University of Virginia Library

6
THE RULES OF CONDUCT FOR MONKS,
NOVICES, AND LAYMEN

As we have seen, early Buddhist tradition emphasized it was the Dhamma
(doctrine) and the rules of discipline (as contained in the Patimokkha)
that should bind the community of monks, who were recommended to
decide on issues and exercise discipline in democratic collective assembly
with full appreciation of the individuality and moral responsibility of
each monk.

The shift from eremitical to cenobitical life was no doubt historically
important. Whereas the poetical books of the Tripitika, especially the
Songs of the Monks and the Nuns, are a panegyric on solitary meditation
in the midst of nature's beauties, in the Patimokkha we breathe the
atmosphere of conventional monastic establishments.

However, monastic life was still decisively different from the domestic
life of a married householder. From one perspective the logical opposite
of home is homelessness (the wanderer's life); but it is equally true to
say that collective life among members of the same sex (as in monastic life)
is also the logical opposite of family life, which is based on the difference
between and therefore the symbiosis of the two sexes. Monasteries are
also distinctive by virtue of being `total institutions' in Goffman's sense
(1961), that is, establishments whose encompassing or total character
signifies a barrier to social intercourse with the world outside.

The paradoxical feature of the Buddhist Sangha is that, while its
organizational form is anti-hierarchical and antagonistic to specifying status
positions with associated competencies, the disciplinary rules which the
monks have to follow are spelled out in such fine nagging detail. One
answer to this paradox is that a de-emphasis on social structure and an
emphasis on individual responsibility through the internalization of ethical
rules is a consistent characteristic of salvation seekers who have renounced
organized society. But the actual situation, as we shall see in this chapter,
is more complicated.

The disciplinary rules find their most detailed expression in the Canonical
text called the Vinaya Pitaka (especially the Maha and Cullavaggas).
What is the relation between the Patimokkha and the Vinaya?

The Patimokkha, we have already seen, is a liturgical formulary or

manual which states the rules governing the conduct of monks. The
Vinaya contains the same precepts but they are accompanied by a vast
quantity of explanatory matter. Some scholars believe that the Patimokkha
manual is the original and the Vinaya an amplification of it. Rhys Davids
and Oldenberg (1881, pp. ix-x) assert that the Patimokkha `is one of the
oldest, if not the oldest, of all Buddhist text-books; and it has been
inserted in its entirety into the first part of the Vinaya, the Vibhanga'.
Pachow (1951) confirms this view, considering the Patimokkha to be the
oldest text in the Vinaya Pitaka. The method of amplification in the
Vinaya proceeds thus: `First, in each case there is a history of the circumstances
under which the Buddha propounded the rule. Then comes the
rule, and then the verbal glossary and commentary. Then follows an
immense number of illustrations, cases in which, as it is stated, doubt
arose whether a monk was guilty or not...' (Copleston 1892, p. 197).
The Theravada tradition is that the Vinaya regulations are in a chronological
sequence because they were pronounced by the Buddha himself
as each incident or dispute arose in time.[1]

Since the core precepts are contained in the Patimokkha I shall use
one version of the former to make a content analysis of the rules. There
are in fact many versions of the Patimokkha (see Pachow 1951, 1953 for
details)[2] I shall use here an English translation from a Pali version published
in Thailand (Nanamoli Thera 1966).[3] The following are the traditionally
recognized groupings of the rules.

1. Parajika, `the four causes of defeat', crimes which are punished by
expulsion from the Order.

2. Sanghadidesa, thirteen cases which entail the `initial and subsequent
meeting of the community', that call for suspension, penance and reinstatement
by an assembly of at least twenty monks.

3. Aniyata, the two `indefinite cases' that involve expulsion, suspension,
or expiation according to circumstances.

4. Nissaggiya Pacittiya, thirty cases which entail expiation and forfeiture
of articles (which monks have improperly taken or used).

5. Pacittiya dhamma, ninety-two offences which entail expiation only.

6. Patidesaniya dhamma, four cases that must be confessed.

7. Sekhiya, seventy-four rules concerning observations and proprieties
that must be recited.

8. Adhikaranasamatha, the `seven cases of settlement of litigation',
that is, the rules to be observed in conducting judicial investigations
concerning the conduct of monks.

Rather than follow this classification or list the rules in detail I shall
follow a different scheme, using my own labels to bring out the areas and
order of emphasis portrayed by the rules.

(A) The four parajika offences, few in number, entail the extreme
punishment of expulsion from the Order. Two offences are `crimes
against society' in general, which are not peculiarly religious in that most
governments punish them. These crimes are: (1) theft of such nature
that kings would punish by arrest and execution, imprisonment or banishment;
and (2) homicide or inciting (or aiding and abetting) another to
commit suicide. Some texts phrase (1) above as taking anything not
given, even a blade of grass, an injunction which takes a serious view of
any kind of theft.

If we then leave aside these two, the two remaining relate to sexual
offence, namely a monk having sexual intercourse `even with a female
animal', which undermines the vocation of monkhood, and to crime
against Buddhist doctrine by falsely claiming the superior state of a Noble
one's (i.e. arahat's) knowledge and extraordinary qualities.

(B) It is in the classes of crimes other than the extreme parajika
offences that we distinctly see the order of emphasis and weighting. The
crimes which evoke the assembly of monks, suspension of the offender,
his penance and reinstatement are concerned with two areas only:
sexual offences which are short of intercourse but express lust or intention
of lust; and offences detrimental to monastic community life. The sexual
offences, which are meticulously enumerated, are of the following types:
intentional ejection of semen (which certainly includes masturbation);
any form of bodily contact with a woman; verbally suggesting or inviting
sexual intercourse; receiving a robe from an unrelated bhikkuni (nun);
and acting as an intermediary in marriage, concubinage or other sexual
arrangement. The last offence indirectly points out that the vocation of
monkhood is antithetical to and separated from marriage, the crucial
institution of the life of a householder. `A wise man should avoid married
life (abrahmacariyam) as if it were a burning pit of live coals' (Dhammika
Sutta).

On a par with these sexual offences are the following which deal with

relations between monks in collective monastic life and with the basis of
monastic life itself. They are: falsely accusing another monk of one of the
four major crimes (parajika); attempting to cause schism of the community
either singly or in a group, resisting admonishment by fellow monks
concerning the rules of discipline; not getting the assembly of monks
to select or ratify the site of residence. It is also specified that the residence
itself should be of a type which causes no harm to creatures and has
a surrounding walk (for meditation and also, I may say, for separating
spatially and symbolically the habitation of the monk from that of the
layman). A final injunction is against a monk corrupting families by giving
them gifts and thereby living on intimate terms with people of a village
or town, a relationship which would attack the basis of monastic life.

(C) The third level of offences in the hierarchy—requiring expiation
with forfeiture of the possessions in question—focuses on two themes
which may be described as firm rejection of the way of life and occupations
of the householder, and a careful enumeration of the improper ways of
accepting and soliciting gifts from laymen, ways which in turn manifest
the sin of avaricious acquisition and accumulation of possessions. What is
noteworthy about these precepts is their manifestation of the double
relation that on the one hand the monk's way of life is a rejection of the
layman's, and on the other, that indeed a monk is in an elaborate relation
of gift-acceptance from the layman.

The monk should not solicit robes from a layman except under certain
stipulated conditions; he should not accept robes in excess of his needs;
without being invited to do so, he should not instruct the giver how the
robe should be made or what quality of robe should be purchased on his
behalf.

The injunctions against the handling of money and against directly
engaging in trading transactions are conspicuous. A monk should not
directly accept from a donor the price of a robe, but may direct the donor
to entrust the money to the monk's steward, who is expected to hold it in
trust. A monk should not pick up or cause to be deposited for his personal
use gold or silver.

Furthermore, possessions that suggest a life of luxury or of aesthetic
pleasure are denied a monk: items listed are silk rugs, felt rugs of black
wool (the latter should be disfigured by adding other colours), etc. The
possession and eating of rich foods (such as ghee, butter, honey, molasses)
outside of specified circumstances (usually relating to sickness) is also
punished by expiation and forfeiture. Other, less serious venal offences,
such as using a bed or chair upholstered with cotton, and asking for and
eating rich foods, call only for expiation.

(D) The rules at the next level are the largest in number, ranging
over many spheres, and together make up the cluster of attributes that
ordinarily characterize a monk. Infringement of these rules requires only
simple expiation (through confession and absolution). The behavioural
areas are distinguishable as follows.

Sexual improprieties: these improprieties relate to conduct that may
give a second or third party the impression of immorality, or may lead
the monk to the actual commission of an offence. Thus a monk must not
be found seated alone with a woman; he must not intrude upon and sit
in the bedroom of a man and his wife if one or the other objects; he must
not sleep under the same roof with a woman (even if they are physically in
different places). Rules regarding proper behaviour with a bhikkhuni are
listed: a monk should not give a robe to a bhikkhuni who is not related
(except as an exchange); he should not `exhort' bhikkhuni without the
permission of other bhikkhus, and never after sundown. He should not
sit with a bhikkhuni or go on a journey with her (or any other woman) by
appointment.

Separation from the layman and his way of life: A monk may not sleep
more than two or three nights in the company of a layman. He should
not dig the earth, or cause it to be dug, nor should he damage plants.
This injunction virtually rules out the monk's engaging in agricultural
work.

Perhaps even more telling is that a monk may not rehearse the Dhamma
word by word (with text and commentary) with one who has not been
admitted to the Order. The discrimination against a woman—presumably
on the grounds of her inferior chances of salvation and her dangerous
sexual attributes—goes one step further. A woman may not be taught
more than five or six sentences of the Dhamma without an intelligent
man being present. Furthermore, a monk may not make the claim to
a layman that he has attained a `superior human state'.

Behaviour towards fellow monks: expiation is required if a monk hits
another monk, makes a threatening gesture towards him, provokes him,
eavesdrops when other monks are disputing, etc. A monk is urged to
put away furniture after use, not to deny a fellow monk room to sleep,
and to desist from other acts which might endanger the physical safety
of his brethren. Other offences against the Order are fully admitting a
person under twenty years of age to the Order when his age is known, and
disparaging the training precepts and the law that the Buddha taught.

Food: restraint in the consumption of food is much elaborated upon.
The well-known rule is that the monk should not consume food between
noon and the following morning. Other rules specify that a bhikkhu (unless

sick) may not eat more than one meal at a place of food distribution, should
not receive from lay donors cakes and sweets in excess (which in any
case he should share with other bhikkhus), should neither ask for nor consume
superior foods, etc.

Non-violence: the last major category of rules relates to the theme of
non-violence and ahimsa. It is important that a monk's way of life be
sharply distinguished from activities that lead to the taking of life; this
theme is also strongly emphasized in the Jaina religion and ranks very
high in the brahmanical code. The rules, which form an interconnected
cluster, are: drinking wines and spirits (`maddening', hence conducive
to violence), depriving any living creature of its life, using water with
knowledge that it contains living things. A rejection of the military code
is expressed in the injunction that a monk should not visit an army in
full array without suitable reason; and if he does so with good reason, he
should not visit the battlefield or witness an exercise or parade.

(E) The final set of some seventy-five rules is merely recited in the
form `I shall' and `I shall not'. As a rough classification, these rules
elaborate on the proper demeanour and manners of a monk and the
proper demeanour and respect a layman should show a monk when the
latter is expounding the doctrine to him. Under the former are minute
specifications about the proper manner of wearing the robe, of sitting
and walking, of tranquil body posture, of eating without noise and greed,
of accepting food, etc. The proper etiquette a monk should expect from
a layman is carefully stated. A monk should not expound to a man who
has an umbrella (or stick) in his hand, or wears shoes, or wields a weapon,
or is in a vehicle, or is lying in an easy chair, or has his head covered, or
is sitting while the monk is standing. Some of these disrespectful gestures
do not apply to a sick person.

The reader will have noted that the `227' rules are wide in range,
uneven in the topics they relate to, and that many are concerned with
minute details of conduct. Rather than accounting for this content in
terms of a collection of historically disparate elements brought together
in an accidental or arbitrary manner, it is more revealing to view the rules
as representing those aspects of conduct that have come to be emphasized
and considered important in monastic life. The minute enumerations are
an index of behavioural emphasis and preoccupations.

The hierarchy of emphasis judged in terms of seriousness of offence
may be briefly summarized as follows.

If we exclude the grave social crimes (theft and homicide), the major
emphasis is put on sexual offences and on those that would undermine the
life of a monastic community. The eschewing of sexual activity (the ideal of

celibacy) (brahmacharya) is not only a major requirement for emancipation
from suffering and desire, but is in a sense a prime index of the salvation
quest. Moreover, it is clear that the salvation quest in organized Buddhism
is to be undertaken in a community of fellow monks, the lonely seeker being
exceptional.

Next priority is given to formulating the ethics of taking gifts from laymen
and to vigilance against the temptations of money, wealth and possessions.
The meticulous ethics of receiving gifts is also an indirect statement of
how necessary this material dependence on the layman is if the monk is
to follow his quest.

A lesser category of offences has a wider span, elaborating on the themes
already stated. It deals with minor sexual improprieties, and with restraint
in the acceptance and consumption of food; it emphasizes the separation
of the monk's way of life from that of the layman, both physically and
occupationally; it also emphasizes that the full doctrine cannot be transmitted
to the layman but is a preserve of the monks; and it develops the
theme of non-violence and the abhorrence of military pursuits.

Finally we have the rules of conduct which are simply recited. They
relate to the demeanour of the monk, and to the demeanour of the layman
appropriate for being taught the Law.

From the standpoint of a numerical measurement, we see that the less
serious offences are more numerous in kind than the more serious. This
of course may be true of any hierarchy of offences. But the meticulous
listing of details of behaviour relating to the minor offences is indicative
not only of what most monks are in danger of committing but also of the
kind of outward form of conduct which is taken to symbolize and express
the bhikkhu's special mode of life.

The Patimokkha defines the basis of monastic life and the proper
conduct of a monk. In this sense it is a kind of charter or constitution
(although it does not by itself exhaust the techniques and methods of the
salvation quest). If we accept it as a yardstick in this limited sense, then
it is revealing to make a digression and contrast the Patimokkha with the
charter of one tradition of Christian monastic life, for this contrast will
help to bring out the special features of Buddhist monachism.

It is not to the `desert monks'—the Egyptian and Syrian monks of the
early centuries A.D., who in isolation were concerned with the individual
soul in its interior life—that I wish to refer, but to The Rule of Saint
Benedict which provided the basis for Christian monastic life for some
five hundred years (c. A.D. 650-c. 1150).

The Rule is a relatively short piece of writing. And yet it has liturgical
and penal provisions, formal precepts and practical advice, and legislation

on every department of monastic life, as well as spiritual instruction.
What is of especial interest is the kind of monastic life envisaged by
The Rule, in both its internal structure and its relation to the world at
large. The monastery, which The Rule describes, Its inmates were to serve God and sanctify their souls apart from the life
of the world. No work done within its walls was to be directed to an
end outside them, even should it give material or spiritual relief to
dependants or those in the neighbourhood. The inmates were to be
concerned with three activities: Opus Dei (liturgical service), lectio divina
(spiritual reading), and opus manuum (manual work). The monks would
engage in manual work—domestic activities, farming and crafts, etc.—
although not themselves doing all the necessary manual labour, depending
on coloni to do much of the normal heavy work.

Compared with the statutes of Christian orders, the Vinaya shows
remarkable differences. The Buddha did not consider it important to
provide in monastic life for work, obedience, or worship. And the philosophy
of manual labour as an essential part of monastic life, acting as a defence
against evil thoughts and the temptations of the flesh, was not a part of
the Buddha's thought system, which was concerned with the conquest
of mental defilement, not its displacement. While the Benedictine Rule
and the Patimokkha are similar in their ideals of simplicity, community
of life, silence and spiritual quest, it is the differences that are dramatic.
The Benedictine life entailed the rules of strict obedience to a master
abbot, a completely self-sufficient mode of life with minimal contact
with the laity, as well as the emphasis on manual work which, apart from
its moral effect, would ensure the satisfaction of the material needs of the
monks. In contrast, the Patimokkha is to a large degree concerned with the
regulation of the dealings of monks with the laity on whom they are
materially dependent. And it gives little attention to the machinery of
discipline enforcement within the Sangha.

Placed in its historical context, the Benedictine conception is understandable.
The ancient world with its city life, its seats of culture and
communication facilities, was rapidly disappearing; in the new world
coming into being the estate, village and district were the social units,
and society was becoming an aggregate of cells bound to one another
by the loosest of ties. St Benedict's monastery was a microcosm of this

world, and when later the feudal state emerged in the eleventh century
the Benedictine model decayed, and new monastic orders sprang up to
meet the complexities of the new society.

To return to the Buddhist precepts. There is a gradation from the
227 precepts which apply to the bhikkhu, to the ten, eight and five precepts
which apply with subtle distinctions to novices (samanera) and householders
(gahapati).

The five precepts (pancha sila) are doctrinal prescriptions that apply
to laymen who consider themselves Buddhists. They are abstinence
from the destruction of life, from taking what is not given, from fornication
(also rendered by some as `adultery'), from speaking falsely, from consuming
spiritous, strong and maddening liquors which are the cause
of sloth. Obeyesekere (1968) has commented perceptively on the nature
of these precepts. He rightly points out that the precepts are not worded
as categorical imperatives or commandments in the Biblical sense, that
they lack specificity and precision of formulation, and that because they
are impossible to conform to in the fullest sense, they are capable of
adaptations and interpretations suited to the local context in which
Buddhism exists.

It is readily apparent that there is a spectacular gap between the 227
precepts of the monks, which are formulated positively as a code of conduct,
and the five precepts for the householder formulated as exhortations to
avoid excess. This once again dramatizes the disjunction between the two
modes of life, that whereas the monk is orientated to salvation the layman
is orientated to a better rebirth.

Another point needs to be made, however. From an historical (but not
doctrinal) point of view it can be said that the five precepts are the fundamentals
and the cardinal rules from which many of the more detailed and
specific rules of the Patimokkha have been elaborated. The precept of
sexual restraint is transformed into the state of celibacy (brahmacharya) for
the bhikkhu, minutely elaborated upon. The rule for the layman regarding
the proper acceptance or taking of things gives rise in the case of the
monk to the rules of gift acceptance from the laity and the proscriptions
against avarice, greed and property accumulation. Around prohibition
of the destruction of and injury to living creatures are woven the elaborate
rules of non-violence. False speech is the essential theme of the rules
regulating monastic life and protecting the doctrine. The quantitative
increase in rules at some point changes into the qualitatively different
life of the bhikkhu. Furthermore, these rules are the common basis of
the brahmanical codes and the Jaina religion. The brahmanical pancha
sila differs from the Buddhist only in one respect (if we ignore verbal

nuances): it substitutes `liberality' for the liquor clause (the consumption
of liquor being tabooed anyway); and the Jains substitute for the same
clause the renunciation or devaluation of interest in worldly things
(aparigraha).

With the addition of three specific rather than general avoidances, we
get the eight precepts. The three additional avoidances may be voluntarily
undertaken, by a layman, either permanently or more commonly temporarily
on fortnightly uposatha days or on the four-a-month `sabbath'
(poya in Ceylon, wanphraa or wansil in Thailand) days. These are avoidance
of eating after midday, of witnessing displays of music, song and dance,
and of the use of garlands, scents, unguents.

An additional two—the avoidance of the use of seats or couches above
a prescribed height and of receiving gold or silver—complete the ten
precepts, which again may be voluntarily followed by the layman.

Now these ten precepts which a layman may voluntarily observe are
those obligatorily avowed by the novice (samanera) at his initiation ceremony.
They therefore also form a part of the bhikkhu's way of life for his morality
is inclusive of the lower states. Correspondingly any pious layman who
practises the eight or ten precepts—commonly called upasaka (male),
upasika (female)—is seen as approaching the bhikkhu's or the world renouncer's
way of life. But typically in Buddhist countries like Ceylon,
Burma and Thailand, this pious layman is an old person who is approaching
death and is both socially ready and mentally inclined to remove himself
or herself from the entanglements of society.

The novice is distinctly different from the upasaka. He is initiated, lives
in the monastery, wears robes, and has his head shaved. Typically he is
a youth (minimally eight years old) and can later on become a monk.
He performs some of the functions of the monk—he can administer the
five and eight precepts to a layman[4] and conduct Buddhist rituals and
recite a sermon—as the monk does. He is, while in robes, ruled by the
ten precepts. Any layman is obliged to pay him the same respect in
gesture and language as he does the bhikkhu. At the same time, there is
a distinct gap between monk and novice: a novice is not strictly a member
of the Sangha, and is excluded from the deliberations of the monastic
assembly concerning matters of discipline and government. His inferiority
in the monastery is expressed daily in the fact that he cannot eat in the
circle or group consisting of monks; novices eat separately, even if the
`separation' is only a gap in the line of eaters.

The gradation of precepts gives us a gradation of statuses: monk,
novice, upasaka, and ordinary householder. The statuses separate and
combine in pairs in many ways. But what these statuses and their interrelations
mean in village religion can only be seen in terms of village
ethnography. But before taking that up, as we shall later, we should here
seek another level of understanding by comparing the Buddhist statuses
on the path or stream of salvation with the brahmanical formulations.

The obvious basis for comparison is the Hindu four stages of life:
brahmacharin (celibate student), grahasta (householder), vanaprasta
(hermit existence and retirement from secular life), and finally sannyasin
(world renouncer). A final formulation of the theory in Hinduism is that
these statuses represent stages in a life cycle and that each status is
required and precedes the latter. As I have stated before, the sannyasin
conception is radically opposed to the classical Vedic conception of the
natural progression of the other three statuses, but is capable of neat
incorporation as the final stage. In actuality, the sannyasin stage is not the
culmination for the majority of persons, and the true sannyasin is likely
to reject the world some time before he has actually acquitted the obligations
of a householder and head of a family.

The Buddhist statuses present a different configuration. In a sense
the novice corresponds to the celibate brahmacharin. But from this
threshold he can pass on, at the virile age of twenty, to the superior state
of bhikkhu, the mendicant and goer-forth from home into monastic life,
the incomplete but partial analogue of the sannyasin (the truer Buddhist
counterpart being the hermit monk). The Sangha thus is primarily
composed of celibates in the prime of adult life.

The Buddhist layman in comparison passes from the state of householder
to the analogue of the Hindu vanaprasta in the role of upasaka, and
this is in conformity with a life cycle from youth to old age.

The four Buddhist statuses cannot in theory fit into a single life cycle.
But in fact in Thailand (as in Burma) the statuses, as stations in life, have
been successfully arranged into one cycle, for those who want to follow
it. The manipulation is made possible by the classical Buddhist privilege
that a man in robes may give them up and return to the lower secular
state if he has not found in the doctrine a resting place. As The Questions
of King Milinda put it: there are ten things that cause a man to neglect
the assumption of the yellow robe or tempt him to cast it off: the mother,
the father, the wife, children, poor relations who need to be provided
for, friends, property, desire for wealth or for worldly honour, and the
love of pleasure.

LAY MORALITY FROM A DOCTRINAL POINT OF VIEW

I conclude this chapter with a statement of what can be gleaned from
some of the doctrinal texts as regards the recommended conduct for the
layman. Let me emphasize that the results of this inquiry cannot be
expected to tell us in any complete sense what norms direct the behaviour
of contemporary Thai villagers or how villagers relate these norms to
classical Buddhist values.

It is clear that, as taught by the teachings of the Buddha, salvation is
best attainable by those of the homeless bhikkhu state, and that there is
a gap between the way of the monk and the life of the laity, who can
practise only a lower form of righteousness. The ethic of non-action and
pure contemplation is the ideal way of the monk: `whoever would do
good deeds, should not become a monk'.

The ethic of conduct promulgated by early Buddhism for the ordinary
householder was not elaborate. I have already discussed the five precepts.
Other avoidances and exhortations appear in the texts. Certain trades
were expressly forbidden the upasaka (lay disciple), namely the butcher's
trade, caravan trade, and trade in weapons, poison, alcohol and slaves.
The Sigalovada Suttanta, which Buddhagosa rendered as `The Vinaya
of the Houseman', is supposed to be Buddha's explicit statement on the
whole domestic and social duty of the Buddhist layman. In this homily,
Buddha gives Sigala many admonitions on how to avoid six channels of
dissipating wealth and how to protect the six quarters: parents as the
east, teachers as the south, wife and children as the west, friends and
companions as the north, servants and work people as the nadir, religious
teachers and brahmans as the zenith. Buddha once told another layman
that out of his income he should spend one part for his daily needs,
invest two parts in his business, and save the fourth part for an emergency.

In the Noble Eightfold Path, or the Middle Path, proposed by the
Buddha as leading to the cessation of dukkha (suffering), three categories
comprise ethical conduct (sila)—namely, right speech, right action, and
right livelihood—all of which as far as the layman is concerned are defined
by the avoidances and admonitions stated earlier. To these we may add
exhortations to listen to sermons and temporary asceticism (observance
of eight or ten precepts). But one obligation of the pious layman was
singled out for emphasis and has come to loom large in religious conduct
as defining the concept of dana (generosity)—that is the duty of materially
supporting the homeless holy seekers. The insistence by the Buddha that
the salvation seeker be a homeless wanderer, carrying about him the
minimum material needs, made it incumbent on the laity to fill the begging

bowls with food. Dana came to constitute one of the highest merits
available to the lay disciple. The giving of dana stems naturally from the
story of Buddha himself and his disciples who were invited to meals by
the converted layman. (`And Sonadanda the Brahmin satisfied the Blessed
One, and the brethren, with his own hand, with sweet food, both hard
and soft, until they refused any more'—Sonadanda Sutta (Rhys Davids,
Vol. II, 1899, Ch. 4).) In the homily that Buddha preached to Sigala,
often taken to be his most comprehensive discourse on the duties of a
layman, he is reported to have said: `In five ways should the clansman
minister to recluses and Brahmins as the zenith: by affection in act and
speech and mind; by keeping open house to them, by supplying their
temporal needs.' In due course support of the religion included building
vihares and dagobas, and making gifts of land and other material goods
to the Sangha. Such acts took form as the visible expressions of piety,
inculcated by the monks themselves in their preachings.

The Pali Canon as such has little to say on the beneficial effects of the
practice of dana for the layman. We have to turn to the later non-Canonical
literature to find such discourse. The Questions of King Milinda, which is
an early document (Rhys Davids 1963, Part II), began to formulate
a doctrine which was later elaborated on in writings for the edification
of the laity. For instance, the Forty-Ninth Dilemma poses the question
of gifts to the Buddha. On the one hand, the Buddha refused to `chaunt
for wage' (`Gifts chaunted for in sacred hymns/Are gifts I must not
take...'), but on the other hand, when preaching the truth, he was in the
habit of beginning with the so-called `preliminary discourse', in which
giving took first place and goodness only the second. To this contradiction
Nagasena answered that it was the custom of all the Tathagatas to begin
with a discourse on alms-giving in order to make the hearts of hearers
inclined to the sermon, and then afterwards to urge them to righteousness.
`The supporters of the faith, O king, the lordly givers, have their hearts
thus softened, made tender affected. Thereby do they cross over to the
further shore of the ocean of transmigration by the aid of the boat of
their gifts, by the support of the cause-way of their gifts.'

The Forty-First Dilemma poses the question of why houses should
be built for the homeless ones and why this act should be recommended
as meritorious. Besides pointing out the advantage of dwelling places to
monks, Nagasena pronounced that those who make such donations `shall
be delivered from rebirth, old age and death'.

I have elsewhere (Tambiah 1963) referred to Sinhalese literature extolling
the benefits of good deeds to the Sangha. I shall here mention one example
because it aptly describes the orientations and aspirations of Thai villagers,

especially those hopes associated with Maitreya, the coming Buddha. The
example is taken from the Pujavaliya (The History of Offerings), which was
written in the thirteenth century. It gives an account of all the offerings
which the Master received as a bodhisattva. A most explicit exhortation
to an ethic of deeds is contained in the dialogue between Buddha and his
chief disciple, Sariputta, given in the Anagathavansa Desana. Sariputta
beseeches the Buddha to tell him when the next Buddha, Maitreya,
will be born and what his nature will be. The Buddha sets out in detail
who will and who will not see the holy one: among those who are to be
rewarded with chakravarti pleasures and sight of Maitreya are those who
build monasteries, vihares, preaching halls, resting places, plant bo trees,
and minister to the needs of the priesthood by donating food, clothes,
fans and incense. `In short if one flower, one lamp or one spoonful of
rice is given on behalf of the three ratnas (triple gem) and if appropriate
pratana (wish) is made, that person, O! Sariputta, will see Maitri Buddha
and escape from samsara (cycle of rebirths).'

In Thailand, as in Ceylon, the possibility of attaining these earthly
ideals is expressed in the lay donor's uttered wish which accompanies
the gift, and the monks' `statement of merit' (pinvakya in Sinhalese)
recited after acceptance. A Sinhalese pinvakya is worth quoting here, for
it interjects between now and the final birth many lives of earthly and
heavenly splendour, to be climaxed at the very end, in the distant future,
by final extinction and the appearance of the saviour Maitreya.

A question posed by those who take as their point of departure the
classical doctrine is whether the Buddha's admonitions to the layman
constituted a systematic positive code of conduct for everyday life. Max
Weber, for instance, came to the conclusion that the lay morality propounded
by Buddhism `bore the character of an extremely colourless
"bourgeois" ethic'. This conclusion was presumably derived from early
Buddhism's alleged lack of direct concern with the social order, and the

paucity of its precepts and their formulation in terms of rather vague
exhortations to avoidance of certain excesses. Hence the content that
poured into them can be varied and fluid, depending on the social environment
in which Buddhism takes root.

This method of argument can be pursued as well from the standpoint of
comparative religion. Thus it can be said that medieval Christianity
formulated a methodical lay morality for an organic society (which took
a stratified social order for granted) in terms of a status relativism which
enabled different persons in the social order to follow different prescribed
paths to salvation, and integrated these ethical endeavours with the
imperatives of the social order. Mature Hinduism wrought a similar
design: paralleling the caste system, which in itself was a religious design,
was the idea of different paths to salvation—the way of ritual, the way of
bhakti (adoration), the way of yoga (mental discipline), etc. It is said that
Buddhism contains no such complex conception of status relativism linked
with the social order, and instead holds a different kind of prospect: each
person, whatever his present station in life, can through a succession of
future lives rise up and enter the path of salvation. In the end salvation is
possible for all, and is not tied to the moral consequences of one single
finite life as in the Christian conception. Hinduism by comparison, while
firmly grounded in the theory of ethical causation (karma) and cycle of
rebirths (samsara), translated present existence into an ethic of caste-bound
morality through the concept of dharma (morality). In Buddhism the
only firm structuring is the distinction between the monk's superior
mode of life and the layman's inferior path; the elaborations concern the
former while the latter is an ill-mapped thoroughfare.

A continuation of this mode of analysis—the deriving of deductive
inferences from doctrinal tenets—can lead to further propositions. Thus
Max Weber has argued that although early Buddhism did evolve some
kind of secondary morality for the laity `it in no way satisfied the specifically
religious need for emotional experience of the superworldly and for
emotional aid in external and internal distress. Such unsatisfied emotional
needs were and are always decisive for the psychological character of all
soteriologies of intellectuals.' Hocart, in a different context, argued that
Buddhism, being essentially philosophical and rationalistic, provided no
consolation for or relief from the mundane distresses and crises of life;
and that under such conditions cults, dealing with the powers of darkness,
and a corresponding priesthood, dealing with death and decay, must
develop. `If one section (excellent castes) may not concern itself with
the inauspicious ritual of death for fear of contaminating the auspicious
ritual of life, then some other section must handle death and decay, for

these are inexorable facts which must be dealt with' (Hocart 1950, p. 19).
This deductive logic escalates further to postulate that since the lower
ethic fashioned for the laity was not integrated with a salvation goal, lay
religion would not later on take the course of innerworldly puritanical
asceticism but that of a ritualistic `idolatrous' religion.[5] In the light of
these considerations regarding the nature of pristine Buddhism on the
one hand, and the religious needs of the masses on the other, it has been
argued that the cult of magic and of saviours will develop.

The foregoing paragraphs indicate well the limiting and restrictive
nature—and sometimes the excessive character—of deductions from a
certain kind of premise. It is not so much that such deductions are wrong
but that they tell us very little about the structure and texture of a people's
religious system. From the fact that doctrinal Buddhism did not contain
an elaborate ethical code for the layman it is erroneous to postulate that
this is a permanent feature of any contemporary people without first
investigating their pattern of life in terms of their own formulations.
Secondly, to argue that because pristine Buddhism was of a certain sort,
certain other religious cults would grow up to fill in the vacuum of its
deficiencies is not only to work with a dubious historical hypothesis but
indeed to misunderstand the complex nature of religious systems in
general. Between the pseudo-historical argument that magical animism
develops among the masses (who are `idolatrous' anyway!) in order to
complement the one-sidedness of Buddhism, and the structural logic which
postulates that any religious system as a totality is necessarily arranged
in terms of oppositions, complementarities, dialectical tensions and
hierarchical positions, I prefer the latter, because it is less prejudicial
to the discovery and understanding of the ethnographic facts. It is not
the above-mentioned Weberian deductions on which I shall rely when
later on I unfurl the rich embroidery of Thai religion.