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Classical, Biblical, and Medieval Textual Criticism and Modern Editing by G. Thomas Tanselle
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Classical, Biblical, and Medieval Textual Criticism and Modern Editing
by
G. Thomas Tanselle

Most scholarly editors, regardless of the nature or date of the material they work with, recognize that they are participating in a tradition extending back to antiquity; they realize that the activity of "textual criticism," whether called by that name or not, was for centuries concerned with the establishment of the texts of ancient Greek and Roman writings and of the Old and New Testaments and that the development of their discipline is therefore tied to the history of those works. Even if they are not familiar with the details of that history, they know that Aristarchus and other librarians at Alexandria in the third and second centuries B.C. attempted to determine what was authentic and what was spurious in the texts of the manuscripts they assembled; that the Renaissance humanists (among them Poggio, Politian, Aldus, and Erasmus) were particularly concerned with locating, establishing, and disseminating texts in the ancient languages; that Richard Bentley in the early eighteenth century made contributions to the textual study of several Latin authors and proposed a text of the New Testament based on the earliest manuscripts; and that Karl Lachmann, a century later, provided the fullest exposition up to that time of the genealogical approach and is therefore sometimes regarded as the father of modern textual criticism. They probably also know that A.E. Housman had some sharp things to say about the editorial practices of many of his predecessors, comments that emerged from important methodological considerations.

But unless their own work involves classical or biblical or medieval texts, they have in all likelihood not followed closely the nineteenth-and twentieth-century history of textual study in these areas. The explanation is not simply the growing specialization of scholarship but the feeling that the textual criticism of manuscript texts produced centuries after their authors' deaths has little, if any, relevance to textual work on printed texts published during their authors' lifetimes. The foolishness


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of this view is evident to anyone who has read in the editorial literature concerning both ancient and modern texts, for the same issues keep turning up, and some writers seem to be rediscovering, with effort, what was thoroughly discussed in a different field years before. By not familiarizing themselves with the textual criticism of classical, biblical, and medieval literature, textual scholars of more recent literature are cutting themselves off from a voluminous body of theoretical discussion and the product of many generations of experience. And by not keeping up with developments in the editing of post-medieval writings, students of earlier works are depriving themselves of the knowledge of significant advances in editorial thinking. Whereas in the classical and biblical fields textual scholarship was at the forefront, both in prestige and in achievement, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the leadership in theoretical debate about textual matters has in more recent years passed to the field of Renaissance and later literature in English. If textual scholars of these later writings have never quite been accorded by their colleagues the same position of centrality that editors of the classics had long held in their field,[1] there can be no doubt that the extensive, and sometimes acrimonious, debate provoked by Greg's famous essay on copy-text,[2] and its extension by Fredson Bowers and then by the Center for Editions of American Authors,[3] have caused textual and editorial questions to be of serious concern to a larger portion of the

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scholars in the field than they had ever been before. Although the phrase "modern editing" in my title of course refers elliptically to the editing of modern literature, there is some justice in taking it at the same time to mean, more literally, the latest developments in editing.

As a contribution toward what I hope will become increased communication among scholars in all these fields, I should like to offer in what follows a few reflections on the relations between textual work on early or medieval manuscripts and that on later printed texts. Although I do not propose a systematic survey of the history of classical, biblical, and medieval textual criticism,[4] I believe that some purpose is served by bringing together, in this context, references to a number of the significant discussions. What I trust will become clear in the process is that editors of ancient and modern materials have much more to learn from one another than they have generally recognized. Equally revealing, if rather depressing, is the fact that many of their areas of confusion are the same: some of the questions that have been endlessly and inconclusively debated—and often, it must be said, illogically argued as well —are identical in both fields. In either case, the essential point is the relevance each field has for the other.

I

It should not be surprising that all textual scholarship is related, for the same activities are involved, regardless of the diversity of the materials. One must decide whether to produce a diplomatic—that is, unaltered—text of a single document or a critical text, which is a new text that incorporates the results of editorial judgment regarding variant readings and errors. One must assemble the relevant or potentially relevant documents (handwritten, typed, or printed), then find out in what ways their texts differ by collating them, then attempt to determine the relationships among the texts, and finally, if the edition is to be critical, construct a new text by choosing among variant readings and by making conjectures where errors seem to be present in all texts. These stages are interrelated: the kind of thinking one brings to the task of determining relationships among texts, for example, will obviously have a bearing on the decisions made at the next stage. Although these two


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stages are not entirely separable, textual discussions do, in practice, often emphasize one or the other; and I think it is fair to say that perhaps the principal distinction between the body of writing concerned with editing the classics and that dealing with editing modern literature is their differing emphases in this regard. Editors of the earlier material have access to no authorial manuscripts and must contend with copies an unknown number of steps removed (and often many centuries away) from those originals, and such copies sometimes exist in the hundreds, or even—as with the Greek New Testament—the thousands. The task of working out the relationships among the texts of these documents is indeed formidable, and it is natural that a great deal of the thought and writing about editing ancient texts[5] has concentrated on this stage of the editorial process. What has traditionally been called "textual criticism" —or, more recently, "textual analysis"—is this attempt to fix the relationship of the surviving documentary witnesses; and though many of the theories of textual criticism have entailed certain assumptions about how the editor's critical text should be constructed, the focus of attention has normally been not on the "editorial" phase (the actual selection or emendation of readings) but on the prior analysis of the texts that results in the assignment of relationships among them.[6]

Methodological writings about the editing of post-medieval literature, on the other hand, have reversed this emphasis. Although relationships among the texts from this period are by no means always clear-cut, the dimensions of the problem are often significantly different: manuscripts in the author's hand, copies made directly from them, printed editions set from such documents (and perhaps proofread by the author), and later editions during the author's lifetime (perhaps set from copies of the earlier editions annotated by the author) are the characteristic materials. Editorial theorists concerned with this period


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have therefore not been required to give as much thought to the question of establishing relationships among texts and instead have concentrated their attention on the choice and treatment of a "copy-text." Choosing a copy-text is of course dependent on knowing the relationships among the texts; the central problem, however, is not the process of establishing those relationships but of defining the authorial intention that is to be reflected in the critical text, since often more than one document exists that is directly associated with the author. The term "textual criticism" can be used broadly to designate the evaluation of textual witnesses for writings of any period; but its traditional, and more restricted, application to the study of ancient manuscripts is appropriate, for it refers to the kind of analysis that has bulked largest in textual work on those manuscripts.

In classical textual criticism, these basic operations have generally been referred to as recensio and emendatio, and the distinction between the two points up another contrast with textual scholarship of later literature. Recensio refers to the process of establishing the archetype, or the latest common ancestor of all surviving manuscripts, insofar as it can be established from the evidence in those manuscripts, which are the only witnesses to the tradition. The particular decisions made about individual variant readings in the construction of this archetype depend, at least in part, on the relationships that have been postulated among the manuscripts; the practice of stemmatics—of constructing genealogical trees to show manuscript relationships—is therefore also sometimes called "recensionism." And whether or not one aspires to a system that eliminates judgment in the construction and use of the stemmata, the fact is that ultimately judgment will have been involved in the attempt to choose the wording of the archetype from among the variant readings. Swings in scholarly fashion toward, and away from, the use of critical judgment—along with the associated tendency to favor, or disapprove of, eclecticism—must be looked at later; but the point here is not whether a single text is principally adhered to in producing the new recension but the fact that the recension is defined as being limited to readings present in the witnesses (or obvious corrections of them). It is the next stage, emendatio, in which the editor can engage in conjecture to rectify what appear to be errors in all preserved texts.[7] Editorial discussion


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dealing with post-medieval works, in contrast, generally takes the term "emendation" to refer to any alterations introduced by the editor into a particular documentary text (the one chosen as "copy-text"), whether the source of those alterations are other texts or the editor's own ingenuity. It is perhaps natural that this usage should have prevailed among editors of modern works, since they often have an author's manuscript or a text only one or two steps from it to use as a copy-text, and all their alterations may then be seen as corrections to that single documentary text; editors in the earlier manuscript tradition, on the other hand, normally have no such text to choose, and the process of arriving at what might be regarded as the counterpart is a major undertaking in itself, to be accomplished before one can begin to think about how that text departs from what the author must have intended to say. In any event, however the difference in usage came about, it should be clear that both groups of editors are talking about the same categories of editorial intervention—alterations based on readings present in one or more of the documents and alterations emerging from the editor's own conjecture.

It should further be evident that any approach or vocabulary suggesting that the latter are more conjectural than the former is delusory. Of course, a reading adopted from one of the documents may be a striking reading that the editor would not have thought of or dared introduce independently, but the decision to consider it as worthy of acceptance into the critical text is still an act of conjecture, always entailing the potential danger that the reading is accorded too much credence by the mere fact of its existence in one of the documents. To regard the choice among variants as "recension," defined as establishing "what must or may be regarded as transmitted" (Maas), and then to label further editorial alteration as "emendation" or "conjectural emendation," would seem to overemphasize the objectivity of the first and to imply a greater distance between the two than in fact exists. The recension, after all, is a conclusion resulting from scholarly judgment or conjecture—except, of course, when only one text survives or (theoretically) when all surviving texts are identical. Even when the archetype appears to be the text of one of the extant manuscripts, judgment regarding individual variants is still involved in reaching that decision. To think of


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"what must or may be regarded as transmitted" as a single text, when variant texts survive, is to engage in conjecture; and some of the "conjectural emendations" that an editor thinks of may attain to a higher degree of certainty than some of the choices that are made among variant readings in the documents. I do not believe that editors in any field would disagree with this point, despite the implications of the language sometimes used. The fact that the terminology employed by editors of classical and of modern texts diverges somewhat is not important, so long as both groups of editors recognize that they are dealing with the same fundamental questions and so long as they are not misled by the superficial suggestiveness of some of the terms.

As the division of the editorial process into recensio and emendatio makes clear, editors of ancient texts are normally concerned with producing critical editions—editions, that is, containing texts that are different, as a result of the editors' intervention, from any of the documentary texts now existing. Editors of printed texts from the last five hundred years have also been engaged for the most part with this kind of edition: the extensive discussion in the wake of Greg's "Rationale," for instance, has concentrated on critical editions. Yet in the exchange of views that has increasingly been taking place in recent years between editors of modern literature and editors of statesmen's papers, some of the so-called "historical" editors have questioned the value of critical texts, or at least of texts that are "eclectic" in incorporating readings from two or more documents. It is easy to see why a historian editing letters and journals in the hand of a particular statesman would think primarily of a diplomatic edition, and similarly understandable that an editor of an ancient Greek text surviving in much later manuscripts would probably wish to construct a new text attempting to restore the author's words. But the difference between the two situations does not really rest on the different nature of the materials: there are different goals involved, the aim in the former instance being the reproduction of the content of a given document and in the latter being the reconstruction of what the author of a text intended to say. Both approaches are applicable to any material: documents containing ancient Greek texts, for instance, can obviously be treated as entities in their own right, with texts to be exactly reproduced, as manifestations of particular moments in the history of the pieces of writing involved; or they can be regarded as evidence to be used in reconstructing a text nearer its author's intentions than any of the surviving texts manages to come. Historians may more often find themselves producing diplomatic texts of particular documents (the contents of which were often not intended for publication), and scholars of literature (both ancient and modern)


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may more often be engaged in constructing critical texts of works (ordinarily finished pieces of writing—whether "literary" or not—intended for public dissemination). But each group should recognize the value of both approaches and understand how they are related to one another.

This point would seem to be so elementary and obvious as not to need stating; but unfortunately some textual controversies have arisen through a failure to keep in mind the most basic distinctions and to appreciate the place each editorial undertaking occupies in the large framework that encompasses all textual work in all fields. One historical editor has gone so far recently as to make this statement: "To what uses literary critics may put bastard documents is for them to say, but the saying of the same will not likely change the historical discipline's rules of evidence and citation."[8] The narrowness and closed-mindedness of this position is astounding. In a more sophisticated form, however, this issue keeps turning up: the question of eclecticism has perennially been a point of controversy among editors of the classics as well as of modern works.[9] Some editors of modern literary works, who well understand the value of critical texts, have nevertheless argued against combining into a single text readings that reflect different stages of authorial revision. There is nothing wrong in principle, of course, with the position that authorially revised texts may at times be best handled by preparing separate critical editions of each version. But the mistake that sometimes follows is the belief that no variant from one version can be incorporated into another. That injunction would naturally be proper if one were producing a diplomatic edition of each version; but if a critical text of each version is the goal, then one must recognize that some of the variants among versions do not represent a particular stage of revision or rethinking but are precisely the kinds of corrections that the editor is already committed to inserting—without documentary authority. I make this point (which has been discussed more fully else-where)[10] in order to suggest, once again, that the distinction between


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adopted variant readings and conjectural emendations needs to be thought about less mechanically than it often is and to show that editors would be well advised to keep abreast of textual debate in fields other than their own. Just as editors of statesmen's papers and of modern literature stand to benefit from knowing more about the editorial thinking underlying critical editions of ancient texts, so editors of the classics (and of statesmen's papers) will find that the discussions of authorial revisions, engaged in fully by editors of modern literature, raise questions relevant for them.

Further indication of these connections can be suggested by referring to three of the more recent manuals on textual criticism, published coincidentally at about the same time, James Willis's Latin Textual Criticism (1972), Martin L. West's Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique Applicable to Greek and Latin Texts (1973), and Vinton A. Dearing's Principles and Practice of Textual Analysis (1974).[11] These books offer several contrasts. Willis and West, classicists and editors, address their work, as the titles indicate, to other editors of classical texts; Dearing, a professor of English who is establishing the text for the California edition of Dryden and is also working on an edition of the Greek New Testament, intends for his book to be applicable to all editorial scholarship, indeed "to the transmission in any form of any idea or complex of ideas" (p. ix). Willis, whose writing is marred by unsuccessful sarcasm, is principally occupied with restating "the many ways in which scribes were accustomed to make mistakes" (p. ix), though he prefaces that account with a brief section on "Fundamentals"; West, who writes lucidly and concisely, would claim originality largely (though not entirely) for his way of stating certain complex questions and their conventional answers and for choosing passages to illustrate his points; Dearing, who writes at greater length and with some obscurity, covers what a manual must cover but uses the occasion to set forth his own proposal for the analysis of relationships among texts. Willis's book is the narrowest and least significant of the three, focusing on scribal errors and devoting considerable space to "trial passages," on which readers are invited to exercise their ingenuity by proposing emendations


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(answers are provided). Dearing's experience with both ancient and modern texts (he is perhaps unique in working in both fields) and his view of textual analysis as "a completely general discipline of very wide specific applicability in the arts and social sciences" (p. 1) are encouraging signs, and one has good reason to expect his book to have broader significance than West's.[12] In my view, however, West's book is calmer, clearer, and more sensible and finally a better introduction for students from any discipline. Whether or not I am right, I hope that one point implicit in my opinion will be granted: that the interests of all who deal with texts are closely related and therefore that the sources of specific illustrations are of less moment than the basic statements and discussions of principles. A book that draws its examples from many periods and languages is not necessarily of more general applicability than one that takes all its illustrations from Greek and Latin texts; it may be, but the range of examples and even the immediate aims of the author are not the decisive tests.

One vital matter commented on in all three books—and one that editors of modern literature have a particular interest in—is the role of the analysis of physical evidence in textual decisions. What has come to be known as "analytical bibliography" is crucial to the editing of texts in printed books: in order to be in a position to understand textual anomalies in a printed text, one must first have extracted as much information as possible about the printing of the work from the evidence preserved in the printed sheets themselves. As a result of the efforts of McKerrow, Pollard, Greg, Bowers, and Hinman,[13] and of those that followed their lead, editors of printed texts must now deal with such matters as the identification of compositors' habits and of the order of formes through the press. Knowing as much as one can about what happened to a particular text in the printing shop or the publisher's office puts one in a better position to recognize those features of the text that did not come from the author (or at least were not present in the copy furnished to the printer); analytical bibliography has shown time and


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again that much can be learned from physical evidence about the transmission of the text. The same principle obviously applies to manuscripts as well: in the case of manuscript texts not in their authors' hands, the scribe or copyist occupies the roles of publisher's editor, compositor, and pressman combined. Introductory manuals for editors of manuscripts have recognized this point to some extent in that they often contain fairly detailed comments classifying the kinds of errors that scribes were likely to make. Such "habits" are generalized ones, and less attention has been paid to uncovering the habits of particular scribes through physical evidence, including that which fixes the manuscript in time and place.

This whole question enters Dearing's book in the first sentence, where we are told that textual analysis "determines the genealogical relationships between different forms of the same message" but not "the relationships between the transmitters of the different forms"—or, as he puts it in the next paragraph, "the genealogy of the variant states of a text" but not "the genealogy of their records."[14] The distinction, indeed, Dearing regards as one of his central achievements: he believes that his book "carries out to the full" the differentiation set forth in the earlier version[15] between "the genealogy of manuscript and other books as physical objects and the genealogy of the ideas or complexes of ideas that these physical objects transmit" (p. ix). It is of course quite proper to begin with this basic point; editors of all materials from all periods must recognize that the chronology of texts does not necessarily match the chronology of their physical presentation. The point is perhaps not quite such a revelation as Dearing thinks. Nevertheless, it is always good to have fundamental distinctions set forth clearly at the outset of a discussion, and one would have no cause for complaint if Dearing had not carried the point to the opposite extreme, slighting the legitimate role of physical evidence in textual study. Writers in the past, he says, have "almost always" confused the physical document with the text it carries, and he admits that "it is extremely difficult to free oneself from the bibliographical spell"; but it is a "fundamental and important" matter, he insists, "to exclude bibliographical thinking from textual analysis"


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(p. 15). That the valid distinction he began with could have led to this wrongheaded conclusion is unfortunate; but the problem might have been predicted from some remarks made along the way to illustrate the basic point that texts are different from their transmitters. To show that "the same record" may preserve "two or more states of a text," he cites as one illustration a poem appearing twice in an anthology (p. 14). But how is "record" being defined here? What is the physical unit? One may ask the same questions when he then says that different records may "transmit the same state of a text when they are produced by a mechanically perfect reproductive process, such as Xerox copying, and whenever it is deemed vital to preserve the text without change, as in statute books, state documents such as the Constitution of the United States, religious documents such as the Book of Common Prayer, and careful scholarly reprints of all sorts" (pp. 14-15). Xerox copying is not "mechanically perfect," if only because the size of the image is not identical with the original. Beyond that, it is no criticism of the Xerox process to say that it is not "mechanically perfect," since no system can be, if what is meant is that the reproduction is identical to the original. The reproduction is a different physical object, and therefore it is not the same thing; and most, if apparently not quite all, users of Xerox reproductions are aware of the dangers of assuming that what they see in the reproduction is precisely what they would see in the original. Furthermore, is Dearing suggesting that whenever "it is deemed vital to preserve the text without change" such preservation is achieved? Are there never errors in the reprintings of statutes, or prayer books, or "careful scholarly reprints"? Does not the acceptance of aim for fact question the need for textual scholarship at all (or any other effort to establish truth)?

The serious bibliographical problem raised by these statements becomes even more evident with Dearing's next sentence: "The many identical copies produced by printing from the same setting of type, however, provided they are uniformly bound and readied for sale as a single lot, are usually counted as one record." Analytical bibliographers have been demonstrating for three-quarters of a century that surviving copies from the same setting of type (i.e., from the same edition) are not necessarily "identical" in their text—indeed, that they are frequently (or, in some periods, usually) not identical. (Whether or not they are "uniformly bound" or "readied for sale as a single lot" has nothing to do with their text.) Differences can come about either intentionally or inadvertently, through stop-press corrections and alterations between printings or through accidents that damage the type (perhaps necessitating some resetting) and deterioration of type or plates through wear. The essential point is that different copies of an edition are different physical


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objects and are therefore separate pieces of evidence; it is unscholarly to assume, without investigation, that they are identical, and in fact such an assumption would very often be wrong, for books of any period, even the twentieth century. If one were to regard all copies of an edition as a single "record," one would have to define "record" in a special way, for there would frequently be textual variants among particular copies of the "record." It is difficult, for example, to say what "the" text of the Shakespeare First Folio is; one might say that it is the text in Charlton Hinman's Norton Facsimile (1968)—but that work assembles from various copies of the Folio the pages representing corrected formes. No one surviving copy contains all the corrected pages, and constructing such a copy in facsimile is a task requiring scholarly judgment. Some people who work only with manuscripts (and some who work with printed books as well) think of copies of printed editions as identical, in contrast to manuscripts, each of which is expected to be different. Undeniably manuscripts and printed books are produced in fundamentally different ways; but the fact that copies of an edition are mass-produced and intended to be identical does not mean that they are actually identical. Indeed, they cannot be identical, since no two physical objects are identical in every respect; and textual differences are among the kinds of variations that occur. Printed books resemble manuscripts more than many people seem to think. These are elementary points, and Dearing (who has done a great deal of work with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English books) certainly understands them; why he fails to take them into account here is inexplicable.[16] The fact that their absence is more likely to be noticed by students of printed books than by students of the manuscript tradition is an indication of the distance that exists between the two groups—an unfortunate distance, since these points clearly have their implications for manuscript study as well and form one more illustration of the common issues facing all textual scholars.

We thus come back to Dearing's assertion that "bibliographical thinking" should be excluded from "textual analysis." It is no doubt true that some textual critics have been confused in their thinking and have not differentiated between a document and the text it contains; but it is an overstatement to say that "textual critics in the past almost always confused the two genealogies when they did not devote their attention exclusively to the genealogy of records" (p. 15). In any case,


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the solution to the problem is not to banish the allegedly overemphasized bibliographical approach, since it unquestionably plays a crucial role in the whole process. To be fair to Dearing's argument, one must remember that he distinguishes "textual analysis" from "textual criticism": the latter is the larger term, covering all the stages of textual work, whereas the former is one particular operation, concerned with working out the "genealogy of the states of a text" (p. 2) and reconstructing their latest common ancestor. It is from "textual analysis" that bibliographical thinking is to be excluded. Nevertheless, one can insist that even here bibliographical analysis is important without being guilty of equating texts with records, for the texts are tied to the records, and an understanding of the physical evidence is necessary for an informed interpretation of the textual evidence. Dating a document (manuscript or printed book), for example, is significant even if one recognizes that the state of the text is not necessarily of the same date. Dearing makes much of what he sees as different uses of manuscript dates for textual analysts and for bibliographers: he neatly pairs the successful copyist, who "produces a record that postdates the state of the text it records," with the successful editor, who "produces a state of the text which anedates his exemplar" (p. 39). But to contrast "successful" copyists and editors is to place the emphasis on what they intended to do. In actuality copyists do not always reproduce with fidelity the texts in front of them, and though the records they create certainly postdate the records they use, their texts may also postdate those of the earlier records. Similarly, editors do not always succeed (it must be assumed but cannot be proved) in reconstructing earlier forms of the texts, and the texts they do produce may be said to postdate the other extant states.

Without losing sight of the idea that the genealogy of texts is a different concept from the genealogy of documents, there is a real sense in which one may still claim that a text does date from the time it is inscribed or set in type. The changes introduced by a scribe or compositor, whether out of habitual practice or out of inadvertence, produce a new text;[17] and understanding as much as possible about the production of that text—the habits of the individual scribe, the characteristics of the period, and so on—helps one to know how certain readings occurred. If one rules out this knowledge, one makes textual analysis a rather fruitless exercise, for one may postulate relationships that are shown by


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physical evidence to be incorrect. Purely as abstract statements about agreements and divergences among certain messages, they are not incorrect, and this is Dearing's point; but so long as textual analysts are concerned—as they ultimately must be—with direction of descent, with genealogical relationships, they cannot ignore any physical evidence that eliminates certain relationships from further consideration as factual possibilities. Dearing himself does discuss general categories of scribal error (pp. 44-54) in his treatment of directional variation. Recognizing the influence of the physical process of transmission on what the text says (that is, "bibliographical thinking") cannot therefore be divorced from the analysis of the relationships among texts and need not involve a confusion of texts and records. Dearing asserts that textual analysts describe "not what was but what is and therefore what all can agree upon" (p. 19). They describe "what is," however, only if their aim is to record variant readings, and even then it is by no means certain that all would agree on what the reading of each text is at every point. But if the textual analyst's work includes reconstructing "the latest state from which all the extant states have descended," a state that is "in most respects the closest we can approach to the author's original intention" (p. 2), the textual analyst does deal with "what was," just as the bibliographer does. Both are engaged in historical reconstruction, and their tasks are intimately linked. When Dearing speaks of "bibliographical thinking" he may be referring more to descriptive bibliography (the history of the physical forms in which a work has appeared) than to analytical bibliography (the analysis of the physical evidence present in those physical forms), but the latter is of course a tool used in the former; in any case Dearing's approach, in the course of emphasizing texts as "messages," neglects the inextricability of the "transmitter" and the "message" and therefore the role of physical evidence in the interpretation of textual evidence that the textual analyst must perform.[18]

In contrast, West's manual sets forth emphatically, if briefly, the role that the analysis of "external" evidence must play. He points out that the process of examining texts has refined "our understanding of the languages, metres, and styles of the Greeks and Romans," which in turn provides a background for examining further texts; we learn about "such matters as the proclivities of scribes" and "the processes governing the spread of texts at different periods" (p. 8) and need that knowledge (which, as he correctly says, is of interest in its own right) in evaluating particular texts. At other points he refers to the use of paleographical


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evidence and watermarks in dating manuscripts (p. 30), along with information about "what is known of the general historical conditions that governed the transmission of classical texts at different times" and "more particular facts such as the movements of individual known scribes" (p. 31); and he speaks of eliminating from the text "those features which we know, from our general knowledge of the history of books and writing, to have been introduced since the time of the author" (p. 54). He recognizes, in other words, the relation of physical evidence to textual study, even if he does not go beyond the traditional statements of its role. Like most writers of textual manuals, he explains the categories of alteration that scribes are likely to be responsible for (pp. 18-29);[19] as usual, these characteristics are discussed as generalized possibilities, and little attention is given to procedures for establishing the habits of individual scribes or assessing the textual implications of physical features that may reveal information about the method of production of individual manuscripts. One misses the kind of detail now standard in the compositorial and physical analysis of printed books; more work is needed for manuscript studies along the lines of Farquhar's and Van Sickle's investigations of the physical characteristics of codices and book rolls and Colwell's focus on the characteristics of particular scribes.[20] But even if, to students of printed books, West's manual seems to slight the explicit treatment of techniques for analyzing physical evidence, they would nevertheless find his essential position congenial. His repeated, if general, comments on the necessity for investigating the processes of the production of manuscripts form a sounder basis on

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which to proceed than Dearing's well-grounded but inappropriately applied segregation of bibliographical and textual concerns.

West's inclusion of the results of paleographical analysis and watermark study among the types of "external" evidence points to the way in which terminology reflects point of view. To the analytical bibliographer such evidence would be thought of as internal, because it is part of the physical evidence of the document, as opposed to relevant information that comes from outside the document, such as that from publishers' archives or from one's knowledge of the book-making practices of the period (itself built up from internal evidence from other documents). West can place both watermark evidence and one's general knowledge of the period together as external evidence because they are both external to the text, even though one is not external to the document transmitting the text. Both usages—that of the analytical bibliographer and that of the textual critic—are proper: they simply result from different approaches to the material. Such differences in terminology should prove no obstacle to mutual comprehension so long as the operations being referred to are thoroughly understood and so long as the line between the approaches is not imagined to be firmer than it actually is. Some techniques of analytical bibliography—compositorial analysis, for instance—involve evidence drawn from the text itself; determining the habits of a compositor, or a scribe, depends on a close examination of practices within the text. One can say, and some have said, that this kind of examination takes the text only as additional physical evidence, regarding it simply as ink on paper. It is true that those inked shapes constituting the text are physical evidence; it is also true, however, that the analytical bibliographer must understand what the text says, in order to know which characteristics are worth studying as possibly attributable to compositorial or scribal practice. Determining whether this evidence is internal or external is not a very productive problem; what is important is to guard against equating "external" with "objective" and "internal" with "subjective." The terms unfortunately come to have these connotations in many discussions of the textual criticism of manuscripts. Sometimes "internal evidence" is used to refer to the kind of evidence adduced by an editor to support a conjectural emendation (largely evidence from context, which, in varying degrees, involves interpretation and is therefore subjective), and "external evidence" is taken to mean the relationship among manuscripts, which in turn leads (without the necessity of literary judgment) to the adoption of certain readings rather than others. West is too sensible to make this mistake: he describes "the more exact information derived from internal evidence" as "the interrelationships of the copies as inferred from comparison of their readings"


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(p. 31), recognizing that the establishment of a genealogy involves inferences and that the result is normally conjecture rather than established fact.

Nevertheless, his statement is not as clear as it might be. One assumes that "copies" refers to texts, for if it referred to the manuscripts themselves the statement would be guilty of the confusion, about which Dearing warns, between records and texts. Even so, there is a problem, for the sentence seems to make "the interrelationships of the copies" wholly dependent on a "comparison of their readings" and leaves one wondering how the "external" evidence previously described fits in. "The inquiry," West says, "proceeds on two fronts, from external and from internal evidence" (p. 30). The external evidence of provenance, paleography, "general historical conditions," and the like then becomes the "historical backcloth" (p. 31) against which to "project the more exact information derived from internal evidence." Stated in this way, it is hard to comprehend precisely what the function of the "backcloth" is in the whole process. West does understand that physical evidence plays a role in interpreting the readings present in a text, but his category of "external evidence" is here presented largely as having to do with the relationships of documents rather than of texts. What is lacking is explicit recognition that the comparison of readings, leading to inferences about the relationships of the texts, must involve analysis of physical evidence as well as literary analysis: examination of the physical features of a document is relevant not only to dating the document but also to evaluating the readings in the text contained in that document. Whether one is dealing with printed books or with manuscripts, understanding the physical evidence may set limits on the literary speculation that can be engaged in. I do not wish to dwell on what is only an infelicity in West's exposition, but it provides an occasion for underscoring a significant point. Distinguishing "external" and "internal" as they refer to evidence is finally not so important as recognizing the interrelatedness of all evidence. Neither kind of evidence has a monopoly on demonstrable conclusions; because generalizations based on inductive evidence are inevitably provisional, some historical "facts" may be more conjectural than emendations based on an editor's judgment. And if one wishes to think of the physical evidence of a document as external to the text, then one must think of degrees of externality, for such evidence is not in the same realm as the larger historical framework into which one hopes to place both the document and the text. If West, instead of asserting that "the interrelationships of the copies as inferred from comparison of their readings" should be projected onto a "historical backcloth," had said—turning his statement around—that the comparison


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of readings, taken together with physical evidence and the historical background, results in the tentative establishment of the relationships among the texts, his comment would not have required discussion. That he could state the matter as loosely—in effect, carelessly—as he did must reflect, at least to some extent, a general lack of awareness, among textual critics of manuscript material, of the contribution analytical bibliography has made to the editing of printed texts.

Some of the techniques of bibliographical analysis, such as some of those used to distinguish compositors, rely on characteristics of spelling and punctuation; and data about compositors' habits in these respects are important to the editor whose aim is to restore the author's spelling and punctuation as well as wording.[21] Most scholarly editors of postmedieval writing have such an aim: since spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and so on must be considered an integral part of texts, affecting their meaning, and since most of the extant documents containing these writings are relatively near to the authors' manuscripts (or include those manuscripts), editors dealing with these centuries have given a great deal of thought to the problem of authoritative spelling, punctuation, and capitalization (or "accidentals," as these features are sometimes called, in distinction to "substantives," or the words themselves). It is a common notion that the treatment of accidentals is one of the major respects in which the editing of ancient writing differs from the textual work on more recent material; because the spelling, punctuation, and system of abbreviations in the surviving texts of ancient works generally reflect the customs of scribes who lived long after the authors of the works, many people assume that even if these matters are of bibliographical significance they are not of textual importance and that editors of such texts would therefore find nothing relevant in the extensive discussion of recent decades concerning the accidentals in literature of the last five hundred years. At first glance there would seem to be good reason for this position, when one considers, among other points, that, although punctuation was in use from at least the fourth century B.C., the extent of its use is a matter of considerable debate; that in ancient times texts were normally written as a continuous series of letters, without spaces to separate words; and that in both Greek and Latin there was flexibility in spelling in certain periods.[22] Thus both the possibility of restoring to a classical text the spelling and punctuation of its author


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and the desirability of restoring certain features in use in the author's time (such as the lack of word-division) are seriously to be questioned. This conventional position is expressed by West in his manual when he says, "The critic is at liberty . . . to repunctuate, even if he has taken a vow never to depart from the paradosis" (p. 55).[23] Later he repeats, "Careful thought should be given to punctuation, which can be a great help or hindrance to following the author's train of ideas, and which is of course entirely a matter for the editor's discretion" (p. 69).

The issue is not as simple, however, as these statements, taken out of context, would suggest, and West's own discussion raises some of the considerations that link so-called accidentals with meaning and with the author. West recognizes that "in theory an accent or a breathing in a medieval copy of a post-Hellenistic writer might go back to the author's autograph"; but he goes on to say that in most cases "all such features of the tradition will represent some later person's interpretation of a text consisting of virtually nothing but a continuous sequence of letters" (pp. 54-55) and that the textual critic is also "at liberty" to "reinterpret" the text in this respect. The question of how, or whether, to divide a continuous text into separated words is one that editors of modern works do not have to face, and it has therefore not been included in those editors' discussions of accidentals. In one sense word-division does fall into the group of features sometimes classed as "accidentals," for it is a matter of spacing and not of what letters are present. But obviously there may be ambiguous spots in an undivided text, where the letters can be formed into more than one set of words that make sense in the context, and matters of wording are usually called "substantive." The point is not what label ought to be used but the fact that the distinction between substantives and accidentals involves form, not meaning.[24] West further underlines the connection between marks and meaning when he says that, in the case of a nonsense word, "accents etc. may be valuable clues to what lies behind it, since they must have been supplied when the text was in a more intelligible state" (p. 55). Words that are not nonsense, however, may still be wrong (as West recognizes elsewhere), and accents or punctuation may provide clues anywhere in the text, not just where the text fails to make sense. Similarly, scribal


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abbreviations in manuscripts are not always unambiguous; and though West is right to caution that "abbreviations are not actually misread as often as some ingenious emenders think" (p. 28), editors should remember that abbreviations do sometimes affect substance as well as form. The same points are also applicable to spelling. As West realizes, spelling variants "can be of use (though not by themselves) in working out the details of a stemma, and they are not uninstructive in themselves" (p. 66). This view is not always accepted, even by persons who emphasize the breadth of significant evidence; thus Willis claims that "any variant other than the purely orthographical may be significant, however trivial it may appear" (p. 36). For Dearing spellings, and the other accidentals as well, enter into bibliographical, but not textual, analysis: "the textual analyst," he says, classifies variations as "substantive, quasi-substantive, and accidental and ignores the latter class" (p. 34); later he says that an editor who concludes that scribes or compositors were following copy "even in accidentals" can "make a bibliographical analysis in which he includes accidental variations with the rest of his evidence" (p. 154). The idea that accidentals partake more of the nature of physical than of textual evidence fails to give them their due as elements of meaning in a text; indeed, the interpolation of a class of "quasi-substantives" between substantives and accidentals shows that accidentals are being thought of here as not involving meaning. However, they are indisputably part of the text and may affect the meaning of the text at any time; whether or not they do in a given instance[25] has no bearing on their classification as accidentals. I am not suggesting that scribal punctuation, abbreviations, and spelling necessarily ought to be preserved in a critical text, but they should certainly be taken seriously as part of the textual evidence present in manuscripts; they may point to how the text was understood at a particular time and may therefore—like the words themselves—be a link to a tradition and help to establish the author's meaning.

The attention one pays to accidentals, in other words, goes beyond the question of whether they reflect authorial or scribal practice. It is no doubt true that the accidentals in surviving manuscripts of classical texts exhibit more alterations by scribes than do the words, and equally true that editors have more basis for attempting to establish authors' wording than punctuation and spelling. Nevertheless, scribes do alter words as well as accidentals; the distinction is one of degree, and the texts one has to deal with contain both words and accidentals. If one decides in a given case that the accidentals of the manuscript tradition have no authority,


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the decision results not from theory but from the circumstances of the individual situation. To agree with Greg that people involved in the transmission of a text have generally felt freer to alter accidentals than to alter substantives is not to say that accidentals in scribal copies are necessarily unauthoritative, though it does provide a basis, when the evidence warrants, for treating accidentals differently from substantives. The editor is finally responsible for establishing both substantives and accidentals, and to assume that scribal accidentals are too far removed from the author's practice to be worth preserving is to ignore the connections between accidentals and meaning. One may not in the end accept those accidentals, but the question of what accidentals to include in a critical text must be faced. Authorial accidentals in ancient texts may be more conjectural than in modern texts, but the attempt to approximate them is not necessarily to be rejected in favor of standardized spelling and modernized punctuation. West's discussion takes this point into account:
As a general rule it would seem most rational to impose consistently the spelling that the original author is most likely to have used (for which the manuscript tradition may not be the best evidence). It is true that he himself may have been inconsistent, and it may be argued that the best manuscript authority should be followed on each occasion. But this will be no reliable guide to his practice; we shall surely come nearer the truth by regularizing the spelling than by committing ourselves to the vagaries of the tradition. (p. 69)
Presumably this "regularizing" would be to the practice contemporary with the author, insofar as it is known. West also takes up briefly the question of variations in spelling in Greek and Latin: in contrast to early Greek, he says, "In Latin there is not the problem of different alphabetic systems, but notions of the correct way to spell things were more fluid until the first century of the Empire, and here again (though with less justification) the convention has been established of presenting authors at least of the late Republic in the orthography of a somewhat later period" (pp. 69-70). This matter is not pursued, but a doubt about the convention has been registered. The point he proceeds to make about still later texts in which "it is often impossible to distinguish between the barbarisms of copyists and those of the original" is illogical but instructive: "In this situation, rather than impose a consistent system which can only be chosen rather arbitrarily, it is better to follow the paradosis, not under the delusion that it is at all reliable, but as the most convenient way of exhibiting it" (p. 70). Of course, in a critical, as opposed to a diplomatic, text, exhibiting the paradosis within the text is not in itself a virtue, and the accidentals of the paradosis would

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properly be retained only if there is a chance of their reflecting authorial practice more accurately than another system. But West's concern for establishing accidentals contemporary with the author and possibly retaining the accidentals of the manuscript tradition is uncommon in this field; though his discussion is undeveloped, it implies a greater link than some have imagined with the approach to accidentals followed by many editors of post-medieval work. Indeed, one must ask whether for a work of any period there is ever a justification, from a scholarly point of view, of any aim regarding accidentals other than the reconstruction of the author's own practice; however imperfectly that aim may be realized in many instances, it is the only aim consistent with the view that accidentals are integral to a text and that modernization therefore has no place in scholarly editing. Without underestimating the differences between ancient and modern texts, one can see a common issue here; West's brief remarks would strike an editor of modern literature as bordering on familiar territory.[26]

These considerations have direct implications for the apparatus. Since accidentals can affect meaning and scribal practices in accidentals can constitute important textual evidence, a complete recording of such details, as well as of substantive variants, would seem to be desirable. Selectivity, of one kind or another, has been the rule, however, in apparatuses for early texts, though disagreement has existed about the principles of selection. Willis approvingly claims that it is "a matter of common consent that purely orthographical variants should be excluded" (p. 35). His statement is disproved by West, who finds it "advisable to record orthographical variants fairly systematically, at least for portions of the text," and who further implies their significance by holding that, if one decides not to record "certain orthographical trivialities," "the fact should be stated" (p. 66).[27] Of course, printing costs


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sometimes dictate selectivity. Even some of the CEAA/CSE editions of nineteenth-century authors, which always contain complete lists of editorial alterations in the copy-texts, exclude accidentals from the lists of variants among other collated texts. But it is one thing to be selective as a result of believing that completeness is unimportant or even undesirable and quite another to recognize selectivity as a matter of expediency only—for in the former case one is likely to think that subjective notions of significance are sufficient for determining what to include, whereas in the latter one will wish to define the categories included or excluded as objectively as possible. Willis advocates (in addition to the elimination of spelling variants) the exclusion of certain manuscripts, but on grounds that grossly misunderstand the purposes of an apparatus: "An apparatus criticus," he maintains, "which tries to use too many manuscripts is liable not only to be obscure and hard to use (the problem of finding enough sigla is not the least), but to be inaccurate, since the task of collating accurately some thirty or forty manuscripts is enormous for one man, and to find and organize reliable helpers is scarcely less difficult than doing it all oneself" (p. 43). It seems hardly necessary to reply to these objections, for the difficulty of using a complex apparatus is of no importance to a person who values having the evidence recorded (the designation of sigla is surely a trivial matter), and the attainment of accuracy is always a challenge, regardless of the scope of the coverage (one wonders how scholarship would ever progress if this challenge were allowed to inhibit activity). Willis's statement that "About ten manuscripts should be enough to set up the text of a Latin author" (p. 42) may be accurate on the average (I am not questioning Willis's knowledge of his field), but it seems unwise to prescribe how much evidence will be significant. In justifying a selective approach, Willis enunciates the principle that it is preferable "to give all the readings of some than some of the readings of all" (p. 44). This particular point can be (and has been)[28] legitimately objected to, but the motivation behind it—to find an objective basis for selectivity—is one to be taken seriously. Dearing, thinking along the same lines, says, "The critic should define the interesting variations as precisely as possible so as to be consistent and accurate himself and to facilitate consistency and accuracy in the work of his staff or associates" (p. 147). There is no doubt that the number of

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manuscripts available in some cases, especially in biblical studies, is so large as to make impractical the goal of recording everything in all of them (or even the examination of all of them). But whenever one finds it necessary to be selective—either in the texts to be covered or in the details from those texts to be recorded—one should remember that no amount of rationalization will conceal the fact that the resulting apparatus is a compromise and is less satisfactory than a complete record. In such cases one owes the reader the courtesy of an unambiguous definition of what is included (not just some such statement as "the most significant readings"), so that the reader will be in the position of knowing precisely what kinds of evidence must be looked for elsewhere.[29] These questions concerning the construction of an apparatus thus raise issues relevant to all textual scholarship, regardless of the period involved or the nature of the surviving textual witnesses—as indeed, I have tried to suggest, do many other questions relating to other aspects of the editorial process.

II

If discussion of the role of punctuation and spelling and of physical analysis in editing has been rather neglected in the theoretical writings devoted to early texts, the problem of how to determine the relationships among the surviving texts certainly has not been neglected. The great body of literature on the theory of the textual criticism of ancient and medieval writings has focused on what is after all at the heart of all critical editing: the question how to choose among variant readings, which in turn involves an assessment of the relationships among the witnesses and an evaluation of when a departure from all the variants would bring one closer to the author's intention. These matters have of course been debated at length by editors of modern works also, and the same central issues link all these discussions together. All of them in fact can be seen as variations on the theme of objectivity versus subjectivity. Some urge the desirability of as objective a system as possible,


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in which the role of the scholar's own judgment is minimized; others argue for the superiority of taste and insight applied to individual cases over the attempt to follow a predetermined rule. One's position along this spectrum affects, directly or indirectly, how one will approach all other textual questions—such as how much authority one assigns to a "copy-text" or a "best text" and how much freedom one perceives to be justified in altering it (by drawing on other texts or on one's own conjectures). Fluctuations from one direction to the other have characterized editorial thinking in all fields; but the lack of interdisciplinary communication is reflected in the fact that the various fields have not fluctuated in unison.

Fredson Bowers, writing on "Textual Criticism" in the 1958 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, illustrates this point by suggesting how the editing of modern texts has benefited from earlier work on the classics: "The acceptance of Housman's attitude and its extension, about the middle of the 20th century, to editing from printed texts constitutes one of the most interesting of modern developments in editorial theory." Bowers here takes Housman as the exponent of a movement away from the Lachmannian tradition of relying whenever possible on the archetype as established through genealogical reasoning. Although many have pointed out the fallacy of believing that a "best" text has the correct readings at points where it is not obviously in need of emendation, Housman's famous remark in the preface to his 1903 edition of the first book of the Astronomicon of Manilius must be regarded as the classic statement of it:

To believe that wherever a best MS. gives possible readings it gives true readings, and that only where it gives impossible readings does it give false readings, is to believe that an incompetent editor is the darling of Providence, which has given its angels charge over him lest at any time his sloth and folly should produce their natural results and incur their appropriate penalty. Chance and the common course of nature will not bring it to pass that the readings of a MS. are right wherever they are possible and impossible wherever they are wrong: that needs divine intervention; . . . .[30]
The reason that this fallacious approach (the "art of explaining corrupt passages instead of correcting them" [p. 41]) gained currency, according to Housman, is not only that "superstition" is more comfortable than truth but also that it was a reaction against an earlier age in which "conjecture was employed, and that by very eminent men, irrationally" (p. 43). Exactly the same sequence—but delayed by several decades—can be

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observed in the history of editorial approaches to printed texts. R. B. McKerrow's edition of Thomas Nashe (1904), though it appeared at almost the same time as Housman's Manilius, represented the kind of distrust of eclecticism that Housman was attacking. McKerrow was one of a group of scholars of English Renaissance drama whose work would revolutionize the study of printed texts by showing the interdependence of physical and textual evidence; the analytical techniques that resulted did at times enable McKerrow and his colleagues to settle a textual point conclusively, as a matter of demonstrable fact, and to that extent editing was legitimately put on a more "scientific" basis. But in most cases there was still a large area in which the facts were not conclusive, and here McKerrow took the position that involved the least exercise of editorial judgment, the decision to adhere to the text chosen as copy-text. In so doing he was reacting, at least in part, against the undisciplined eclecticism that had characterized the nineteenth-century editing in this field.[31] The event that Bowers refers to, in the mid-twentieth century, representing a reinstatement of editorial judgment—but, like Housman's, on a more responsible basis than previously—was W. W. Greg's "The Rationale of Copy-Text." Greg broke down the notion of a single authoritative text in two ways: the more novel way, which he was the first to suggest, was that the primary authority for accidentals might reside in a different text from that for substantives (generally an early text for the accidentals, a later one for the substantives); the less surprising way, in line with Housman's criticisms, was that an editor could judge individual readings on their own terms and did not have to accept all variants that were not manifestly impossible simply because they came from a text that was known to contain some authorial revisions.[32] Both Greg and Housman restore editorial judgment to a place of prominence; but that judgment is firmly directed toward the determination of what the author would have written, whereas the earlier proponents of eclecticism (against whom the immediate predecessors of Greg and Housman were rebelling) tended to be less scrupulous in distinguishing between what they themselves preferred and what the authors being edited would have preferred.

The hope of having a single text to rely on dies hard, however, and


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one mark of the wisdom of Greg's essay is that he recognized the danger that he labeled "the tyranny of the copy-text."[33] Although his rationale for selecting a copy-text entailed choosing a text that could justifiably be accorded presumptive authority in cases where the variants seemed completely equal (particularly, in practice, in regard to accidentals), he understood that there had always been a temptation to let the weight of copy-text authority extend to readings that did not deserve such support. Greg's rationale does not (though some of its critics seem to think it does) provide timid editors with the opportunity to shirk, in the respectable name of conservatism, difficult decisions. Of course, it can rightly be regarded as conservative, and sensibly so, to retain a copy-text reading, even if one personally does not prefer it, when one is not convinced that any of the alternatives are authorial; Greg's point is simply that one should not be deterred, by whatever authority attaches to the copy-text, from altering it when one is convinced (through critical insight, in the light of all available evidence) that another reading is, or comes nearer to, what the author intended.[34] Sometimes editors, both of classical and of modern works, argue that the most they are justified in doing is to attempt to purge the copy-text, or archetype, or paradosis, of errors—not to try to restore what the author wrote. But this argument cannot be praised for its respect of historical evidence; rather, it confuses two kinds of edition, both legitimate, neither of which, when done properly, disregards the evidence. If one is interested in a text as it appeared at a particular time to a particular audience, a diplomatic or facsimile edition of it serves the purpose best; correcting errors in it—editing it critically—would be out of place, for the errors, though unintended, were part of what the contemporary readers saw in the text in front of them. If, on the other hand, one wishes to correct errors—to try to repair the damage done to the text in transmission, however famous or influential its corrupt form may be—then one is producing a text that differs from any now extant (probably from any that ever existed), and

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the aim of the alterations is obviously not the preservation of a documentary from of the text but the construction of a text as close as possible (as close, that is, as surviving evidence permits) to the one the author intended.[35]

Some confusion on this point has been exhibited in the debate among editors of modern works over whether to choose an author's final manuscript as copy-text in preference to the first printed edition set from it. Of course, any attempt to fix a general rule on this matter is misguided, since situations vary greatly, and in some cases an author's revisions in proof may have been so thorough as to make the printed edition the proper choice. Some editors, however, prefer the first edition not for such reasons, but because it is the product of a historical moment; even though some aspects of its text may be the result of changes made in the publishing office or pressures brought to bear on the author by the publisher or others, the author accepted these conditions, they say, as part of the whole publishing process, and the text of the first edition is the one that emerged from a specific set of historical forces and the one that the public first read. This argument, however, leads only to the production of a facsimile edition; it has no relevance to a critical edition, although it is sometimes offered as if it did have, through a failure to think clearly about what the two approaches mean. Editors of earlier material do not encounter the problem in quite this form, since they do not deal with authorial manuscripts or authorially supervised printed texts, but the general issues are familiar to them. One manifestation of the exaggerated respect accorded to individual printed texts is the problem of the textus receptus of ancient writings. The text of the New Testament, or of other writings, that reached print was not, of course, necessarily more authoritative than other texts; but the controversy that sometimes surrounds editorial decisions to depart from the textus receptus suggests the irrationality with which a favored text can be defended. Clearly there are many differences between this situation and the question, faced by editors of modern works, whether to turn from printed book to manuscript for copy-text. But there is an essential similarity as well: in both cases the scholar's responsibility is to examine all the evidence in an effort to come as close as possible to the text intended by the author,[36] however many or few steps removed


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such a text may be from the texts that survive. Deciding whether an author's intention includes acquiescence to changes made by the publisher is a problem of more immediate concern to editors of modern writings; even so, such an editor's decision to follow a first edition may look just as foolish as the hesitation to depart from the textus receptus on the part of an editor of earlier material.

Greg's rationale for selecting a copy-text was of course set forth in the first instance for editors of printed texts that are not far removed from authorial manuscripts; and near the beginning of his essay he distinguishes his approach (growing out of McKerrow's) from that appropriate for the classics. In the latter, he says, "it is the common practice, for fairly obvious reasons, to normalize the spelling," whereas in the editing of English texts "it is now usual to preserve the spelling of the earliest or it may be some other selected text":

Thus it will be seen that the conception of "copy-text" does not present itself to the classical and to the English editor in quite the same way; indeed, if I am right in the view I am about to put forward, the classical theory of the "best" or "most authoritative" manuscript, whether it be held in a reasonable or in an obviously fallacious form, has really nothing to do with the English theory of "copy-text" at all. (p. 375)
It is true that a concern for incorporating in an edition documentary punctuation and spelling led to Greg's perception that the text with authority for accidentals might not be the same as the one with authority for substantives and to his statement that "the copy-text should govern (generally) in the matter of accidentals" (p. 381). In fact, however, the distinction between substantives and accidentals, though it has its uses, is not crucial to the concept of copy-text that Greg calls "English," as the word "generally" in his sentence suggests. Editors following Greg's general line would in practice emend the copy-text with a later reading of any kind, a substantive or an accidental, that could convincingly be argued to be authorial; and in the cases where the variants seem evenly balanced, they would fall back on the copy-text reading. Thus what underlies this conception of copy-text is the idea of presumptive authority, a text to be relied on when one finds no basis for preferring one variant over another—an authority, it must be emphasized, that does not restrict one's freedom to choose variants from other texts when there is reason to do so. It may be that editors of modern writings will normally choose their copy-texts, as Greg was the first to point out explicitly, to serve primarily as the authority for accidentals; but it does not follow

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that a different understanding of copy-text is required for editors of earlier materials, even when they are not concerned with reproducing documentary accidentals.[37] The fact that editors dealing with different periods may have to take somewhat different positions regarding accidentals is a superficial matter that does not alter the fundamental questions they all have to face. The real issue that should be raised about the "English" conception of copy-text is whether the idea of a text of presumptive authority is appropriate to all patterns of textual descent—an issue relevant to modern as well as earlier texts. If we are not distracted by the problem, undeniably troublesome, of how to treat spelling and punctuation, we can see that Greg's essay takes its place in the larger tradition of textual theory: like the seminal pieces on the editing of classical, biblical, and medieval works, its dual theme is textual authority and editorial freedom. To state a rationale of copy-text is inevitably to take a position on how much weight should be given to the editor's critical judgment in establishing a text—that is to say, how much alteration should be permitted in any given documentary form of the text, on the basis of the editor's assessment of its status, of the variants in other texts, and of further conjectures. The principal approaches to this question that have been advanced over the years are well known, and have often been surveyed.[38] I propose to do no more here than specify some

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main lines, so that Greg's rationale can be seen in relation to them. They have not usually been taken up in this context, but doing so shows, I think, that editorial discussion might be sharpened by greater awareness of the entire tradition.[39]

For this purpose it is not necessary to go back beyond the approach usually associated with Karl Lachmann. Although scholars have shown that Lachmann's own contributions to the development of the "genealogical" approach have been greatly exaggerated,[40] his editions of the New Testament (1831) and of Lucretius (1850) stand as monuments linking his name with this method. Historically the importance of this movement is that it represented a reaction against the unprincipled eclecticism that had prevailed in the previous century (of which Richard Bentley was the most important, and most notorious, exemplar) and marked a recognition of what a scholarly approach must entail, at a time when ancient documents were beginning to be more accessible. There can be no question that the general drift of the genealogical approach is correct: that scholars must examine all the extant documents, learn as much about them as possible, and attempt to establish the relationships among the texts they contain. This much we would now take for granted as part of what it means to be scholarly. The difficulty comes in choosing a means for working out those relationships and in deciding what use to make of the data thus postulated; and when people refer to "the genealogical method" they normally mean the particular recommendations on these matters associated with Lachmann and his followers. Taken in this sense, the genealogical method can certainly be criticized, and its defects have by now been enumerated many times.[41] The essence of the method is to classify texts into families by


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examining "common errors," on the assumption that texts showing common errors have a common ancestor.[42] Despite the obvious fallacies of such an approach, it had an influential life of more than a century and is regarded as the classic method of textual criticism. Two landmarks in its history added to its stature but at the same time can be seen to have made its weaknesses evident. One is B. F. Westcott and F. J. A. Hort's great Introduction to their edition of the New Testament (1881), which brilliantly stated the rationale for the approach and improved it methodologically (e.g., by focusing on agreements in correct or possibly correct readings rather than agreements in errors); they conclusively showed the illogic of relying on the textus receptus. However, as Ernest Colwell has carefully explained, Westcott and Hort in practice did not strictly adhere to the method, recognizing that editorial judgment in assessing the general credibility of individual manuscripts and the intrinsic merits of individual readings must remain central, even in an approach that emphasizes objectivity.[43] The second classic statement of the genealogical method is Paul Maas's famous essay, "Textkritik" (1927), best known to English readers in Barbara Flower's translation (not published until 1958).[44] It is a highly abstract distillation of the basic principles, showing their logic and soundness under certain conditions; but unfortunately those stated conditions (p. 3)—that each scribe copied from a single exemplar, not "contaminating" the tradition by drawing readings from two or more exemplars, and that each scribe also

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made distinctive departures, consciously or unconsciously, from that exemplar—are unlikely to have obtained in real situations.[45]

The force of these weaknesses is obvious, as is their relevance to the textual analysis of later material. Another of the often-discussed limitations of the method deserves to be underscored here: the fact that it does not make allowance for authorial revisions, for the possibility that variant readings result from the author's second thoughts as well as from scribes' errors and alterations. This oversight is not unique to the genealogical method but in fact exists, in greater or less degree, in all the approaches to textual criticism, regardless of the date of the works being considered. It springs from wishful thinking, for however difficult it is to choose among variants, it is easier to proceed on the basis that one is right and the others wrong than to recognize that several may be "right" or at least represent the author's preference at different times. Even among editors of modern works, where many authorial revisions can be documented, there is a reluctance to conceive of a text as containing multiple possibilities; and though an editor's goal is indeed to "establish" a text, editors—of works from all periods—should not forget that a "work" comprehends all the authorial readings within its several texts.

Another common criticism of the genealogical method—that one must revert to one's own judgment when the choice is, to quote Maas, "between different traditions of equal 'stemmatical' value" (p. 1)—calls attention to what may be a more serious problem: the tendency to think that the method generally minimizes the role of subjective judgment. The Lachmannian system is responsible for the standard division of editorial activity into recension and emendation and is therefore conducive to an attitude, as I suggested earlier, that takes the first of these procedures to be more objective than it is (or can be). There is superficially an appropriateness in distinguishing readings thought of by the


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editor from those present in at least one of the surviving documents; indeed, from the point of view of documentary evidence, one is bound to regard any proposed reading not in the documents as falling into a distinctly separate category. But from the point of view of what are likely to be the authorial readings, this distinction is of no significance, for an editorial "conjecture" may be more certainly what the author wrote than any of the alternative readings at a point of variation. The very term "conjecture," or "conjectural emendation," prejudices the case; readings in the manuscripts are less conjectural only in the sense that they actually appear in documents, but they are not necessarily for that reason more certain. One is conjecturing in deciding that one of them is more likely to be authorial than another, just as one conjectures in rejecting all the variants at a given point in favor of still another reading. The process of conjecture begins as soon as one combines readings from two documents,[46] and every decision about what is an "error" in a document rests on the editor's judgment. Unquestionably the attempt to establish first a transmitted text is a more responsible procedure than to engage at once in speculation, before surveying the range of documentary evidence; but one must then resist the temptation to regard that text as an objective fact. Colwell states this point well in a comment on Hort:
His prudent rejection of almost all readings which have no manuscript support has given the words "conjectural emendation" a meaning too narrow to be realistic. In the last generation we have depreciated external evidence of documents and have appreciated the internal evidence of readings; but we have blithely assumed that we were rejecting "conjectural emendation" if our conjectures were supported by some manuscripts. We need to recognize that the editing of an eclectic text rests upon conjectures. (p. 107)
This problem is equally of concern to editors of modern works. Although their tendency to use "emendation" to mean any editorial change in the copy-text, including readings drawn from other documents, is more realistic, they are inclined to think that they are being cautious if they choose a documentary reading over one newly proposed by an editor. Such is not necessarily true, of course: the quality of the reading is everything, finally, and the editorial tact necessary to recognize that quality is at the heart of the whole process. The system associated with Lachmann's name cannot be held entirely responsible for editors' misunderstanding of this point, but it does seem to make the point harder to see by imputing to certain kinds of editorial decisions a greater objectivity than can usually exist.


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Some of the people who have criticized the "Lachmann method" have set forth alternative approaches that have themselves become the subject of considerable discussion. One such person is Joseph Bédier, whose work, particularly influential in the medieval field, can serve to represent another general approach to editing. The introduction to his second edition (1913) of Jean Renart's Le Lai de l'Ombre, which has become the point of departure for the twentieth-century criticism of Lachmann,[47] concentrates on the two-branched stemma as evidence of the weakness of the genealogical method. The fact that most stemmata turn out to be dichotomous is regarded suspiciously as indicating more about the operation of the system than about the actual relationships among the manuscripts. What Bédier recommends instead is to choose a single good manuscript and to reprint it exactly except for any alterations that the editor finds imperative. This approach has been called "a return to the method of the humanists of the Renaissance";[48] certainly it is a move in the opposite direction from Housman's criticism of Lachmann at nearly the same time. When Giorgio Pasquali, ridiculing this best-manuscript approach, linked the English Shakespeare scholars with the medievalists in following it,[49] he was essentially correct in regard to the period before Greg's "Rationale." There is no question that, in spite of Housman's incontrovertible logic, the best-text theory —whether or not directly influenced by Bédier in every case—held sway over a great deal of editing in the first half of the twentieth century. An instructive paradox of the commentary on Bédier is that his position has been regarded both as extremely conservative, restricting the role of editorial judgment, and as extremely subjective, emphasizing the editor's own critical decisions. The strict adherence to a single text does suggest an attempt to minimize subjectivity; but the leeway then allowed the editor in deciding what readings are not possible and must be replaced sets very few restrictions on subjectivity. The point in the editorial


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procedure where subjectivity enters may seem to have been shifted, but its extent has not been reduced. And in fact it is present from the beginning in both approaches—both in the selection of a "best" text and in the decisions involved in recensio.

Followers of Bédier and of Lachmann have been adept at suppressing recognition of the role of critical judgment at certain stages of the processes they favor, and they have failed to see that their apparently quite different approaches have much in common. The narrowness and confusion exhibited by such partisans can be illustrated in the work of a distinguished medievalist, Eugène Vinaver.[50] Admiring Bédier's criticism of Lachmann, he makes sweeping claims for the newer system:

Recent studies in textual criticism mark the end of an age-long tradition. The ingenious technique of editing evolved by the great masters of the nineteenth century has become as obsolete as Newton's physics, and the work of generations of critics has lost a good deal of its value. It is no longer possible to classify manuscripts on the basis of "common errors"; genealogical "stemmata" have fallen into discredit, and with them has vanished our faith in composite critical texts. (p. 351)
The real issue of course is whether objective rules or individual judgment will bring us closer to the author's text, and this fact is nowhere better shown than in the conclusion Vinaver draws from these observations (that "composite critical texts" are discredited) or in the statement he proceeds to make: "nothing has done more to raise textual criticism to the position of a science than the realisation of the inadequacy of the old methods of editing." Housman, for instance, would have agreed in general with most of Vinaver's paragraph but would have come to the opposite conclusion: that we must put more faith in critical texts and not aim to place editing in "the position of a science."[51] Vinaver realizes that Bédier's position, which he essentially approves, does not eliminate subjectivity, and his own effort toward injecting more objectivity into it is to explain six kinds of errors that arise from scribal transcription.[52]

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Knowledge of them, he believes, will "widen the scope of 'mechanical' emendation" and "narrow the limits of 'rational' editing" (p 365).[53] Vinaver is one of those editors who, in their eagerness to find objective criteria for editorial decisions, exaggerate the distinction between correcting an error and making a conjectural emendation. Vinaver's attention to scribal error stems from his belief that an editor should aim at "lessening the damage done by the copyists," not at reconstructing the original. To do the latter, he thinks, would be to "indulge in a disguised collaboration with the author" (p. 368). He does not seem to see that attempting to restore what the author wrote is different from altering the text to what, in one's own opinion, the author should have written. Like Bédier and other advocates of the best-text approach, he is not willing to say that the former is important enough to be worth risking along the way a few instances of the latter. Yet in defining the editor's role as that of "a referee in the strictly mechanical conflict between the author and the scribe" (p. 368), he does not eliminate the problem; he is not, after all, ruling out every editorial departure from the chosen text, and he leaves unsolved the question how one can satisfactorily distinguish safe and unsafe categories of critical activity. His effort to assist Bédier proves no assistance in the end, for he overestimates, along with Bédier, the difference between their approach and Lachmann's. It is interesting to learn that the predominance of the dichotomous stemma is mathematically not such an oddity as Bédier thought;[54] but that fact does not make Lachmann right and Bédier wrong. The approaches associated with both their names are in fact subject to the same criticisms, for they both cover up much of the uncertainty and subjectivity in the detection of error and therefore entail a misunderstanding of the nature and scope of conjectural emendation.

It was inevitable that the desire for objectivity in textual analysis would lead to the use of quasi-mathematical or quasi-statistical approaches.


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Nine years after Bédier's famous introduction, Henri Quentin, in his Mémoire sur l'etablissement du texte de la Vulgate (1922), announced a system that proved to be the first of a long line of twentieth-century attempts to make textual analysis something akin to formal logis.[55] The heart of Quentin's system is the rule that, in any group of three manuscripts, the intermediary between the other two will sometimes agree with one or both of them, but they will never agree against it. Quentin's system is thus to build a stemma by taking up manuscripts (and their families) in groups of three, following this rule. In the process of comparison no attempt is made to recognize "errors"; variants are simply variants, without a direction of descent implied. The concept of the intermediary therefore encompasses three possibilities: the intermediary could be (a) the archetype from which the other two manuscripts are independently descended, (b) the descendant of one of them and the ancestor of the other, or (c) the descendant, through conflation, of both of them. In order to determine which of these possibilities is actually true, Quentin resorts to so-called "internal" evidence—that is, to subjective judgments about the nature of the variants. He envisions his system as an attempt to reconstruct the archetype—the latest ancestor of all the surviving texts—rather than the author's original; in Lachmannian terms, he is concerned only with recensio. And certain central difficulties in Lachmann are present in Quentin also: the definiteness Quentin imputes to his method does not seem fully to recognize the amount of subjectivity that is finally relied upon; nor does the suggestion that there is something more objective in attempting to reconstruct the archetype than in trying to approach the author's original acknowledge adequately how indistinct the line is between the two, at least from the point of view of the nature and certainty of the conjectures involved.[56] Although the same cannot be said of W. W. Greg's effort five years later (The Calculus of Variants, 1927)—for Greg more openly admits the limitations of his "calculus"—the problems with his work are essentially the same. The details of his procedure are of course different (in a quasi-algebraic operation, he factors his formulaic representations of complex variants so that he can focus on two variants at a time), but it reaches an impasse, as Quentin's does, beyond which one cannot proceed without the introduction of subjective judgments regarding genetic

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relationships. As a mental exercise (and as a demonstration of the keenness of Greg's analytic mind), the Calculus is a fascinating work; but as a contribution to editorial theory it does not have the significance of his "The Rationale of Copy-Text" a generation later.[57] Not long after the publication of Quentin's and Greg's proposals, William P. Shepard performed the interesting experiment of applying both to a number of medieval works, some of which had previously been studied by other textual scholars. Invariably the two methods produced different stemmata, both from each other and from those proposed by earlier editors. Shepard's experiments, as he stressed, are not conclusive, but they lend weight to his doubt whether the human activity of copying can be given a "mechanistic explanation."[58]

He recognized, however, that "we are bound to seek such an explanation if we can"; and the dream that "some day a law or a formula will be discovered which we can apply to the reconstruction of a text as easily and as safely as the chemists now apply laws of analysis or synthesis" (p. 141) continues to intrigue us, as evidenced by the scholars—such as Archibald Hill, Antonín Hrubý, and Vinton A. Dearing—who have followed in the tradition of Quentin and Greg.[59] Hill, Hrubý, and Dearing all attempt to work out problems left unsettled by Greg, and all recognize the importance, first seen clearly by Quentin, of examining distributional before genealogical evidence (i.e., studying the record of


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variant readings for evidence of relationships before attempting to assess which descended from which). Hill proposes a principle of "simplicity" as a mechanical means for choosing among alternative stemmata: one scores two points for each line connecting a hypothetical intermediary and one point for the other lines and then selects the diagram yielding the smallest total. Hrubý tries to use probability calculus applied to individual readings in texts in order to solve what Greg called "the ambiguity of three texts"—to distinguish, in other words, between states of a text resulting from independent descent and those resulting from successive descent. Dearing's work is an extension of Greg, taking into account and adapting Quentin's idea of intermediaries and Hill's of simplicity; like Greg, he offers a "calculus" that involves the rewriting of variations, and he sets forth in detail the formal logic that underlies it. Because a primary deficiency of earlier approaches was their inability to deal with situations in which a scribe conflated the texts of two or more manuscripts,[60] Dearing's handling of this problem is of particular interest. For him, a logical consequence of his distinction between bibliographical and textual analysis is that in the latter conflation simply does not exist. A scribe using two manuscripts, he says, would not think of himself as conflating them but as attempting to produce a more accurate text (a text nearer the archetype) than either of them; to say that he had "manufacturered one state of the message out of two others" would be "to confuse means and ends" (p. 17). The bibliographer, who is concerned with the physical means of textual transmission, can say that a record has been produced out of two others; but the textual analyst will see it simply as a message that may at times have affinities with other texts. Although this observation is presented as a remarkable revelation ("The light of truth blinded Saint Paul. New insights are not always easy to understand, much less to accept when understood"), one may wonder whether it is not in fact commonly understood and taken for granted. Clarity of thought does demand that some such distinction be recognized, and one cannot quarrel with Dearing for attempting to make it explicit; but whether it materially affects one's dealing with "conflation" is another matter. If, from the textual point of view, there can be no "conflation," one has eliminated the word as an appropriate way of describing the situation; but one has not eliminated the situation itself or the problem it poses for textual analysis. Dearing speaks instead of "rings" in genealogical trees and devotes considerable space to techniques

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for rewriting trees so as to eliminate rings, either by inferring states or by breaking the weakest connection in a ring. One breaks the weakest, rather than some other, link in deference to the "principle of parsimony": "The fewest possible readings are treated as something different from what they really are" (p. 88). As with the other systems, the nature of the concessions required to make the system work causes one to question the validity of the results.[61] Dearing's effort to encompass conflation within his system is laudable, but his confidence that his book "for the first time formulates the axioms of textual analysis and demonstrates their inevitability" (p. x) would seem to be excessive.[62] In the half century since Shepard discussed Quentin and Greg a great deal of effort has been expended on statistical approaches to textual analysis, but there seems little reason for a more optimistic verdict than his.

Different as these various methods—from Lachmann to Dearing—are, they all have the same problem: the questions of conflation and the direction of descent prove to be the stumbling block for systems that attempt to achieve objectivity, and those systems either rely on subjective decisions, covertly or openly, or else set up conditions that limit their relevance to actual situations. This is not to say that one or another of the procedures developed in these systems will not be helpful to editors—of modern as well as earlier material—on certain occasions,[63] and editors can profit from the discussion of theoretical issues that the exposition of these systems has produced. But the impulse to minimize the role of human judgment (the view, in Dearing's words, that "textual analysis, having absolute rules, is not an art" [p. 83]) has not led to any satisfactory comprehensive system. In this context, it is useful to look again at the approach suggested by Greg in "The Rationale of Copy-Text," for it places no restrictions on individual judgment—that is, informed judgment, taking all relevant evidence into account and directed toward the scholarly goal of establishing the text as the author wished it. The idea that all alterations made by an editor in the selected copy-text are emendations—whether they come from other documentary texts or from the editor's (or some editor's) inspiration—gives rise to a fundamentally different outlook from that which often has prevailed in the


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textual criticism of earlier material. It leads to a franker acceptance of the centrality of critical judgment because it calls attention to the similarity, rather than the difference, between adopting a reading from another text and adopting a reading that is one's own conjecture. Both result in a form of the text unlike that in any known document and therefore represent editorial judgment in departing from documentary evidence. Some documentary readings are—or seem—obviously wrong, but obviousness is itself subjective, and correcting even the most obvious error is an act of judgment; and attempting to work out the relationships among variant documentary readings involves judgment, or at least, as we have seen, evaluation of the varying results of different systems for establishing those relationships. This approach recognizes that what is transmitted is a series of texts and that to think of a single text, made up of readings from the documentary texts, as "what is transmitted" is to confuse a product of judgment based on the documentary evidence with the documentary evidence itself. But the choice of one of the extant texts as a copy-text in the sense that emerges from Greg's rationale is not at all the same as taking a "best-text" approach (whether Bédier's or some other variety), for one has no obligation to favor the copy-text whenever one has reason to believe that another reading is nearer to what the author intended. Indeed, if one has a rational basis for selecting one reading over another at all points of variation, there is no need for one text to be designated as "copy-text" at all. In this conception, therefore, copy-text is a text more likely than any other—insofar as one can judge from all available evidence—to contain authorial readings at points where one has no other basis for deciding. The usual deterioration of a text as it is recopied suggests that normally the text nearest the author's manuscript is the best choice for copy-text—except, of course, when the circumstances of a particular case point to a different text as the more appropriate choice.

All available evidence should be considered by the editor in making these decisions—evidence from the physical analysis of the documents and from the textual analysis of their contents as well as from the editor's own judgment as to what, under the circumstances, the author is likely to have written. Although Greg's proposal is specific, dealing with the printed dramas of the English Renaissance, the spirit of his rationale can, I think, be legitimately extended in this way, providing a comprehensive approach that encompasses other more limited approaches. It allows one to go wherever one's judgment leads, armed with the knowledge of what evidence is available and what systems of analysis have been proposed; and it provides one with a mechanical means of deciding among variants only when all else fails, a means that is still rationally


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based. One must postulate a relationship among the texts, of course, before one can select and emend a copy-text, and Greg does not suggest in his essay on copy-text how to work out that relationship. His emphasis is different from that of most of the writers on the textual criticism of earlier materials, and in this sense his work is not directly comparable to theirs. But many of them have also talked about the construction of a critical text and have revealed in the process that the two activities cannot always be kept entirely separate. Since the analysis of textual relationships involves judgment at some point, the examination of variants for that purpose is intimately linked with the consideration of variants for emendation. It is not arguing in a circle to decide (having used subjective judgment to some extent) on a particular tree as representing the relationship among the texts, and then to cite that relationship as one factor in the choice among variant readings; the latter is simply a concomitant of the former, for the process of evaluation employed in working out the relationship between the two readings overlaps that used in making a choice between them. Ideally the relationship among the texts should be a matter of fact, which can then be taken as a given in the critical process of deciding what the author wrote. But historical "facts" vary in their degree of certainty; and the more judgment is involved in establishing the "fact" of textual relationship the more such a process will coincide with that of evaluating readings to produce a critical text. The traditional division between recension and emendation is an illustration of this point, though it often has served as a way of concealing it. The open reliance on critical judgment in Greg's rationale and the lack of dogmatism manifested there can appropriately be extended to the prior task of dealing with genealogical relationships. It would seem reasonable to maintain an openness to all approaches that might be of assistance both in evaluating variants and in pointing to relationships. A statistical analysis might prove suggestive, for example, but should be used in conjunction with other data, such as physical evidence. Bibliographical and textual evidence, though undeniably distinct, must be weighed together, since physical details sometimes explain textual variants.

Because Greg spoke specifically of copy-texts that were chosen for the relative authority of their accidentals, editors of earlier works—of which the preserved documents are not likely to contain authoritative accidentals—have concluded that his approach is relevant only for works preserved in authorial manuscripts or in printed editions based on them. Such a view does not take into account the natural extension of Greg's position that I have mentioned: the idea of copy-text as presumptive authority, which one accepts (for both accidentals and substantives)


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whenever there is no other basis for choosing among the variants. This concept of copy-text is relevant for materials of any period, for it is not tied to the retention of accidentals: any feature of the copy-text that one has good reason for emending can be emended without affecting the status of the copy-text as the text one falls back on at points where no such reason exists to dictate the choice among variants. Dearing takes too narrow a view of the matter, therefore, when he says that one chooses a particular text as copy-text if one concludes that the scribes "tended to follow copy even in accidentals" (p. 154). Furthermore, the point is not whether they followed copy; it is simply that the text located at the smallest number of steps from the original is likely to be the best choice to use where the variants are otherwise indifferent, because that text can be presumed, in the absence of contrary evidence, to have deteriorated least, even if the scribes were not careful in following copy.[64] When there are two or more lines of descent, an editor may conclude in a given case that a text in one line, though it is probably more steps removed from the original than a text in another line, is nevertheless more careful and more representative of the original; one would then select it as copy-text, for the point of this approach is that one turns to the text nearest the original only when there is no other evidence for deciding.

This procedure, derived from Greg, would seem to be appropriate for all instances in which—if the choice of copy-text is not clear on other grounds—one can decide that a particular text is fewer steps removed from the original than any other known text. It is not helpful, however, in those instances in which two or more texts are an equal, or possibly equal, number of steps from the original. These situations are taken up by Fredson Bowers in an important essay on "Multiple Authority,"[65] which is the logical complement to Greg's "Rationale." What is particularly


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interesting about Bowers's essay is that, although it deals with a problem especially relevant to earlier material, it is occasioned by work on modern literature, specifically Stephen Crane's stories that were published through a newspaper syndicate.[66] In the absence of any of the presumably duplicate copies of the text sent out by the syndicate office, what the editor has are the appearances of the text in the various newspapers that belonged to the syndicate. These are all apparently removed from the syndicate's master proof, and from the author's original, to exactly the same extent; and unless one has other evidence to suggest that one of the newspapers is likely to be more accurate than the others, there is no way to choose one of these texts as carrying presumptive authority. In such cases, therefore, Bowers recognizes that "critical tests (guided by bibliographical probabilities) must be substituted for the test of genealogical relationship" (p. 467). Statistical analysis is important, but, as Bowers says, "quantitative evidence is not always enough" and "qualitative evidence, the real nature of the variant, needs to be considered" (p. 468). What Bowers implies, but does not quite say, is that in such cases there is no copy-text at all, since no text can be elevated over the others and assigned presumptive authority; the critical text is constructed by choosing among readings, at all points of variation, on critical and bibliographical grounds.[67] If one finds two readings evenly matched, there is no copy-text authority to fall back on, and one must settle the dilemma some other way (such as by a statistical analysis to determine which text has apparently been correct most often). This approach to radiating texts, taken in conjunction with the idea of a copy-text of presumptive authority, when the situation warrants, provides a comprehensive plan for dealing with variants. The point that should be stressed is that neither part of this plan is limited to material of a certain type or period.[68]


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My comments in the preceding pages aim to be nothing more than a series of reflections arising from an effort to think about what connections there are between the textual criticism of ancient writings and the editorial scholarship devoted to modern works. I do not claim to have proposed a new "method"; but I do hope that I have exhibited a coherent line of thinking applicable to all editorial scholarship. The issues will always be debated, and there will always be champions of various approaches. But no approach can survive in the long run that does not recognize the basic role of human judgment, accept it as something positive, and build on it. Welcoming critical judgment is not incompatible with insisting on the use of all possible means for establishing demonstrable facts. Scholarly editors are, after all, historians as well as literary critics, and they must understand the subjective element in the reconstruction of any event from the past. Establishing texts from specific times in the past, including the texts intended by their authors, is a crucial part of this large enterprise of historical reconstruction and cultural understanding. It seems obvious that textual scholars dealing with modern works can benefit from examining the ways in which editors of earlier materials have dealt with complicated problems of transmission and from studying the theories underlying those treatments; I think it equally clear that editors of earlier writings will find relevant what students of later texts have said about authors' revisions and the choice and treatment of a copy-text. One of the textual scholars who have emphasized the importance of cooperation among specialists in different areas is Bruce Metzger. He has urged New Testament scholars, through his own impressive example, to explore textual work in the Septuagint and the Homeric and Indian epics and to "break through the provincialism . . . of restricting one's attention only or chiefly to what has been published in German, French, and English." As he says, "An ever present danger besets the specialist in any field; it is the temptation to neglect taking into account trends of research in other fields. Confining one's attention to a limited area of investigation may result in the impoverishment rather than the enrichment of scholarship."[69] It is to be hoped that many more textual scholars will pursue their work with this same breadth of vision and will welcome the "cross-fertilization of ideas and


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methods" that results. Editing ancient texts and editing modern ones are not simply related fields; they are essentially the same field. The differences between them are in details; the similarities are in fundamentals.

Notes

 
[1]

Robert R. Bolgar evocatively describes the situation in the last decades of the nineteenth century: "Textual criticism was the branch of Latin studies that enjoyed most esteem. . . . Successful editors, critics whose conjectures appeared in learned journals or in their adversaria critica were regarded as the leading scholars of their day. They had the stature of paladins in the eyes of their colleagues." See "Latin Literature: A Century of Interpretation," in Les Études classiques aux XIXe et XXe siècles: leur place dans l'historie des idèes, ed. Willem den Boer (1979), pp. 91-126 (quotation from p. 99).

[2]

W. W. Greg, "The Rationale of Copy-Text," Studies in Bibliography, 3 (1950-51), 19-36; reprinted in his Collected Papers, ed. J. C. Maxwell (1966), pp. 374-391.

[3]

I have attempted to provide a critical survey of these developments in "Greg's Theory of Copy-Text and the Editing of American Literature," SB, 28 (1975), 167-229 (reprinted in Selected Studies in Bibliography [1979], pp. 245-307), and in "Recent Editorial Discussion and the Central Questions of Editing," SB, 34 (1981), 23-65. Four publications of the Modern Language Association of America contain basic statements about editing that derive from Greg's rationale: The Aims and Methods of Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures, ed. James Thorpe (1963; rev. ed., 1970), which contains Fredson Bowers's "Textual Criticism" (pp. 29-54); Center for Editions of American Authors, Statement of Editorial Principles and Procedures (1967; rev. ed., 1972); The Center for Scholarly Editions: An Introductory Statement (1977; also printed in PMLA, 92 [1977], 586-597); Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures, ed. Joseph Gibaldi (1981), which contains G. T. Tanselle's "Textual Scholarship" (pp. 29-52). (In the latter three I have suggested further related reading.) Two other general treatments in this tradition are Fredson Bowers, "Scholarship and Editing," PBSA, 70 (1976), 161-188, and G. T. Tanselle, "Literary Editing," in Literary & Historical Editing, ed. George L. Vogt and John Bush Jones (1981), pp. 35-56.

[4]

Excellent accounts of the history of classical and biblical textual criticism can be found in Bruce M. Metzger, The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration (1964; 2nd ed., 1968); L. D. Reynolds and N. G. Wilson, Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek and Latin Literature (1968; 2nd ed., 1974); and E. J. Kenney, The Classical Text: Aspects of Editing in the Age of the Printed Book (1974). For the Renaissance humanists, see also M. D. Feld, "The Early Evolution of the Authoritative Text," Harvard Library Bulletin, 26 (1978), 81-111. Some further studies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments are listed below in note 38.

[5]

When I speak of "ancient" (or "early") texts, I include medieval texts, which also normally depend on scribal copies a number of removes from the original (though generally not as many steps removed).

[6]

The term "textual analysis" has been used—particularly by Vinton A. Dearing (see note 11 below) and James Thorpe (note 39 below)—to refer specifically to the process of establishing the relationships among texts, which is only one of the operations that make up the larger undertaking of "textual criticism." Dearing's use of the term helps him to emphasize that what he is concerned with is the relationship of "messages," not their "transmitters"; but "textual criticism," in which one applies the abstractions of "textual analysis" to the specific instance of verbal texts, can also draw on "bibliographical analysis," the analysis of the physical documents transmitting the texts. I use these terms here with this distinction in mind, though I often employ the more general term where some might prefer the more specific. Whether "analysis" can be wholly objective and can be kept entirely distinct from the larger process of "criticism," in which subjective judgment plays a role, is a debatable question, and is taken up at several points later in this essay.

[7]

Paul Maas, in his celebrated essay "Textkritik" (note 44 below), as well as many other writers, specifies a step called examinatio between recensio and emendatio (or divinatio). But examining the recension to determine whether or not it can be regarded as furnishing what the author intended is a necessary first step in the process of deciding when to emend; it is simply a matter of definition whether or not one takes emendatio to comprehend the examination that leads to emendation, and in any case the two are intimately related. As E. J. Kenney concisely notes in his article on "Textual Criticism" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed. (1974), the two activities are "in practice performed simultaneously." (He also recognizes that even recension "entails the application of criteria theoretically appropriate" to examination and emendation.) Maas in fact takes up divinatio in his section entitled "Examinatio." A similar point is implied by Robert Renehan, in Greek Textual Criticism (1969), which aims "to show the textual critic actually at work on a number of specific passages," when he says that his book deals with "examinatio, including both selectio between variants and divinatio" (p. 2).

[8]

Wayne Cutler, "The 'Authentic' Witness: The Editor Speaks for the Document," Newsletter of the Association for Documentary Editing, 4, no. 1 (February 1982), 8-9. A notorious example of this view, arguing that historical editions exhibit a "respect for historical fact" lacking in literary editions, is Peter Shaw's "The American Heritage and Its Guardians," American Scholar, 45 (1975-76), 733-751 [i.e., 37-55]; his position has been commented on by G. T. Tanselle in "The Editing of Historical Documents," SB, 31 (1978), 1-56 (Selected Studies, pp. 451-506)— cf. SB, 32 (1979), 31-34 (Selected Studies, pp. 385-388).

[9]

For an authoritative statement on eclecticism in the editing of modern works, see Fredson Bowers, "Remarks on Eclectic Texts," Proof, 4 (1975), 13-58 (reprinted in his Essays in Bibliography, Text, and Editing [1975], pp. 488-528).

[10]

See G. T. Tanselle, "Problems and Accomplishments in the Editing of the Novel," Studies in the Novel, 7 (1975), 323-360 (esp. 329-331); see also SB, 34 (1981), 30-31, 55 n.65.

[11]

An earlier, and much briefer, version of Dearing's book, entitled A Manual of Textual Analysis, appeared in 1959. Two manuals on medieval literature, which appeared later in the 1970s, are Charles Moorman's Editing the Middle English Manuscript (1975), a slight and very elementary book, and Alfred Foulet and Mary Blakely Speer's On Editing Old French Texts (1979), a much more useful and sophisticated treatment. A thorough and learned manual dealing with Italian literature of all periods is Franca Brambilla Ageno's L'edizione critica dei testi volgare (1975). A somewhat earlier manual that is full of common sense and wise observations is Ludwig Bieler's "The Grammarian's Craft: A Professional Talk," Folia, 2 (1947), 94-105; 3 (1948), 23-32, 47-58; 2nd ed., Folia, 10, no. 2 (1956), 3-42 (and as a separate).

[12]

He specifically mentions its use by "historians, cartographers, musicologists, iconographers, and so on," who will have to "translate from the more literary terminology and examples into their own" (pp. 1-2).

[13]

For an account of the development of analytical bibliography, see F. P. Wilson, "Shakespeare and the 'New Bibliography,'" in The Bibliographical Society 1892-1942: Studies in Retrospect (1945), pp. 76-135; it has been reprinted as a separate volume (1970), revised and edited by Helen Gardner. See also my "Physical Bibliography in the Twentieth Century," in Books, Manuscripts, and the History of Medicine: Essays on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Osler Library, ed. Philip M. Teigen (1982). The central statements of the field are R. B. McKerrow, An Introduction to Bibliography for Literary Students (1927); Charlton Hinman, The Printing and Proof-Reading of the First Folio of Shakespeare (1963); and Fredson Bowers, Bibliography and Textual Criticism (1964).

[14]

He immediately proceeds to say that the goal of textual analysis is not "merely to provide a genealogy of the states of a text" but, if the state from which all the others descended is not known to be extant, "to reconstruct the latest state from which all the extant states have descended." This goal is proper, but one must remember that reconstructing a text is a very different activity from analyzing the relationships of those that exist.

[15]

In the 1959 Manual (note 11 above) he considers himself to be introducing this idea: "My method for the first time distinguishes the text conveyed by the manuscript— a mental phenomenon—from the manuscript conveying the text—a physical phenomenon" (p. ix).

[16]

He does later show his awareness of some of them, as when he cautions against using reproductions, which are "subject to all sorts of unexpected failures to perform their function" (p. 148). In his article on "Textual Criticism" in Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Alex Preminger et al. (1965), he properly points out that "early books preserved in only a few copies may differ in every copy."

[17]

Even if no changes are introduced (a theoretical possibility), the text is still new —though this possibility illustrates what Dearing means by bibliographical thinking, since there is no difference between the two "messages" but only between their "records." Nevertheless, the fact that separately produced texts may happen at times to be identical does not alter the general point that physical details are relevant to textual analysis.

[18]

Willis neglects the same fact, in his much less sophisticated way, when he claims that, whereas a paleographer is concerned with a manuscript as "a physical entity," to a textual critic "a manuscript is of interest only as a vehicle of readings" (p. 5).

[19]

Among the many other treatments of scribal error are Willis's (pp. 51-161) and Vinaver's (note 50 below); and Louis Havet, Manuel de critique verbale appliquée aux textes latins (1911). Two classic psychological studies of scribal alterations are Jakob Stoll, "Zur Psychologie der Schreibfehler," Fortschritte der Psychologie und ihrer Anwendungen, 2 (1913-14), 1-133; and Sebastiano Timpanaro, Il lapsus freudiano: psicanalisi e critica testuale (1974; translated into English by Kate Soper, 1976). In the latter, textual study is the basis for a criticism of Freud's theory in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life.

[20]

James Douglas Farquhar, 'The Manuscript as a Book," in Sandra Hindman and J. D. Farquhar, Pen to Press: Illustrated Manuscripts and Printed Books in the First Century of Printing (1977), pp. 11-99; John Van Sickle, "The Book-Roll and Some Conventions of the Poetic Book," Arethusa, 13 (1980), 5-42, 115-127; Ernest C. Colwell, "Scribal Habits in Early Papyri: A Study in the Corruption of the Text," in The Bible in Modern Scholarship, ed. J. Philip Hyatt (1965), pp. 370-389 (reprinted as "Method in Evaluating Scribal Habits . . ." in Colwell's Studies in Methodology in Textual Criticism of the New Testament [1969], pp. 106-124). See also C. H. Roberts, "The Codex," Proceedings of the British Academy, 40 (1954), 169-204; and G. S. Ivy, "The Bibliography of the Manuscript-Book," in The English Library before 1700: Studies in Its History, ed. Francis Wormald and C. E. Wright (1958), pp. 32-65. (An example of an inept effort to base textual decisions on physical evidence is Albert C. Clark's argument, in The Descent of Manuscripts [1918] and other works, that many omissions result from scribes' skipping whole lines, since the lengths of omissions, he believed, often corresponded to multiples of the number of letters in a characteristic manuscript line.)

[21]

Of course, knowledge of each compositor's habits and reliability is useful in evaluating substantive readings in the part of the text he set, not just in dealing with the spelling and punctuation.

[22]

For information about ancient punctuation, see the interesting discussions cited in Reynolds and Wilson, Scribes and Scholars (note 4 above), pp. 214-215, 216.

[23]

"Paradosis" is "a rather imprecise but convenient term meaning 'the data furnished by the transmission, reduced to essentials'" (p. 53). Willis calls it "a pedantic synonym for 'transmitted reading' or for 'reading best attested'" (p. 228).

[24]

Greg, in his "Rationale" (note 2 above), says that the distinction is not "theoretical" or "philosophic" but "practical," separating two categories toward which scribes or compositors reacted differently; thus even if punctuation affects meaning, "still it remains properly a matter of presentation" (p. 376), for it would normally have been perceived so by scribes and compositors.

[25]

In itself not a matter about which universal agreement can be expected.

[26]

For further discussion of the accidentals of manuscript texts, see Bieler (note 11 above), who is sensible on this subject as on much else: his basic point is that "we should always try even in externals [i.e., accidentals] to keep to the original as nearly as evidence warrants and the reader may be reasonably expected to follow" (p. 28), for "the editor should prefer to make his readers think rather than to save them the trouble" (pp. 29-30); it is not proper for editors to insert "the standard punctuation of their mothertongue," and an editor must never "wish to be more consistent than his author" (p. 29). Similarly, S. Harrison Thompson on the classicizing of medieval Latin: "Medieval Latin writers had a right to spell as they wanted to, and we may not change their orthography and put it out under their names" ("Editing of Medieval Latin Texts in America," Progress of Medieval and Renaissance Studies in the United States and Canada Bulletin, 16 (1941), 37-49 (quotation from p. 47).

[27]

West's phrase "at least for portions of the text," however, indicates that the listing is being thought of more as a suggestive indication of the nature of the spelling variants than as a record of the evidence that was available to the editor and that may be relevant in understanding a particular passage or evaluating the editor's treatment of it. Years earlier MacEdward Leach had made a plea for constructing apparatus so that "the state of the manuscript in the smallest particular can be ascertained" (p. 150); regardless of the editorial alterations made in the text, these details should be available to the reader, because medieval capitalization may not have been haphazard and medieval punctuation "may be important and significant" (p. 147). See "Some Problems in Editing Middle English Manuscripts," English Institute Annual, 1939, pp. 130-151.

[28]

See R. J. Tarrant's review in Phoenix, 27 (1973), 295-300.

[29]

Most manuals on manuscript editing of course discuss the form of apparatus; the treatment in the Foulet-Speer manual (note 11 above) emerges from a long tradition of published rules for the medieval French field (and aims to supersede those set forth by Mario Roques in Romania, 52 [1926], 243-249). The Leiden system—Emploi des signes critiques: disposition de l'apparat dans les éditions savantes de textes grecs et latins (1932, 1938)—is an official publication of the Union Académique Internationale and is intended to apply to all kinds of editions, not only those of epigraphical and papyrological interest; O. Stahlin's Editionstechnik (2nd ed., 1914) has long been regarded as standard for classical texts. Two treatments concerned with later materials, but raising some general considerations, are G. T. Tanselle, "Some Principles for Editorial Apparatus," SB, 25 (1972), 41-88 (reprinted in Selected Studies, pp. 403-450); and Fredson Bowers, "Transcription of Manuscripts: The Record of Variants," SB, 29 (1976), 212-264.

[30]

Part of this preface is conveniently reprinted in Housman's Selected Prose, ed. John Carter (1961), pp. 23-44 (quotation from p. 36).

[31]

See Fredson Bowers, "McKerrow's Editorial Principles for Shakespeare Reconsidered," Shakespeare Quarterly, 6 (1955), 309-324.

[32]

Greg's own evolution from a position similar to McKerrow's can in part be seen in "McKerrow's Prolegomena Reconsidered," Review of English Studies, 17 (1941), 139-149, and in the prefaces to the first two printings of his The Editorial Problem in Shakespeare (1942, 1951), as well as in what he sees as the relation of his own "Prolegomena" (pp. viilv) to McKerrow's Prolegomena for the Oxford Shakespeare (1939).

[33]

He attributes the term to Paul Maas, who used it—somewhat differently—in a review of Greg's The Editorial Problem in Shakespeare, in Review of English Studies, 19 (1943), 410-413; 20 (1944), 73-77. After praising the book as "a decisive step forward from McKerrow's orthodoxy towards the eclecticism which the character of the transmission requires" (p. 410) and congratulating Greg on his "courageous vindication of eclecticism" (p. 75), Maas objects to the idea of copy-text and expresses the hope that the "bibliographical school . . . will continue to move towards emancipation from the tyranny of the copy-text" (p. 76). Greg replied (20 [1944] 159-160) that a classicist would naturally object to copy-text, claiming that the concept "has no place in the editing of classical texts," where one is not concerned with preserving documentary accidentals. Cf. note 45 below.

[34]

Housman (in the Manilius) ridiculed the equation of conservatism with a thoughtless adherence to a single text: "assuredly there is no trade on earth, excepting textual criticism, in which the name of prudence would be given to that habit of mind which in ordinary human life is called credulity" (p. 43).

[35]

Of course, it is possible to set some other goal for a critical edition; e.g., one could attempt to reconstruct the text of any particular document presumed to have existed but no longer extant. More often, however, the goal of critical editing is the restoration of what the author wished. This goal is still historical, even though the resulting text is not that of any surviving document, and the evidence from all those documents can be reported in the apparatus.

[36]

One cannot simply say "written by the author," since the author's manuscript may have contained slips of the pen, and the critical editor is aiming for an ideal that may not ever have been realized in any document, even the author's own manuscript.

[37]

That they should in some cases be more concerned with it than they have been is a separate issue. Even when there is legitimately no question of retaining the accidentals of the manuscript tradition, documentary accidentals may be significant (as I suggested earlier) in assessing the presence of certain substantives and may play a role in the thinking that leads to the choice of a copy-text.

[38]

In addition to the splendid surveys in Metzger, Reynolds-Wilson, and Kenney (mentioned in note 4 above), other helpful discussions are by Bieler (note 11 above); Edward B. Ham, "Textual Criticism and Common Sense," Romance Philology, 12 (1958-59), 198-215; E. J. Kenney in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (note 7 above); Pasquali (note 45 below); and Robert Marichal, "La Critique des textes," in L'Histoire et ses méthodes, ed. Charles Samaran (Encyclopédie de la Pleiade 11, 1961), pp. 1247-1366. A convenient survey, making particular reference to the Old French field, appears in the Foulet-Speer manual (note 11 above); two useful collections emphasizing medieval texts are Christopher Kleinhenz (ed.), Medieval Manuscripts and Textual Criticism (1976), containing reprinted essays (some translated for the first time), and A. G. Rigg (ed.), Editing Medieval Texts, English, French, and Latin, Written in England (1977), bringing together the papers from the 1976 Toronto editorial conference. For the biblical field, see also Bruce M. Metzger, Chapters in the History of New Testament Textual Criticism (1963), and "Recent Developments in the Textual Criticism of the New Testament," in his Historical and Literary Studies: Pagan, Jewish, and Christian (1968), pp. 145-162; Eldon Jay Epp, "The Twentieth Century Interlude in New Testament Textual Criticism," Journal of Biblical Literature, 93 (1974), 386-414; Frederic G. Kenyon, The Text of the Greek Bible: A Students Handbook (1937; 3rd ed., rev. A. W. Adams, 1975); D. Winton Thomas, "The Textual Criticism of the Old Testament," in The Old Testament and Modern Study, ed. H. H. Rowley (1951), pp. 238-263; and Harry M. Orlinsky, "The Textual Criticism of the Old Testament," in The Bible and the Ancient Near East, ed. G. Ernest Wright (1961), pp. 113-132.

[39]

One book that does look at the traditions of the textual criticism of early manuscript materials in the context of the study of post-medieval English and American literature is James Thorpe's Principles of Textual Criticism (1972; see "Textual Analysis," pp. 105-130). Thorpe says in his preface, "I believe that the same textual principles are true for all periods and for all literatures" (p. viii).

[40]

The fullest and most impressive treatment of this point is Sebastiano Timpanaro, La genesi del metodo del Lachmann (1963)—revised from its earlier appearance in Studi italiani di filologia classica, 31 (1959), 182-228; 32 (1960), 38-63. Particularly important forerunners of Lachmann in developing a genealogical approach were the eighteenth-century scholars J. A. Bengel and J. J. Griesbach.

[41]

E.g., briefly in Reynolds-Wilson (note 4 above), pp. 192-194, and more thoroughly by Ernest C. Colwell, "Genealogical Method: Its Achievements and Limitations,' Journal of Biblical Literature, 66 (1947), 109-133 (reprinted in his Studies in Methodology [note 20 above], pp. 63-83). See also Vinton A. Dearing, "Some Notes on Genealogical Methods in Textual Criticism," Novum Testamentum, 9 (1967), 278-297. E. Talbot Donaldson makes a strong plea for abandoning the Lachmann approach in "The Psychology of Editors of Middle English Texts," in Speaking of Chaucer (1970), pp. 102-118 (see also his complaint about the amount of energy that has been devoted to trying to devise a "scientific system," p. 129). Most of the older standard introductions contain an exposition of Lachmann's method and some criticism of it; among them are Kirsopp Lake, The Text of the New Testament (1900; 6th ed., 1928); R. C. Jebb in A Companion to Greek Studies, ed. Leonard Whibley (1905); 4th ed., 1931); J. P. Postgate in A Companion to Latin Studies, ed. J. E. Sandys (1910, 1913, 1921), and in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed. (1911); F. W. Hall, A Companion to Classical Texts (1913); and Hermann Kantorowicz, Einführung in die Textkritik (1921).

[42]

On the place of "common error" in Lachmann's own work, see Kenney (note 4 above), p. 135 n. 1.

[43]

Colwell, after saying that Westcott and Hort did not actually apply the genealogical method to New Testament manuscripts, adds, "Moreover, sixty years of study since Westcott and Hort indicate that it is doubtful if it can be applied to New Testament manuscripts in such a way as to advance our knowledge of the original text of the New Testament" (Studies in Methodology [note 20 above], p. 63). Colwell believes that the method is useful only for closely related families of manuscripts "narrowly limited in time and space" (p. 82).

[44]

Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft, 1 (3rd ed.), part 7 (1927), 18 pp.; separate editions appeared in 1950 and 1957. The 1958 English edition (Textual Criticism) includes a translation of Maas's "Leitfehler und stemmatische Typen," Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 37 (1937), 289-294. (For the Italian translation, Critica del testo, see note 49 below. Some comments on the influence of Maas in Italy and France appear in Luciano Canfora, "Critica textualis in caelum revocata," Belfagor, 23 [1968], 361-364.)

[45]

It is likely, of course, that a scribe would depart from his exemplar, but not that his departures would be such that no other scribe might hit on them independently. Maas, because his name is linked with the abstract and theoretical statement of stemmatics, is sometimes—but wrongly—thought to represent rigidity and an opposition to individual judgment. The truth is altogether different, as illustrated by his review of Greg (note 33 above), which includes the remark, "Misuse of conjecture is not more probable than misuse of conservatism, and is perhaps less dangerous" (p. 76). Giorgio Pasquali's long review of Maas in Gnomon, 5 (1929), 417-435, 498-521, was the predecessor of his great book, Storia della tradizione e critica del testo (1934; 2nd ed., with a new preface and appendixes, 1952). Pasquali's position (along with that of Michele Barbi, La Nuova Filologia e l'edizione dei nostri scrittori da Dante al Manzoni, 1938) in the Italian school of "new philology" is concisely described by Mary B. Speer in a review of two other books in Romance Philology, 32 (1978-79), 335-344; she notes their reaction against the rigidity of Maas's stemmatics and their emphasis on critical judgment as a scholarly and responsible procedure.

[46]

Sometimes it begins sooner, if one has difficulty determining some of the readings present in a particular document.

[47]

Bédier extended his discussion in "La Tradition manuscrite du Lai de l'Ombre: reflexions sur l'art d'editer les anciens textes," Romania, 54 (1928), 161-196, 321-356; and in "De l'Édition princeps de la Chanson de Roland aux éditions les plus récentes: nouvelles remarques sur l'art d'établir les anciens textes," Romania, 63 (1937), 433-469; 64 (1938), 145-244, 489-521. For an example of the voluminous later commentary on Bédier, see Frederick Whitehead and Cedric E. Pickford, "The Introduction to the Lai de l'Ombre: Sixty Years Later," Romania, 94 (1973), 145-156 (also published in Kleinhenz [note 38 above], pp. 103-116). Whitehead and Pickford find that textual criticism in the Old French field has "moved decisively away from the phase of extreme conservatism" (p. 156) associated with Bédier and has returned "to procedures familiar to textual critics in the classical field but completely lost to sight by editors of French medieval texts at the turn of the century" (p. 155).

[48]

By William P. Shepard (note 58 below), p. 140.

[49]

In his introduction to Nello Martinelli's translation (1952, 1958), of Maas's Textkritik.

[50]

"Principles of Textual Emendation," in Studies in French Language and Mediaeval Literature Presented to Professor Mildred K. Pope (1939), pp. 351-369 (reprinted in Kleinhenz [note 38 above], pp. 139-159).

[51]

Vinaver argues ineffectually with Housman later in the essay, twisting Housman's point in order to claim that it "is right to preserve a reading as long as it is possible that it comes from the original" (p. 368).

[52]

Vinaver is criticized by Henry John Chaytor, in "The Medieval Reader and Textual Criticism," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 26 (1941-42), 49-56, for assuming that scribes had "visual memory" rather than "auditory memory"—a difference that would affect the kinds of errors they made. Another effective criticism of Vinaver is provided by T. B. W. Reid, in "On the Text of the Tristran of Béroul," in Medieval Miscellany Presented to Eugène Vinaver by Pupils, Colleagues and Friends, ed. Frederick Whitehead, A. H. Diverres, and F. E. Sutcliffe (1965), pp. 263-288 (esp. pp. 269-272); reprinted in Kleinhenz (note 38 above) pp. 245-271 (esp. pp. 252-254). (On scribal errors, see note 19 above.) See also George Kane's defense of emendation, in opposition to Vinaver and Bédier, in "Conjectural Emendation," in Medieval Literature and Civilization: Studies in Memory of G. N. Garmonsway, ed. D. A. Pearsall and R. A. Waldron (1969), pp. 155-169 (reprinted in Kleinhenz [note 38 above], pp. 211-225); and in his editions of the A and B versions of Piers Plowman (1960, 1975, the latter with E. Talbot Donaldson).

[53]

What it really does, however, is to provide the editor with information that may be of assistance in making a critical judgment. Knowing that a category of error exists may help the editor to recognize an instance of it, but one cannot assume that all possible instances of it are in fact errors. The editor must still decide whether a particular reading, in a particular context, is best explained as falling into one of those categories, or whether it need not be regarded as an error at all.

[54]

See Frederick Whitehead and Cedric E. Pickford, "The Two-Branch Stemma," Bulletin bibliographique de la Société internationale arthurienne, 3 (1951), 83-90. Cf. Jean Fourquet, "Le Paradoxe de Bédier," Mélanges 1945 (Strasbourg, 1946), 2:1-16; and "Fautes communes ou innovations communes," Romania, 70 (1948-49), 85-95.

[55]

Further elaborated in his Essais de critique textualle (ecdotique) (1926).

[56]

For more detailed criticism of Quentin, see E. K. Rand, "Dom Quentin's Memoir on the Text of the Vulgate," Harvard Theological Review, 17 (1924), 197-264; and J. Burke Severs, "Quentin's Theory of Textual Criticism," English Institute Annual, 1941, pp. 65-93. Bédier's 1928 criticism is cited above (note 47). The Quentin-Bédier controversy is treated in a number of well-known books, such as Paul Collomp, La Critique des textes (1931) and Arrigo Castellani, Bédier avait-il raison? (1957).

[57]

The importance of the Calculus as a starting point for further thinking about objective methods of analysis, however, is recognized in the work of Dearing and Hrubý, commented on briefly below, and in F. M. Salter's critical but balanced review of Greg's edition (1935) of The Play of Antichrist in Review of English Studies, 13 (1937), 341-352 (to which Greg replied at 13 [1937], 352-354, and 14 [1938], 79-80).

[58]

"Recent Theories of Textual Criticism," Modern Philology, 28 (1930-31), 129-141. Greg replied to Shepard's criticisms (28 [1930-31], 401-404), emphasizing the distinction between the "mechanism of transmission," with which he was dealing, and the reconstruction of texts, which he acknowledges cannot be mechanical.

[59]

Hill, "Some Postulates for Distributional Study of Texts," SB, 3 (1950-51), 63-95; Hrubý, "Statistical Methods in Textual Criticism," General Linguistics, 5 (1961-62), 77-138; Hrubý, "A Quantitative Solution of the Ambiguity of Three Texts," SB, 18 (1965), 147-182 (the opening pages of which offer a good survey of the statistical tradition); Dearing, Principles and Practice of Textual Analysis (1974; see part I above and note 11). Other quantitative approaches involving the tabulation of agreements are represented by Ernest C. Colwell (e.g., several of the papers collected in his Studies in Methodology [see note 20 above]), Paul R. McReynolds (e.g., "The Value and Limitation of the Claremont Profile Method," in the 1972 volume of the Society of Biblical Literature seminar papers), and John G. Griffith (e.g., papers on "numerical taxonomy" in Museum Helveticum, 25 [1968], 101-138, and Journal of Theological Studies, n.s., 20 [1969], 389-406); brief comments on Colwell appear in Metzger (see note 4 above), pp. 180-181, and Dearing, pp. 120-121, and on Griffith in West, pp. 46-47 (West's own approach, pp. 38-39, though simpler, is related). For comments on the use of computers in textual analysis, see Dearing, pp. 215-236; Jacques Froger, La Critique des textes et son automatisation (1968); and the works listed in the Center for Scholarly Editions statement (note 3 above), p. 9.

[60]

Sometimes "contamination" is distinguished from "conflation," the former resulting from the use of now one and now another manuscript, the latter from the combining of elements from two or more manuscripts. In a looser usage, they can be employed interchangeably to refer to the results of a scribe's use of two or more manuscripts.

[61]

The considerable amount of labor entailed by all these systems, often cited as a criticism, would not be a serious objection, of course, if the results were conclusive.

[62]

More detailed criticism of Dearing can be found in M. P. Weitzman's trenchant review in Vetus Testamentum, 27 (1977), 225-235. Dearing makes some comments on this review in "Textual Analysis: A Consideration of Some Questions Raised by M. P. Weitzman," Vetus Testamentum, 29 (1979), 355-359. His 1959 book is discussed by David M. Vieth in Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 59 (1960), 553-559 (cf. Harvard Library Bulletin, 24 [1976], 210 n. 14).

[63]

Among the notable features of Bieler's essay (note 11 above) is his discussion suggesting situations in which various of these approaches might be appropriate.

[64]

Dearing says, "In fact, Greg's rule implies that scribes and compositors tend to follow copy in accidentals. If the evidence is clear that they did not, then any extant text may be the most like the author in the matter of accidentals, and the bibliographical tree does not limit the editor's choice of copy-text" (p. 155). It would be more accurate to say that Greg assumes deterioration as one text is copied from another and believes, when no other evidence is available, that more of the author's practices are likely to show through in the earliest copy. As Dearing implies, it would be possible for a later copyist, being unfaithful to the deteriorated text he is copying from, to happen to reintroduce a number of authorial practices. But they would carry no more authority than the editor's own decision to introduce them—unless, of course, there were reason to believe that the copyist had drawn on a more authoritative document, in which case the editor would have good cause to select the text containing them as copy-text. Greg would agree that "the bibliographical tree does not limit the editor's choice of copy-text," for he never argued for following a mechanical rule if the evidence, as one sees it, points another way.

[65]

"Multiple Authority: New Problems and Concepts of Copy-Text," Library, 5th ser., 27 (1972), 81-115; reprinted in his Essays in Bibliography, Text, and Editing (1975), pp. 447-487.

[66]

Bowers also speaks of carbon copies from typewriting—another modern phenomenon that can produce radiating texts.

[67]

I have explored this point, and its implications for the recording of variants, in "Editorial Apparatus for Radiating Texts," Library, 5th ser., 29 (1974), 330-337. Dearing —both in Principles and Practice of Textual Analysis (p. 154) and in "Concepts of Copy-Text Old and New," Library, 5th ser., 28 (1973), 281-293 (p. 291)—continues (as does Bowers) to use the term "copy-text" in these situations, but he confuses the concepts of "copy-text" and "printer's copy," as when he says (in the article) that "if we can completely reconstruct the archetype, any copy-text is as good as any other and we need only choose the one we must change the least to bring it into conformity with the archetype." What is being chosen in such a case is not a copy-text but a text that can conveniently serve as the basis for printer's copy; indeed, at the beginning of the article Dearing defines "copy-text" as "what a scholar-editor sends to the press." The necessity for maintaining a distinction between "copy-text" and "printer's copy" is shown, I hope, in my "The Meaning of Copy-Text: A Further Note," SB, 23 (1970), 191-196.

[68]

Another point that should perhaps be repeated to avoid misunderstanding: what I have said here does not purport to summarize Greg and Bowers but tries to extend their ideas in a direction suggested by their essays.

[69]

Chapters (see note 38 above), pp. ix and 142 respectively. This statement would in fact serve well as the motto for the Society for Textual Scholarship, founded by David Greetham in 1979; some remarks of mine along the same lines appear at the beginning of the first volume of Text (1981), the Society's publication. Forty years ago R. W. Chapman indicated some connections between the editing of ancient and of modern works, in "A Problem in Editorial Method," Essays and Studies, 27 (1941), 41-51.