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Summary

The goals of the mission congregation were subverted very early in its life. We have tried to suggest several reasons for this. First, and most significantly, the achievement of the goals stated and approved by the Miami Presbytery required the recruitment of active lay people. Failure to plan adequately for this structural prerequisite virtually excluded at the onset the possibility of achieving these goals. In our discussion we have attempted to outline a scenario whereby the recruitment of active Presbyterians might have been achieved.

Second, the failure to provide an adequate structure to recruit active lay people meant the only potential recruits into the new congregation were persons alienated from traditional church life, with little interest in cooperating with other congregations. The immediate informal leaders of the mission congregation saw social action as their only legitimate reason for being. Indeed, their remaining in the group seems to have been conditional upon the organizing pastor's consent to move quickly into social-action projects.

Third, there is serious ambiguity regarding the intentions of those most intimately responsible for the creation of the new congregation. While formally stated goals place paramount emphasis on an educational-training relationship with other congregations, a strategy statement leaves open the door for the development of a direct social-action group. This strategy statement provided Righter legitimacy for what did emerge.

Fourth, the development of social-action projects employing confrontation strategies served to create very considerable strain between the mission congregation and other congregations in the Presbytery. At this point, it would be unrealistic to think further financial support for the mission congregation could be approved by the Presbytery. Furthermore, it would be equally unrealistic to think that the Congregation for Reconciliation might be redirected toward the achievement of the original coals.

Finally, given that the structural realities virtually precluded from the onset the achievement of the original goals, a fair assessment of the Congregation must focus on what they have achieved. In the next two chapters we shall examine two of their more important social-action projects. Other projects might have been selected. One, in particular, provides evidence of their ability to work effectively behind the scenes with nonconflict strategies. We have chosen not to examine this project because it is not possible to do so without (a) divulging information gained in confidence from sympathetic business and political leaders and (b) risking the Congregation's future effectiveness in this arena. After examining two action projects, in chapter 7 we shall discuss some broader issues of their conflict strategy.