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THE `RUPA LOKA' AND `ARUPA LOKA' (`BRAHMA LOKA')
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THE `RUPA LOKA' AND `ARUPA LOKA' (`BRAHMA LOKA')

Whereas the six lower deva heavens belong to the domain of form and
sensation (kama loka), there are twenty other, higher heavens.

The next level upwards is that of the rupa loka, consisting of sixteen
heavens where there is form but no sensual enjoyment. Beyond them
are the four arupa heavens with no form at all. These last are of minimal
significance in village myth and ritual.

This brief outline of classical Buddhist mythology contains a number
of significant ideas that are essential to the understanding of Buddhism


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as a religion that is not only thought but also lived. One vital conception
is that all the orders of being described are fundamentally homogeneous
or of one kind. There are six forms of existence—god, demon, man,
animal, ghost, soul in hell—whose distinctions are only of temporary
duration and through which all human beings (except those who have
entered the path leading to salvation) may at one time or other pass. The
god may be reborn as demon and an animal as man, etc.; a change of
condition is a realistic possibility depending on one's karma and ethical
status. At any one point of time, the stratification is a statement of a
gradient of pure bliss and tranquillity enjoyed by the gods to black torment
suffered by those in hell. The gods, especially those in the six lower heavens,
exist in subtle corporeal forms. Although they are not omnipotent, they
are capable of beneficial acts towards human beings. They, too, are
subject to the universal law of dissolution and rebirth. They appear in
the cosmology mainly as protectors of the faith, ready to help believers or
to testify to the true doctrine. In turn, the other orders of existence can
descend or go upwards. The ghosts and demons are not perpetually
condemned; they may harm men but they are also subject to the law of
rebirth and can change their status for the better.

This is essential for grasping the Buddhist notions of `this world' and
the `other world', laukika and lokottara. All the levels and forms of
existence so far described belong to `this world': the heavens, the earth,
and the hells; gods, men, beasts, and demons. Canonical Buddhism's
conception of `otherworldliness' is nirvana, the salvation of extinction
from rebirth and existence. Otherworldliness does not simply mean
concerns which transcend the present existence, or rebirth, or existence
in the heavens of devas, but a liberation from sentient existence. Lokottara
means `hypercosmical'. I emphasize the point because some anthropologists
have mistakenly assimilated `rebirth' and the `next' life to the
notion of `otherworldliness'.

A second fundamental idea embodied in this cosmological scheme is
that, in the dynamic hierarchy of sentient existence, it is man in his
human condition living on this earth who is the fundamental acting
agent. It is said that in order to attain nirvana any order of being, even
a god, must be born of a woman in a human status in his last life. Central
to the Buddhist doctrine is that to be born as a human being is a privilege
because it offers the only opportunity for betterment and final liberation
through one's decisive effort. It is in a human status that new karma and
increment to it can be made. A god can merely enjoy the fruits of previous
karma and must be born a human to ascend higher.

A transformation of this relation is expressed again in respect of a


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layman (i.e., one who is not a monk) reaching nirvana. While normally it
is a monk alone who may reach the final state, should a layman be on the
threshold of nirvana he should either become a monk or immediately
pass into the state of death (parinibbana). Thus the whole cosmological
system focuses on man as the moral agent, and it holds the possibility
of a complementary relation between man and god on the one side, and
between man and the dark agents on the other. Man can transfer the
fruits of his merit to them; in turn, he can be affected for good or evil
by them. The way is thus open in ritual action for manipulating the
categories and achieving a change of moral state.

While the total cosmological scheme is integrated in this manner, the
scheme also contains a tension or inconsistency or opposition of ideas.
This tension derives basically from the philosophical and doctrinal formulations
and can be simply put thus: if the doctrine of karma gives an
explanation of present suffering and squarely puts the burden of release
on individual effort, then the doctrine that supernatural agents can cause
or relieve suffering and that relief can come through propitiating them
contradicts the karma postulate. Some writers (e.g. Spiro 1967 concerning
Burma) see this tension as a basic inconsistency between Buddhism and
supernaturalism (or animism). While I recognize that this categorical
opposition is present in Thailand, I see it as one which operates within
a total field that expresses other relations as well of complementarity and
hierarchical ordering between Buddhism and the spirit cults. To emphasize
one aspect at the cost of others seems to me to be a partial analysis; to
go further and assert that there are, in fact, two contradictory religions
in uneasy co-existence appears to me to be a misunderstanding.

While we must await the presentation of the Thai data in later chapters
to see that another way of looking at the religious system is possible,
I should like to make a point regarding analytical orientation which
may have a bearing on the question.

Some analysts may take as their point of reference the postulates of
doctrinal Buddhism as the essence and reality of Buddhism, and therefore
also the base line for studying popular Buddhism. This orientation dictates
its methodology and shapes the final conclusions, for the analyst accordingly
seeks to see how `non-doctrinal' facts are adapted, modified and rationalized
in relation to the `doctrinal' ideas. The question is thus prejudged.
Another method is possible and it is more open. While being mindful
of the doctrinal and mythological heritage, we can pay attention to the
total array of religious ideas and rituals as they present themselves and
see the internal relations and distinctions in this total field. The doctrinal
approach is especially mischievous if, as in Spiro's study of Burmese


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supernaturalism, the Buddhism contrasted with the nat cults and exorcism
rituals (which are analysed in detail) is not that of the ideas and activities
of the village Buddhist temple and its monks or the rituals performed by
monks (which are conspicuous by their virtual absence in his book), but
a set of tenets drawn almost exclusively from doctrine stated in the Canonical
texts. Furthermore, it is not at all clear whether the alleged inconsistency
of the two religions is a product of the anthropologist's own understanding
of what true Buddhism really is, or is an irresolvable incompatibility
reflected in the ideas and actions of the actors themselves. The Burmese
evidence is unclear; at best it would appear that sophisticated Burmese
are at one level aware of a contradiction, but it is startling to read that
`None of the villagers, however, showed any awareness of the basic
inconsistency...' (Spiro 1967, p. 46). However, one should not throw
out the baby with the bath water. Distinctions, oppositions, complementarities,
linkages and hierarchy do exist in the arrangement of ideas, ritual
idiom, techniques and roles of the practitioners, and the behaviour of
villagers according to context and situation; an exploration of these is
a major task of this book. The anthropologist must find a new way of
relating the past to the present, classical dogma to present ideas.