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DOCTRINE OF ACCELERATION OF ESTATES.

Although the ulterior devise is, in terms, not to take
effect in possession until the decease of the prior devisee,
if tenant for life, yet in point of fact it is to be read as
a limitation of the remainder to take effect in every event
which removes the prior estate out of the way.

- Northern Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 94 N. E. 980.

Doubtless the amount of the residuum of the estate would
be reduced by the election of the widow to take under the
Statute and the payment to her of her distributive share of
the personalty; but that is where the uncompensated loss
ultimately should fall, unless it is otherwise indicated in
the will.

- Dunlap v. McCloud (Ohio-1911) 96 N. E. 774.

Where testator gives son 80 acres of land and widow
renounces will and receives 40 acres thereof, loss to the son
will be made up out of residuum at the loss of residuary legatees.

- Pittman v. Pittman (Kan) 107 Pac. 235.

A testator bequeathed his personal property to his wife
for life, and provided that at her death certain specific
legacies should be paid, and the residue should go to certain
relatives. The wife renounced the will and took onehalf of the

personal property absolutely, — Held, that the specific
legacies were thereupon payable in full at once, the wife's
renunciation being equivalent to her death.

In re- Vance's Estate (Penn.) 21 Atl. -. 643, (1891).

The testator is presumed to know that the widow's
rights under the law are paramount to her rights under his
will, and therefore it is not accurate to say that his whole
scheme of disposition of his property is destroyed by the
widow's election. It is disarranged pro tanto, but in the
absence of any reference to such contingency or provision
for it in the will, there is ordinarily nothing on which
to found a presumption that he would have made any specific
difference in distribution, had he known she would exercise
her right — certainly not that he would have decreased
any of the definite pecuniary legacies to swell the amount
going at the end of the list to the residuaries. No Court
is authorized to make distribution for the sake of equality.
The testator's scheme must be carried out as he made it,
except so far as that has been rendered impossible by the
widow's action.

In re- Vance's estate, supra.

There is a line of authorities holding that upon renunciation
by a widow of the benefits of a life estate intended
for her by the will, such of said property as remains after
her election may be sequestered by the Court and used as a
trust fund during the life of the widow from which the residuary
legatees are to be compensated for the losses sustained
by them by reason of such election.

But this rule does not obtain in those estates in which
the doctrine of acceleration of estates has become established.

(Insert)

In re- Vance's estate, supra.

In the case of Macknet v. Macknet, 24 N. J. Eq., p. 292,
the Court in holding that estate in remainder, then under
consideration should be accelerated in its vesting, cites the
following:

(Insert)

In re- Vance's estate, supra.

The law must have a settled and uniform rule, and it is
that as to provision in a will for legacies subordinate to
a life interest in the widow, and contingent upon her death, or
payment of which is postponed till then, her election to take
against the will is equivalent to the widow taking her share
as if the husband had died intestate, and the will then operates
on the rest of the estate precisely as it the widow were dead.
A court of equity will interpose, if necessity requires, to
preserve the intention of the testator from destruction, but
such interposition never should take place in favor of a subordinate,
as against a preferred or superior interest; and therefore
never in favor of a residuary as against a definite
legatee, unless upon a plain implication in the will that the
residuary legatee was in fact a preferred object of the testator's
bounty.

The early cases in which it was held that an estate
in reversion vests immediately upon the determination of
the life estate upon which it is limited, by the death
of the tenant for life, or by the surrender or forfeiture
of his estate, or his disqualification to take it (1
Jarman on Wills, 513; Sheppard's Touchstone 435) have been
followed in this country in cases such as the present.

It seems to be settled by the weight of authority
that — "Where the widow, who has been given a life interest
under the will, renounces and elects to take her
dower or the Statutory allowance instead, her renunciation
works extinguishment of her life estate, and accelerates
the rights of the second taker".

Citing Fox v. Rumery, 68 Me. 121;

Dean v. Hard, 62 Ala. 310

20 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, pp. 895 & 897, and cases
cited in Note 3.

The doctrine of acceleration proceeds upon the supposition
that, though the ulterior devise is in terms not to
take effect in possession until the decease of the prior
devisee, if tenant for life, yet that in point of fact it
is to be read as a limitation of a remainder to take effect
in every event which removes the prior estate out of the
way.

- 1 Jarman on Wills, 539

- Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Ill. 11.

Whether the life estate is determined by a revocation,
or by death, or by the renunciation of the widow, or by any
other circumstance, which puts the life estate out of the
way, the remainder takes effect, having only been postponed
in order that the life estate might begiven to the life
tenant.

- Blatchford v. Newberry, supra.

Where it can be shown, however, that the intention
of the testator is that the remainder shall not take effect
until the expiration of the life of the prior donee, the remainder
will not be accelerated.