University of Virginia Library

Chapter XVII

GUARDING AGAINST THE INTERIOR[1]

The difficulty of the lord of men lies in his confidence in
men. Confiding in men, he is restrained by men.

Ministers, in relation to the ruler, have no kinship, but,
solely because constrained by force of circumstances, serve
him. Therefore, those who minister to a ruler, always
watch the mental condition of their master without stopping
even for a moment; whereas the lord of men remains idle
and arrogant over them. This is the reason why the world
sees cases of ruler-molestation and regicide.

If the lord of men has much confidence in his son, then
wicked ministers will utilize his son to accomplish their
selfish purposes. For illustration, Li Tai, while assisting
the King of Chao, starved the Father Sovereign.

If the lord of men has much confidence in his spouse,
then wicked ministers will utilize his spouse to accomplish
their selfish purposes. For illustration, Actor Shih, while
assisting Princess Li,[2] murdered Shên-shêng[3] and placed
Hsi-ch`i[4] in his stead.[5]

Indeed, even the spouse who is so near and the son who
is so dear to the sovereign are not trustworthy, much less
can anybody else be trustworthy.

Besides, whether he be a ruler of ten thousand chariots
or a ruler of one thousand chariots, the queen, the concubine,
or the crown prince, even though he be the legitimate son,
might hope for his early death.

How do I know it is so? Indeed, man and wife, having
no kinship between them, are intimate when mutually in
love and distant when not in love. Hence the saying: "If
the mother is loved, the son is held in the arms." If so,
the contrary must run like this: "If the mother is unloved,
the son is cast aside." Men fifty years old are as fond of
women as usual, but women only thirty years old are falling
off in beauty. If women falling off in beauty have to serve
men still fond of the fair sex, then they will be neglected[6]
and their sons will doubt if they will remain heirs of their
fathers. This is the reason why queens, princesses, and
concubines crave the death of the rulers.

It is only when the mother is the queen dowager and the
son is the sovereign that decrees never fail to prevail and
prohibitions never fail to function. Then she finds as much
pleasure between man and woman as at the time when the
late ruler was still alive, and under no suspicion can she
have all the powers of the ruler of ten thousand chariots to
herself. For such a reason, poisoning with wine and hanging
in secret are practised.

Hence it is said in T`ao-wu's[7] Spring and Autumn Annals:
"Of the lords of men, those who died of illness were not

even half of those that died." If the ruler is ignorant of
such a danger, seeds of disorder will multiply. Hence the
saying: "If those who will profit by the ruler's death are
numerous, then the lord of men is in danger."

Thus, Wang Liang liked horses, and Kou-chien, King of
Yüeh, liked able-bodied men, merely for driving and fighting
purposes. The physician sucks patients' cuts and holds
their blood in his mouth, not because he is intimate with
them like a blood relation, but because he expects profits
from them. Likewise, when the cartwright finishes making
carriages, he wants people to be rich and noble; when the
carpenter finishes making coffins, he wants people to die
early. Not that the cartwright is benevolent and the carpenter
is cruel, but that unless people are noble, the carriages will
not sell, and unless people die, the coffins will not be bought.
Thus, the carpenter's motive is not a hatred for anybody
but his profits are due to people's death. For the same
reason, when the clique of the queen, the princess, the
concubine, or the crown prince, is formed, they want the
ruler to die early. For, unless the ruler die, their positions
will not be powerful. Their motive is not a hatred for the
ruler, but their profits are dependent on the ruler's death.
Therefore the lord of men must specially mind those who
will profit by his death.

For illustration, though the sun and the moon are
surrounded by haloes, the causes of their eclipses are inside
themselves. Similarly, though the ruler guards against what
he hates, the causes of his calamity consist in what he loves.

For this reason, the intelligent sovereign[8] would neither

carry out any untenable task,[9] nor eat any inordinate food,
but would listen from all round and observe everybody
closely in order thereby to scrutinize the faults of the interior
and the exterior,[10] and reflect on pros and cons so as to know
the line of demarcation between different factions, compare
the results of testimony, and thereby hold every utterance
responsible for an equivalent fact, hold the consequent in
correspondence with the antecedent, govern the masses in
accordance with the law, and gather causes of different
affairs for comparison and observation; so that nobody
shall receive any undue reward and overstep the limits of his
duties, and that every murderer shall be sentenced to proper
penalty and no convict shall be pardoned. If so, there will
be left no room for wicked and villainous persons to
accomplish their self-seeking purposes.

If compulsory labour service is frequent, the people will
feel afflicted; if the people are afflicted, powerful and
influential men will appear to the fore; if powerful and
influential men make their appearance, exemptions will
multiply; and if exemptions multiply, the nobles will, by
accepting bribes from the people exempted from labour
service, become wealthy. To afflict the people and thereby
enrich the nobles and to vacate the august position and let
ministers utilize it, is not a permanent advantage to the
world. Hence the saying: "If compulsory labour service
is rare, the people will feel safe; if the people are safe, the
ministers will gain no extra power; if the ministers have

no extra power, powerful and influential men will be
extinguished; and if powerful and influential men disappear,
all credit will be due to the sovereign."

Now, take for illustration the truism that water overpowers
fire. Yet, when a tripod-kettle goes between them,
then the water will be heated and boiled till it dries up over
the fire while the fire can flame with vigour and continue
burning beneath the water. Indeed, the fact that government
forbids wickedness is still clearer than this. Yet, when
ministers who ought to uphold the law play the part of the
tripod-kettle by standing between ruler and subject, then
the law, however clear in the sovereign's mind, has already
lost its reason to forbid wickedness.

According to the sayings handed down from remote
antiquity, as recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals,
whoever violates the law, launches an insurrection, and
thereby commits high treason, comes from among the high
and noble ministers. Yet what laws and orders guard against
and penalties censure is always among the low and humble.
That being so, the people give up all hope of salvation and
find nobody to petition for relief. The chief vassals form
juntas, obscure the ruler en bloc, and maintain their intimate
relationship in secret but pretend in the open to mutual
hatred in order to prove their unselfishness, and work as
the ears and eyes of one another in order to watch for the
sovereign's unguarded moments. Thus, surrounded and
deluded, the lord of men has no way to get news from
outside and retains the sovereign's title but not the reality
while ministers have all laws to themselves and carry them
into effect at their discretion. Of such a ruler the Sons of
Heaven of Chou were good examples. In short, if the power

and influence of the Throne is deputed to any minister in
particular, high and low will displace their posts; which
amounts to saying that no minister should be allowed to
utilize the power and influence of the ruler.[11]