard to Capua especially, but generally in
respect of all who had formed cabals and conspiracies against the republic,
including the secret leagues entered into by candidates for office. The inquiry
began to embrace a wider scope both with respect to the nature of the
alleged offences and the persons affected, and the Dictator insisted that the
authority vested in him as criminal judge was unlimited. Men of high family
were indicted, and no one was allowed to appeal to the tribunes to arrest
proceedings. When matters had gone thus far, the nobility -not only those
against whom information was being laid, but the order as a whole -protested that the charge did not lie on the patricians, to whom the path to
honours always lay open, unless it was obstructed by intrigue, but on the
novi homines. They even asserted that the Dictator and the Master of the
Horse were more fit to be put upon their trial than to act as inquisitors in
cases where this charge was brought, and they would find that out as soon as
they had vacated their office.
Under these circumstances, Maenius, more anxious to clear his
reputation than to retain his office, came forward in the Assembly and
addressed it in the following terms: "You are all cognisant, Quirites, of what
my life has been in the past, and this very office which has been conferred
upon me is a testimony to my innocence. There are men amongst the nobility
-as to their motives it is better that you should form your own opinion than
that I, holding the office I do, should say anything without proof -who tried
their utmost to stifle this inquiry. When they found themselves powerless to
do this they sought to shelter themselves, patricians though they were,
behind the stronghold of their opponents, the tribunician veto, so as to
escape from trial. At last, driven from that position, and thinking any course
safer than that of trying to prove their innocence, they have directed their
assaults against us, and private citizens have not been ashamed to demand
the impeachment of the Dictator. Now, that gods and men alike may know
that in trying to avoid giving an account of themselves these men are
attempting the impossible, and that I am prepared to answer any charge and
meet my accusers face to face, I at once resign my Dictatorship. And if the
senate should assign the task to you, consuls, I beg that you will begin with
M. Foslius and myself, so that it may be conclusively shown that we are
protected from such charges, not by our official position, but by our
innocence." He then at once laid down his office, followed by the Master of
the Horse. They were the first to be tried before the consuls, for so the
senate ordered, and as the evidence given by the nobles against them
completely broke down, they were triumphantly acquitted. Even Publilius
Philo, a man who had repeatedly filled the highest offices as a reward for his
services at home and in the field, but who was disliked by the nobility, was
put on his trial and acquitted. As usual, however, it was only whilst this
inquisition was a novelty that it had strength enough to attack illustrious
names; it soon began to stoop to humbler victims, until it was at length
stifled by the very cabals and factions which it had been instituted to
suppress.
9.27
The
rumour of these proceedings, and, still more, the expectation of a Campanian
revolt, which had already been secretly organised recalled the Samnites from
their designs in Apulia. They marched to Caudium, which from its proximity
to Capua would make it easy for them, if the opportunity offered, to wrest
that city from the Romans. The consuls marched to Caudium with a strong
force. For some time both armies remained in their positions on either side of
the pass, as they could only reach each other by a most difficult route. At
length the Samnites descended by a short detour through open country into
the flat district of Campania, and there for the first time they came within
sight of each other's camp. There were frequent skirmishes, in which the
cavalry played a greater part than the infantry, and the Romans had no cause
to be dissatisfied with these trials of strength, nor with the delay which was
prolonging the war. The Samnite generals, on the other hand, saw that these
daily encounters involved daily losses, and that the prolongation of the war
was sapping their strength. They decided, therefore, to bring on an action.
They posted their cavalry on the two flanks of their army with instructions to
keep their attention on their camp, in case it were attacked, rather than on
the battle, which would be safe in the hands of the infantry. On the other
side, the consul Sulpicius directed the right wing Poetilius the left. The
Roman right was drawn up in more open order than usual, as the Samnites
opposed to them were standing in thinly extended ranks in order either to
surround the enemy or to prevent themselves from being surrounded. The
left, which was in a much closer formation, was further strengthened by a
rapid maneuver of Poetilius, who suddenly brought up into the fighting line
the cohorts which were usually kept in reserve, in case the battle was
prolonged. He then charged the enemy with his full strength. As the Samnite
infantry were shaken by the weight of the attack their cavalry came to their
support, and riding obliquely between the two armies were met by the
Roman cavalry who charged them at a hard gallop and threw infantry and
cavalry alike into confusion, until they had forced back the whole line in this
part of the field. Sulpicius was taking his part with Poetilius in encouraging
the men in this division, for on hearing the battle-shout raised he had ridden
across from his own division, which was not yet engaged. Seeing that the
victory was no longer doubtful here he rode back to his post with his 1200
cavalry, but he found a very different condition of things there, the Romans
had been driven from their ground and the victorious enemy were pressing
them hard. The presence of the consul produced a sudden and complete
change, the courage of the men revived at the sight of their general, and the
cavalry whom he had brought up rendered an assistance out of all proportion
to their numbers, whilst the sound, followed soon by the sight of the success
on the other wing, re-animated the combatants to redouble their exertions.
From this moment the Romans were victorious along the whole line, and the
Samnites abandoning all further resistance, were all killed or taken prisoners,
with the exception of those who succeeded in escaping to Maleventum, now
called Beneventum. Their loss in prisoners and slain is stated by the
chroniclers to have amounted to 30,000.
9.28
After this
great victory the consuls advanced to Bovianum, which they proceeded to
invest. They remained there in winter quarters until C. Poetilius, who had
been named Dictator with M. Foslius as Master of the Horse, took over the
army from the new consuls, L. Papirius Cursor, consul for the fifth time, and
C. Junius Bubulcus, for the second time. On learning that the citadel of
Fregellae had been captured by the Samnites, he raised the siege of
Bovianum and marched to Fregellae. The place was retaken without fighting,
for the Samnites evacuated it in the night, and after leaving a strong garrison
there, the Dictator returned to Campania with the main object of recovering
Nola. At his approach the whole of the Samnite population and the native
peasantry retired within the walls. After examining the position of the city,
he gave orders for all the buildings outside the wall -and there was a
considerable population in the suburbs -to be destroyed in order to render
the approach easier. Not long afterwards, Nola was taken, either by the
Dictator or by the consul, C. Junius, for both accounts are given. Those who
give the credit of the capture to the consul state that Atina and Calatia were
also taken by him, and they explain the appointment of Poetilius by saying
that he was nominated Dictator for the purpose of driving in the nail on the
outbreak of an epidemic. Colonies were sent out this year to Suessa and
Pontia; Suessa had belonged to the Auruncans, and the island of Pontia had
been inhabited by the Volscians, as it lay off their coast. The senate also
authorised the settlement of a colony at Interamna on the Casinus, but it fell
to the succeeding consuls, M. Valerius and P. Decius, to appoint the
commissioners and send out the colonists to the number of 4000.
9.29
The
Samnite war was now drawing to a close, but before the senate could
dismiss it entirely from their thoughts there was a rumour of war on the side
of Etruria. With the one exception of the Gauls, no nation was more dreaded
at that time, owing to their proximity to Rome and their vast population.
One of the consuls remained in Samnium to finish the war, the other, P.
Decius, was detained in Rome by serious illness, and on instructions from the
senate, nominated C. Junius Bubulcus Dictator. In view of the seriousness of
the emergency the Dictator compelled all who were liable for service to take
the military oath, and used his utmost endeavours to have arms and whatever
else was required in readiness. Notwithstanding the great preparations he
was making, he had no intention of assuming the aggressive, and had quite
made up his mind to wait until the Etruscans made the first move. The
Etruscans were equally energetic in their preparations, and equally reluctant
to commence hostilities. Neither side went outside their own frontiers. This
year (312 B.C.) was signalised by the censorship of Appius Claudius. His
claim to distinction with posterity rests mainly upon his public works, the
road and the aqueduct which bear his name. He carried out these
undertakings single-handed, for, owing to the odium he incurred by the way
he revised the senatorial lists and filled up the vacancies, his colleague,
thoroughly ashamed of his conduct, resigned. In the obstinate temper which
had always marked his house, Appius continued to hold office alone. It was
owing to his action that the Potitii, whose family had always possessed the
right of ministering at the Ava Maxima of Hercules, transferred that duty to
some temple servants, whom they had instructed in the various observances.
There is a strange tradition connected with this, and one well calculated to
create religious scruples in the minds of any who would disturb the
established order of ceremonial usages. It is said that though when the
change was made there were twelve branches of the family of the Potitii
comprising thirty adults, not one member, old or young, was alive twelve
months later. Nor was the extinction of the Potitian name the only
consequence; Appius himself some years afterwards was struck with
blindness by the unforgetting wrath of the gods.
9.30
The
consuls for the following year were C. Junius Bubulcus (for the third time)
and Q. Aemilius Barbula (for the second time). At the beginning of their year
of office they laid a complaint before the Assembly touching the
unscrupulous way in which vacancies in the senate had been filled up, men
having been passed over who were far superior to some who had been
selected, whereby the whole senatorial order had been sullied and disgraced.
They declared that the selection had been made solely with a view to
popularity and out of sheer caprice, and that no regard whatever had been
paid to the good or bad characters of those chosen. They then gave out that
they should ignore them altogether, and at once proceeded to call over the
names of the senators as they appeared on the roll before Appius Claudius
and C. Plautius were made censors. Two official posts were for the first time
this year placed at the disposal of the people, both of a military character.
One was the office of military tribune; sixteen were henceforth appointed by
the people for the four legions; these had hitherto been selected by the
Dictators and consuls, very few places being left to the popular vote. L.
Atilius and C. Marcius, tribunes of the plebs, were responsible for that
measure. The other was the post of naval commissioner; the people were to
appoint two to superintend the equipment and refitting of the fleet. This
provision was due to M. Decius, a tribune of the plebs. An incident of a
somewhat trifling character occurred this year which I should have passed
over did it not appear to be connected with religious customs. The guild of
flute-players had been forbidden by the censors to hold their annual banquet
in the temple of Jupiter, a privilege they had enjoyed from ancient times.
Hugely disgusted, they went off in a body to Tibur, and not one was left in
the City to perform at the sacrificial rites. The senate were alarmed at the
prospect of the various religious ceremonies being thus shorn of their due
ritual, and they sent envoys to Tibur, who were to make it their business to
see that the Romans got these men back again. The Tiburtines promised to
do their best, and invited the musicians into the Senate-house, where they
were strongly urged to return to Rome. As they could not be persuaded to
do so, the Tiburtines adopted a ruse quite appropriate to the character of the
men they were dealing with. It was a feast day and they were invited to
various houses, ostensibly to supply music at the banquets. Like the rest of
their class, they were fond of wine, and they were plied with it till they drank
themselves into a state of torpor. In this condition they were thrown into
wagons and carried off to Rome. They were left in the wagons all night in
the Forum, and did not recover their senses till daylight surprised them still
suffering from the effect of their debauch. The people crowded round them
and succeeded in inducing them to stay, and they were granted the privilege
of going about the City for three days every year in their long dresses and
masks with singing and mirth; a custom which is still observed. Those
members of the guild who played on solemn occasions in the temple of
Jupiter had the right restored to them of holding their banquets there. These
incidents occurred while the public attention was fixed on two most serious
wars.
9.31
The
consuls drew lots for their respective commands; the Samnites fell to Junius,
the new theatre of war in Etruria to Aemilius. The Roman garrison of Cluvia
in Samnium, after being unsuccessfully attacked, were starved into
surrender, and were then massacred after being cruelly mangled by the
scourge. Enraged at this brutality, Junius felt that the first thing to be done
was to attack Cluvia, and on the very day he arrived before the place he took
it by storm and put all the adult males to death. Thence his conquering army
marched to Bovianum. This was the chief city of the Pentrian Samnites, and
by far the wealthiest and best supplied with arms. There was not the same
cause for resentment here as at Cluvia, the soldiers were mainly animated by
the prospect of plunder, and on the capture of the place the enemy were
treated with less severity; but there was almost more booty collected there
than from all the rest of Samnium, and the whole of it was generously given
up to the soldiers. Now that nothing could withstand the overwhelming
might of Roman arms, neither armies nor camps nor cities, the one idea in
the minds of all the Samnite leaders was to choose some position from which
Roman troops when scattered on their foraging expeditions might be caught
and surrounded. Some peasants who pretended to be deserters and some
who had, either deliberately or by accident, been made prisoners, came to the
consuls with a story in which they all agreed, and which really was true,
namely, that an immense quantity of cattle had been driven into a pathless
forest. The consuls were induced by this story to send the legions, with
nothing but their kits to encumber them, in the direction the cattle had taken,
to secure them. A very strong body of the enemy were concealed on either
side of the road, and when they saw that the Romans had entered the forest
they suddenly raised a shout and made a tumultuous attack upon them. The
suddenness of the affair at first created some confusion, while the men were
piling their kits in the centre of the column and getting at their weapons, but
as soon as they had each freed themselves from their burdens and put
themselves in fighting trim, they began to assemble round the standards.
From their old discipline and long experience they knew their places in the
ranks, and the line was formed without any orders being needed, each man
acting on his own initiative.
The consul rode up to the part where the fighting was hottest and,
leaping off his horse, called Jupiter, Mars, and other gods to witness that he
had not gone into that place in quest of any glory for himself, but solely to
provide booty for his soldiers, nor could any other fault be found with him
except that he had been too anxious to enrich his men at the expense of the
enemy. From that disgrace nothing would clear him but the courage of his
men. Only they must one and all make a determined attack. The enemy had
been already worsted in the field, stripped of his camp, deprived of his cities,
and was now trying the last chance by lurking secretly in ambush and
trusting to his ground, not to his arms. What ground was too difficult for
Roman courage? He reminded them of the citadels of Fregellae and of Sora
and of the successes they had everywhere met with when the nature of the
ground was all against them. Fired by his words, his men, oblivious of all
difficulties, went straight at the hostile line above them. Some exertion was
needed while the column were climbing up the face of the hill, but when
once the leading standards had secured a footing on the summit and the army
found that it was on favourable ground, it was the enemy's turn to be
dismayed; they flung away their arms, and in wild flight made for the
lurking-places in which they had shortly before concealed themselves. But
the place which they had selected as presenting most difficulty to the enemy
now became a trap for themselves, and impeded them in every way. Very
few were able to escape. As many as 20,000 men were killed, and the
victorious Romans dispersed in different directions to secure the cattle of
which the enemy had made them a present.
9.32
During
these occurrences in Samnium the whole of the cities of Etruria with the
exception of Arretium had taken up arms and commenced what proved to be
a serious war by an attack on Sutrium. This city was in alliance with Rome,
and served as a barrier on the side of Etruria. Aemilius marched thither to
raise the siege, and selected a site before the city where he entrenched
himself. His camp was plentifully supplied with provisions from Sutrium.
The Etruscans spent the day after his arrival in discussing whether they
should bring on an immediate engagement or protract the war. Their
generals decided upon the more energetic course as the safer one, and the
next day at sunrise the signal for battle was displayed and the troops
marched into the field. As soon as this was reported to the consul he ordered
the tessera to be given out, instructing the men to take their breakfast, and
after they were strengthened by food to arm themselves for battle. When he
saw that they were in complete readiness, he ordered the standards to go
forward, and after the army had emerged from the camp he formed his
battle-line not far from the enemy. For some time both sides stood in
expectation, each waiting for the other to raise the battle-shout and begin the
fighting. The sun passed the meridian before a single missile was discharged
on either side. At length the Etruscans, not caring to leave the field without
securing some success, raised the battle-shout; the trumpets sounded and the
standards advanced. The Romans showed no less eagerness to engage. They
closed with each other in deadly earnest. The Etruscans had the advantage in
numbers, the Romans in courage. The contest was equally maintained and
cost many lives, including the bravest on both sides, nor did either army
show any signs of giving way until the second Roman line came up fresh into
the place of the first, who were wearied and exhausted. The Etruscans had
no reserves to support their first line, and all fell in front of their standards or
around them. No battle would have witnessed fewer fugitives or involved
greater carnage had not the Tuscans, who had made up their minds to die,
found protection in the approach of night, so that the victors were the first to
desist from fighting. After sunset the signal was given to retire, and both
armies returned in the night to their respective camps. Nothing further worth
mention took place that year at Sutrium. The enemy had lost the whole of
their first line in a single battle and had only their reserves left, who were
hardly sufficient to protect their camp. Amongst the Romans there were so
many wounded that those who left the field disabled were more numerous
than those who had fallen in the battle.
9.33
The
consuls for the following year were Q. Fabius and C. Marcius Rutilus. Fabius
took over the command at Sutrium, and brought reinforcements from Rome.
A fresh army was also raised in Etruria and sent to support the besiegers.
Very many years had elapsed since there had been any contests between the
patrician magistrates and the tribunes of the plebs. Now, however, a dispute
arose through that family which seemed marked out by destiny to be the
cause of quarrels with the plebs and its tribunes. Appius Claudius had now
been censor eighteen months, the period fixed by the Aemilian Law for the
duration of that office. In spite of the fact that his colleague, C. Plautius, had
resigned, he could under no circumstances whatever be induced to vacate his
office. P. Sempronius was the tribune of the plebs who commenced an action
for limiting his censorship to the legal period. In taking this step he was
acting in the interests of justice quite as much as in the interests of the
people, and he carried the sympathies of the aristocracy no less than he had
the support of the masses. He recited the several provisions of the Aemilian
Law and extolled its author, Mamercus Aemilius, the Dictator, for having
shortened the censorship. Formerly, he reminded his hearers, it was held for
five years, a time long enough to make it tyrannical and despotic, Aemilius
limited it to eighteen months. Then turning to Appius he asked him: "Pray
tell me, Appius, what would you have done had you been censor at the time
that C. Furius and M. Geganius were censors?" Appius Claudius replied that
the tribune's question had not much bearing on his case. He argued that
though the law might be binding in the case of those censors during whose
period of office it was passed, because it was after they had been appointed
that the people ordered the measure to become law, and the last order of the
people was law for the time being, nevertheless, neither he nor any of the
censors subsequently appointed could be bound by it because all succeeding
censors had been appointed by the order of the people and the last order of
the people was the law for the time being.
9.34
This
quibble on the part of Appius convinced no one. Sempronius then addressed
the Assembly in the following language: "Quirites, here you have the
progeny of that Appius who, after being appointed decemvir for one year,
appointed himself for a second year, and then, without going through any
form of appointment either at his own hands or at any one else's, retained the
fasces and the supreme authority for a third year, and persisted in retaining
them until the power which he gained by foul means, exercised by foul
means, and retained by foul means, proved his ruin. This is the family,
Quirites, by whose violence and lawlessness you were driven out of your
City and compelled to occupy the Sacred Mount; the family against which
you won the protection of your tribunes; the family on whose account you
took up your position, in two armies, on the Aventine. It is this family which
has always opposed the laws against usury and the agrarian laws; which
interfered with the right of intermarriage between patricians and plebeians;
which blocked the path of the plebs to curule offices. This name is much
more deadly to your liberties than the name of the Tarquins. Is it really the
case, Appius Claudius, that though it is a hundred years since Mamercus
Aemilius was Dictator, and there have been all those censors since, men of
the highest rank and strength of character, not one of them ever read the
Twelve Tables, not one of them knew that the last order of the people is the
law for the time being? Of course they all knew it, and because they knew it
they preferred to obey the Aemilian Law rather than that older one by which
the censors were originally appointed, simply because the former was the last
passed by order of the people and also because when two laws contradict
each other the later one repeals the earlier. Do you maintain, Appius, that the
people are not bound by the Aemilian Law, or do you claim, if they are
bound by it, that you alone are exempt from its provisions? That law availed
to bind those arbitrary censors C. Furius and M. Geganius, who gave us a
proof of the mischief which that office could work in the republic when, in
revenge for the limitation of their power, they placed among the aerarii the
foremost soldier and statesman of his time, Mamercus Aemilius. It bound all
the succeeding censors for a hundred years, it binds your colleague C.
Plautius, who was appointed under the same auspices, with the same powers
as yourself. Did not the people appoint him 'with all the customary powers
and privileges' that a censor can possess? Or are you the solitary exception in
whom all these powers and privileges reside? Whom then can you appoint as
'king for sacrifices'? He will cling to the name of 'king' and say that he was
appointed with all the powers that the Kings of Rome possessed. Who do
you suppose would be contented with a six months' dictatorship or a five
days' interregnum? Whom would you venture to nominate as Dictator for the
purpose of driving in the nail or presiding at the Games? How stupid and
spiritless, Quirites, you must consider those men to have been who after their
magnificent achievements resigned their dictatorship in twenty days, or
vacated their office owing to some flaw in their appointment! But why
should I recall instances of old time? It is not ten years since C. Maenius as
Dictator was conducting a criminal process with a rigour which some
powerful people considered dangerous to themselves, and in consequence
his enemies charged him with being tainted with the very crime he was
investigating. He at once resigned his dictatorship in order to meet, as a
private citizen, the charges brought against him. I am far from wishing to see
such moderation in you, Appius. Do not show yourself a degenerate scion of
your house; do not fall short of your ancestors in their craving for power,
their love of tyranny; do not vacate your office a day or an hour sooner than
you are obliged, only see that you do not exceed the fixed term. Perhaps you
will be satisfied with an additional day or an additional month? 'No,' he says,
'I shall hold my censorship for three years and a half beyond the period fixed
by the Aemilian Law and I shall hold it alone.' This sounds very much like an
absolute monarch. Or will you co-opt a colleague, a proceeding forbidden by
divine laws even where one has been lost by death?
"There is a sacred function going back to the very earliest times, the
only one actually initiated by the deity in whose honour it is performed,
which has always been discharged by men of the highest rank and most
blameless character. You, conscientious censor that you are, have
transferred this ministry to servants, and a House older than this City,
hallowed by the hospitality they showed to immortal gods, has become
extinct in one short year owing to you and your censorship. But this is not
enough for you, you will not rest till you have involved the whole
commonwealth in a sacrilege the consequences of which I dare not
contemplate. The capture of this City occurred in that lustrum in which the
censor, L. Papirius Cursor, after the death of his colleague, C. Julius,
co-opted as his colleague M. Cornelius Maluginensis sooner than abdicate
his office. And yet how much more moderation did he show even then than
you, Appius; he did not continue to hold his censorship alone nor beyond the
legal term. L. Papirius did not, however, find any one to follow his example,
all succeeding censors resigned office on the death of their colleague. But
nothing restrains you, neither the expiry of your term of office nor the
resignation of your colleague nor the Law nor any feeling of self-respect.
You consider it a merit to show arrogance, effrontery, contempt of gods and
men. When I consider the majesty and reverence which surround the office
that you have held, Appius Claudius, I am most reluctant to subject you to
personal restraint or even to address you in severe terms. But your obstinacy
and arrogance have compelled me to speak as I have done, and now I warn
you that if you do not comply with the Aemilian Law I shall order you to be
taken to prison. Our ancestors made it a rule that if at the election of censors
two candidates did not get the requisite majority of votes one should not be
returned alone, but the election should be adjourned. Under this rule, as you
cannot be appointed sole censor, I will not allow you to remain in office
alone." He then ordered the censor to be arrested and taken to prison.
Appius formally appealed to the protection of the tribunes, and though
Sempronius was supported by six of his colleagues, the other three vetoed
any further proceedings. Appius continued to hold his office alone amidst
universal indignation and disgust.
9.35
During
these proceedings in Rome the siege of Sutrium was being kept up by the
Etruscans. The consul Fabius was marching to assist the allies of Rome and
to attempt the enemy's lines wherever it seemed practicable. His route lay
along the lowest slopes of the mountain range, when he came upon the
hostile forces drawn up in battle formation. The wide plain which stretched
below revealed their enormous numbers, and in order to compensate for his
own inferiority in that respect by the advantage of position, he deflected his
column a little way on to the rising ground, which was rough and covered
with stones. He then formed his front against the enemy. The Etruscans,
thinking of nothing but their numbers, on which they solely relied, came on
with such eager impetuosity that they flung away their javelins in order to
come more quickly to a hand-to-hand fight, and rushed upon their foe with
drawn swords. The Romans, on the other hand, showered down upon them
first their javelins and then the stones with which the ground plentifully
supplied them. Shields and helmets alike were struck, and those who were
not wounded were confounded and bewildered; it was almost impossible for
them to get to close quarters, and they had no missiles with which to keep
up the fight from a distance. Whilst they were standing as a mark for the
missiles, without any sufficient protection, some even retreating, the whole
line wavering and unsteady, the Roman hastati and principes raised their
battle-shout again and charged down upon them with drawn swords. The
Etruscans did not wait for the charge but faced about and in disorderly flight
made for their camp. The Roman cavalry, however, galloping in a slanting
direction across the plain, headed off the fugitives, who gave up all idea of
reaching their camp and turned off to the mountains. For the most part
without arms, and with a large proportion of wounded, the fugitives entered
the Ciminian forest. Many thousands of Etruscans were killed, thirty-eight
standards were taken, and in the capture of the camp the Romans secured an
immense amount of booty. Then the question was discussed whether to
pursue the enemy or no.
9.36
The
Ciminian forest was, in those days, more frightful and impassable than the
German forests were recently found to be; not a single trader had, up to that
time, ventured through it. Of those present in the council of war, hardly any
one but the general himself was bold enough to undertake to enter it; they
had not yet forgotten the horrors of Caudium. According to one tradition, it
appears that M. Fabius, the consul's brother -others say Caeso, others again
L. Claudius, the consul's half-brother -declared that he would go and
reconnoitre, and shortly return with accurate information. He had been
brought up in Caere, and was thoroughly conversant with the Etruscan
language and literature. There is authority for asserting that at that time
Roman boys were, as a rule, instructed in Etruscan literature as they now are
in Greek, but I think the probability is that there was something remarkable
about the man who displayed such boldness in disguising himself and
mingling with the enemy. He is said to have been accompanied by only one
servant, and during their journey they only made brief inquiries as to the
nature of the country and the names of its leading men, lest they should
make some startling blunder in conversing with the natives and so be found
out. They went disguised as shepherds, with their rustic weapons, each
carrying two bills and two heavy javelins. But neither their familiarity with
the language nor the fashion of their dress nor their implements afforded
them so much protection as the impossibility of believing that any stranger
would enter the Ciminian forest. It is stated that they penetrated as far as
Camerinum in Umbria, and on their arrival there the Roman ventured to say
who they were. He was introduced into the senate, and, acting in the consul's
name, he established a treaty of friendship with them. After having been most
kindly and hospitably received, he was requested to inform the Romans that
thirty days' provision would be ready for them if they came into that district,
and the Camertine soldiery would be prepared to act under their orders.
When the consul received this report, he sent the baggage on in advance at
the first watch. The legions were ordered to march behind the baggage,
while he himself remained behind with the cavalry. The following day at
dawn he rode up with his cavalry to the enemy's outposts stationed on the
edge of the forest, and after he had engaged their attention for a considerable
time, he returned to the camp and, in the evening, leaving by the rear gate,
he started after the column. By dawn on the following day he was holding
the nearest heights of the Ciminian range, and after surveying the rich fields
of Etruria he sent out parties to forage. A very large quantity of plunder had
already been secured when some cohorts of Etruscan peasantry, hastily got
together by the authorities of the neighbourhood, sought to check the
foragers; they were, however, so badly organised that, instead of rescuing
the prey, they almost fell a prey themselves. After putting them to flight with
heavy loss, the Romans ravaged the country far and wide, and returned to
their camp loaded with plunder of every kind. It happened to be during this
raid that a deputation, consisting of five members of the senate with two
tribunes of the plebs, came to warn Fabius, in the name of the senate, not to
traverse the Ciminian forest. They were very glad to find that they had come
too late to prevent the expedition, and returned to Rome to report victory.
9.37
This
expedition did not bring the war to a close, it only extended it. The whole
country lying below the Ciminian range had felt the effect of his
devastations, and they roused the indignation of the cantons of Etruria and
of the adjoining districts of Umbria. A larger army than had ever assembled
before was marched to Sutrium. Not only did they advance their camp
beyond the edge of the forest, but they showed such eagerness that they
marched down in battle order on to the plain as soon as possible. After
advancing some distance they halted. leaving a space between them and the
Roman camp for the enemy to form his lines. When they became aware that
their enemy declined battle, they marched up to the rampart of the camp and,
on seeing that the outposts retired within the camp, they loudly insisted upon
their generals ordering the day's rations to be brought down to them from
their camp, as they intended to remain under arms and attack the hostile
camp, if not by night, at all events at dawn. The Romans were quite as
excited at the prospect of battle, but they were kept quiet by their
commander's authority. It was about four o'clock in the afternoon when the
general ordered the troops to take food, and instructed them to remain under
arms and in readiness at whatever hour he gave the signal, whether by day or
by night. In a brief address to his men he drew a contrast between the
military qualities of the Samnites and those of the Etruscans, speaking highly
of the former and disparaging the latter, saying that there was no comparison
between them as regarded either their courage or their numbers. They would
learn in time that he had another weapon in reserve, meanwhile he must keep
silence. By these dark hints he made his men believe that the enemy were
being betrayed, and this helped to restore the courage which had quailed at
the sight of such an immense multitude. This impression was confirmed by
the absence of any intention on the part of the enemy to entrench the ground
they were occupying.
After the troops had had dinner, they rested until about the fourth
watch. Then they rose quietly and armed themselves. A quantity of
mattock-headed axes were distributed to the camp-followers, with which
they were to dig away the rampart and fill up the fosse with it. The troops
were formed up within their entrenchments, and picked cohorts were posted
at the exits of the camp. Then a little before dawn -in summer nights the
time for deepest sleep -the signal was given, the men crossed the levelled
rampart in line and fell upon the enemy, who were lying about in all
directions. Some were killed before they could stir, others only half awake as
they lay, most of them whilst wildly endeavouring to seize their arms. Only a
few had time to arm themselves, and these, with no standards under which to
rally, no officers to lead them, were routed and fled, the Romans following in
hot pursuit. Some sought their camp, others the forest. The latter proved the
safer refuge, for the camp, situated in the plain below, was taken the same
day. The gold and silver were ordered to be brought to the consul; the rest
of the spoil became the property of the soldiers. The killed and prisoners
amounted to 60,000. Some authors assert that this great battle was fought
beyond the Ciminian forest, at Perusia, and that fears were felt in the City
lest the army, cut off from all help by that terrible forest, should be
overwhelmed by a united force of Tuscans and Umbrians. But wherever it
was fought, the Romans had the best of it. As a result of this victory,
Perusia, Cortona, and Arretium, which were at that time the three leading
cantons of Etruria, sent to Rome for a treaty of peace. A thirty years' truce
was granted them.
9.38
During
these occurrences in Etruria the other consul, C. Marcius Rutilus, took
Allifae from the Samnites. Many other fortified posts and hamlets were
either destroyed or passed uninjured into the power of the Romans. While
this was going on, P. Cornelius, whom the senate had made maritime
prefect, took the Roman fleet to Campania and brought up at Pompeii. Here
the crews landed and proceeded to ravage the territory of Nuceria. After
devastating the district near the coast, from which they could have easily
reached their ships, they went further inland, attracted as usual by the desire
for plunder, and here they roused the inhabitants against them. As long as
they were scattered through the fields they met nobody, though they might
have been cut off to a man, but when they returned, thinking themselves
perfectly safe, they were overtaken by the peasants and stripped of all their
plunder. Some were killed; the survivors were driven helter-skelter to their
ships. However great the alarm created in Rome by Q. Fabius' expedition
through the Ciminian forest, there was quite as much pleasure felt by the
Samnites when they heard of it. They said that the Roman army was hemmed
in; it was the Caudine disaster over again; the old recklessness had again led
a nation always greedy for further conquests into an impassable forest; they
were beset by the difficulties of the ground quite as much as by hostile arms.
Their delight was, however, tinged with envy when they reflected that
fortune had diverted the glory of finishing the war with Rome from the
Samnites to the Etruscans. So they concentrated their whole strength to
crush C. Marcius or, if he did not give them a chance of fighting, to march
through the country of the Marsi and Sabines into Etruria. The consul
advanced against them, and a desperate battle was fought with no decisive
result. Which side lost most heavily was doubtful, but a rumour was spread
that the Romans had been worsted, as they had lost some belonging to the
equestrian order and some military tribunes, besides a staff officer, and -what was a signal disaster -the consul himself was wounded. Reports of the
battle, exaggerated as usual, reached Rome and created the liveliest alarm
among the senators. It was decided that a Dictator should be nominated, and
no one had the slightest doubt that Papirius Cursor would be nominated, the
one man who was regarded as the supreme general of his day. But they did
not believe that a messenger could get through to the army in Samnium, as
the whole country was hostile, nor were they by any means sure that Marcius
was still alive.
The other consul, Fabius, was on bad terms with Papirius. To
prevent this private feud from causing public danger, the senate resolved to
send a deputation to Fabius, consisting of men of consular rank, who were to
support their authority as public envoys by using their personal influence to
induce him to lay aside all feelings of enmity for the sake of his country.
When they had handed to Fabius the resolution of the senate, and had
employed such arguments as their instructions demanded, the consul,
keeping his eyes fixed on the ground, withdrew from the deputation, without
making any reply and leaving them in utter uncertainty as to what he would
do. Subsequently, he nominated L. Papirius Dictator according to the
traditional usage at midnight. When the deputation thanked him for having
shown such rare self-command, he remained absolutely silent, and without
vouchsafing any reply or making any allusion to what he had done, he
abruptly dismissed them, showing by his conduct what a painful effort it had
cost him. Papirius named C. Junius Bubulcus, Master of the Horse. Whilst he
was submitting to the Assembly of Curies the resolution conferring the
Dictatorial power, an unfavourable omen compelled him to adjourn the
proceedings. It fell to the Faucian cury to vote first, and this cury had voted
first in the years in which two memorable disasters occurred, the capture of
the City and the capitulation of Caudium. Licinius Macer adds a third
disaster through which this cury became ill-omened, the massacre at the
Cremera.
9.39
The
following day, after fresh auspices had been taken, the Dictator was invested
with his official powers. He took command of the legions which were raised
during the scare connected with the expedition through the Ciminian forest,
and led them to Longula. Here he took over the consul's troops, and with the
united force went into the field. The enemy showed no disposition to shirk
battle, but while the two armies stood facing each other fully prepared for
action, yet neither anxious to begin, they were overtaken by night. Their
standing camps were within a short distance of each other, and for some
days they remained quiet, not, however, through any distrust of their own
strength or any feeling of contempt for the enemy. Meantime the Romans
were meeting with success in Etruria, for in an engagement with the
Umbrians the enemy were unable to keep up the fight with the spirit with
which they began it, and, without any great loss, were completely routed. An
engagement also took place at Lake Vadimonis, where the Etruscans had
concentrated an army raised under a lex sacrata, in which each man chose his
comrade. As their army was more numerous than any they had previously
raised, so they exhibited a higher courage than they had ever shown before.
So savage was the feeling on both sides that, without discharging a single
missile, they began the fight at once with swords. The fury displayed in the
combat, which long hung in the balance, was such that it seemed as though it
was not the Etruscans who had been so often defeated that we were fighting
with, but some new, unknown people. There was not the slightest sign of
yielding anywhere; as the men in the first line fell, those in the second took
their places, to defend the standards. At length the last reserves had to be
brought up, and to such an extremity of toil and danger had matters come
that the Roman cavalry dismounted, and, leaving their horses in charge,
made their way over piles of armour and heaps of slain to the front ranks of
the infantry. They appeared like a fresh army amongst the exhausted
combatants, and at once threw the Etruscan standards into confusion. The
rest of the men, worn out as they were, nevertheless followed up the cavalry
attack, and at last broke through the enemy's ranks. Their determined
resistance was now overcome, and when once their maniples began to give
way, they soon took to actual flight. That day broke for the first time the
power of the Etruscans after their long-continued and abundant prosperity.
The main strength of their army was left on the field, and their camp was
taken and plundered.
9.40
Equally
hard fighting and an equally brilliant success characterised the campaign
which immediately followed against the Samnites. In addition to their usual
preparations for war, they had new glittering armour made in which their
troops were quite resplendent. There were two divisions; one had their
shields plated with gold, the other with silver. The shield was made straight
and broad at the top to cover the chest and shoulders, then became narrower
towards the bottom to allow of it being more easily moved about. To protect
the front of the body they wore coats of chain armour; the left leg was
covered with a greave, and their helmets were plumed to give them the
appearance of being taller than they really were. The tunics of the men with
gold plated shields were in variegated colours, those with the silver shields
had tunics of white linen. The latter were assigned to the right wing, the
former were posted on the left. The Romans knew that all this splendid
armour had been provided, and they had been taught by their generals that a
soldier ought to inspire dread not by being decked out in gold and silver but
by trusting to his courage and his sword. They looked upon those things as a
spoil for the enemy rather than a defence for the wearer, resplendent enough
before a battle but soon stained and fouled by wounds and bloodshed. They
knew that the one ornament of the soldier was courage, and all that finery
would belong to whichever side won the victory; an enemy however rich
was the prize of the victor, however poor the victor might be.
With this teaching fresh in their minds, Cursor led his men into
battle. He took his place on the right wing, and gave the command of the left
to the Master of the Horse. As soon as the two lines came into collision, a
contest began between the Dictator and the Master of the Horse, quite as
keen as the struggle against the enemy, as to whose division should be the
first to win the victory. Junius happened to be the first to dislodge the
enemy. Bringing up his left wing against the enemy's right, where the
"devoted" soldiers were posted, conspicuous in their white tunics and
glittering armour, he declared that he would sacrifice them to Orcus, and,
pushing the attack, he shook their ranks and made them visibly give way. On
seeing this, the Dictator exclaimed, "Shall the victory begin on the left wing?
Is the right wing, the Dictator's own division, going to follow where another
had led the way in battle, and not win for itself the greatest share of the
victory?" This roused the men; the cavalry behaved with quite as much
gallantry as the infantry, and the staff-officers displayed no less energy than
the generals. M. Valerius on the right wing, and P. Decius on the left, both
men of consular rank, rode up to the cavalry who were covering the flanks
and urged them to snatch some of the glory for themselves. They charged
the enemy on both flanks, and the double attack increased the consternation
of the enemy. To complete their discomfiture, the Roman legions again
raised their battle-shout and charged home. Now the Samnites took to flight,
and soon the plain was filled with shining armour and heaps of bodies. At
first the terrified Samnites found shelter in their camp, but they were not able
even to hold that; it was captured, plundered, and burnt before nightfall.
The senate decreed a triumph for the Dictator. By far the greatest
sight in the procession was the captured armour, and so magnificent were
the pieces considered that the gilded shields were distributed amongst the
owners of the silversmiths' shops to adorn the Forum. This is said to be the
origin of the custom of the aediles decorating the Forum when the symbols
of three Capitoline deities are conducted in procession through the City on
the occasion of the Great Games. Whilst the Romans made use of this
armour to honour the gods, the Campanians, out of contempt and hatred
towards the Samnites, made the gladiators who performed at their banquets
wear it, and they then called them "Samnites." The consul Fabius fought a
battle this year with the remnants of the Etruscans at Perusia, for this city
had broken the truce. He gained an easy and decisive victory, and after the
battle he approached the walls and would have taken the place had not
envoys been sent on to surrender it. After he had stationed a garrison in
Perusia, deputations came to him from different cities in Etruria to ask for a
restoration of amicable relations; these he sent on to the senate at Rome.
Then he entered the city in triumphal procession, after achieving a more solid
success than the Dictator, especially as the defeat of the Samnites was put
down largely to the credit of the staff-officers, P. Decius and M. Valerius.
These men were chosen by an almost unanimous vote at the next elections -one as consul, the other as praetor.
9.41
Owing to
his splendid services in the subjugation of Etruria, the consulship of Fabius
was extended to another year, Decius being his colleague. Valerius was
elected praetor for the fourth time. The consuls arranged their respective
commands; Etruria fell to Decius, and Samnium to Fabius. Fabius marched
to Nuceria, where the people of Alfaterna met him with a request for peace,
but as they had refused it when offered to them before, he declined to grant
it now. It was not till he actually began to attack the place that they were
forced into unconditional surrender. He fought an action with the Samnites
and won an easy victory. The memory of that battle would not have survived
if it had not been that the Marsi engaged for the first time on that occasion in
hostilities with Rome. The Peligni, who had followed the example of the
Marsi, met with the same fate. The other consul, Decius, was also
successful. He inspired such alarm in Tarquinii that its people provided his
army with corn and asked for a forty years' truce. He captured several
fortified posts belonging to Volsinii, some of which he destroyed that they
might not serve as retreats for the enemy, and by extending his operations in
all directions he made his name so dreaded that the whole Etruscan league
begged him to grant a treaty. There was not the slightest chance of their
obtaining one, but a truce was granted them for one year. They had to
provide a year's pay for the troops and two tunics for every soldier. That was
the price of the truce.
While matters were thus quieted in Etruria fresh trouble was caused
by the sudden defection of the Umbrians, a people hitherto untouched by the
ravages of war beyond what their land had suffered from the passage of the
Romans. They called out all their fighting men and compelled a large section
of the Etruscan population to resume hostilities. The army which they
mustered was so large that they began to talk in very braggart tones about
themselves and in very contemptuous terms about the Romans. They even
expressed their intention of leaving Decius in their rear and marching straight
to attack Rome. Their intentions were disclosed to Decius; he at once
hastened by forced marches to a city outside the frontiers of Etruria and took
up a position in the territory of Pupinia, to watch the enemy's movements.
This hostile movement on the part of the Umbrians was regarded very
seriously in Rome, even their menacing language made people, after their
experience of the Gaulish invasion, tremble for the safety of their City.
Instructions were accordingly sent to Fabius, ordering him, if he could for
the time being suspend operations in Samnium, to march with all speed into
Umbria. The consul at once acted upon his instructions and proceeded by
forced marches to Mevania, where the forces of the Umbrians were
stationed. They were under the impression that he was far away in Samnium,
with another war on his hands, and his sudden arrival produced such
consternation amongst them, that some advised a retreat into their fortified
cities, while others were in favour of abandoning the war. There was one
canton -the natives call it Materina -which not only kept the rest under
arms but even induced them to come to an immediate engagement. They
attacked Fabius while he was fortifying his camp. When he saw them making
a rush towards his entrenchments he called his men off from their work and
marshalled them in the best order that the ground and the time at his disposal
allowed. He reminded them of the glory they had won in Etruria and in
Samnium, and bade them finish off this wretched aftergrowth of the Etruscan
war and exact a fitting retribution for the impious language in which the
enemy had threatened to attack Rome. His words were received with such
eagerness by his men that their enthusiastic shouts interrupted their
commander's address, and without waiting for the word of command or the
notes of the trumpets and bugles they raced forward against the enemy. They
did not attack them as though they were armed men; marvellous to relate,
they began by snatching the standards from those who bore them, then the
standard-bearers were themselves dragged off to the consul, the soldiers
were pulled across from the one army to the other, the action was
everywhere fought with shields rather than with swords, men were knocked
down by the bosses of shields and blows under the arm-pits. More were
captured than killed, and only one cry was heard throughout the ranks: "Lay
down your arms!" So, on the field of battle, the prime authors of the war
surrendered. During the next few days the rest of the Umbrian communities
submitted. The Ocriculans entered into a mutual undertaking with Rome and
were admitted to her friendship.
9.42
After
bringing to a victorious close the war which had been allotted to his
colleague, Fabius returned to his own sphere of action. As he had conducted
operations with such success the senate followed the precedent set by the
people in the previous year and extended his command for a third year in
spite of the strenuous opposition of Appius Claudius who was now consul,
the other consul being L. Volumnius. I find in some annalists that Appius
was a candidate for the consulship while he was still censor, and that L.
Furius, a tribune of the plebs, stopped the election until he had resigned his
censorship. A new enemy, the Sallentines, had appeared, and the conduct of
this war was assigned to his colleague; Appius himself remained in Rome
with the view of strengthening his influence by his domestic administration,
as the attainment of military glory was in other hands. Volumnius had no
cause to regret this arrangement, he fought many successful actions and took
some of the enemy's cities by storm. He was lavish in distributing the spoil,
and this generosity was rendered still more pleasing by his frank and cordial
manner; by qualities such as these he made his men keen to face any perils or
labours. Q. Fabius, as proconsul, fought a pitched battle with the Samnites
near the city of Allifae. There was very little uncertainty as to the result; the
enemy were routed and driven to their camp, and they would not have held
that had more daylight been left. Before night, however, their camp was
completely invested, so that none could escape. On the morrow while it was
still twilight they made proposals for surrender, and their surrender was
accepted on condition that the Samnites should be dismissed with one
garment apiece after they had all passed under the yoke. No provision had
been made for their allies, and as many as 7000 of them were sold into
slavery. Those who declared themselves Hernicans were separated and
placed under guard; subsequently Fabius sent them all to the senate in Rome.
After inquiries had been made as to whether they had fought for the
Samnites against Rome as conscripts or as volunteers, they were committed
to the custody of the Latin cities. The new consuls, P. Cornelius Arvina and
Q. Marcius Tremulus, were ordered to bring the whole question of the
prisoners before the senate. The Hernicans resented this, and a national
council was held at Anagnia in what they call the Maritime Circus; the whole
nation thereupon, with the exception of Aletrium, Ferentinae, and Verulae,
declared war against Rome.
9.43
Now that
Fabius had evacuated the country the Samnites became restless. Calatia and
Sora and the Roman garrisons there were taken by storm, and the soldiers
who had been taken prisoners were cruelly massacred. P. Cornelius was
despatched thither with an army. The Anagnians and Hernicans had been
assigned to Marcius. At first the enemy occupied such a well-chosen position
between the camps of the two consuls that no messenger, however active,
could get through, and for some days both consuls were kept in ignorance of
everything and in anxious suspense as to each other's movements. Tidings of
this alarming state of things reached Rome, and every man liable to service
was called out; two complete armies were raised against sudden
emergencies. But the progress of the war did not justify this extreme alarm,
nor was it worthy of the old reputation which the Hernicans enjoyed. They
attempted nothing worth mentioning, within a few days they were stripped
of three camps in succession, and begged for a thirty days' armistice to allow
of their sending envoys to Rome. To obtain this they consented to supply the
troops with six months' pay and one tunic per man. The envoys were
referred by the senate to Marcius, to whom they had given full powers to
treat, and he received the formal surrender of the Hernicans. The other
consul in Samnium, though superior in strength, was more hampered in his
movements. The enemy had blocked all the roads and secured the passes so
that no supplies could be brought in, and though the consul drew up his line
and offered battle each day he failed to allure the enemy into an engagement.
It was quite clear that the Samnites would not risk an immediate conflict,
and that the Romans could not stand a prolonged campaign. The arrival of
Marcius, who after subjugating the Hernicans had hurried to the assistance
of his colleague, made it impossible for the enemy to delay matters any
longer. They had not felt themselves strong enough to meet even one army
in the open field, and they knew that their position would be perfectly
hopeless if the two consular armies formed a junction; they decided,
therefore, to attack Marcius while he was on the march before he had time to
deploy his men. The soldiers' kits were hurriedly thrown together in the
centre, and the fighting line was formed as well as the time allowed. The
noise of the battle-shout rolling across and then the sight of the cloud of dust
in the distance created great excitement in the standing camp of Cornelius.
He at once ordered the men to arm for battle, and led them hurriedly out of
the camp into line. It would, he exclaimed, be a scandalous disgrace if they
allowed the other army to win a victory which both ought to share, and
failed to maintain their claim to the glory of a war which was especially their
own. He then made a flank attack, and breaking through the enemy's centre
pushed on to their camp, which was denuded of defenders, and burnt it. As
soon as Marcius' troops caught sight of the flames, and the enemy looking
behind them saw them too, the Samnites took to flight in all directions, but
no place afforded them a safe refuge, death awaited them everywhere.
After 30,000 of the enemy had been killed the consuls gave the
signal to retire. They were recalling and collecting the troops together amidst
mutual congratulations when suddenly fresh cohorts of the enemy were seen
in the distance, consisting of recruits who had been sent up as
reinforcements. This renewed the carnage, for, without any orders from the
consuls or any signal given, the victorious Romans attacked them,
exclaiming as they charged that the Samnite recruits would have to pay
dearly for their training. The consuls did not check the ardour of their men,
for they knew well that raw soldiers would not even attempt to fight when
the veterans around them were in disorderly flight. Nor were they mistaken;
all the Samnite forces, veterans and recruits alike, fled to the nearest
mountains. The Romans went up after them, no place afforded safety to the
beaten foe, they were routed from the heights they had occupied, and at last
with one voice they all begged for peace. They were ordered to supply corn
for three months, a year's pay, and a tunic for each soldier, and envoys were
despatched to the senate to obtain terms of peace. Cornelius was left in
Samnium; Marcius entered the City in triumphal procession after his
subjugation of the Hernicans. An equestrian statue was decreed to him which
was erected in the Forum in front of the Temple of Castor. Three of the
Hernican communities -Aletrium, Verulae, and Ferentinum -had their
municipal independence restored to them as they preferred that to the
Roman franchise, and the right of intermarriage with each other was granted
them, a privilege which for a considerable period they were the only
communities amongst the Hernicans to enjoy. The Anagnians and the others
who had taken up arms against Rome were admitted to the status of
citizenship without the franchise, they were deprived of their municipal
self-government and the right of intermarriage with each other, and their
magistrates were forbidden to exercise any functions except those connected
with religion. In this year the censor C. Junius Bubulcus signed a contract for
the building of the temple to Salus which he had vowed when engaged as
consul in the Samnite war. He and his colleague, M. Valerius Maximus, also
undertook the construction of roads through the country districts out of the
public funds. The treaty with the Carthaginians was renewed for the third
time this year and munificent presents were made to the plenipotentiaries
who had come over for the purpose.
9.44
P.
Cornelius Scipio was nominated Dictator this year, with P. Decius Mus as
Master of the Horse, for the purpose of holding the elections, as neither of
the consuls could leave the seat of war. The consuls elected were L.
Postumius and Tiberius Minucius. Piso places these consuls immediately
after Q. Fabius and P. Decius, omitting the two years in which I have
inserted the consulships of Claudius and Volumnius and of Cornelius and
Marcius. Whether this was due to a slip of memory in drawing up the lists or
whether he purposely omitted them, believing them to be wrongly inserted,
is uncertain. The Samnites made forays this year into the district of Stellae in
Campania. Both consuls accordingly were despatched to Samnium.
Postumius marched to Tifernum, Minucius made Bovianum his objective.
Postumius was the first to come into touch with the enemy and a battle was
fought at Tifernum. Some authorities state that the Samnites were
thoroughly beaten and 24,000 prisoners taken. According to others the battle
was an indecisive one, and Postumius, in order to create an impression that
he was afraid of the enemy, withdrew by night into the mountains, whither
the enemy followed him and took up an entrenched position two miles away
from him. To keep up the appearance of having sought a safe and
commodious place for a standing camp -and such it really was -the consul
strongly entrenched himself and furnished his camp with all necessary stores.
Then, leaving a strong detachment to hold it, he started at the third watch
and led his legions in light marching order by the shortest possible route to
his colleague, who was also encamped in front of another Samnite army.
Acting on Postumius' advice Minucius engaged the enemy, and after the
battle had gone on for the greater part of the day without either side gaining
the advantage, Postumius brought up his fresh legions and made an
unsuspected attack upon the enemy's wearied lines. Exhausted by fighting
and by wounds they were incapable of flight and were practically annihilated.
Twenty-one standards were captured. Both armies marched to the camp
which Postumius had formed, and there they routed and dispersed the
enemy, who were demoralised by the news of the previous battle.
Twenty-six standards were captured, the captain-general of the Samnites,
Statius Gellius, and a large number of men were made prisoners, and both
camps were taken. The next day they commenced an attack on Bovianum
which was soon taken, and the consuls after their brilliant successes
celebrated a joint triumph. Some authorities assert that the consul Minucius
was carried back to the camp severely wounded and died there, and that M.
Fulvius was made consul in his place, and after taking over the command of
Minucius' army effected the capture of Bovianum. During the year Sora,
Arpinum, and Cesennia were recovered from the Samnites. The great statue
of Hercules was also set up and dedicated in the Capitol.
9.45
P.
Sulpicius Saverrio and P. Sempronius Sophus were the next consuls. During
their consulship the Samnites, anxious for either a termination or at least a
suspension of hostilities, sent envoys to Rome to sue for peace. In spite of
their submissive attitude they did not meet with a very favourable reception.
The reply they received was to the effect that if the Samnites had not often
made proposals for peace while they were actually preparing for war
negotiations might possibly have been entered into, but now as their words
had proved worthless the question must be decided by their deeds. They
were informed that the consul P. Sempronius would shortly be in Samnium
with his army, and he would be able to judge accurately whether they were
more disposed to peace or to war. When he had obtained all the information
that he wanted he would lay it before the senate; on his return from
Samnium the envoys might follow him to Rome. Wherever Sempronius
marched they found the Samnites peaceably disposed and ready to supply
them with provisions and stores. The old treaty was therefore restored. From
that quarter the Roman arms were turned against their old enemies the
Aequi. For many years this nation had remained quiet, disguising their real
sentiments under a peaceable attitude. As long as the Hernicans remained
unsubdued the Aequi had frequently co-operated with them in sending help
to the Samnites, but after their final subjugation almost the whole of the
Aequian nation threw off the mask and openly went over to the enemy. After
Rome had renewed the treaty with the Samnites the fetials went on to the
Aequi to demand satisfaction. They were told that their demand was simply
regarded as an attempt on the part of the Romans to intimidate them by
threats of war into becoming Roman citizens. How desirable a thing this
citizenship was might be seen in the case of the Hernicans who, when
allowed to choose, preferred living under their own laws to becoming
citizens of Rome. To men who were not allowed which they would prefer,
but were made Roman citizens by compulsion, it would be a punishment.
As these opinions were pretty generally expressed in their different
councils, the Romans ordered war to be declared against the Aequi. Both the
consuls took the field and selected a position four miles distant from the
enemy's camp. As the Aequi had for many years had no experience of a
national war, their army was like a body of irregulars with no properly
appointed generals and no discipline or obedience. They were in utter
confusion; some were of opinion that they ought to give battle, others
thought they ought to confine themselves to defending their camp. The
majority were influenced by the prospect of their fields being devastated and
their cities, with their scanty garrisons, being destroyed. In this diversity of
opinions one was given utterance to which put out of sight all care for the
common weal and directed each man's regards to his own private interests.
They were advised to abandon their camp at the first watch, carry off all
their belongings, and disperse to their respective cities to protect their
property behind their walls. This advice met with the warmest approval from
all. Whilst the enemy were thus straggling homewards, the Romans as soon
as it was light marched out and formed up in order of battle, and as there
was no one to oppose, they went on at a quick march to the enemy's camp.
Here they found no pickets before the gates or on the rampart, none of the
noise which is customary in a camp, and fearing from the unusual silence that
a surprise was being prepared they came to a halt. At length they climbed
over the rampart and found everything deserted. Then they began to follow
up the enemy's footsteps, but as these went in all directions alike, they found
themselves going further and further astray. Subsequently they discovered
through their scouts what the design of the enemy was, and their cities were
successively attacked. Within a fortnight they had stormed and captured
thirty-one walled towns. Most of these were sacked and burnt, and the
nation of the Aequi was almost exterminated. A triumph was celebrated over
them, and warned by their example the Marrucini, the Marsi, the Paeligni,
and the Feretrani sent spokesmen to Rome to sue for peace and friendship.
These tribes obtained a treaty with Rome.
9.46
It was
during this year that Cn. Flavius, the son of a freedman, born in a humble
station of life, but a clever plausible man, became curule aedile. I find in
some annalists the statement that at the time of the election of aediles he was
acting as apparitor to the aediles, and when he found that the first vote was
given in his favour, and was disallowed on the ground that he was a clerk, he
laid aside his writing tablet and took an oath that he would not follow that
profession. Licinius Macer, however, attempts to show that he had given up
the clerk's business for some time as he had been a tribune of the plebs, and
had also twice held office as a triumvir, the first time as a triumvir nocturnus,
and afterwards as one of the three commissioners for settling a colony.
However this may be, there is no question that he maintained a defiant
attitude towards the nobles, who regarded his lowly origin with contempt.
He made public the legal forms and processes which had been hidden away
in the closets of the pontiffs; he exhibited a calendar written on whitened
boards in the Forum, on which were marked the days on which legal
proceedings were allowed; to the intense disgust of the nobility he dedicated
the temple of Concord on the Vulcanal. At this function the Pontifex
Maximus, Cornelius Barbatus, was compelled by the unanimous voice of the
people to recite the usual form of devotion in spite of his insistence that in
accordance with ancestral usage none but a consul or a commander-in-chief
could dedicate a temple. It was in consequence of this that the senate
authorised a measure to be submitted to the people providing that no one
should presume to dedicate a temple or an altar without being ordered to do
so by the senate or by a majority of the tribunes of the plebs.
I will relate an incident, trivial enough in itself, but affording a
striking proof of the way in which the liberties of the plebs were asserted
against the insolent presumption of the nobility. Flavius went to visit his
colleague, who was ill. Several young nobles who were sitting in the room
had agreed not to rise when he entered, on which he ordered his curule chair
to be brought, and from that seat of dignity calmly surveyed his enemies,
who were filled with unutterable disgust. The elevation of Flavius to the
aedileship was, however, the work of a party in the Forum who had gained
their power during the censorship of Appius Claudius. For Appius had been
the first to pollute the senate by electing into it the sons of freedmen, and
when no one recognised the validity of these elections and he failed to secure
in the Senate-house the influence which he had sought to gain in the City, he
corrupted both the Assembly of Tribes and the Assembly of Centuries by
distributing the dregs of the populace amongst all the tribes. Such deep
indignation was aroused by the election of Flavius that most of the nobles
laid aside their gold rings and military decorations as a sign of mourning.
From that time the citizens were divided into two parties; the uncorrupted
part of the people, who favoured and supported men of integrity and
patriotism, were aiming at one thing, the "mob of the Forum" were aiming at
something else. This state of things lasted until Q. Fabius and P. Decius were
made censors. Q. Fabius, for the sake of concord, and at the same time to
prevent the elections from being controlled by the lowest of the populace,
threw the whole of the citizens of the lowest class -the "mob of the Forum"
-into four tribes and called them "the City Tribes." Out of gratitude for his
action, it is said, he received an epithet which he had not gained by all his
victories, but which was now conferred upon him for the wisdom he had
shown in thus adjusting the orders in the State -the cognomen "Maximus."
It is stated that he also instituted the annual parade of the cavalry on July 15.
End of Book 9