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CHAPTER 4
Parental Disappointment: The Problem of Goals
Gideon`s Gang: A Case Study Of The Church In Social Action |  |
But We Thought You Said . . .
On one occasion the Congregation did make a concerted effort to carry out the Presbytery's goal of exploring all courses of action designed to change negative attitudes toward racial understanding. This attempt ended in a mild disaster. We trace those developments here to demonstrate the difficulties for the Congregation in seeking to follow one of the Presbytery's goals.
In 1969 the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. ordered the establishment of a task force on Southern Africa. Among other things, it was instructed "to examine the corporations and banks from which boards, agencies, and institutions now purchase goods and services or in which they have investments to ascertain what if any connections these firms and banks have in southern Africa." [1] On the basis of resolutions passed in the 1970 General Assembly, the task force undertook a series of studies focusing upon Gulf Oil Corporation's involvement in Portuguese Angola. As a result, they recommended on March 1, 1971, that Presbyterian. stockholders support in person, or by proxy, a resolution to be made at the forthcoming stockholders' meeting of Gulf which would "prohibit the corporation from making or maintaining investments in territories under or so long as they are under colonial rule, including the territories of Angola and. Mozambique." This request was sent to all Presbyterian churches.
The Congregation for Reconciliation had been studying the Gulf-Angola question and had in March 1971 passed a resolution establishing a committee to take social action aimed at coordinating a boycott of Gulf products "while the business relationship of Gulf Oil Corporation with the Portuguese Government in Angola continues."
On March 31 a letter addressed to "All Pastors and Congregations" was sent by the Task Force of the United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., encouraging study, interpretation, and favorable vote. The Gulf-Angola Committee of the Congregation for Reconciliation saw this as an opportunity to offer their services to the local Presbyterian churches. They called all the pastors in the area, offering their committee's resources for study and encouraging pastors to inform their congregations. Most pastors stated they would inform their members. One congregation invited the committee to speak briefly at worship and to lead an adult class afterward. Several other pastors requested proxy statements and further materials.
Three of the largest churches in Dayton, for various reasons, were unable to bring the issue before their sessions and then to their congregations for prompt consideration. This lack of urgency was interpreted by the Gulf-Angola Committee as evidence of
The response from the leadership of these churches was prompt. Four days after the leafleting a letter was sent to the Miami Presbytery Council by the pastor of the largest Presbyterian church in Dayton, one of three whose members had been leafleted. Portions of the letter follow:
The statement "We received no support from your pastoral leadership" is . . . an arrogant infringement upon the relationship between the pastor and people of a particular church. It is as though we . . . decided that we know what is best for [another] church and proceeded to contact the members of that church directly, to advance our views, with no consideration for the inner workings of that congregation. Such conduct would be, and is, in the case in question, irresponsible.
The actual effect of such affrontery is to prejudice the congrega
[This] church has taken the position that our Presbytery Benevolence be diverted away from the National Missions Committee, largely because of the support given the Congregation for Reconciliation by that committee. We urge other churches of Miami Presbytery to follow a similar course.
A second congregation complained in a letter that they had received the offer of service from the Congregation for Reconciliation without sufficient time to send it through the channels before they were leafleted. They too were offended by the disparaging remarks about their pastoral leadership.
The members of the Congregation for Reconciliation felt, and indeed were operating under, great time pressure, since the Gulf stockholders' meeting was scheduled only nine days after the date of their leafleting. Had they waited for the one congregation to process the request through Session and/or had they firmly established that the pastors had refused to cooperate in bringing the request to their congregations, passing out proxy solicitations would have been an exercise in futility since the stockholders' meeting would already be past.
Some members of the Congregation now concede the message in their leaflet had been tactless at points. This they attribute to the combination of haste to get their message out, their sense of frustration, and their belief that the pastors in question were deliberately uncooperative. To the issue of cooperation with the broader structures of the Presbyterian denomination, they felt they were acting responsibly and in keeping with the goals of the General Assembly and Presbytery.
The Presbytery's National Missions Committee formed a subcommittee to investigate the matter. After a rather prolonged discussion with all parties on May 19, the committee agreed the incident represented more than a breakdown in communication between the Congregation and the three offended churches. In their view it resulted from a "series of serious errors in judgment and tactics by the Congregation." The most serious was the
But the onus of responsibility was not placed as clearly on the shoulders of the Congregation for Reconciliation as the complaining churches and some of the members of the National Missions Committee might have liked. Indeed, the complaining churches were also called on the carpet, as is demonstrated by the following passage from the subcommittee minutes:
The official letter of reprimand to the Congregation contains milder language than the subcommittee minutes. In fact, it almost has the flavor of an apologetic slap on the wrist. By and large, the members of the Congregation did not even interpret the whole affair as a reprimand. Some became incensed with us when we suggested the experience had been "humiliating."
The outcome of the committee's discipline has been more of a standoff than a truce or reconciliation between the Congregation and the large churches of the Presbytery. The sessions of two of the churches agreed to meet with representatives of the Congregation for Reconciliation. A third refused. These meetings provided an opportunity for both sides to present their views, but if further cooperation is viewed as a criterion of a meeting of minds, this has not occurred. At a later date, the Congregation again leafleted these same congregations, although under the aegis of another organization, the United People (see next chapter).
For the most part, the Congregation's relations with other churches now manifest a "once burned, twice shy" attitude. In spite of the insistence of some that they were not really reprimanded, or if they were, they do not accept the legitimacy of the National Missions Committee's action, they have mostly steered away from other churches. There has been no further "ministry of harassment" because there has been no further ministry. On the other hand, we saw no evidence the established
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CHAPTER 4
Parental Disappointment: The Problem of Goals
Gideon`s Gang: A Case Study Of The Church In Social Action | |